We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...) accepted methods for dealing with the logical paradoxes. (shrink)

The neural structures of the brain exist to construct information. They do this by creating concepts that relate internal, personal need to external, environmental reality. Meaning is formed in the brain by neural network patterns that traverse these two structures of experience: the visceral nervous system and the somatic nervous system. How exactly does the brain get from constructing information to creating meaning, and what can this process tell us about the nature of experience? This book addresses both of these (...) questions, making an important contribution to both neuroscience and philosophy. (shrink)

Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne, and Gabriel Uzquiano have recently argued that free logics—logics that reject or restrict Universal Instantiation—are ultimately not promising approaches to resolving a family of intensional paradoxes due to Arthur Prior. These logics encompass ramified and contextualist approaches to paradoxes, and broadly speaking, there are two kinds of criticism they face. First, they fail to address every version of the Priorean paradoxes. Second, the theoretical considerations behind the logics make absolutely general statements about all propositions, properties of (...) propositions, etc., but because this sort of intensional quantification is always restricted in the logics, they cannot even express those considerations. I present a novel sort of free logic, which rejects the standard Universal Instantiation but validates a restricted form of the rule, and which addresses both kinds of criticism by allowing some propositions to be unrestricted in their quantification. (shrink)

Jörg Hansen, John Horty, and Xavier Parent and Leendert van der Torre have all recently described some sort of nonmonotonic logic to model reasons and their interactions. Horty’s framework is broader in scope than the other two, encompassing both reasoning about the relative strengths of reasons and reasoning about which reasons to consider in the first place. Hansen discusses a plethora of approaches and examples, including Horty’s, arguing that his preferred system best captures our intuitions. And Parent and van der (...) Torre present a family of systems of input/output logic, which are in some ways the most flexible. In this paper, I aim to combine these features. Without attempting to answer the question of which intuitions are the best to capture, I first argue that there are good reasons to explore systems that behave more like Hansen’s than Horty’s. I then show that Parent and van der Torre’s framework of input/output logic can exactly duplicate Hansen’s system but is flexible enough to produce other results as well. Finally, I extend their framework to include the additional kinds of reasoning Horty discusses, showing that the resulting theory can handle a wider range of cases than Horty’s. (shrink)

In , Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russellthe intensional paradoxess interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.

A number of authors have taken a family of paradoxes, whose members trace back to theorems due either in whole or in part to Richard Montague, to pose a serious, possibly fatal challenge to theories of fine-grained, hyperintensional content. These paradoxes all assume that we can represent attitudes such as knowledge and belief with sentential predicates, and this assumption is at the heart of the purported challenge: the thought is that we must reject such predicates to avoid the paradoxes, and (...) that hyperintensionality precludes such a rejection. In this paper I examine in more detail both parts of this thought. I first argue that while there are relatively few satisfactory alternatives to rejecting sentential attitude predicates, we cannot conclusively rule them all out—there are, at least, bullets that proponents of hyperintensionality can bite. I then argue that while most forms of hyperintensional content do in fact guarantee the existence of sentential attitude predicates, one relatively underexplored sort of content, due to Max Cresswell, does not. I thus conclude that while these Montagovian paradoxes present a serious challenge to nearly every popular theory of hyperintensionality, they do not on their own require that we retreat all the way to a familiar, coarse-grained, possible-worlds account of propositions. (shrink)

Introduction Future HIV vaccine efficacy trials with adolescents will need to ensure that participants comprehend study concepts in order to confer true informed assent. A Hepatitis B vaccine trial with adolescents offers valuable opportunity to test youth understanding of vaccine trial requirements in general. Methods Youth reviewed a simplified assent form with study investigators and then completed a comprehension questionnaire. Once enrolled, all youth were tested for HIV and confirmed to be HIV-negative. Results 123 youth completed the questionnaire (mean age=15 (...) years; 63% male; 70% Hispanic). Overall, only 69 (56%) youth answered all six questions correctly. Conclusions Youth enrolled in a Hepatitis B vaccine trial demonstrated variable comprehension of the study design and various methodological concepts, such as treatment group masking. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

