In light of the ongoing validity crisis in psychiatric classification, phenomenologically oriented psychiatric study has gained traction. This paper assesses two modes of investigation proposed by phenomenologists in studying mental disorders: the ideal type approach and the essential type approach. Despite the recent suggestion that they are antithetical approaches, I argue that they should constantly constrain and inform each other. In short, I advance a mutual complementarity thesis. Having established this thesis, I conclude by demonstrating how this (...) proposal can function as an heuristic strategy for effectively facilitating the recently proposed psychiatric research initiative, i.e. the ontological project of phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

Types are fundamental for conceptual modeling and knowledge representation, being an essential construct in all major modeling languages in these fields. Despite that, from an ontological and cognitive point of view, there has been a lack of theoretical support for precisely defining a consensual view on types. As a consequence, there has been a lack of precise methodological support for users when choosing the best way to model general terms representing types that appear in a domain, and for building (...) sound taxonomic structures involving them. For over a decade now, a community of researchers has contributed to the development of the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) - aimed at providing foundations for all major conceptual modeling constructs. At the core of this enterprise, there has been a theory of types specially designed to address these issues. This theory is ontologically well- founded, psychologically informed, and formally characterized. These results have led to the development of a Conceptual Modelling language dubbed OntoUML, reflecting the ontological micro-theories comprising UFO. Over the years, UFO and OntoUML have been successfully employed on conceptual model design in a variety of domains including academic, industrial, and governmental settings. These experiences exposed improvement opportunities for both the OntoUML language and its underlying theory, UFO. In this paper, we revise the theory of types in UFO in response to empirical evidence. The new version of this theory shows that many of OntoUML’s meta-types (e.g. kind, role, phase, mixin) should be considered not as restricted to substantial types but instead should be applied to model endurant types in general, including relator types, quality types, and mode types. We also contribute with a formal characterization of this fragment of the theory, which is then used to advance a new metamodel for OntoUML (termed OntoUML 2). To demonstrate that the benefits of this approach are extended beyond OntoUML, the proposed formal theory is then employed to support the definition of UFO-based lightweight Semantic Web ontologies with ontological constraint checking in OWL. Additionally, we report on empirical evidence from the literature, mainly from cognitive psychology but also from linguistics, supporting some of the key claims made by this theory. Finally, we propose a computational support for this updated metamodel. (shrink)

_Psychological Types_ is one of Jung's most important and most famous works. First published by Routledge in the early 1920s it appeared after Jung's so-called fallow period, during which he published little, and it is perhaps the first significant book to appear after his own confrontation with the unconscious. It is the book that introduced the world to the terms 'extravert' and 'introvert'. Though very much associated with the unconscious, in _Psychological Types_ Jung shows himself to be a supreme theorist (...) of the conscious. In putting forward his system of psychological types Jung provides a means for understanding ourselves and the world around us: our different patterns of behaviour, our relationships, marriage, national and international conflict, organizational functioning. Appearing in paperback for the first time this central volume from Jung's Collected Works will be essential to anyone requiring a proper understanding of Jung's psychology. (shrink)

The replication crisis has caused researchers to distinguish between exact replications, which duplicate all aspects of a study that could potentially affect the results, and direct replications, which duplicate only those aspects of the study that are thought to be theoretically essential to reproduce the original effect. The replication crisis has also prompted researchers to think more carefully about the possibility of making Type I errors when rejecting null hypotheses. In this context, the present article considers the utility (...) of two types of Type I error probability: the Neyman–Pearson long run Type I error rate and the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability. It is argued that the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate is inapplicable in social science because it refers to a long run of exact replications, and social science deals with irreversible units that make exact replications impossible. Instead, the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability is recommended as a more meaningful way to conceptualize false positive results in social science because it can be applied to each sample-specific decision about rejecting the same substantive null hypothesis in a series of direct replications. It is concluded that the replication crisis may be partly due to researchers’ unrealistic expectations about replicability based on their consideration of the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate across a long run of exact replications. (shrink)

Type theory is a fast-evolving field at the crossroads of logic, computer science and mathematics. This gentle step-by-step introduction is ideal for graduate students and researchers who need to understand the ins and outs of the mathematical machinery, the role of logical rules therein, the essential contribution of definitions and the decisive nature of well-structured proofs. The authors begin with untyped lambda calculus and proceed to several fundamental type systems culminating in the well-known and powerful Calculus of (...) Constructions. The book also covers the essence of proof checking and proof development, and the use of dependent type theory to formalize mathematics. The only prerequisites are a good knowledge of undergraduate algebra and analysis. Carefully chosen examples illustrate the theory throughout. Each chapter ends with a summary of the content, some historical context, suggestions for further reading and a selection of exercises to help readers familiarize themselves with the material. (shrink)

