In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:270 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Prophets of Paris. By Frank E. Manuel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.) This perceptive and sophisticated contribution to the history of ideas is organized around the intellectual biographies of Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, the Saint-Simoniarts, Charles Fourier, and Auguste Comte. Professor Manuel's prophets were all Frenchmen and all, he believes, can be placed in a common tradition marked by their conviction that Paris was the (...) mount from which the new gospel had to be delivered, that love was the key to social organization, and that social and religious relationships were more significant than political forms. He presents them as prophets in the Old Testament sense--as unsparing moral critics, teachers and the "revealers of a divine historical design." They were philosophers of an age of crisis, convinced that theirs was the instant of a great human divide and therefore victims "of the anguish of futurity." The future they so confidently foretold to anyone who cared to listen, and to many who did not, has found many of their prophetic visions to be poor predictions, but for Manuel they cannot be dismissed as utopian cranks or frustrated totalitarians. Many of the issues they raised and problems they sensed have yet to be adequately confronted, and it is this prescience, particularly with regard to the psychological conditions of social existence, that Manuel wishes to emphasize. This treatment, as its author admits, is a "frank attempt at rehabilitation, to right the balance of historical judgement and bestow new worth upon thinkers who have often been treated with superficiality" (pp. 1-10). Manuel's approach to the history of ideas lends itself quite effectively to this purpose. He admits to a "romantic view of history-writing" which entails an effort to establish an intimacy with his subjects through an immersion in their manuscripts, in the "scribbled brouillons, the casual notes, the personal letters," as well as in the identity presented through their published works. His writing of history is romantic not only in this regard but much more profoundly in his historicism, which attempts an immediate empathetic confrontation with the total organic complex of his subject's life, ideas, and environment. Manuel's evident sympathy occasionally tempts him into apologetics, but essentially he is not arguing a brief for the defense but trying to understand what it was that made these men see so far, and yet with such myopic arrogance, and what it was they saw. It seemed to me that his approach is most successful with Fourier, and least so with Turgot. Charles Fourier, the self-taught travelling salesman from Besan~on, is often summarily dismissed as a cosmic crank with easy reference to his fantastic aberrations --his seas of lemonade and the copulation of the planets. Manuel helps us to understand not only the aberrations but the prescient insights by establishing the relationship between Fourier's personality and his ideas, as well as by tracing the connections between apparently contradictory conceptions. He does not misuse this technique of intellectual biography by patronizing or justifying a system of thought with reference to its psychological antecedents, but rather helps to illuminate a philosophy by examining the reasons for its expression. This works particularly well with Fourier, an obsessed and deprived personality, whose great contribution, according to Manuel, was the assimilation into a social doctrine of the fundamental needs and drives of mankind--its "manifold wants, its secret desires, and its obstinate fixations" (p. 203). Both Fourier and the SaintSimonians believe that it was pointless to tinker with the social environment without regard for permanent psychological realities, but the latter hoped to sublimate human passions through a social organization that redefined them, while Fourier wanted a social system that would provide for their total gratification (p. 226). Occasionally Manuel rather triumphantly unearths striking parallels with our present BOOK REVIEWS 271 concerns that do not demonstrate the vision of his seers into the future so much as his discovery of analogues in the past. Fourier's case is not particularly strengthened by the observation that his vision of a climate so benign under the regime of phalansteries as to render tire very poles inhabitable is "no longer as... (shrink)

Hundreds of thousands of individuals experience traumatic injuries each year. Some are mild to moderate in nature and patients experience full functional recovery and little change to their physical appearance. Others result in enduring, if not permanent, changes in physical functioning and appearance. Reconstructive plastic surgical procedures are viable treatments options for many patients who have experienced the spectrum of traumatic injuries. The goal of these procedures is to restore physical functioning and reduce the psychosocial burden of living with an (...) appearance that may be viewed negatively by the patient or by others. Even after receipt of reconstructive procedures, many patients are left with residual disfigurement. In some, disability and disfigurement may be so profound that individuals are candidates for vascularized composite allotransplantation procedures, i.e., the transplantation of a vascularized human body part containing multiple tissue types as an anatomical and/or structural unit. This narrative review paper summarizes the literature on the psychosocial burden experienced by those who have visible disfigurement. While many of these individuals experience stigma and discrimination, relatively few studies have employed a stigma framework to understand the psychosocial sequelea. This paper briefly addresses this framework. Last, particular focus is given to the psychosocial issues of individuals with particularly severe injuries who are potential candidates for VCA procedures. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é aprofundar a questão da estilística na perspectiva de Spitzer, procurando aspectos relacionados com a estilística de Bakhtin, em específico no tratamento dado por ambos à obra de Rabelais Gargântua e Pantagruel. O princípio que fundamenta as análises é a concepção de estilo e de literatura que perpassa as análises de Spitzer e Bakhtin, desvelando aspectos contrastantes na interpretação dessa obra rabelaisiana. ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to delve deeper into issues (...) of stylistics as addressed in the interpretation of Rabelais’ works, Gargantua and Pantagruel, from Spitzer’s perspective, while looking for related aspects from a Bakhtinian perspective. The principles on which the analysis is based are the concept of style and literature that crosses Spitzer and Bakhtin’s analyses, revealing contrasting aspects in the interpretation of this Rabelaisian work. (shrink)

This book is the English translation of Alain Badiou’s seminar on Nicolas Malebranche, part of a series of seminars on Being, the One, and the Infinite. In this extraordinary seminar, originally ta...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 71-80 [Access article in PDF] Some Reflections on the (Analytic) Philosophical Approach to Delusion Louis A. Sass There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." —Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5 The peculiar, often problematic phenome na of psychopathology have been attract ing the attention of analytic philosophers in recent years. The topic of delusion has (...) been a particular draw, with a number of analytic philosophers attempting to use their conceptual tools, usually combined with ideas from cognitive neuroscience, to criticize the traditional understanding and to clarify the nature of this central psychiatric topic. It is useful to have this kind of interdisciplinary dialogue. Indeed, there is good reason to hope that concepts honed in the philosophy of mind and other philosophical subfields will help to sort out our understanding of a phenomenon (or set of phenomena) for which contemporary psychiatric definitions and conceptualizations are clearly inadequate and, in some respects, downright misleading (see Parnas and Sass 2001; Spitzer 1990).1Here, however, I would like to call attention to some weaknesses that, it seems to me, are rather common (I do not say universal) in many analytic philosophical approaches to psychopathology. In my opinion, there is a tendency to formulate issues and arguments in overly polarized, even dichotomous terms, and then to rely too uncritically on these essentialistic formulations in exploring the domain of inquiry. Although this polarizing tendency sometimes has the salutary effect of clarifying conceptual domains, it can, when taken too far, actually hamper our understanding of phenomena that are often fraught with ambiguities and complexities that defy many standard conceptualizations.The relationship between philosophy and psychopathology is obviously a two-way street—we are familiar, for example, with disorders that challenge deep philosophical assumptions about self and mind (e.g., blindsight, split-brain phenomena, perhaps also Dissociative Identity Disorder, and the first rank symptoms of schizophrenia). I am suggesting that, in their work on delusions, philosophers may need to put more emphasis on moving from the natural phenomena [End Page 71] of psychopathology and to the domain of philosophical analysis.I believe that a greater sensitivity to the modes of knowing associated with the phenomenological tradition, and to the forms of conceptual self-critique fostered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, are crucial ingredients for any adequate approach to delusion as well as many other topics in psychopathology. In my opinion, the work of many analytic philosophers interested in psychopathology would be enriched if they spent more time trying to discover and imagine what it might be like to experience certain kinds of abnormal psychiatric conditions, and also speculating about what implications such experiential modalities might have for action and verbal expression. I believe they would also be wise to spend more time questioning, and attempting to transcend, the philosophically derived conceptual distinctions and dichotomies that appear to organize their conceptual universes. Phenomenological imagination and Wittgensteinian critique can show how to move outside the conceptual capsule and into the rich and strange realms of actual experience, both normal and abnormal.So far I have offered only slogans. Let me use the articles by Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie (2004) and Robert Klee (2004) to flesh out the criticisms I have offered. There is much that is intelligent and much that is worthwhile in both their articles. (For example, I was largely convinced by the criticisms of John Campbell and of Donald Davidson that are central to the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee, respectively.) Here, however, I will focus only on issues that illustrate the above-mentioned tendencies—tendencies that, in my view, tend to infect even the best writings on the (analytic) philosophy of psychiatry. I will also make some remarks about the works of Campbell and Davidson, the two philosophers criticized in the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee. Because the article by Eugenie Georgaca (2004) is in a different tradition, I will say only a few words about it at the end. Bayne and Pacherie on the Preservation-Of-meaning... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to delve deeper into issues of stylistics as addressed in the interpretation of Rabelais’ works, Gargantua and Pantagruel, from Spitzer’s perspective, while looking for related aspects from a Bakhtinian perspective. The principles on which the analysis is based are the concept of style and literature that crosses Spitzer and Bakhtin’s analyses, revealing contrasting aspects in the interpretation of this Rabelaisian work. RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é aprofundar a questão da estilística (...) na perspectiva de Spitzer, procurando aspectos relacionados com a estilística de Bakhtin, em específico no tratamento dado por ambos à obra de Rabelais Gargântua e Pantagruel. O princípio que fundamenta as análises é a concepção de estilo e de literatura que perpassa as análises de Spitzer e Bakhtin, desvelando aspectos contrastantes na interpretação dessa obra rabelaisiana. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Impact of Clinicians on the Diagnostic ManualThomas A. Widiger (bio)Keywordsdiagnosis, classification, DSM, taxonomy, clinical judgmentSurveys of clinicians’ opinions can be very informative. There is a long tradition within medicine that new disorders are discovered within clinical practice. The original edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) diagnostic manual (DSM) was based in large part on clinical experience. The recent editions have been governed more heavily by more systematic (...) research (Widiger and Clark 2000), but many of the new additions are still said to come from clinical practice. As described for the development of DSM-III (APA 1980), “if there is general agreement among clinicians, who would be expected to encounter the condition, that there are a significant number of patients who have it and that its identification is important in their clinical work, it is included in the classification” (Spitzer, Sheehy, and Endicott 1977, 3).Clinicians can also be surveyed with regard to their opinions concerning a proposed revision. The ultimate consumers of a diagnostic manual are practicing clinicians and any effort to develop an official nomenclature should consider the opinions of the persons who must use the classification within their clinical practice (First et al. 2004; Sadler 2005). Clinicians can also be surveyed (or studied) with respect to how the diagnostic manual is being implemented. Much of this research has demonstrated that clinicians might be failing to apply the diagnostic manual in a reliable or valid manner (Garb 2005; Kutchins and Kirk 1997).It is perhaps obvious, however, that a diagnostic manual should not be governed primarily by clinical opinion or current clinical practice. The authors of DSM-III (APA 1980) and DSM-III-R (APA 1987) indicated that they would include a new diagnosis within the official nomenclature if a group of clinicians indicated that it was important to their clinical practice (Spitzer et al. 1977). This liberal threshold led to the decision of the DSM-III-R Task Force to include such diagnoses as paraphiliac rapism, self-defeating personality disorder, and sadistic personality disorder despite the lack of systematic research supporting their validity and the likelihood that these new diagnoses would have harmful social and forensic applications (Widiger 1995). These diagnoses no longer even appear within the appendix of DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000) for proposed diagnoses needing further study.The authors of DSM-III avoided opinion surveys because “no one wanted to repeat the scene of the general membership voting on a presumably ‘scientific’ issue, as was done in 1973 on the [End Page 277] issue of the elimination of homosexuality from the DSM-II classification” (Spitzer, Williams, and Skodol 1980, 152). Matters of construct validity should probably be addressed through systematic research rather than through opinion polls. Decisions should be informed by a fair hearing of the diversity of perspectives, and these viewpoints and perspectives should be systematically and enthusiastically solicited. Nevertheless, the most scientifically valid decision may at times be “politically incorrect.” The authors of the diagnostic manual should have the authority to make innovative decisions that are scientifically justified even when they are contrary to general clinical consensus (Widiger and Clark 2000).Some persons, though, do suggest that the diagnostic manual should be modeled on how disorders are being diagnosed within clinical practice. This is perhaps most readily