In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable. However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As (...) we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species. (shrink)

On many currently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of value definiteness, according to which the properties of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether either metaphysical supervaluationist or determinable-based approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can accommodate quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI). We start by discussing the standard theoretical indicator of QMI, and distinguishing three seemingly different sources of QMI (S1). We then show that previous arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical supervaluationism (...) cannot accommodate QMI, due to Darby 2010 and Skow 2010, are unsuccessful, in leaving open several supervaluationist responses. We go on to provide more comprehensive argumentation for the negative conclusion. Here, among other results, we establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the concern that is the focus of Darby's and Skow's discussions (according to which a supervaluationist approach is incompatible with the orthodox interpretation, in light of the Kochen-Specker theorem) to also attach to common understandings of other interpretations on which there is QMI (S2). We then argue that a determinable-based account can successfully accommodate all three varieties of QMI (S3). We close by observing the positive mutual bearing of our results on the coherence and intelligibility of both quantum mechanics and metaphysical indeterminacy (S4). (shrink)

This paper explores quantum indeterminacy, as it is operative in the failure of value‐definiteness for quantum observables. It first addresses questions about its existence, its nature, and its relations to extant quantum interpretations. Then, it provides a critical discussions of the main accounts of quantum indeterminacy.

In Calosi and Wilson (Phil Studies 2019/2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson 2013 and 2016, properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit (...) experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (§1). We then apply a developed 'glutty' implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (§2). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2017), either to QMI (§3) or to our specific account of QMI (§4); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick's deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (§5). (shrink)

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

Priority monism is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that is, a concrete object that does not depend on any other concrete object. Schaffer, the main advocate of PM, claims that PM is compatible with dependence having two different directions: from parts to wholes for subcosmic wholes, and from whole to parts for the cosmic whole. Recently it has been argued that this position is untenable. Given plausible assumptions about dependence, PM entails that dependence has (...) only one direction, it always goes from wholes to parts. One such plausible assumption is a principle of Isolation. I argue that, given all extant accounts of dependence on the market, PM entails No Isolation. The argument depends upon a particular feature of the dependence relation, namely, necessitation and its direction. In the light of this, I contend that the argument is important, insofar as it suggests that we should distinguish dependence from other cognate notions, e.g. grounding. Once this distinction is made, I suggest we should also distinguish between two different notions of fundamentality that might turn out to be not-coextensive. (shrink)

The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality in QM.

En este artículo analizamos la crítica que Richard Rorty hace de la apelación al “método experimental” por parte de John Dewey. Defendemos que la categórica desestimación que Rorty presenta del vínculo entre el pragmatismo de Dewey y su concepción de método hubiera sido o bien matizada, o bien radicalmente diferente, de haber considerado seriamente la importancia que la reflexión sobre la educación tenía para el filósofo de Vermont. Nuestra estrategia interpretativa se apoya en la recuperación que Henry Cowles hace recientemente (...) de la apelación al método experimental que Dewey lleva a cabo en How We Think —uno de sus textos educativos más importantes—, en donde se muestra las vinculaciones relevantes entre pragmatismo, evolucionismo y método. Este marco histórico-conceptual nos permitirá cuestionar la reconstrucción de Rorty en torno de este aspecto de la filosofía deweyana tomando en cuenta, fundamentalmente, sus propias reflexiones sobre educación. (shrink)

The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.

Are submergence and submergent properties metaphysically possible? This is a substantive question that has been either utterly neglected or quickly answered in the negative. This neglect is not only significant in itself; the possibility of submergence plays a crucial role in hotly debated topics in metaphysics, for example, the debate over Monism and Pluralism. This paper is intended to prompt a discussion about metaphysical submergence. In particular I will provide examples of submergent properties, argue that these are metaphysically possible and (...) finally propose a pluralist argument from submergence. (shrink)