Anscombe famously said that there are some act types that can only be done intentionally. We defend this claim: some act types are essentially intentional. We argue that Ving intentionally is itself essentially intentional: it is not possible to be non-intentionally Ving intentionally. And we show how this explains why various other act types—such as trying, lying, and thanking—are essentially intentional. Finally, building on Piñeros Glassock (2020) and Beddor & Pavese (2022), we explain how this makes trouble for the thesis (...) that if I am Ving intentionally, I know that I am Ving. (shrink)

_Psychological Types_ is one of Jung's most important and most famous works. First published by Routledge in the early 1920s it appeared after Jung's so-called fallow period, during which he published little, and it is perhaps the first significant book to appear after his own confrontation with the unconscious. It is the book that introduced the world to the terms 'extravert' and 'introvert'. Though very much associated with the unconscious, in _Psychological Types_ Jung shows himself to be a supreme theorist (...) of the conscious. In putting forward his system of psychological types Jung provides a means for understanding ourselves and the world around us: our different patterns of behaviour, our relationships, marriage, national and international conflict, organizational functioning. Appearing in paperback for the first time this central volume from Jung's Collected Works will be essential to anyone requiring a proper understanding of Jung's psychology. (shrink)

Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) propose that the use of a chemical restraint that affects only a particular conscious state is ethically permissible if, and only if, (1) it is the least restrictive...

The Essential Berkeley and Neo-Berkeley is an introduction to the life and work of one of the most significant thinkers in the history of philosophy and a penetrating philosophical assessment of his lasting legacy. David Berman goes beyond providing an introduction and gives us a broader and deeper appreciation of Berkeley as a philosopher. He argues for Berkeley's work as a philosophical system with coherence and important key themes hitherto unexplored and provides an analysis of why he thinks Berkeley's (...) work has had such lasting significance. With a particular focus on Berkeley's dualist thinking and theories of 'mental types', Berman provides the reader with a key to unlocking the significance of this work. This introductory text will provide an insight into Berkeley's full body of work, the distinctiveness of his thinking and how deeply relevant this key thinker is to contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 (...) blindsight differs from ordinary visual experience in lacking the particularity, transparency and fine-grainedness often taken to be essential to visual experience, at least in veridical cases. I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight provides a counterexample to the view that these characteristics are essential to veridical visual experience and that this gives us reason to resist the view that visual experience is essentially a perceptual relation to external objects. In the second part of the paper I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight yields important insights into the effects of attentional modulation on perceptual content and that cases of attentional modulation of appearance are not at odds with the view that the phenomenology of visual experience flows from its content. (shrink)

The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding (...) missing reasons, for deductive arguments, e.g., semantic tableaux are suggested. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalism views epistemic norms and epistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions like epistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or means-end normativity, norms, and rationality. I do two main things in this paper. In part 1, I argue that there is an under-appreciated distinction between two independent types of epistemic instrumentalism. These are instrumentalism about epistemic norms and instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. In part 2, I argue that this (...) under-appreciated distinction matters for the debate surrounding the plausibility of EI. Specifically, whether we interpret EI as norm-EI or as source-EI matters for the widely discussed universality or categoricity objection to EI, and for two important motivations for adopting EI, namely naturalism and the practical utility of epistemic norms. I will then conclude by drawing some lessons for epistemic instrumentalism going forward. (shrink)

Dicotyledons are polarly organised in several ways. In plant morphology polarity, a principle allowing comparison of different plant structures has until yet not been studied. A division** of the vegetative plant in shoot and root as polar structures leads to the distinction of four instead of three basic organs: leaf, shoot axis, root axis and root cap together with the root hairs. The flower is also polarly organised, its poles are formed by the carpels and the stamens. The foliage leaves (...) are also polarly organised which is reflected by the morphological relationship of foliage leaf, stamen and carpel. The stamen uses the hypophyll*** as base of construction and the carpel uses the epiphyll**** as base of construction. Hypophyll and epiphyll are the two poles of the foliage leaf. Root and shoot, the polar entities of the vegetative plant and stamen and carpel, the polar entities of the generative plant, are morphologically correlated. Stamen and carpel can be understood as a combination of the basic organs of vegetative and generative parts of the plant. The basic organs of the generative plant are pollen grain and embryo sack with their gametophytes. The quantitative comparison of variable proportions is supplemented by a qualitative comparison of polarities. The result is, that the organisation type of the dicotyledons can yet be understood as constituted of morphological related parts.* in german Grundorgane. (shrink)