evident in the proposals of Westen and Shedler (2000) to diagnose mental disorders via prototypal matching. They eschew the provision of specific and explicit criterion sets in favor of simply matching the patient to a global (e.g., paragraph description) of a prototypic case. A purported strength of this approach is that it is said to “conform to the way clinicians think about psychiatric diagnoses” (First and Westen 2007, 473).There are, however, concerns with respect to prototypal matching. First, it is not really clear that clinicians actually provide diagnoses in this manner. There are data to suggest that clinicians instead reach a diagnostic decision on the basis of just one or two individual diagnostic criteria rather than matching to a global prototype (Herkov and Blashfield 1995).More important, it is unclear whether the diagnostic manual should in fact emulate what is occurring within clinical practice. There is a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 55-64 [Access article in PDF] Delusions and Discourse:Moving beyond the Constraints of the Modernist Paradigm David J. Harper This special issue provides a good opportunity to reflect on the range of views about delusions,1 and it is good to see all the authors taking the issue of how to approach this topic seriously. Here I wish to argue that the traditional psychiatric view (...) of delusions is problematic. In the first half of this article I will group my comments on the issues raised by the papers by Klee and Bayne and Pacherie together as I think that, for their differences, they share modernist philosophical assumptions. I will argue that the modernist paradigm runs into considerable problems in considering beliefs felt by some to be unusual and I will go on to argue that we need to move beyond this paradigm and embrace different approaches, of which the work by Georgaca is an exemplar. The Trouble with (traditional Views of) Delusions The traditional psychiatric view of delusion has come under increasing attack over recent years. As Georgaca has noted, a number of problems with the assumptions in definitions of delusion can be identified when they are viewed from a social constructionist perspective (Georgaca 2000, 2004; Harper 1992, 1996; Heise 1988). For convenience I will group these under four main headings. They Are Based on a Naively Realist View of the World The criterion of inaccuracy or falsity implies that deciding on the veracity of a belief is a relatively unproblematic matter. However, the reality of claims does not always seem so important in judgments about whether a belief is delusional or not. For example, there is little evidence that mental health professionals systematically investigate the basis for people's beliefs; rather, they decide whether a belief is plausible. Thus Maher has argued that the assessment of the plausibility of beliefs is "typically made by a clinician on the basis of "common sense," and not on the basis of a systematic evaluation of empirical data" (1992, 261). He notes that it is not "customary to present counterevidence to the patient; it is not even common to present vigorous counterargument" (1992, 261) and there appears to be some empirical evidence of this (McCabe et al. 2002). Here then, we begin to see [End Page 55] how psychiatry, while claiming to have the power to judge the truth of beliefs on the basis of its status as an empirical scientific discipline, can be seen to make judgments on the basis of common sense and taken-for-granted social and cultural assumptions.Some commentators have suggested that delusions should be identified less by whether they seem to accord with reality but more by whether a person gives evidence for their belief (Gillett 1995; Spitzer 1990). However, this seems to be based on an idealized view of how people manage their beliefs in everyday life. For example, I would question how many of us have evidence for many of the beliefs (e.g., political, ethical, religious, etc.) we hold dear; indeed it would be hard to think of what evidence we could have for some of them (e.g., religious and ethical beliefs). Some recent work has suggested that the diagnosis of delusion is made on the basis of how people with delusions talk and interact; for example, some have argued that they do not appear to appreciate the hearer's point of view (Palmer 2000). However, here and in previous work, Georgaca (2000, 2004) has shown that people with delusions are able to talk about and negotiate disagreements about their beliefs and that many disputes of fact cannot be settled in conversation. People Said to Have Delusions Are Seen to Vary in the Conviction With Which Those Beliefs Are Held There is evidence that people considered to be deluded vary in the conviction with which they hold beliefs (Garety 1985) and can also be persuaded to modify their beliefs if this is conducted in a sensitive and collaborative manner (e.g., Chadwick, Birchwood, and Trower 1996). This... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Brian Boyd responds:In responding to my critical discussion, Lisa Zunshine restates the argument of Why We Read Fiction at some length but replies to none of my specific criticisms. These criticisms are all based on the evidence of the texts that she offers as case studies, especially Mrs Dalloway and Lolita. Although I—and the textual evidence—contradict her claims, she provides no answers to the criticisms.Let me respond to two (...) restatements. First: "Fictional narratives endlessly experiment with rather than automatically execute our evolved cognitive adaptations" (p. 190). This is often, but almost tautologically, true in the case of experimental fiction, as the work of Richardson, Woolf, and Nabokov (to cite Zunshine's key examples) was in their time. It is not necessarily true in the sense Zunshine especially means it—that authors give us a demanding cognitive workout of our capacity for Theory of Mind by incorporating multiple embedding, A's thoughts of B's thoughts of C's thoughts of D's thoughts of E—even in the case of fictional experimenters like Defoe, Tolstoy, or Joyce, and it is not true of the vast bulk of fiction, from folk tale or jokes to soap operas or pulp [End Page 196] novels, and it cannot therefore be an explanation for "why we read fiction," though it may explain why some of us read some fiction. And to identify overloaded embedding when it is not present, as Zunshine does in discussing Mrs Dalloway, constitutes a simple misreading.Second: "Our Theory of Mind makes literature as we know it possible" (p. 191). Granted, without Theory of Mind we would not have fiction. But nor would we have fiction without many other features of human nature: without sociality, episodic memory, language, childhood pretend play, empathy, the brain's inhibitory mechanisms, folk physics, our mental databases for individuals, and much, much more. An evolutionary and cognitive understanding of fiction needs to take into account many aspects of our capacity for understanding events and stories, not just one.Apart from one three-word phrase, Zunshine's sole quotation from my review is this: "To what extent has Zunshine benefited from the methodology, rather than results, of science?" (I refer to "the results of science" here because I note that although, for instance, she relies most heavily on Simon Baron-Cohen among Theory of Mind researchers, while ignoring major figures in the field like Janet Astington or Josef Perner, she does not even cite the book or any of the more than twenty papers of which Baron-Cohen has been primary author since his 1995 Mindblindness.) Her quotation from my review continues: "Alas, she appears to have learned less than one would have hoped.... Her formulations are often weak and indecisive, hedgings, rather than strong testable hypotheses. Rather than apply scientific stringency to her literary analysis, she seems more interested in exploiting than testing what she can find." She confesses herself puzzled by this charge. Let me explain one simple point.Science's core methodological principle is that claims should be subjected to the test of evidence, and accepted or rejected on the basis of their compatibility with the relevant evidence. Leo Spitzer long ago pointed out that good reading follows scientific method: we read, we make hypotheses about the text, and we either confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses according to what we find in the text, and search for ampler hypotheses when previous ones have been discredited.1 Literary scholarship has long been vitiated by a far flabbier methodology, by the naïve assumption that evidence for a proposition suffices: "I see a and b in the text, therefore my claim C is a valid interpretation." But if reading or interpretation C is incompatible with counter-evidence d and e in the text, it is a falsified hypothesis and needs to yield to a better [End Page 197] reading, an interpretation that can incorporate this counter-evidence. I showed that Zunshine's claims about her prime examples were not compatible with evidence in the texts. She does not challenge the textual counter-evidence I provide, but just ignores it. That is where literary criticism most urgently needs to learn from scientific... (shrink)

