This article examines how therapists and patients start building and managing relationships and pursue institutional goals at the same time. Based on a corpus of 6 audio-recorded therapies (client-centered therapy and psychodynamic therapy), I investigate first encounters between therapists and patients as the starting points of any therapeutical process and the place where a relationship between the interactants is established for the first time. Following a microlinguistic qualitative approach and applying methods from conversation analysis and discourse analysis, I show how (...) therapists, on the one hand, try to align with patients to build a positive working alliance and, on the other hand, work to fulfill specific interactive tasks of therapeutic discourse which demand disaligning with the patients’ communicative activity and their interactive expectations. Specific interactive “jobs” that need to be fulfilled in psychotherapy are identified, namely the performance of institutional roles by the interactants, the establishment of an interaction structure and the pursuit of helpful change in the patient. I show at which places in the interaction therapists (dis-)align with the patients’ projected communicative activity and how aligning and disaligning are related to the interactive process and the establishment and performance of these interactive jobs. The analysis shows that, at the beginning of therapy, alignment and disalignment are both important processes for the following reasons: Aligning with the patient contributes to a positive relationship, which has been shown to be vital for successful psychotherapy, while disaligning introduces the patient to the specific discursive mechanisms that characterize therapeutic discourse and constitute the basis for its effectiveness. Overall, the paper argues that reducing therapy to a dichotomy between relationship and “technique” seems overly simplistic, as both aspects need to be handled and managed at the same time. (shrink)

On many currently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of value definiteness, according to which the properties of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether either metaphysical supervaluationist or determinable-based approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can accommodate quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI). We start by discussing the standard theoretical indicator of QMI, and distinguishing three seemingly different sources of QMI (S1). We then show that previous arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical supervaluationism (...) cannot accommodate QMI, due to Darby 2010 and Skow 2010, are unsuccessful, in leaving open several supervaluationist responses. We go on to provide more comprehensive argumentation for the negative conclusion. Here, among other results, we establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the concern that is the focus of Darby's and Skow's discussions (according to which a supervaluationist approach is incompatible with the orthodox interpretation, in light of the Kochen-Specker theorem) to also attach to common understandings of other interpretations on which there is QMI (S2). We then argue that a determinable-based account can successfully accommodate all three varieties of QMI (S3). We close by observing the positive mutual bearing of our results on the coherence and intelligibility of both quantum mechanics and metaphysical indeterminacy (S4). (shrink)

This paper explores quantum indeterminacy, as it is operative in the failure of value‐definiteness for quantum observables. It first addresses questions about its existence, its nature, and its relations to extant quantum interpretations. Then, it provides a critical discussions of the main accounts of quantum indeterminacy.

In Calosi and Wilson (Phil Studies 2019/2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson 2013 and 2016, properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit (...) experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (§1). We then apply a developed 'glutty' implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (§2). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2017), either to QMI (§3) or to our specific account of QMI (§4); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick's deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (§5). (shrink)

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality in QM.

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer, to the Special Composition Question. According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised against such (...) answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism. (shrink)

Multilocation – the notion of an object being at two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.

The present paper has three closely related aims. We first argue that Agazzi’s scientific realism about Quantum Mechanics is in line with Selleri’s and Tarozzi’s proposal of Quantum Waves. We then go on to formulate rigorously different metaphysical principles such as property compositional determinateness and mereological extensionalism. We argue that, contrary to widespread agreement, realism about Quantum Mechanics actually refutes only the former. Indeed we even formulate a new quantum mechanical argument in favor of extensionalism. We conclude by noting that, (...) given the results of the work, Agazzi’s particular attitude towards Quantum Mechanics is still one of the most promising theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

According to the Determinable Based Account of metaphysical indeterminacy, there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, roughly a state of affairs in which a constituent object x has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. There are different ways in which x might have a determinable but no unique determinate: x has no determinate—gappy MI, or x has more than one determinate—glutty MI. Talk of determinables and determinates is usually constructed (...) as relative to levels of determination. In this paper I first provide a formal construction for determinables and determinates that pays crucial attention to intermediate levels of determination, and then explore the consequences for the DBA of introducing such intermediate levels. In particular, I argue that intermediate levels of determination highlight crucial differences between gappy and glutty cases of MI, and allow one to introduce a third way of indeterminacy, glappy MI. (shrink)