According to structuralism, all natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures. According to quidditism, at least some natural properties are individuated in some other way. Because these theses deal with the identities of natural properties, this distinction cuts to the core of a serious metaphysical dispute: Are the intrinsic natures of all natural properties essentially causal/nomological in character? I'll argue that the answer is ‘no’, or at least that this answer is more plausible than many critics of (...) quidditism have recognized. In section 1, I distinguish between two versions of quidditism. Bare quidditism holds that worlds with distinct properties and isomorphic structures must be qualitatively identical in the following sense: inhabiting one world would be indistinguishable from inhabiting the other. In contrast, qualitative quidditism allows such worlds to have qualitative differences. In section 2, I discuss an epistemological position that allows us to bett... (shrink)

The existence of different types of semiosis has been recognized, so far, in two ways. It has been pointed out that different semiotic features exist in different taxa and this has led to the distinction between zoosemiosis, phytosemiosis, mycosemiosis, bacterial semiosis and the like. Another type of diversity is due to the existence of different types of signs and has led to the distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic semiosis. In all these cases, however, semiosis has been defined by (...) the Peirce model, i.e., by the idea that the basic structure is a triad of ‘sign, object and interpretant’, and that interpretation is an essential component of semiosis. This model is undoubtedly applicable to animals, since it was precisely the discovery that animals are capable of interpretation that allowed Thomas Sebeok to conclude that they are also capable of semiosis. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear how far the Peirce model can be extended beyond the animal kingdom, and we already know that we cannot apply it to the cell. The rules of the genetic code have been virtually the same in all living systems and in all environments ever since the origin of life, which clearly shows that they do not depend on interpretation. Luckily, it has been pointed out that semiosis is not necessarily based on interpretation and can be defined exclusively in terms of coding. According to the ‘code model’, a semiotic system is made of signs, meanings and coding rules, all produced by the same codemaker, and in this form it is immediately applicable to the cell. The code model, furthermore, allows us to recognize the existence of many organic codes in living systems, and to divide them into two main types that here are referred to as manufacturing semiosis and signalling semiosis. The genetic code and the splicing codes, for example, take part in processes that actually manufacture biological objects, whereas signal transduction codes and compartment codes organize existing objects into functioning supramolecular structures. The organic codes of single cells appeared in the first three billion years of the history of life and were involved either in manufacturing semiosis or in signalling semiosis. With the origin of animals, however, a third type of semiosis came into being, a type that can be referred to as interpretive semiosis because it became closely involved with interpretation. We realize in this way that the contribution of semiosis to life was far greater than that predicted by the Peirce model, where semiosis is always a means of interpreting the world. Life is essentially about three things: (1) it is about manufacturing objects, (2) it is about organizing objects into functioning systems, and (3) it is about interpreting the world. The idea that these are all semiotic processes, tells us that life depends on semiosis much more deeply and extensively than we thought. We realize in this way that there are three distinct types of semiosis in Nature, and that they gave very different contributions to the origin and the evolution of life. (shrink)

This chapter revisits Thomas Kuhn’s argument about an essential tension between tradition and innovation as a driver of scientific progress. It shows that Kuhn’s argument builds on a number of assumptions about the practices of science that held for past science conducted by individuals working within isolated disciplines, and argues that it does therefore not necessarily hold for the increasingly collaborative and interdisciplinary science we see today. Examining different types of organization into teams, the chapter discusses how changes in (...) the granularity of collaboration affect Kuhn’s essential tension argument. (shrink)

Pure Type Systems, PTSs, introduced as a generalisation of the type systems of Barendregt's lambda-cube, provide a foundation for actual proof assistants, aiming at the mechanic verification of formal proofs. In this paper we consider simplifications of some of the rules of PTSs. This is of independent interest for PTSs as this produces more flexible PTS-like systems, but it will also help, in a later paper, to bridge the gap between PTSs and systems of Illative Combinatory Logic. First (...) we consider a simplification of the start and weakening rules of PTSs, which allows contexts to be sets of statements, and a generalisation of the conversion rule. The resulting Set-modified PTSs or SPTSs, though essentially equivalent to PTSs, are closer to standard logical systems. A simplification of the abstraction rule results inion-modified PTSs or APTSs. These turn out to be equivalent to standard PTSs if and only if a condition holds. Finally we consider SAPTSs which have both modifications. (shrink)

Pure Type Systems, PTSs, introduced as a generalisation of the type systems of Barendregt's lambda-cube, provide a foundation for actual proof assistants, aiming at the mechanic verification of formal proofs. In this paper we consider simplifications of some of the rules of PTSs. This is of independent interest for PTSs as this produces more flexible PTS-like systems, but it will also help, in a later paper, to bridge the gap between PTSs and systems of Illative Combinatory Logic. First (...) we consider a simplification of the start and weakening rules of PTSs, which allows contexts to be sets of statements, and a generalisation of the conversion rule. The resulting Set-modified PTSs or SPTSs, though essentially equivalent to PTSs, are closer to standard logical systems. A simplification of the abstraction rule results in Abstraction-modified PTSs or APTSs. These turn out to be equivalent to standard PTSs if and only if a condition (*) holds. Finally we consider SAPTSs which have both modifications. (shrink)