This volume is the first systematic and thorough attempt to investigate the relation and the possible applications of mereology to contemporary science. It gathers contributions from leading scholars in the field and covers a wide range of scientific theories and practices such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, computer science and engineering. Throughout the volume, a variety of foundational issues are investigated both from the formal and the empirical point of view. The first section looks at the topic as it applies (...) to physics. The section addresses questions of persistence and composition within quantum and relativistic physics and concludes by scrutinizing the possibility to capture continuity of motion as described by our best physical theories within gunky space times. The second part tackles mathematics and shows how to provide a foundation for point-free geometry of space switching to fuzzy-logic. The relation between mereological sums and set-theoretic suprema is investigated and issues about different mereological perspectives such as classical and natural Mereology are thoroughly discussed. The third section in the volume looks at natural science. Several questions from biology, medicine and chemistry are investigated. From the perspective of biology, there is an attempt to provide axioms for inferring statements about part hood between two biological entities from statements about their spatial relation. From the perspective of chemistry, it is argued that classical mereological frameworks are not adequate to capture the practices of chemistry in that they consider neither temporal nor modal parameters. The final part introduces computer science and engineering. A new formal mereological framework in which an indeterminate relation of part hood is taken as a primitive notion is constructed and then applied to a wide variety of disciplines from robotics to knowledge engineering. A formal framework for discrete mereotopology and its applications is developed and finally, the importance of mereology for the relatively new science of domain engineering is also discussed. (shrink)

Kant ha subrayado el carácter problemático del auto-conocimiento en el campo de la antropología y la psicología: desde sus primeras obras insistió en la imposibilidad de conocer con certeza, sobre la base de las acciones, la disposición moral subjetiva, la única que da a la acción un valor moral. Esta dificultad no se atenúa cuando el juicio moral es dirigido sobre el sujeto mismo. A los problemas cognitivos se añade una tendencia al auto-engaño que está activa en toda la vida (...) moral. Si se mantiene la importancia de este argumento, puede emerger una caracterización de la Gesinnung que la distingue de cualquier “intención” subjetiva. Aquella puede ser concebida más bien como una estructura “objetiva”, independiente de la conciencia subjetiva y análoga a una idea regulativa, que obliga a interpretar las acciones morales sobre la base de un principio que es necesario asumir, pero que no es posible conocer. (shrink)

The present paper has three closely related aims. We first argue that Agazzi’s scientific realism about Quantum Mechanics is in line with Selleri’s and Tarozzi’s proposal of Quantum Waves. We then go on to formulate rigorously different metaphysical principles such as property compositional determinateness and mereological extensionalism. We argue that, contrary to widespread agreement, realism about Quantum Mechanics actually refutes only the former. Indeed we even formulate a new quantum mechanical argument in favor of extensionalism. We conclude by noting that, (...) given the results of the work, Agazzi’s particular attitude towards Quantum Mechanics is still one of the most promising theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

Dynamical systems are mathematical structures whose aim is to describe the evolution of an arbitrary deterministic system through time, which is typically modeled as (a subset of) the integers or the real numbers. We show that it is possible to generalize the standard notion of a dynamical system, so that its time dimension is only required to possess the algebraic structure of a monoid: first, we endow any dynamical system with an associated graph and, second, we prove that such a (...) graph is a category if and only if the time model of the dynamical system is a monoid. In addition, we show that the general notion of a dynamical system allows us not only to define a family of meaningful dynamical concepts, but also to distinguish among a cluster of otherwise tangled notions of reversibility, whose logical relationships are finally analyzed. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el proceso de integración del Mercosur en el que participan Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay y sus efectos sobre la ciudadanía política y social. En la primera parte del mismo los autores examinan los rasgos, el contexto de nacimiento y la filosofía del proceso de integración mercosureño. La segunda parte analiza la evolución de la democracia y de la justicia social durante el proceso de integración. Los autores llegan a la conclusión de que el modelo de integración (...) mercosureño no puede contrarrestar la crisis de la democracia y de la justicia social que tienen lugar especialmente en Argentina y Brasil. (shrink)

A scholarly annotated epic poem on the pitfalls and tribulations of “good philosophizing”. Divided into twenty-eight cantos (in medieval Italian hendecasyllabic terza rima), the poem tells of an allegorical journey through the downward spiral of the philosophers’ hell, where all sorts of thinkers are punished for their faults and mistakes, in the endeavor to reach a way out of the condition of intellectual impasse in which the narrator has found himself. The affinities with Dante’s Inferno are apparent. Whereas Dante’s poem (...) is about human sins and moral felonies, this one is about philosophical errors and fallacies; whereas Virgil takes Dante through the gluttons, the wrathful, the violent, the traitors to parties and countries, etc., here Socrates takes us through the realists, the skeptics, the dualists, the nichilists, the worshipers of language and easy mythos, etc. And yet this is not just a philosophical counterpart of Dante’s masterpiece, even less a parody. We can’t say exactly when, how, and why it was written, but this is an authentic piece of philosophy, a poem of love, a passionate testimony of militant metaphysics. It is the inspired and inspiring journey of someone, anyone, who is truly moved by the Love for Wisdom and by the grueling purification of the intellect that it demands. (shrink)

La justicia social internacional -- La participación política en América Latin -- Apuntes acerca de la dialéctica democracia-autoritarismo en América Latina.

