This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

15 found
Order:
  1. Frege's Conception of Logic: Truth, the True, and Assertion.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1397-1417.
    Gottlob Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege’s conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, that is, the truth-vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Frege's Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth, and the Fregean Conception of Judgment.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (5):1-26.
    I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Fate of the Act of Synthesis: Kant, Frege, and Husserl on the Role of Subjectivity in Presentation and Judgment.Jacob Rump - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11).
    I investigate the role of the subject in judgment in Kant, Frege, and Husserl, situating it in the broader and less-often-considered context of their accounts of presentation as well as judgment. Contemporary philosophical usage of “representation” tends to elide the question of what Kant called the constitution of content, because of a reluctance, traced to Frege’s anti-psychologism, to attend to subjectivity. But for Kant and Husserl, anti-psychologism allows for synthesis as the subjective act necessary for both “mere presentation” and judgment. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Why Is Frege’s Judgment Stroke Superfluous?Martin Gustafsson - 2018 - In Gisela Bengtsson, Simo Säätelä & Alois Pichler (eds.), New Essays on Frege: Between Science and Literature. Springer. pp. 87-99.
    Frege’s use of a judgment stroke in his conceptual notation has been a matter of controversy, at least since Wittgenstein rejected it as “logically quite meaningless” in the Tractatus. Recent defenders of Frege include Tyler Burge, Nicolas Smith and Wolfgang Künne, whereas critics include William Taschek and Edward Kanterian. Against the background of these defenses and criticisms, the present paper argues that Frege faces a dilemma the two horns of which are related to his early and later conceptions of asserted (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
    Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Freges Urteilslehre. Ein in der Logik vergessenes Lehrstück der Analytischen Philosophie.Moritz Cordes - 2014 - XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie 28. September - 2. Oktober 2014.
    Frege's philosophy of language includes detailed views on judgments. His formal logic - the Begriffsschrift - documents some of these views in the introduction and treatment of the judgment stroke. In current logic such an expression is either entirely ignored or, appearing as turnstile, plays an fundamentally different role. In this paper I put forward four claims: (i) Considering Frege's Begriffsschrift, it is methodologically palpable why the judgment stroke was omitted in nearly all logical systems developed after Frege. (ii) The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Is Judgment Stroke the Sign of Assertoric Force?: Clarifying a Problem in Frege's Logic through Husserl's "Glaubensmodifikation".Song Gao - 2011 - Modern Philosophy (1):80-87.
    Frege believes that the real power to determine the sentence to show the logic of interest to "true." And with the word "truth" of redundancy on the same, he believes the lack of everyday language and the ability to determine the appropriate symbol. However, Frege, it seems that he invented the concept of text assigned to a special force to determine the sign: determine the bar. This paper attempts to demonstrate, although Frege until the final stage of his academic career (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference Not Consequence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):639-665.
    One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  9. The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign.Mitchell S. Green - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
  10. The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language.D. Greimann - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
    The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pragmatic operator; in Frege's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  11. Frege's Judgement Stroke.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):153 – 175.
    This paper brings to light a new puzzle for Frege interpretation, and offers a solution to that puzzle. The puzzle concerns Frege’s judgement-stroke (‘|’), and consists in a tension between three of Frege’s claims. First, Frege vehemently maintains that psychological considerations should have no place in logic. Second, Frege regards the judgementstroke—and the associated dissociation of assertoric force from content, of the act of judgement from the subject matter about which judgement is made—as a crucial part of his logic. Third, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12. Frege und Husserl über Urteilen und Denken.Markus Stepanians - 1998 - Paderborn: Schöningh.
  13. Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Irving M. Copi - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461.
    The purpose of the article is to explain two curious doctrines maintained by frege and rejected by wittgenstein in the 'tractatus logico-philosophicus'. that a special assertion sign is necessary was maintained by frege because he wanted to apply his concept-writing to ordinary language, and it was rejected by wittgenstein because his concern in the 'tractatus' was with scientific assertions only. frege's paradoxical notion that 'the concept horse is not a concept' was a consequence of his symbolizing functions by 'unsaturated' expressions. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Dudman on Frege's Judgment-Stroke.R. H. Stoothoff - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (83):166-167.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Frege's Judgment-Stroke.V. H. Dudman - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):150-161.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations