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  1. The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately (...)
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  • The Principle of Rational Explanation Defended.Richard Double - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.
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  • Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons.Richard Double - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.
    The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...)
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  • Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.
    Robert Kane’s libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane’s claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent’s will is not yet appropriately structured. I then (...)
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  • Kane and Double on the Principle of Rational Explanation.Neil Campbell - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):45-63.
    En utilisant le cadre théorique développé par Jaegwon Kim, soit l’opposition entre le réalisme explicatif et l’irréalisme explicatif, ainsi que quelques observations sur la métaphysique et l’épistémologie de l’explication, je réexamine le désaccord opposant Robert Kane à Richard Double au sujet du principe de l’explication rationnelle. Je défends la position de Kane sur la double rationalité et je soutiens que le principe proposé par Double possède un champ d’application plus limité qu’il le prétend. Je montre aussi que, contrairement à ce (...)
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  • Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane’s Libertarian Theory.Neil Campbell & Jamal Kadkhodapour - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):415-430.
    Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane’s influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose (...)
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  • Freedom and responsibility: An agent -causal view.Meghan Elizabeth Griffith - unknown
    In this dissertation, I argue that we ought to accept an agent-causal view of free and responsible action. First, I set the stage for this claim by highlighting our intuitions regarding moral responsibility and freedom, and by ruling out competing positions. I support Harry Frankfurt's claim that responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I go beyond this claim, however, to argue that responsibility requires that one be the true originator of one's action, and that this requires a (...)
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