I give a new and more general argument against presentism within relativistic spacetimes. This argument is untouched by different recent proposals designed to save presentism in a relativistic setting.

This volume advances the research agenda of one of the most remarkable political thinkers of our time: Jon Elster. With an impressive list of contributors, it features studies in five topics in political and social theory: rationality and collective action, political and social norms, democracy and constitution making, transitional justice, and the explanation of social behavior. Additionally, this volume includes chapters on the development of Elster's thinking over the past decades. Like Elster's own writings, the essays in this collection are (...) problem-driven, non-ideal inquiries of practical relevance. This volume closes with lucid comments by Jon Elster. (shrink)

En busca de un arte hispanoamericano.--El cine es arte?--La imagen y la obra de arte.--Velázquez, cumbre y mediodía.

Resumen: El siguiente trabajo pretende analizar la categoría de “romanticismo político” desarrollada por el filósofo alemán Carl Schmitt, aplicando su acepción de “política romántica” al caso del poeta-político chileno Guillermo Matta Goyenechea. Por medio de términos tales como imaginación, lenguaje cósmico, progreso moral, democracia, entre otros, este poeta-político articuló su discurso social durante el periodo de 1853 a 1858, como elementos de disputa con el poder regente bajo la intención de reformar la sociedad chilena de su época.: The present work (...) had the purpose of defining the category of "political romanticism" developed by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, applying its meaning of "romantic politics" to the case of the Chilean political poet Guillermo Matta Goyenechea. Through the terms stories such as imagination, cosmic language, moral progress, democracy, among others, this poet-politician articulated his social discourse during the period from 1853 to 1858, as elements of dispute with the ruling power under the intention of reforming the chilean society of his time. (shrink)

Product structures are represented in engineering models by depicting and linking components, features and assemblies. Their understanding requires knowledge of both design and manufacturing practices, and yet further contextual reasoning is needed to read them correctly. Since these representations are essen- tial to the engineering activities, the lack of a clear and explicit semantics of these models hampers the use of information systems for their assessment and exploita- tion. We study this problem by identifying different interpretations of structure rep- resentations, (...) and then discuss the formal properties that a suitable language needs for representing components, features and combinations of these. We show that the representation of components and features require a non-standard mereology. (shrink)

In this article, we tackle the phenomenon of what seems to be a misunderstanding between science education theory and philosophy of science−one which does not seem to have received any attention in the literature. While there seems to be a consensus within the realm of science education on limiting or altogether denying the explanatory role of scientific laws (particularly in contrast with “theories”), none of the canonical models of scientific explanation (covering law, statistical relevance, unification, mechanistic-causal, pragmatic) lends any support (...) to this view of laws. We will reconstruct three different versions of this demotion of laws (i.e., laws are merely descriptive; laws are explanatory only of singular events, not of laws; laws are explanatory but only in a “superficial” way), propose possible grounds for them and illustrate why these perspectives pose a conceptual challenge as they contrast with epistemological approaches to the problem of explanation. We will also suggest the potential negative outcomes that would arise from science teachers adopting these approaches in the classroom when aiming to assist students in moving beyond mere description and towards explanation. (shrink)

Esta discussão pretende mostrar pontos relevantes de uma comparação entre a obra de David Hume e de Charles Darwin, no que toca às capacidades cognitivas humanas e de outros animais. Hume tem uma teoria que explica o conhecimento causal em termos de um instinto natural – o hábito. A presença de tal instinto pode ser entendida remetendo-se a uma teoria geral da natureza, onde o mundo é entendido como governado por leis e regularidades constantes, e sem a suposição da interferência (...) de um plano ou desígnio. Isto conduz Hume à aproximação entre a capacidade cognitiva humana e a de outros animais, que também manifestam um aprendizado instintivo do tipo causal. Darwin, por sua vez, menciona uma graduação de diversas capacidades de conhecimento, diferenciando a ação instintiva da ação que resulta de deliberação e inferência; e aponta para o fato de que muitos animais apresentam um grau significativo de comportamento inteligente. Seu mecanismo de evolução por seleção natural pretende explicar essas características, tanto no homem como nos animais. Disso resulta contemporaneamente uma corrente em epistemologia que tem recebido o nome de epistemologia evolutiva, a qual, ao seguir declaradamente Darwin, carece de uma interpretação mais detalhada do pensamento de Hume, que poderia, supõe-se, oferecer elementos para o tratamento de questões epistemológicas tais como a da capacidade para o conhecimento causal. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo se circunscribe en los dilemas que vivencia el profesional, el intelectual que se posiciona en una trinchera del conocimiento que tiene causa común con el enfrentamiento del modelo económico-social actual. Analiza la pugna que existe entre la satisfacción de necesidades de la institución donde trabaja y aquellas necesidades explicitas y latentes del grupo humano donde materializa el ejercicio disciplinario La finalidad, entonces, es sumarse al proyecto social que llama a la militancia en el campo, a la resignificación (...) del compromiso intelectual con la clase oprimida, a la lucha que deben dar en el campo los intelectuales, no solo contra el poder simbólico, sino en contra de la razón neoliberal. (shrink)