Part four of the Proceedings of the fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, August 27-September 2, 1975.

A partir da concepção de um racionalismo integral, em que vigora o ideal da plena demonstrabilidade segundo o paradigma identitário da verdade, configura-se em Leibniz a questão da universalidade, que seria enunciada com mais pertinência como a do determinismo universal. São dois aspectos de uma mesma questão: em primeiro lugar, a universalidade no sentido arquitetônico, correspondente à totalidade; em segundo lugar, a determinação absoluta do indivíduo singular. Tanto num caso quanto no outro, a plena determinação é inalcançável para a mente (...) humana. Mas as operações simbólicas de determinação, permitem, de alguma maneira, contornar a impossibilidade de uma visão simultânea e articulada de todos os elementos de um composto e, assim, nos encaminham na direção de uma universalidade determinante. Os fundamentos, os procedimentos e os riscos aí envolvidos constituem o tema desse texto. (shrink)

This new, second edition of the popular college textbook offers the beginning philosophy student a comprehensive introduction to several aspects of one of the most influential schools of thought in the twentieth century. Professor Klemke begins by pointing out the distinctions among the various types of analytic and linguistic philosophies, while emphasising that they all arose as a response to the formerly predominant school of absolute idealism. After a prologue section containing a representative exposition of idealism by Josiah Royce, the (...) following sections show the radically new philosophical approach of the analytic school in its various guises: realism and common sense (G. E. Moore); logical atomism (Bertrand Russell); logical positivism (A. J. Ayer); conceptual analysis (Gilbert Ryle, G. E. Moore, John Wisdom); logico-metaphysical analysis (Gustav Bergman, W. V. Quine); linguistic analysis (J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, J. R. Searle); and the recent development of new realism (Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Richard N. Boyd). (shrink)

