This paper advances the thesis that we can justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibility statements. The first part of the paper critically discusses van Inwagens skeptical arguments while at the same time laying some of the foundation for a positive view. The second part of the paper advances a view of conceivability in terms of imaginability, where imaginging can be propositional, pictorial, or a combination of the two, and argues that conceivability can, and often does, provide us with justified beliefs of (...) what is metaphysically possible. The notion of scenarios is developed, as is an account of how filling out scenarios can uncover a defeater or, in many cases, strengthen the justification for the relevant possibility statement. (shrink)
I argue that Frege's puzzle can extend beyond semantics and to, for example, pictures and scent. Accordingly, attempted solutions to the puzzle should not focus solely on semantics. Solutions that do so can at best provide a partial solution to the puzzle. They will not provide a solution that explains the broader phenomenon; the one that includes my childhood case. Below I will provide a solution that accounts for the typical Frege case as well as my childhood case. The solution (...) will, accordingly, not be a semantic solution. Instead it will focus on information we have on objects and how we organize and access the information. The solution I will provide is psychological and not semantic in nature. At the same time I will show that the solution I provide aligns itself well with Millianism. (shrink)
This Handbook offers students and more advanced readers a valuable resource for understanding linguistic reference; the relation between an expression (word, phrase, sentence) and what that expression is about. The volume’s forty-one original chapters, written by many of today’s leading philosophers of language, are organized into ten parts: I Early Descriptive Theories II Causal Theories of Reference III Causal Theories and Cognitive Significance IV Alternate Theories V Two-Dimensional Semantics VI Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity VII The Empty Case VIII Singular (...) (De Re) Thoughts IX Indexicals X Epistemology of Reference Contributions consider what kinds of expressions actually refer (names, general terms, indexicals, empty terms, sentences), what referring expressions refer to, what makes an expression refer to whatever it does, connections between meaning and reference, and how we know facts about reference. Many contributions also develop connections between linguistic reference and issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. (shrink)
The focus of this paper will be on singular thoughts. In the first section I will present Jeshion’s cognitivism; a view that holds that one should characterize singular thoughts by their cognitive roles. In the second section I will argue that, contrary to Jeshion’s claims, results from studies of object tracking in cognitive psychology do not support cognitivism. In the third section I will discuss Jeshion’s easy transmission of singular thought and argue that it ignores a relevant distinction between general (...) and specific understanding of names. Finally, the last section will argue that conscious attention should replace Jeshion’s significance condition as a necessary condition for one to have a singular thought. The paper will show that we need to take seriously the acquaintance requirement for singular thoughts, as even the easy transmission of singular thoughts with the use of names will be called into question. (shrink)
Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons’ intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails (...) to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth. (shrink)
Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan have argued that the new moral realism, which rests on the causal theory of reference, is untenable. While I do agree that the new moral realism is untenable, I do not think that Timmons and Horgan have succeeded in showing that it is. I will lay out the case for new moral realism and Horgan and Timmons’ argument against it, and then argue that their argument fails. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory as well (...) as attempts to improve upon it, raise serious problems for these semantic accounts, and suggest an alternative view that accounts for our use of moral terms. (shrink)
In Naming and Necessity' Saul A. Kripke gives two types of examples of contingent truths knowable a priori. So he disagrees with the first leg of the thesis. As we will see later, his examples depend on the direct designation theory of names. While there have been attempts to provide examples of the contingent a priori that do not depend on that theory, most of those examples should be viewed as expansions, or modifications, of Kripke's examples. Philip Kitcher, for example, (...) gives an interesting example that has nothing to do with theories of names, but is produced using the indexical 'actual'.2 His example, however, is a variation of Kripke's Neptune Type example.' In what follows I will focus on Kripke's two types of examples and modifications of them. I will argue that although both types of example fail, it is possible to modify his Standard Metre example in such a way that we have an example of the contingent a priori. (shrink)
In a couple of recent papers Deborah Tollefsen has argued that groups should be viewed as having some of the intentional and epistemic properties as do individuals. In “Organizations as True Believers” she argues that corporations really do have intentional states.1 In “Collective Epistemic Agency”2 she continues her development of group agency and she now argues that collectives can be genuine knowers. The target of her arguments is, naturally, the wide spread view that “knowers are individuals, and knowledge is generated (...) by mental processes and lodged in the mind-brain.”3 According to Tollefsen, “An epistemic agent is a deliberator that is subject to epistemic assessment; she can be charged with incoherency, inconsistency, ambiguity, and so on.”4 Further, “To be a deliberator in the rich sense in which you or I deliberate is to be subject to the immediacy that is characteristic of reason. When we engage in reasoning (and assuming we have the appropriate desires) we are moved to act immediately or think in accordance with the reasons that we arrive at through deliberation.”5 When we identify which attitudes and acts should be shaped or informed, then such identification takes place from a point of view. Typically, the point of view is the first person singular I, but Tollefsen argues that reflections on group deliberation show that the we-concept often marks the point of view in question. So, Tollefsen argues in effect that 1. A group can be a deliberator 2. A deliberator, in the sense being discussed, is an epistemic agent 3. An epistemic agent can have knowledge 4. So a group can have knowledge. The bulk of Tollefsen’s paper, “Collective Epistemic Agency,” is focused on arguing that (1) is true, i.e., that a group can be a deliberator. One of the examples she uses to make her case involves the decision made by a college admissions committee. The three committee members consider each candidate and vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depending on whether or not the candidate should be accepted into the program.. (shrink)
Most of the historically salient versions of the Cosmological Argument rest on two assumptions. The first assumption is that some contingeney (i.e., contingent fact) is such that a necessity is required to explain it. Against that assumption we will argue that necessities alone cannot explain any contingency and, furthermore, that it is impossible to explain the totality of contingencies at all.The second assumption is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Against the Principle of Sufficient Reason we will argue that it is (...) unreasonable to require, as the Principle of Sufficient Reason does, that any given whole of contingent facts has an explanation. Instead, it depends on the results of empirical investigation whether or not one should ask for an explanation of the given whole.We argue that if a cosmological argument invokes either of the two assumptions, then it fails to prove that a necessity is needed to explain the universe of contingent facts. (shrink)
One reason for the recent attention to conceivability claims is to be found in the extended use of conceivability in philosophy of mind, and then especially in connection with zombie thought experiments. The idea is that zombies are conceivable; beings that look like us and behave like us in all ways, but for which “all is dark inside;” that is, for a zombie, there is no “what it is like.” There is no “what it is like” to be a zombie, (...) there is no “what it is like” for a zombie to feel pain, there is no “what it is like” for a zombie to taste, or feel, or smell something. They are creatures without consciousness. I am skeptical about the conceivability of zombies. That is not to say that I believe that there is some inherent contradiction to be found in the idea of zombies. Instead, I do not think that I am justified in believing that zombies are conceivable. The focus on justification is not common in the literature on conceivability, or for that matter in the literature on the possibility of zombies. Instead, the focus tends to be on trying to find out whether or not the notion of a zombie is contradictory. It is widely accepted in the literature on conceivability that the absence of a contradiction when conceiving of X is both necessary and sufficient for X to be conceivable. That might be true of ideal conceivability, but as I will argue below, ideal conceivability is not relevant to our (human) pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Further, as I will argue, once we focus on non-ideal conceivability the notion of justification, and degrees of justification comes into play. (shrink)
Horgan and Timmons, with their Moral Twin Earth arguments, argue that the new moral realism falls prey to either objectionable relativism or referential indeterminacy. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment on which the arguments are based relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. First, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth example and the conclusions drawn from that about the meaning of kind names. Further, it relies on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they (...) would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. I will argue that the similarities with Putnam’s thought experiment are questionable and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is questionable. I will then further argue that even if we accept the intuitions that Horgan and Timmons rely on, the anti-realist conclusion is not warranted due to there being more to the meaning of kind terms than the argument assumes. Once we develop the meaning of kind terms further we can acknowledge both that Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different properties with their moral terms, and that in spite of that they can have a substantive disagreement due to a shared meaning component. (shrink)
The logical problem of evil centers on the apparent inconsistency of the following two propositions: God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, and There is evil in the world. This is the problem that Alvin Plantinga takes to task in his celebrated response to the problem of evil. Plantinga denies that and are inconsistent, arguing that J.L. Mackie's principle - that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do - is false. We challenge Plantinga, and defend Mackie's (...) view. (shrink)
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would (...) be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same. (shrink)
The thesis that the necessary and the a priori are extensionally equivalent consists of two independent claims: 1) All a priori truths are necessary and 2) all necessary truths are a priori. In Naming and Necessity1 Saul A. Kripke gives examples of necessary but a posteriori truths, so he disagrees with the second leg of the thesis.2 His examples are of two types; on the one hand statements involving essential properties and on the other hand true identity statements. My concern (...) will be with examples of the second type and whether they refute (2). (2), however, is ambiguous and can mean one of three things. (shrink)