Among the most egregious and discouraging problems of conservation is the rapidly escalating human‐caused species extinction rate. “De‐extinction” refers to the application of certain cutting‐edge techniques for the supposed recovery of lost species and gives the impression that scientists, enlightened and empowered by the miracles of technology, are coming to the rescue. “De‐extinction” is the latest example of a long play of language that has given conservation efforts a tragically false sense of accomplishment and has worsened the conservation crisis. De‐extinction (...) is the tip of an intellectual iceberg that sits atop of a host of profoundly questionable value systems, expectations, attitudes, and priorities that elude and bewitch critical reflection. It gives the impression that extinction is reversible and, thus, diminishes the gravity of the human annihilation of species. Here, we examine how the language of de‐extinction influences attitudes, shapes thoughts and imagination, and creates ethical blindness. The language developing around “de‐extinction” reveals what is in fact a profound intellectual crisis at the foundation of conservation. The underlying challenge is to find the language that will articulate and inspire the radical and indispensable change needed to come to grips with the value of nature. (shrink)

I give a new and more general argument against presentism within relativistic spacetimes. This argument is untouched by different recent proposals designed to save presentism in a relativistic setting.

Multilocation – the notion of an object being 18756735_00000147_text.pdfat two places – is a central notion in metaphysics. According to a widespread view, multilocation is problematic but metaphysically possible. In effect, it has been claimed that in a quantum world, multilocation is not simply possible but actual. This article provides a new argument against the latter claim: there is no quantum multilocation.

Super-substantivalism (of the type we’ll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier “on top of” spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts (...) of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism’s tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics. (shrink)

Different realistic attitudes towards wavefunctions and quantum states are as old as quantum theory itself. Recently Pusey, Barret and Rudolph on the one hand, and Auletta and Tarozzi on the other, have proposed new interesting arguments in favor of a broad realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be considered the modern heir to some views held by the fathers of quantum theory. In this paper we give a new and detailed presentation of such arguments, propose a new taxonomy of (...) different realistic positions in the foundations of quantum mechanics and assess the scope, within this new taxonomy, of these realistic arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, we address an infamous argument against divisibility that dates back to Zeno. There has been an incredible amount of discussion on how to understand the critical notions of divisibility, extension, and infinite divisibility that are crucial for the very formulation of the argument. The paper provides new and rigorous definitions of those notions using the formal theories of parthood and location. Also, it provides a new solution to the paradox of divisibility which does not face some threats (...) that can possibly undermine the standard Lebesgue measure solution to such a paradox. (shrink)

The present study investigated the mediating role of conceptions of learning in the relationship between metacognition and academic outcomes among middle school students. The self-report ‘Learning Conceptions Questionnaire’ (LCQ) and ‘Metacognitive questionnaire on the method of study’ (QMS) were administered to 136 middle school students and their academic outcomes were collected. Correlation analyses revealed that within metacognition only self-assessment was positively correlated with academic outcomes. Mediation analysis indicated that a conception of learning as internal attribution of success and failure was (...) significantly involved as mediator in the relationship between metacognition and academic achievements. The present study permitted to advance our knowledge about the relationship between metacognition and academic achievements and it opened the way to practical implications. (shrink)