I defend the conception of musical works as indicated temporally initiated types against Julian Dodd's recent argument that all types are eternal and uncreated. In doing so, I develop a new account of both cultural and natural types. While types are in a certain sense determined by the properties that underlie them, not all properties determine types; and properties such as being indicated by Beethoven exist only once the temporally initiated entities that those properties essentially involve exist. A cultural (...) class='Hi'>type such as Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is a sound pattern that has the essential property of being used in the way specified by Beethoven's singling out of that pattern. (Natural types, such as bird songs or biological species, are patterns having places in actual causal chains in nature.) Given this framework, the Fifth Symphony is an indicated type that was, in a straightforward literal sense, created by Beethoven in 1804–1808. (shrink)

Various questions arise in semantic analysis concerning the nature of types. These questions include whether we need types in a semantic theory, and if so, whether some version of simple type theory (STT, Church 1940) is adequate or whether a richer more flexible theory is required to capture our semantic intuitions. Propositions and propositional attitudes can be represented in an essentially untyped first-order language, provided a sufficiently rich language of terms is adopted. In the absence of rigid typing, care (...) needs to be taken to avoid the paradoxes, for example by constraining what kinds of expressions are to be interpreted as propositions (Turner 1992). But the notion of type is ontologically appealing. In some respects, STT seems overly restrictive for natural language semantics. For this reason it is appropriate to consider a system of types that is more flexible than STT, such as a Curry-style typing (Curry & Feys 1958). Care then has to be taken to avoid the logical paradoxes. Here we show how such an account, based on the Property Theory with Curry Types (PTCT, Fox & Lappin 2005), can be formalised within Typed Predicate Logic (TPL, Turner 2009). This presentation provides a clear distinction between the classes of types that are being used to (i) avoid paradoxes (ii) allow predicative polymorphic types. TPL itself provides a means of expressing PTCT in a uniform language. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the theory of function levels proposed by Frege in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik anticipates the hierarchy of types that underlies Church’s simple theory of types. This claim roughly states that Frege presupposes a type of functions in the sense of simple type theory in the expository language of Grundgesetze. However, this view makes it hard to accommodate function names of two arguments and view functions as incomplete entities. I propose and defend an alternative interpretation (...) of first-level function names in Grundgesetze into simple type-theoretic open terms rather than into closed terms of a function type. This interpretation offers a still unhistorical but more faithful type-theoretic approximation of Frege’s theory of levels and can be naturally extended to accommodate second-level functions. It is made possible by two key observations that Frege’s Roman markers behave essentially like open terms and that Frege lacks a clear criterion for distinguishing between Roman markers and function names. (shrink)

According to John Rawls, self-respect is the most important of the primary goods and is essential for the construction of the just society. Self-respect, however, remains a concept which is inadequately theorised, being closely linked to other concepts such as dignity, shame, pride, autonomy and security. Most usually self-respect is considered to be just the self-reflection of the respect we receive from others. In this paper I argue that self-respect consists of both a self-evaluative and a social reflexive element. (...) Using Darwall’s distinction between two types of respect as a building block, I argue that it is worth considering self-respect as having three dimensions. Broadly these are human recognition, status recognition and appraisal. (shrink)

This paper defends three claims about concrete or physical models: these models remain important in science and engineering, they are often essentially idealized, in a sense to be made precise, and despite these essential idealizations, some of these models may be reliably used for the purpose of causal explanation. This discussion of concrete models is pursued using a detailed case study of some recent models of landslide generated impulse waves. Practitioners show a clear awareness of the idealized character of (...) these models, and yet address these concerns through a number of methods. This paper focuses on experimental arguments that show how certain failures to accurately represent feature X are consistent with accurately representing some causes of feature Y, even when X is causally relevant to Y. To analyse these arguments, the claims generated by a model must be carefully examined and grouped into types. Only some of these types can be endorsed by practitioners, but I argue that these endorsed claims are sufficient for limited forms of causal explanation. (shrink)

This article argues that, strictly speaking, from its inception with the ancient Greeks and for all time, philosophy and science are identical and consist in an essential relationship between a specific type of understanding of the human person as possessed of an intellectual soul capable of being habituated and a psychologically-independent composite whole, or organization. It maintains, further, that absence of either one of the extremes of this essential relationship cannot be philosophy/science and, if mistaken for such (...) and applied to the workings of cultural institutions, will generate anarchy within human culture and make leadership excellence impossible to achieve. Finally, it argues that only a return to this “common sense” understanding of philosophy can generate the leadership excellence that can save the West from its current state of cultural and civilizational anarchy. (shrink)