Plantinga grants that there are possible worlds with freedom and no moral evil, but he argues that it is possible that although God is omnipotent, it is not within God’s power to actualize a world containing freedom and no moral evil. Plantinga believes that the atheologian assumes that it is necessary that it is within an omnipotent God’s power to actualize these better worlds, but in fact, Plantinga argues, this is demonstrably not the case. Since so many philosophers have regarded (...) Plantinga’s Free Will Defense to be a definitive solution to the logical problem of evil, the focus of the debate of the problem of evil has changed from the logical problem of evil to the evidential problem of evil. But we believe that the atheist tossed in the towel too early, and the theist celebrated victory too early. We will argue that Plantinga’s argument does not succeed. Mackie, incidentally, thought the same. He wrote “But how could there be logically contingent states of affairs, prior to the creation and existence of any created beings with free will, which an omnipotent god would have to accept and put up with? This suggestion is simply incoherent.” In this essay we argue that Plantinga fails to demonstrate that it is possible that God is omnipotent, and it is not within God’s power to actualize a world containing freedom but lacking moral evil. Thus Plantinga does not refute Mackie’s response to the Free Will Defense, and the point of Mackie’s question “Why could God not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?” still stands unrefuted. (shrink)
In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how (...) it is believed.1 While it is generally agreed upon among Russellians that this distinction needs to be drawn there is considerable disagreement as to what exactly the distinction amounts to and what role the what and the how should play. The most plausible option seems to be to not assign a semantic value to the cognitive role played by the name or indexical in the sentence assented to. But recently Mark Richard2 has attempted to make the cognitive role affect truth values by building it into the truth conditions of belief reports.3 I will argue that Richard’s attempt fails to satisfy our pretheoretical intuitions about the sharing of beliefs. Furthermore, and more surprisingly, I will argue that Richard’s theory makes it virtually impossible for us to judge whether or not most belief reports are true or false, since doing so would involve what I call RAM probing, which would require viewing elements that are essentially private. (shrink)
One of the issues that has been hotly discussed in connection with the direct designation theory is whether or not coreferential names can be substituted salva veritate in epistemic contexts. Some direct designation theorists believe that they can be so substituted. Some direct designation theorists and all Fregeans and neo-Fregeans believe that they cannot be so substituted. Fregeans of various stripes have used their intuition against free substitution to argue against the direct designation theory. Some direct designation theorists have used (...) the same intuitions to argue against the view that belief reports of simple declarative sentences can be accounted for with singular propositions. This paper has two main goals; first, to show that the discussion of the issue has tended to treat all epistemic contexts equally, and second, to argue that we should not treat substitutions in contexts that involve justification (and hence knowledge) in the same way as we treat substitution in simple belief contexts, i.e., contexts that just involve the belief relation. (shrink)
Driven by the intuition that the propositions expressed by a=a and a=b, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are codesignative names, differ in cognitive value, philosophers constructing theories of beliefs and belief attributions have been attracted to elements from both Frege’s and Russell’s theories. This, I will argue, has had the consequence that some of the theories entail that it is a necessary condition for making the astronomical discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus that we make a mental discovery about our representations of (...) Venus. I will discuss the motivation behind Frege’s and Russell’s views and present an example which makes it clear that we can make astronomical discoveries prior to making the mental discovery that two names, or two mental representations, are of the same object. The upshot of the discussion is that we should not build modes of presentation into propositions. (shrink)
Recently there has been a surge of new Fregeans who claim that the direct designation theory, as understood by contemporary Russellians, does not, and cannot, account for the different cognitive significance of statements containing different but codesignative names or indexicals. Instead, they say we must use a fine grained notion of propositions; one which builds a mode of presentation into proposition in addition to including in them the object referred to by the name or indexical in the sentence expressing the (...) proposition. Thus we have Mark Richard, John Perry, and Mark Crimmins championing theories that build the mode of presentation into propositions, making the mode of presentation affect the truth conditions of belief reports. What is interesting, though, is that all three accept the direct designationalists claim that proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives are directly referential.I present four problems for the direct designation theorists and argue that the problem the new Fregeans use to motivate their move to include cognitive significance in propositions is the least basic of the four problems. I then provide an account of beliefs of singular propositions which does not require us to build modes of presentations into propositions and which solves the problems posed for the direct designation theory. (shrink)
This concise anthology collects important historical and contemporary readings on the central ethical theories, including Divine Command Theory, Consequentialism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics, and Feminist Ethics. Each section includes two or three of the most important contributions to the field, together with brief introductions from the editors. This new third edition offers expanded coverage of meta-ethics through the addition of thought-provoking readings from Susan Wolf, Gilbert Harman, and others. The number of selections from women authors has also increased.