visão tradicional da fi losofi a moderna considera a distinção entre o homem e os animais como resultante da posse da razão. Isto está de acordo com uma concepção do lugar do ser humano na natureza como um lugar de destaque e superioridade em relação às outras formas de vida. Por outro lado, a gradual substituição desta postura leva a uma aproximação entre os seres vivos e a uma destituição do lugar de domínio que se julgava ser ao homem devido. (...) Tudo isso, naturalmente, vai resultar em uma crítica ao conceito tradicional de razão, como a faculdade exclusivamente humana de encontrar a verdade. Ao que parece, a fi losofi a não está em condições de, sozinha, julgar até que ponto a origem comum com os outros seres vivos é relevante para a teoria do conhecimento. Entretanto, é do maior interesse descobrir até que ponto se pode estender esta analogia entre o ser humano e os animais. Diante das similaridades reveladas pelas ciências, procurar este elemento de distinção no meio ambiente cultural parece bem mais viável do que procurar entre as capacidades cognitivas do sujeito. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo presentamos a san Agustín como punto de partida de la reflexión de Husserl respecto del tiempo y la correlación entre memoria y Erinnerung. La investigación fenomenológica de Husserl acerca de la conciencia interna del tiempo parte de la reflexión de san Agustín por el mismo problema. En estas obras, el tiempo se puede medir porque hay una distentio animi. En Husserl, Die Erinnerung nos coloca ante una conexión infinita de “antes”, pues toda percepción se encuentra en (...) una relación de multiplicidad de percepciones. Ambos pensadores están unidos por la vocación de dar cuenta de la propia inmanencia.: This article presents Saint Agustin as a starting point for Husserl’s reflection on time and the correlation between memory and Erinnerung. Husserl’s phenomenological research on the internal consciousness of time starts from the reflection of St. Augustine on the same problem. In this works, time can be measured because there is distentio animi. In Husserl, Die Erinnerung places us in the face of an infinite “before” connection, because all perceptions are to be found on a relationship of multiplicity of perceptions. Both thinkers are united by the vocation to account for their own immanence. (shrink)

La reflexión de Friederich Schleiermacher sobre la universidad se centra en las dificultades que observa para superar el estancamiento de la educación alemana a principios del siglo XIX y establece, en ella, dos niveles: por un lado, la excesiva burocratización de la vida universitaria, que le quita lo que tiene precisamente de vital y, por otro, desde la perspectiva propiamente del profesor, la imposibilidad de cultivar el talento de los alumnos mediante clases farragosas, en las que se repite lo que (...) ya está escrito y en las que la memoria es la única medida del conocimiento. La mayoría de los profesores se encuentran en esta situación porque los conocimientos se perciben de manera fragmentaria y, por lo tanto, se transmiten sin el contenido de su unidad profunda. La Facultad de Filosofía tiene el cometido de construir el camino hacia la unidad de conocimiento y fundamentar el sentido profundo de la vida universitaria. Por ello, los cimientos de la universidad moderna descansan sobre el profesor que investiga y transmite en sus clases el pathos de aquella tarea; también descansan sobre el alumno, a quien hay que ayudar a comprender la dimensión de su talento y desde allí, emprender la tarea de la auto-educación. (shrink)

The relation between noise and disturbance is investigated within the general framework of Galois connections. Within this framework, we introduce the notion of leak of information, mathematically defined as one of the two closure maps arising from the observable-channel compatibility relation. We provide a physical interpretation for it, and we give a comparison with the analogous closure maps associated with joint measurability and simulability for quantum observables.

HAN, Byung-Chul. Sociedade do cansaço. Vozes, Petrópolis: 2017.

la82 12.00 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} A epistemologia evolutiva é uma corrente que tenta explicar o conhecimento humano em conformidade com a descriçáo feita dele pelas ciências biológicas. Deste ponto de vista a seleçáo natural concorre como causa da presença, no ser humano, da atitude (...) racional. Uma das principais críticas contra esta corrente epistemológica, proposta por Thomas Nagel, apóia-se no argumento de que um conceito de racionalidade derivado das realizações de uma teoria científica – a teoria da evoluçáo – náo pode ser utilizado para explicar a validade universal das regras segundo as quais esta racionalidade opera. Esta crítica pode, segundo a tese aqui proposta, ser suficientemente respondida, a partir de uma consideraçáo adequada da noçáo de natureza humana, como composta de princípios e mecanismos que estariam na origem da capacidade racional encontrada no ser humano. Michael Ruse oferece uma estratégia de resposta do ponto de vista naturalista. O que se afirma neste trabalho é que há uma outra estratégia de resposta possível à crítica de Nagel contra a legitimidade da epistemologia evolutiva, que se apóia na analogia entre a evoluçáo biológica e a evoluçáo do conhecimento no ambiente da cultura. (shrink)