This paper argues that public sector organizational failure may be best understood from a perspective of collective denial. The rise of this phenomenon is examined using testimony from a Public Inquiry into the downfall of a UK hospital, where falling organizational standards led to unethical decision making and an unacceptable number of patient deaths. In this paper, we show how collective denial, over time, became a process that resided within the fabric of organizational life. To explore the organizational processes associated (...) with collective denial, and how and why it occurs, we identify the influence of a ‘narrative of silence.’ This narrative allows ever more serious failings to be justified as organizational members lose contact with reality entering a downward spiral with no recovery. The combined impact of assumptions about leadership capability, enculturated professional identities, and organizational loyalty create an environment where a narrative of silence can develop. (shrink)

THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS by Tom Campbell Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. 296 pp., $12.95 Campbell's attempt to construct a socialist version of rights and the rule of law fails because it does not draw on individualism. Campbell's positive rights are ineffective barrien to both the schemes of Utopian visionaries who command political authority and more mundane sources of the abuse of power. He leaves unanswered the question of who will determine the extent (...) of the ?needs?; that would constitute socialist rights, in the absence of unlimited resources to fulfill them. And his rejection of individualism ¡eaves him no means of adjudicating among conflicting positive claim?rights. (shrink)

Gareth Palmer _Discipline and Liberty: Television and Governance_ Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2003 ISBN 0719066921 204 pp.

Depue & Collins propose that extraversion should be separated from the impulsivity-constraint dimension of personality, and that the VTA dopamine system is the primary engine of extraversion. Although their focus is on personality traits, it may be useful to consider the evidence on psychological state changes, related both to affective arousal and to drug effects. This evidence shows that there are inherent relations between extraversion and impulsivity-constraint, and that there are influences of dopamine on impulsivity-constraint that are not consistent with (...) the Depue & Collins model. Increased positive affect leads to increased extraversion, and this is associated with more impulsivity and less constraint. The evidence on drug effects shows that greater dopaminergic control is associated with more constraint, and with anxiety and vigilance rather than positive affect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Handle With CareDonna TuckerMy name is Donna Tucker, and I'm a state tested nursing assistant (STNA)! I have been an STNA for 33 years. I simply love it. It is so rewarding to me to know I make a difference in the lives of my patients. I go in to my job with a smile on my face, an upbeat attitude, open arms, broad shoulders, ears, and a caring (...) heart. I set examples to all around me. I am a mentor, I am a go-to person for my director of nursing (DON). Other STNAs come to me with problems or questions or concerns and together we take care of it. I am an expert committee member for my state's aging panel. I am a committee member for Career Nursing Assistants. I work a lot with Geni Gipson, the founder of this committee. I am a published author and the mother of one daughter and two sons. I have six grandchildren. I just wouldn't like doing anything else. I love my job and family and my teacup poodle, Baby!Let's say I have talked to friends who are not STNAs about my job. I tell them that there is always going to be someone's grandma, grandpa, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, mother, father, etc. who will one day need to be placed in a home. I tell them how good I feel when I can help them. STNAs are not going away, and the door to the home I work at will not close. In some cases it's like taking care of a child. The way you give them a bath, dress them, feed them, take care of incontinence problems. No, I agree, not everyone can do my job. I hear that from my friends a lot. So I tell them, I thank God I can do the job I have.What I do when the resident comes to our facility, I introduce myself to them and to their family. I ask the resident, "Are you spoiled?" Sometimes they say no not at all. I tell them, "Well you are in for a treat. I love to spoil and that's one of the things we do around here." If they say yes, I tell them, "Well we have our work cut our for us, because we have to spoil you even more." I usually get lots of smiles from the family and resident. After they settle for a while, and the family is alone, I ask the [End Page 153] family questions about their loved one. I like to get a story about the resident from family so I can use it in my conversation later with the resident. I assure the family their loved one will be treated exactly the way they themselves would treat them. We are not trying to replace the family. We are filling in as family while they are away from the loved one. Then after the family is gone, I keep checking in on the resident, visit for a spell and chat. I ask them if they need anything. I just want the resident to feel safe, loved, and comfortable.Demanding family members can mean different things. For example, if they come in to help feed their loved one—I had a family member tell me, "I want mother's food now so I can feed her." I tell the family the cart that is coming now is room trays and as soon as we deliver the room trays, because we want our residents to get hot meals, I will call the kitchen and get that tray for your mother ASAP. Some family members just want you to drop all you are doing to assist their loved one. When a family member asks for something we are pretty prompt to get up and take care of it. It assures them that we will not put off anything asked of us. Sometimes it's the family member's way to show their loved one, "Well, I'll take care of this" so their loved one knows they are loved by family. Some family members just feel bad... (shrink)

To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

MARXISM AND LIBERALISM edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Jeffrey Paul and John Ahrens New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 223 pp., $14?95 (paper) LIBERALISM by John Gray Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 106 pp., $9.95 (paper).