Transparent intensional logic (TIL) is a well-explored type-theoretical framework for semantics of natural language. However, its treatment of polymorphic functions, which are essential for the analysis of various natural language phenomena, is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we address this issue and propose an extension of TIL that introduces polymorphism via type variables ranging over types and generalized variables ranging over constructions and types. Furthermore, we offer an analysis of sentences involving non-specific notional attitudes of the general (...) form ‘_A_ considers (believes, desires, wants, seeks,...) something’. (shrink)

This volume brings together essential writings by the unjustly neglected nineteenth-century philosopher Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904). A prominent ethicist, feminist, champion of animal welfare, and critic of Darwinism and atheism, Cobbe was well known and highly regarded in the Victorian era. This collection of her work introduces contemporary readers to Cobbe and shows how her thought developed over time, beginning in 1855 with her Essay on Intuitive Morals, in which she set out her duty-based moral theory, arguing that morality (...) and religion are indissolubly connected. This work provided the framework within which she addressed many theoretical and practical issues in her prolific publishing career. In the 1860s and early 1870s, she gave an account of human duties to animals; articulated a duty-based form of feminism; defended a unique type of dualism in the philosophy of mind; and argued against evolutionary ethics. Cobbe put her philosophical views into practice, campaigning for women's rights and for first the regulation and later the abolition of vivisection. In turn her political experiences led her to revise her ethical theory. From the 1870s onwards she increasingly emphasized the moral role of the emotions, especially sympathy, and she theorized a gradual historical progression in sympathy. Moving into the 1880s, Cobbe combatted secularism, agnosticism, and atheism, arguing that religion is necessary not only for morality but also for meaningful life and culture. -/- Shedding light on Cobbe's philosophical perspective and its applications, this volume demonstrates the range, systematicity and philosophical character of her work and makes her core ethical theory and its central applications and developments available for teaching and scholarship. (shrink)

We interpret intuitionistic theories of (iterated) strictly positive inductive definitions (s.p.-ID i′ s) into Martin-Löf's type theory. The main purpose being to obtain lower bounds of the proof-theoretic strength of type theories furnished with means for transfinite induction (W-type, Aczel's set of iterative sets or recursion on (type) universes). Thes.p.-ID i′ s are essentially the wellknownID i -theories, studied in ordinal analysis of fragments of second order arithmetic, but the set variable in the operator form is (...) restricted to occur only strictly positively. The modelling is done by constructivizing continuity notions for set operators at higher number classes and proving that strictly positive set operators are continuous in this sense. The existence of least fixed points, or more accurately, least sets closed under the operator, then easily follows. (shrink)

A key idea in both Frege's development of arithmetic in theGrundlagen[7] and Zermelo's 1904 proof [10] of the well-ordering theorem is that of a “type reducing” correspondence between second-level and first-level entities. In Frege's construction, the correspondence obtains betweenconceptandnumber, in Zermelo's (through the axiom of choice), betweensetandmember. In this paper, a formulation is given and a detailed investigation undertaken of a system ℱ of many-sorted first-order logic (first outlined in the Appendix to [6]) in which this notion of (...) class='Hi'>type reducing correspondence is accorded a central role and which enables Frege's and Zermelo's constructions to be presented in such a way as to reveal their essential similarity. By adapting Bourbaki's version of Zermelo's proof of the well-ordering theorem, we show that, within ℱ, any correspondencecbetween second-level entities (here calledconcepts) and first-level ones (here calledobjects) induces a well-ordering relationW(c) in a canonical manner. We shall see that, whencis the “Fregean” correspondence between concepts and cardinal numbers,W(c) is (the well-ordering of) the ordinalω+ 1, and whencis a “Zermelian” choice function on concepts,W(c) is a well-ordering of the universal concept embracing all objects.In ℱ an important role is played by the notion ofextensionof a concept. To each conceptXwe assume there is assigned an objecte(X) in such a way that, for any conceptsX, Ysatisfying a certain predicateE, we havee(X) =e(Y) iff the same objects fall underXandY. (shrink)

