Gappy, glutty, glappy

Synthese 199 (3-4):11305-11321 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Determinable Based Account of metaphysical indeterminacy, there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, roughly a state of affairs in which a constituent object x has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. There are different ways in which x might have a determinable but no unique determinate: x has no determinate—gappy MI, or x has more than one determinate—glutty MI. Talk of determinables and determinates is usually constructed as relative to levels of determination. In this paper I first provide a formal construction for determinables and determinates that pays crucial attention to intermediate levels of determination, and then explore the consequences for the DBA of introducing such intermediate levels. In particular, I argue that intermediate levels of determination highlight crucial differences between gappy and glutty cases of MI, and allow one to introduce a third way of indeterminacy, glappy MI.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.
Future Contradictions.Jc Beall - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
Finding Tolerance without Gluts.Jc Beall - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):791-811.
Are There Indeterminate States of Affairs? Yes.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - In Elizabeth B. Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. New York: Routledge. pp. 105-119.
Hegel's Glutty Negation.Elena Ficara - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (1):29-38.
Braun Defended.Lee Walters - 2011 - The Reasoner 5 (8):124-125.
Unnecessary existents.Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):766-775.
Quantum indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Cristian Mariani - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (4):e12731.
Please mind the gappy content.Johan Gersel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):219-239.
Gappy propositions?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-157.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-13

Downloads
32 (#473,773)

6 months
10 (#219,185)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Non-accessible mass and the ontology of GRW.Cristian Mariani - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C):270-279.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Jessica Wilson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2599–2627.
A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy.Jessica M. Wilson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.

View all 16 references / Add more references