Because corporate social responsibility (CSR) is potentially beneficial for companies, it is important to understand the factors that improve a company’s CSR practice. Scholars hypothesize that facilitating learning organization characteristics, which are divided in characteristics at the organizational and the operational level, may improve CSR implementation. These characteristics stimulate companies and their members to be critical, learn from the past, and embrace change, but there is limited empirical evidence of this approach. This study addresses this gap by surveying 280 CSR (...) professionals and performing bootstrap mediation analyses to test multiple hypotheses. Learning organization characteristics at the organizational level, play a key role in supporting CSR implementation: leadership for learning, system connection, and group learning show a direct relationship with CSR implementation. It is striking that the role of the learning organization characteristics at the operational level is only indirect; the organizational characteristics mediate their relationship with CSR implementation. (shrink)

The sixteenth-century Reformation remains a fascinating and exciting area of study. The revised edition of this distinguished volume explores the intellectual origins of the Reformation and examines the importance of ideas in the shaping of history. Provides an updated and expanded version of the original, highly-acclaimed edition. Explores the complex intellectual roots of the Reformation, offering a sustained engagement with the ideas of humanism and scholasticism. Demonstrates how the intellectual origins of the Reformation were heterogeneous, and examines the implications of (...) this for our understanding of the Reformation as a whole. Offers a defence of the entire enterprise of intellectual history, and a reaffirmation of the importance of ideas to the development of history. Written by Alister E. McGrath, one of today’s best-known Christian writers. (shrink)

Little is known about how employees on husbandry farms perceive animal welfare and the factors influencing the relationship between them and the animals they engage with in their daily work. Reporting the findings of qualitative interviews with 23 employees on five Danish farms (mink, dairy and pig production), this paper describes how the employees viewed animal welfare, and discusses how they dealt with animal welfare issues in their daily work. Four distinct rationales for animal welfare were identified. 1) Animal welfare (...) was supported by concerns about production and health, and could be negotiated – especially when it came to the ability of the animals to perform natural behaviour. 2) Animal welfare was connected with the working conditions on the farm. 3) The employees’ views about animal welfare were affected by working conditions over which they had no influence. 4) An awareness of the condition of the animals was seen as obviously needed in relation to production, but a deeper attachment to some animals was also seen. A specific challenge is presented by the increasingly diverse workforce in farming, with one third of the employees on Danish farms coming from abroad. If farm owners are not able to integrate these employees, there is a risk of creating a second-tier of foreign workers who are isolated. Furthermore, it was seen that negative working conditions can be taken out on the animals, or that animal welfare can come to be seen as unimportant as compared with human welfare. (shrink)

L'éducation est dans ce livre envisagée comme un geste anthropologique intégral par lequel chaque personne s'achemine vers la plénitude de son être, dans le respect de sa destination naturelle et surnaturelle. À la lumière de cette mystique éducative qui nous fait entrer au coeur de la réalité humaine, l'existence se trouve intensifiée, parce que vécue avec un maximum de profondeur. Encore trop méconnu, l'apport d'Edith Stein en matière d'éducation méritait d'être enfin présenté sous une forme synthétique et accessible. La question (...) éducative occupe une place centrale dans la pensée d'Edith Stein, sans toutefois faire l'objet d'une mise en forme systématique. Cela justifie amplement le projet d'une reconstitution de son architecture d'ensemble. (shrink)

In this chapter, I focus on the experience of torture and, more specifically, on Jean Améry's account of it in his book *At the Mind's Limits*. There he claims that the loss of confidence in the world is the most devastating effect he experienced as a victim of torture. I thus explore what cosmopolitan aspiration may be revealed by this loss and also discuss whether it is to be discredited as an irrational reaction on the victim's side or instead as (...) proportional to the facts and, consequently, as relevant to the conditions under which a certain cosmopolitan aspiration could be achieved or, at least, favored. (shrink)

Part Three of the Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, August 27-September 2, 1975.

Presenta a grandes rasgos su tesis doctoral. Dentro del marco de la teoría de los afectos, Spinoza sostiene una tesis sobre la alienación a partir de la imaginación y del tiempo, para ello produce una teoría del tiempo y, fundamentalmente, una teoría de las intensidades que sirve para explicar la ilusión.