This text is an outgrowth of notes prepared by J. Y. Girard for a course at the University of Paris VII. It deals with the mathematical background of the application to computer science of aspects of logic (namely the correspondence between proposition & types). Combined with the conceptual perspectives of Girard's ideas, this sheds light on both the traditional logic material & its prospective applications to computer science. The book covers a very active & exciting research area, & it will (...) be essential reading for all those working in logic & computer science. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the development of model theory of fuzzy logic in narrow sense. We consider a formal system EvŁ of fuzzy logic that has evaluated syntax, i. e. axioms need not be fully convincing and so, they form a fuzzy set only. Consequently, formulas are provable in some general degree. A generalization of Gödel's completeness theorem does hold in EvŁ. The truth values form an MV-algebra that is either finite or Łukasiewicz algebra on [0, 1].The classical (...) omitting types theorem states that given a formal theory T and a set Σ of formulas with the same free variables, we can construct a model of T which omits Σ, i. e. there is always a formula from Σ not true in it. In this paper, we generalize this theorem for EvŁ, that is, we prove that if T is a fuzzy theory and Σ forms a fuzzy set , then a model omitting Σ also exists. We will prove this theorem for two essential cases of EvŁ: either EvŁ has logical constants for all truth values, or it has these constants for truth values from [0, 1] ∩ ℚ only. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is a comparative analysis of the Lvov-Warsaw School and Frege-Russell's tradition. The Comparison of these is made on the grounds of the analysis of existence. Choosing "existence" as the object of the analysis is very essential. It is so because understanding of the category of existence is strongly connected with the whole system. Thus, while analyzing the category, one can make a reconstruction of the concept scheme ; show their functioning; and compare them to (...) each other. It is easy to notice that in both these systems: a) analyzing is strongly connected with the way of expressing existence in a language, b) the essential problem is to which category existence belongs, c) the main question is whether existence is a predicate. Since the problem of analyzing—especially the problem of applying logic in philosophy—played an essential role both in Frege-Russell's system and Twardowski's school, the author of this paper wants to show how this was understood there. (shrink)

The use of philosophical phenomenology for conceptual debates in psychiatric nosology and psychopathology is beginning to be recognized. In this paper, we extend this trajectory to include Tourette Syndrome, focusing on so-called premonitory urges (PU) preceding Tourettic tics. We clarify some inconsistencies around typology in both phenomenological description and medical classification (i.e., in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, Text Revision, International Classification of Diseases, 10th edition [World Health Organization, 2004], and the scales that elicit PU). (...) We show how a less typological approach might be usefully deployed in the field, that being the dimensional approach developed by Fernandez (2019a; 2019b). We test both the typological and dimensional approaches in relation to the experience and etiological role of PU in Tourette’s syndrome. Based on our synthesis of existing studies and new information garnered through phenomenological interviews (using an approach associated with “micro-phenomenology”), we argue that the role of PU in nosology challenges both the current “operational” criteria favored by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, Text Revision, that are focused on behaviorally observed symptoms, as well as essential and prototypical phenomenological descriptions about a given “type” of experience. (shrink)

Organogenesis and metamorphosis require the intricate orchestration of multiple types of cellular interactions and signaling pathways. Glutamate (Glu) is an excitatory extracellular signaling molecule in the nervous system, while Ca2+ is a major intracellular signaling molecule. The first Glu receptors to be cloned are Ca2+‐permeable receptors in mammalian brains. Although recent studies have focused on Glu signaling in synaptic mechanisms of the mammalian central nervous system, it is unclear how this signaling functions in development. Our recent article demonstrated that Ca2+‐permeable (...) AMPA‐type Glu receptors (GluAs) are essential for formation of a photosensitive organ, development of some neurons, and metamorphosis, including tail absorption and body axis rotation, in ascidian embryos. Based on findings in these embryos and mammalian brains, we formed several hypotheses regarding the evolution of GluAs, the non‐synaptic function of Glu, the origin of GluA‐positive neurons, and the neuronal network that controls metamorphosis in ascidians. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to look at the the syntactic calculus of Bar-Hillel and Lambek, including semantic interpretation, from the point of view of constructive type theory. The syntactic calculus is given a formalization that makes it possible to implement it in a type-theoretical proof editor. Such an implementation combines formal syntax and formal semantics, and makes the type-theoretical tools of automatic and interactive reasoning available in grammar.In the formalization, the use of the dependent types (...) of constructive type theory is essential. Dependent types are already needed in the semantics of ordinary Lambek calculus. But they also suggest some natural extensions of the calculus, which are applied to the treatment of morphosyntactic dependencies and to an analysis of selectional restrictions. Finally, directed dependent function types are introduced, corresponding to the types of constructive type theory. (shrink)