This anthology is designed for use as a brief introduction to ethical theory. Included are sections on various forms of ethical theory: Ethical Relativism; Divine Command Theory; Egoism; Consequentialism; Deontology; Justice; Virtue Ethics; Feminist Ethics; and, new to the second edition, Pluralism. Each section includes two or three of the most important and interesting contributions to the field, together with brief introductions by the editors. The second edition contains an improved approach to applied ethics. Whereas in the first edition the (...) authors included a chapter at the end of the book that contained selections that dealt with moral problems, in the second edition they have dropped that chapter in favour of an approach that ties moral issues more closely to the moral theories. Each chapter on moral theories now includes a selection that deals with a moral problem, such as human cloning, abortion, and global warming. The selection illustrates how the relevant theoretical approach is put to use. There is therefore a much tighter integration between theory and practice than before. The new structural approach should make the book significantly more effective in the classroom. The new edition also contains an improved section on feminist ethical theory. (shrink)
The general topic of this work is the information value of declarative sentences containing proper names. I begin by accepting the direct designation theory of names. The theory, however, does not appear to be able to account for the difference in information value between sentences like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus is Hesperus'. In order to explain this difference I develop an account of belief that takes a novel approach to the contents of beliefs of propositions expressed by such sentences. (...) ;If you have a de re attitude towards a proposition, you can believe it in several different ways. The difference corresponds to the various ways in which you can mentally represent the object in the proposition. I account for this difference by introducing a distinction between the information basis of a sentence, which is the proposition expressed by the sentence, and the information value of the sentence, which is a subjective notion that depends on how one understands the sentence. ;The implication of the theory on the relationship between the necessary and the a priori is significant. I agree with Kripke that true identity statements containing different codesignative names express necessary propositions, but we disagree on the epistemic status of those propositions. While he argues that they can be known only a posteriori, I argue that they also can be known a priori. Regarding sentences like 'stick S is one meter long', I disagree with Kripke, and argue that although we cannot know this a priori, there is a closely related sentence that qualifies as an example of the contingent a priori, namely 'the length S appears to have is one meter'. (shrink)
This is an anthology of landmark essays in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and cognitive science since 1950. It includes essays that aim to reflect the fact that philosophy and the science of mind and language have close historical and conceptual ties. Each section begins with a brief and simple overview highlighting the issues and recommending other readings. The combination of this editorial material with a selection of classic essays makes this anthology a very flexible tool for introductory (...) courses in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology as well as courses devoted to contemporary analytic philosophy. However, the book also contains significant advanced and recent material, making it suitable for more advanced stud, including beginning graduate courses. (shrink)
This new, second edition of the popular college textbook offers the beginning philosophy student a comprehensive introduction to several aspects of one of the most influential schools of thought in the twentieth century. Professor Klemke begins by pointing out the distinctions among the various types of analytic and linguistic philosophies, while emphasising that they all arose as a response to the formerly predominant school of absolute idealism. After a prologue section containing a representative exposition of idealism by Josiah Royce, the (...) following sections show the radically new philosophical approach of the analytic school in its various guises: realism and common sense (G. E. Moore); logical atomism (Bertrand Russell); logical positivism (A. J. Ayer); conceptual analysis (Gilbert Ryle, G. E. Moore, John Wisdom); logico-metaphysical analysis (Gustav Bergman, W. V. Quine); linguistic analysis (J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, J. R. Searle); and the recent development of new realism (Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Richard N. Boyd). (shrink)
n Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke criticized descriptivist theories of proper names and suggested a ‘better picture’ as a replacement. But while the ‘better picture’ that Kripke provided was very interesting and stimulating, it was little more than a sketch of a theory that needed much work and refinement. While Kripke argued that proper names are not synonymous with definite descriptions or clusters of definite descriptions, he was silent on what the semantic contents of names might be. Further, he even (...) speculated in the introduction to his book that the apparatus of propositions might break down given his arguments, thus further adding to the need to develop the agenda that he got underfoot. Still further, in his third lecture Kripke extended his account of proper names as being rigid designators to natural kind terms without providing arguments for such an extension and without arguing specifically that natural kind names are rigid designators. Consequently, it is not clear what one should think about his well known arguments regarding the epistemic and modal status of identity statements, such as ‘water is H2O.’. (shrink)
Gareth Evans and John McDowell have challenged the traditional reading of Frege according to which Frege accepted propositions that are not object dependent, i.e., propositions that can exist even though the proper names that occur in the sentences that express them do not refer. A consequence of the Evans‐McDowell interpretation of Frege is that if someone hallucinates that there is an oasis in front of her, then there is no thought of an oasis but only an illusion of a thought. (...) No reference entails no sense, and no sense entails no thought.This paper will focus on Frege's views on the issue and, in particular, whether there is any evidence that the mature Frege, i.e., after he introduced the sense/reference distinction, did not accept propositions that are not object dependent. It will also address one of the consequences of the Evans‐McDowell reading of Frege, arguing that they have ignored one of his important insights into natural languages. (shrink)
The relations between our cognitions and what they are about have been much discussed in recent decades. A popular view used to be that the relation between a cognitive state and what it is about is a contingent affair, namely that my cognitive state might have been just as it actually is in the absence of the object it is of, or in the presence of a qualitatively identical object as the one it is of. A second position, one more (...) in vogue now, is that we can distinguish between a wide and a narrow content, where the wide content is dependent on the object it is of while the narrow content is not. Ori Simchen rejects both of these views. Instead, he argues, there is a necessary connection between a cognitive episode and the object it is of. There are no narrow contents. Further, a name is necessarily of the object it names. There are natural kinds and individuals have essences that restrain the way they might be. Necessities abound. (shrink)
There is obviously tension between any view which claims that the object denoted is all that names and simple referring terms contribute to propositions expressed by sentences in which they appear and the apparent a posteriority of identity statements containing different but codesignative names. Frege solved the tension by adopting a description theory of names. The direct designation theorist cannot do the same, for that would amount to abandoning the theory. Instead, she has to provide one of two solutions; (a) (...) argue that although Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus express the same proposition their epistemic status differs such that one’s justification of the proposition expressed by the former but not the latter is a priori, or (b) argue that both Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus express a priori truths. I will argue for a version of option (a), and that while coreferential names can be freely substituted in simple belief contexts, they cannot be freely substituted in contexts involving justification. (shrink)
In recent years Russell’s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians, including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how it is believed. While it is generally agreed upon among Russellians that this distinction needs to be drawn there is considerable disagreement as to what exactly the distinction amounts (...) to and what role the what and the how should play. The most plausible option seems to be to not assign a semantic value to the cognitive role played by the name or indexical in the sentence assented to. But recently Mark Richard has attempted to make the cognitive role affect truth values by building it into the truth conditions of belief reports. I will argue that Richard’s attempt fails to satisfy our pretheoretical intuitions about the sharing of beliefs. Furthermore, and more surprisingly, I will argue that Richard’s theory makes it virtually impossible for us to judge whether or not most belief reports are true or faIse, since doing so would involve what I call RAM probing, which would require viewing elements that are essentially private. (shrink)