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

The purpose of the article is to show that the foundations of a dualistic theology of Christian roots are found in the point of connection between platonic metaphysics, gnostic myths and exegesis. It highlights the way in which platonic metaphysics was developed in a completely different way than what is known as “Metaphysics of Exodus”. It considers that myth ─as an expressive vehicle of religious experience and having a polyvalent logic─ was a decisive element for the transmission of gnostic tradition. (...) Thus, the article concentrates on the gnostic understanding of “The Prologue of John”, which focuses on the Christological function of Jesus, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in the indifference with which this tradition dealt with Incarnation. The tools for the exegesis are taken from Hellenic tradition as a form to clarify the gnostic intuition concerning the stages of the propagation of the divine, both before and after the Fall. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo analisa a ocorrência cotidiana, nas redações de jornal, de inúmeras manifestações “laicas” da religiosidade (na concepção simmeliana, é uma capacidade humana que engloba a totalidade da existência e lhe confere sentido). O autor trabalhou, durante cinco anos, nas redações dos jornais Folha de S. Paulo e O Estado de S. Paulo. das observações, anotadas num diário de campo, entrevistas e levantamento de dados, resultou uma “repor-tese” – uma reportagem que virou doutorado. Não há no jornalismo um componente (...) religioso formal. Mas, por predisposição pessoal, ethos da profissão ou tradição, a religiosidade do jornalista secreta um sentido de promoção da verdade e da justiça. A empresa jornalística exerce uma peculiar onipotência ao selecionar acontecimentos que considera dignos de ser publicados. A ancoragem da imprensa no tempo lhe confere certa eternidade, pois a sucessão ininterrupta de edições configura um retorno ao eterno presente. Conclui-se que a característica “religiosa” do jornalismo se manifesta sob forma de rituais de lugar e tempo, de pessoas e falas e também como mística da vocação, da missão e do sofrimento. Essas condições também podem ser usadas como um disfarce “heróico” na exploração do trabalhador. Palavras-chave: Jornalismo; Fenômeno religioso; Ritual; Mística.This article analyses the daily occurrence of multiple secular manifestations of religiousness in newspapers editorial rooms (according to Georg Simmel, it is a human capacity that involves the whole existence and endows it with sense). The author worked for newspapers Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de S. Paulo for five years. From his observations, written down in a diary, interviews and collected data, he wrote a “reporthesis” – a newspaper report that turned into a doctorate thesis. There is not a formal religious component in journalism. But, due to a personal disposition, professional ethos or tradition, the journalist’s religiousness comprises a sense of promotion of truth and justice. Journalists exercise a peculiar omnipotence when they select events that they consider worth publishing. The fundamental connection between the press and time confers a specific eternity on it, once the occurrence of non-stop editions points out a return to the eternal present. We conclude that the “religious” characteristic of journalism appears as rituals of place and time, of people and discourse, and also as a mystic of vocation, mission and suffering. Those conditions can also be a “heroic” disguise for the exploitation of workers. Key words: Journalism; Religious phenomenon; Ritual; Mystic. (shrink)

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that Frege's theory of meaning and denotation is the first successful non-psychologistic response to what has been called 'the puzzle of identity' and that, where Frege's theory differs most significantly from the theory of meaning and denotation developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and in his unpublished manuscripts on logic of 1903-1905, Russell was right. Secondly, it is shown that Russell was again right when he claimed that (...) the central argument of 'On Denoting' completely discredits both his own and Frege's theory of meaning and denotation. An interpretation of the relevant passage of 'On Denoting' is put forward. The discussion makes evident that it is virtually impossible to disentangle that argument if one ignores his unpublished work on the topic. (shrink)