T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller and C. B. Bridges published their comprehensive treatise "The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity" in 1915. By 1920 Morgan 's "Chromosome Theory of Heredity" was generally accepted by geneticists in the United States, and by British geneticists by 1925. By 1930 it had been incorporated into most general biology, botany, and zoology textbooks as established knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons why it was accepted as part (...) of a series of comparative studies of theory-acceptance in the sciences. In this context it is of interest to look at the persuasiveness of confirmed novel predictions, a factor often regarded by philosophers of science as the most important way to justify a theory. Here it turns out to play a role in the decision of some geneticists to accept the theory, but is generally less important than the CTH's ability to explain Mendelian inheritance, sex-linked inheritance, non-disjunction, and the connection between linkage groups and the number of chromosome pairs; in other words, to establish a firm connection between genetics and cytology. It is remarkable that geneticists were willing to accept the CTH as applicable to all organisms at a time when it had been confirmed only for Drosophila. The construction of maps showing the location on the chromosomes of genes for specific characters was especially convincing for non-geneticists. (shrink)

The chromosome theory of inheritance was established during the three first decades of the 20th century. During the early stage of its substantiating, there were lots of puzzles and little evidence that could validate it. The cytological processes were obscure and several scientists maintained serious doubts concerning the existence of a connection between Mendel’s principles and the behaviour of chromosomes during cell division. It was vital to associate an external, observable characteristic of the organism to a specific (...) class='Hi'>chromosome, and this was achieved when sex was connected to special chromosomes. At that time, however, some important scholars refused to accept or delayed acceptance of the conception that the hereditary factors (later called genes) were physical entities located along the chromosomes. Such was the case of Thomas Morgan (1866-1945) and William Bateson (1861-1926). Their attitudes could be explained by considering the doubtful ground of the hypothesis at that time. It is more difficult, however, to understand the attitude of Edmund Beecher Wilson (1856-1939). Being an expert in cytology he was acquainted with all the difficulties concerning the chromosome hypothesis. Nonetheless, from 1905 onward, he attributed little weight to the problems and dedicated a notable effort to obtaining evidence that could have grounded it. This paper analyses Wilson’s attitude focusing on his studies from 1900 to 1915 and the scientific context of this period. This study led to the conclusion that Wilson’s attitude could be explained in methodological terms by the adoption of an instrumentalist attitude, while Bateson and Morgan adopted a realistic perspective. (shrink)

Early in the 20th century Bateson, Doncaster and Punnett formed a cooperative collective to share research findings on the chromosome theory of heredity (CTH). They cross-bred plants and animals to correlate behaviour of chromosomes and heredity of individual traits. Doncaster was the most enthusiastic proponent of the new theory and worked for years to convince Bateson and Punnett on its relevance to their own research. The two younger biologists collaborated with Bateson, the preeminent geneticist in (...) England. As their own reputations developed, their research findings allied with the consensus on the importance of the CTH by the broader scientific community. After Doncaster’s tragic death in 1920, major objections to the theory had been resolved; Bateson and Punnett then utilized the CTH to construct chromosome maps detailing locations of specific genes on particular chromosomes in several different species. The marriage of heredity and cytology enhanced confidence that the theory was an accurate mechanism to explain inheritance in both plants and animals. (shrink)