Exploration of INTERSUBJECTIVITY is continued. Different kinds of if are differentiated and signs for its presence and effects are shown. The difference between it, subjectivity and objectivity are explored. Intersubjectivity is crucial and universal for general everyday discourse in all cultures, sub-cultures, institutions, communities and socio-cultural practices such as religion, sport, etc or the so-called Manifest Image. It is essential for specialized areas, for example religion, sport and disciplines such as the humanities, arts, sciences, philosophy and all institutions. It (...) is a necessity for both cultural, social, interpersonal as well as intra-personal existence, emotions, attitudes, values and norms. But, it is not limited to human existence, life-worlds, realities and worlds, but also required for animals and all organisms. Object Oriented Ontology would emphasize that is it not merely something anthropocentric and restricted to human existence and consciousness (and anthropocentric interpretations of and projections on other objects, non-human creatures and all organisms, as well as all objects.. In the case of the latter one would probably replace the notion of intersubjectivity with terms such as energy and other ways of action and interaction for example intra- and inter-atoms.) In the Appendix is included work related to the above by others such as Sellars, Brandom (and his two images, Manifest and Scientific), Davidson, Dennett, Habermas, Nagel, etc. (shrink)

Types now play an essential role in computer science; their ascent originates from Principia Mathematica. Type checking and type inference algorithms are used to prevent semantic errors in programs, and type theories are the native language of several major interactive theorem provers. Some of these trace key features back to Principia.

Type II DNA topoisomerases (Topo II) are essential enzymes implicated in key nuclear processes. The recent discovery of a novel kind of Topo II (DNA topoisomerase VI) in Archaea led to a division of these enzymes into two non‐homologous families, (Topo IIA and Topo IIB) and to the identification of the eukaryotic protein that initiates meiotic recombination, Spo11. In the present report, we have updated the distribution of all Topo II in the three domains of life by a (...) phylogenomic approach. Both families exhibit an atypical distribution by comparison with other informational proteins, with predominance of Topo IIA in Bacteria, Eukarya and viruses, and Topo IIB in Archaea. However, plants and some Archaea contain Topo II from both families. We confront this atypical distribution with current hypotheses on the evolution of the three domains of life and origin of DNA genomes. BioEssays 25:232–242, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This article consists of three parts, two introductory, in which the limits and the methods of analysis of dialogues are expounded, and the major part, in which the main features of a philosophical theory of disputation are outlined.It was an essential aim of the philosophical analysis of argumentative dialogues to develop tools of substantiation for cases in which logic doesn't help any more. In the first part of this paper I show that such tools can and will be developed (...) only by analyzing argumentations (“argumentation” in the sense of a monologue in which arguments for a thesis are brought forward), and that the analysis of argumentative dialogues doesn't contribute anything to the development of such tools.The systematically first task of the philosophical analysis of dialogues consists in understanding the general practical aims of philosophically interesting types of dialogue. Only subsequently the rules of the dialogue can be reconstructed as good means for reaching these aims. Dialogical games constructed without referring to such a purpose are externally senseless and useless.The third part is an outline of a philosophical theory of disputation (“disputation” here will mean: (learned) dialogue in which the participants cooperatively though perhaps controversially attempt to find out by means of arguments and mutual criticism whether a thesis is true or false). Disputations contain argumentations, and many functions of a disputation can also be fulfilled by argumentations alone. Certifying the truth of convictions is the specific aim of disputation. This is accomplished by eliminating errors of substantiation and foundation as effectively as possible, in revising false convictions and their foundations, thereby making the remaining convictions more certain. Based on this analysis of the aim of disputation, the basic rules of disputations will be critically reconstructed: possible moves, rules of sequence, and the internal aim and ends of disputations. (shrink)

Type 2 diabetes has been considered a public health threat due to its growing prevalence, particularly in the older population. It is important to know the effects of psychosocial stress and its potential consequences for some basic cognitive processes that are important in daily life. Currently, there is very little information about how people with T2D face acute psychosocial stressors, and even less about how their response affects working memory, which is essential for their functionality and independence. Our (...) aim was to characterize the response to an acute laboratory psychosocial stressor and its effects on WM in older people with T2D. Fifty participants with T2D from 52 to 77 years old were randomly assigned to a stress or control condition. Mood and physiological responses to tasks were measured. In addition, participants completed a WM test before and after the stress or control task. Our results showed that the TSST elicited higher negative affect and greater C and sAA responses than the control task. No significant differences in WM were observed depending on the exposure to stress or the control task. Finally, participants who showed higher C and sAA responses to the stressor had lower WM performance. Our results indicate that medically treated older adults with T2D show clear, typical mood and physiological responses to an acute psychosocial stressor. Finally, the lack of acute psychosocial stress effects on WM suggests that it could be related to aging and not to this disease, at least when T2D is adequately treated. (shrink)