A partir da leitura dos escritos de Ficino dedicados à melancolia, a presente investigação considera o modo como, combinando elementos de diversas fontes, o filósofo florentino contribuiu decisivamente para compreensão dessa condição e para a constituição de um medium terapêutico diferenciado. O enquadramento do De Vita Libri Tres na longa sucessão de teorias médico-‑filosóficas relativas à constituição melancólica revela a sua participação na dimensão incremental de uma densa semântica, mas também, de modo decisivo, a ausência de uma evolução unívoca das (...) ideias de melancolia. Assim o demonstra a recuperação de uma vertente favorável do temperamento melancólico, combinando Ficino a ortodoxia médica relativa ao equilíbrio humoral com a possibilidade, enunciada no Problema XXX, de uma forma superior de equilíbrio. O eclodir da genialidade contemplativa, tida como característica central dos maiores feitos humanos, em particular no domínio dos estudos académicos, tem lugar na forma de êxtase, adaptando Ficino traços da mania [furor] platónica. O papel de Ficino na evolução das conceções de melancolia é também evidenciado na sua exploração das suas formas amorosa e religiosa, indicando uma sensibilidade às condições sociais da individuação, mas também a tentativa de compreender e mitigar as tribulações existenciais associadas ao seu próprio temperamento. Já no que se refere ao manancial terapêutico proposto pelo filósofo florentino, o aspeto mais inovador reside na sua mobilização da astrologia e da magia, pro- curando demonstrar que as mesmas são um recurso natural baseado num conceito de simpatia entre os elementos da hierarquia cósmica e, como tal, distintas da necromancia e da demonologia. (shrink)

The present essay seeks to investigate the physical-vital sensations and feelings resulting from the contact with the artistic form. For this purpose, and from the main constellations that orbit around Nietzsche and Warburg, the essay seeks to inquire whether the work of art, as we conceive it, is capable of serving as a vital tonic or stimulant to life. Understanding sensation as friction, the mark of the organism's bodily contact with the environment, and feeling as the incorporation of this sensation (...) in terms of vital increment or decay, the essay seeks to question whether form would not be the translation in vital terms of physical forces. of the world, and therefore, a physical-biological possibility of adding vital power. In this way, more than serving the aesthetic enjoyment, the work would rather be the materialization of a historical way of life, and, therefore, thirsty for the will to power. Key-words: Form; Body; Power. (shrink)

The Sociology of religion, like other sciences, has the objective of pursuing and finding the truth of the phenomenon it studies, not so much in reference to the reality of the noumenon but rather in the veracity of the relative psycho-sociological mediations, as direct object of its approach. Thus it contributes to the complete and concrete knowledge of its own contents and of those, it shares with other sciences . Such perspective is tested by its history and proved by the (...) epistemological precedences, but also by the present applications. For this reason, the sociology of religion demands a rigorous application: from the operazionality of the concepts, to the characterization of the dimensions, till the structural, dynamic and relational features of its own content. It finds therefore the effectiveness of its method: by getting the 'constants' and 'regularities' of the manifestations of the 'religious phenomenon', evidencing the objectivity as predicate of truth of the mediations and by putting into effect the perspective of validation or of the falsification of its results. (shrink)

As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such, but rather toward the object’s way of appearance. Husserl’s famous letter to Hofmannsthal (1907) goes as far as to suggest that any existential concerns are potentially even a menace to the purity of aesthetic experience. This position clearly echoes Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment presented in the third Critique, notably as regards the notion (...) of disinterestedness. However, this is not tantamount to claiming that aesthetic attitude implies the suspension of all interest: this paper aims to show that it would be more appropriate to discuss it in terms of a change of interest: from an existential interest to an axiological one. (shrink)