Considered in relation to the component brain systems of appraisal-emotion interactions, dynamical systems theory blurs the divisions that seem obvious in a psychological analysis, such as between arousal, emotion, and appraisal. At the same time, the component brain mechanisms can themselves be seen to be incomplete as units of analysis, making sense only in the context of the whole organism.

Propositions are more than the bearers of truth and the meanings of sentences: they are also the objects of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, and fear. This variety of roles leads to a variety of paradoxes, most of which have been sorely neglected. Arguing that existing work on these paradoxes is either too heavy-handed or too specific in its focus to be fully satisfactory, I develop a basic intensional logic and pursue and compare three strategies for addressing (...) the paradoxes, one employing truth-value gaps, one restricting propositional quantification, and one restricting our ability to have attitudes like belief and desire. This results in four distinct resolutions of the paradoxes, all but one of which are novel and all of which receive novel and general implementations. While resolving the paradoxes is of course the ultimate goal, I do not here argue that any one of the resolutions is superior. These paradoxes have been so little studied that my primary goal is only to identify the most fundamental costs and benefits of the various approaches one can take to addressing them. Each resolution I develop has significant drawbacks, which I argue highlight tensions between the different roles propositions play. Past researchers have skirted these tensions, and the issues raised by these paradoxes more generally, by focusing on non-propositional paradoxes, such as the most familiar forms of the Liar paradox. At the least, then, I hope this dissertation establishes that the propositional paradoxes deserve attention not only because of their consequences for intensional logic, but also because of their consequences for our understanding of content, truth, quantification, and a host of mental attitudes. (shrink)

Propositions are central to at least most theorizing about the connection between our mental lives and the world: we use them in our theories of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, fear, knowledge, and understanding. Unfortunately, when we press on these theories, we encounter a relatively neglected family of paradoxes first studied by Arthur Prior. I argue that these paradoxes present a fatal problem for most familiar resolutions of paradoxes. In particular, I argue that truth-value gap, contextualist, situation (...) theoretic, revision theoretic, ramified, and dialetheist approaches to the paradoxes must deny us the conceptual resources that they themselves make use of, on pain of contradiction. I then detail the costs of the extant strategies that avoid this issue: Hartry Field’s paracomplete approach; Andrew Bacon’s classical treatment of indeterminacy; a generalization of ideas from Prior, Nicholas J.J. Smith, and Hartley Slater; and free logics as recently explored by Bacon, John Hawthorne, and Gabriel Uzquiano. I argue that none of these is perfect, and that each restricts the theories we can endorse in a variety of areas of philosophy. I spell these restrictions out, showing, I hope, that the further investigation of these paradoxes must be a part of future research on propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Metaphors, particularly the implicit ones, constrain imagination. If we think of the brain as a collection of centers of cognitive activations, lighting up on demand, then this becomes all we can imagine. By thinking of the cortex as propagating its functional work through physical waves, Nunez offers us a new, rich model for distributed representation. Now let's add real anatomy.

The important Hebbian architecture for language may not be the phonological networks of perisylvian cortex, but rather the semantic networks of limbic cortex. Although the high-frequency EEG findings are intriguing, the results may not yet warrant a confident theory of neural assemblies. Nonetheless, Pulvermüller succeeds in framing a comprehensive theory of language function in the literal terms of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology.

The aim of this paper is to understand why some ethical behaviours fail to embed, and importantly what can be done about it. We address this by looking at an example where ethical behaviour has not become the norm, i.e. the widespread, habitual, use of ‘bags for life’. This is an interesting case because whilst a consistent message of ‘saving the environment’ has been the basis of the promotion of ‘bags for life’ in the United Kingdom for many years, their (...) uptake has only recently become more widespread and still remains at low levels. Through an exploratory study, we unpack some of the contextual barriers which may influence ethical consumerism. We do this by examining the attitudes which influenced people to start using ‘bags for life’, and how people persuade others to use ‘bags for life’. We use a case study analysis to try and understand why ethical behaviour change has stalled and not become sustained. We find that both individuals and institutions play a significant interaction role in encouraging a sustained behavioural change towards ethical consumerism. (shrink)