The articles in this volume showcase the potential richness of frame representations. The presentation includes introductory articles on the application of frames to linguistics and philosophy of science, offering readers the tools to conduct the interdisciplinary investigation of concepts that frames allow. * Introductory articles on the application of frames to linguistics and philosophy of science * Frame analysis of changes in scientific concepts * Event frames and lexical decomposition * Properties, frame attributes and adjectives * Frames in concept composition (...) * Nominal concept types and determination "This volume deals with frame representations and their relations to concept types in linguistics and philosophy of science. It aims at reviving concepts and frames as a common model across disciplines for representing semantic and conceptual knowledge. Departing from the general assumption that frames are not just an arbitrary format of representation but essential to human cognition, a number of case studies apply frames as an analytical tool to a wide range of phenomena, from changes in scientific concepts to particular linguistic phenomena. This provides new insights into long-standing semantic issues, such as the lexical representation of verbs (as predicative frames specifying particular event descriptions or situation types and their participants), adjectives and nominals (as concept frames, which provide attributes and properties of an entity), as well as modification, complementation, possessive constructions, compounding, nominal concept types, determination, or definiteness marking." Bert Gehrke, Pompeu, Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain. (shrink)

There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting (...) oppression and marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences. (shrink)

In the literature on persons and their identity, it is customary to distinguish the issue of the nature of personhood—“What is a person?”—from the issue of per- sonal identity—“What are the persistence conditions of a person over time?” In recent years, Eric Olson and Lynne Rudder Baker have brought to the forefront of discussion the related, but often neglected, issue of our essence: “What are we, most fundamentally (essentially)—human animals, persons, or something else?” -/- Attacking what he calls the Standard (...) View of personal identity, according to which personal identity consists in some type of psychological continuity, Olson contends that this thesis has highly implausible implications. Attributing the claim that we are essentially persons to the Standard View, Olson defends the alterna- tive thesis that we are essentially (living) human animals, members of the species Homo sapiens, and that our persistence conditions are biological, having nothing to do with psychology. At the heart of his critique is the contention that the Standard View lacks a plausible account of the relationship between a person and the human animal associated with her. Defending “person essentialism” and defining persons as beings with first-person perspectives, Lynne Rudder Baker responds to Olson’s challenge with the Constitution View: We (human) persons are constituted by, but not identical to, human animals. -/- After reconstructing Olson’s critique of the Standard View, I argue that Baker goes a long way toward meeting his challenge to account plausibly for the relationship between persons and human animals. Then I contend that her person-based Constitution View nevertheless has major difficulties: a “newborn problem”; a dubious ontology; and a problematic account of personal identity. I conclude with general reflections about this dialectic. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology as (...) a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this makes them as essential as any other model of this type. (shrink)

Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies (...) these considerations to responsibility in particular. Theimpossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is arguedthat this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is everresponsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of`responsibility'. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is no possible structural way of drawing a distinction between objects of different types, such as individuals and properties of different adicities and orders. We show first that purely combinatorial information (information about how objects combine to form states of affairs) is not sufficient for doing this. We show that for any set of such combinatorial data there is always more than one way of typing them – that is, there are always several ways of (...) classifying the different constituents of states of affairs as individuals and properties. Therefore, contrary to received ontological opinion, no object is essentially of any specific type. In the second part we argue that taking into account logical information does not help either, since logic presupposes the very distinction we are trying to draw. Furthermore, this distinction is not even essential for logic, since logic can function perfectly well without it. We conclude that certain distinctions which have been traditionally regarded as ontologically basic (such as that between individuals and properties) cannot be as fundamental as is often supposed. (shrink)

This article examines the problem of the origins of the correspondence principle formulated by Bohr in 1920 and intends to test the correctness of the argument that the essential elements of that principle were already present in the 1913 “trilogy”. In contrast to this point of view, moreover widely shared in the literature, this article argues that it is possible to find a connection between the formulation of the correspondence principle and the assessment that led Bohr to abandon the (...) search for a Planck-type theory. In fact, a thorough examination of Bohr’s works shows that the birth of this principle coincided with the depletion of a research program whose origins may date back to Bohr’s stay at the Rutherford’s laboratory (summer 1912). Finally, this article argues that original program of research was abandoned when it became clear that Planck’s quantum hypothesis for the harmonic oscillator was not an adequate support for the theoretical architecture of atomic physics; namely, there was evidence enough to justify a most drastic conclusion, according to Bohr: “I do not think that a theory of the Planck type can be made logical consistent”. (shrink)

We introduce and analyze two theories for typed inductive definitions and establish their proof-theoretic ordinal to be the small Veblen ordinal \. We investigate on the one hand the applicative theory \ of functions, inductive definitions, and types. It includes a simple type structure and is a natural generalization of S. Feferman’s system \\). On the other hand, we investigate the arithmetical theory \ of typed inductive definitions, a natural subsystem of \, and carry out a wellordering proof within (...) \ that makes use of fundamental sequences for ordinal notations in an ordinal notation system based on the finitary Veblen functions. The essential properties for describing the ordinal notation system are worked out. (shrink)