We may now ask the question: In what historical perspective should we place the work of Richard Goldschmidt? There is no doubt that in the period 1910–1950 Goldschmidt was an important and prolific figure in the history of biology in general, and of genetics in particular. His textbook on physiological genetics, published in 1938, was an amazing compendium of ideas put forward in the previous half-century about how genes influence physiology and development. His earlier studies on the genetic and geographic (...) distribution of the various species and races of Lymantria contributed soundly to an understanding of the inheritance and development of sex, as well as the genetics of speciation. He was a curious mixture of the experimentalist, empiricist, and theorizer, who could grasp both the large and the small at once and wrap them into the same integrated and coherent package.In insisting on trying to relate genetics to development, Goldschmidt was continually forced to speculate and to forsake experimental fact for generalized theory. In refusing to reconcile a physiological and developmental conception with a corpuscular theory of the gene, he forced himself to substitute for a large body of experimentally verified evidence, vague and general speculations which did not lead in any precise direction. L. C. Dunn summarizes succinctly the effect of Goldschmidt's thinking on the development of genetic theory: Although Goldschmidt's ideas had a considerable influence in directing attention to the developmental processes intervening between genes and characters, they did not lead to the establishment of a general theory of development in genetical terms. In fact, at the end of the period, as signalized by Goldschmidt's book of 1938 [Physiological Gentics] doubt remained whether there was a field with a defined problem which could be identified as developmental genetics.Yet the frequency with which Goldschmidt is cited by later writers suggests that there is a more positive side to his contribution than this. The early Mendelians had recognized the genic constitution of organisms and the Drosophila workers had uncovered in detail the chromosomal mechanism of heredity. These great discoveries were of classical character, solidly based on a multitude of well established facts. By themselves, however, they would not have been sufficient to place genetics in the central position within biology which it was to assume. Beyond the “static” analysis of gene transmission an insight was needed into the dynamic role of genes in cellular physiology, biochemistry, and development. Goldschmidt recognized this aspect and outlined in brilliant generalizations a physiological theory of genetics. Necessarily the prophetic nature of this achievement — romantic in the sense of Ostwald's classification of great scientists and their discoveries — transcended its factual basis. It was the audacity of the theoretician unimpeded by the still scanty data which gave a new focus to biological thought.Some have called Goldschmidt an “obstructionist” in the history of genetics—one whose efforts were largely directed toward useless and continual criticism — challenge for the sake of challenge. As this line of argument goes, time wasted answering Goldschmidt's poorly conceived criticisms could have been better used to pursue new lines of thought within the classical gene theory. Sometimes historians are upbraided for studying the work of such “obstructionists,” or even the work of those whose ideas have later proved to be inadequate. This argument misses the point of history and the lessons which it can teach. Perhaps Goldschmidt did take the time of a number of the classical geneticists who tried to answer his objections to the gene theory; and perhaps many of his own ideas about genes were, by today's view, “wrong.” These are always easier judgments to make by hindsight than at the moment. But that is not the point. Goldschmidt had a considerable influence on his contemporaries, and to dismiss him as an obstructionist because his opponents later proved to be more nearly right, distorts history and obscures significant questions which we might well be asking. It might be valuable to know why Goldschmidt felt compelled to be an iconoclast —and how that impulse, psychological in orgin, led him to overlook critical items of evidence which his opponents considered more carefully. It might also be valuable to try and understand how a contemporary of Goldschmidt or. Morgan really viewed the gene theory — what were its strong and weak point? Such questions are not readily answered by studying the work of only those men who were correct by later standards.Answers to some of the above questions can be gleaned from this study of Goldschmidt — though the first, and most psychologically oriented, question is largely untouched here.On the one hand, Goldschmidt forced classical geneticists to reexamine the foundation of their ideas about the nature, inviolability, and even physical dimensions of genes. He also kept alive the very real problems of gene physiology and its relations to development — a relationship that was given less attention by the Drosophila school in their pursuit of the transmission process. On a broader level he emphasized to the biological community a principle that was in danger of being lost in the enthusiasm surrounding the expansion of the Mendelian-chromosome theory. The point was that all theories in science are transient, logical constructs which should not be held as sacred. Time and again, as the history of science has shown, theories become rigid structures which retard new modes of thought. From Goldschmidt's perspective, the gene theory was in danger of performing just that function, for it was preventing workers from viewing the gene in a functional as well as a structural light.On the other hand, examining the work of critics (or even of outright “obstructionists”) gives the historian an opportunity to observe how the more established community of scholars at some point in time reacts to challenges of its cherished ideas. The fact that many workers in his own day (such as Beadle, Luria, Delbruck, Sturtevant, Bridges, and others), as well as most geneticists today, saw Goldschmidt as having been largely “obstructionist” is useful historical (and/or sociological) data. Clearly, as this paper has tried to show, Goldschmidt's ideas were not all obstructionist, and his viewpoint that genes must be considered functionally was one which was clearly valid, premature as it may have been from an experimental and technique point of view. Perhaps Goldschmidt's major fault was that he developed alternative theories which were not easily testable. Nonetheless, his challenge to a fundamental and established idea brought forth a reaction from many members of the genetic community which indicates how unwilling they were to reconsider the formalized theory on which their work was based. While many of Goldschmidt's criticisms — and particularly his way of making them — arose out of his own idiosyncrasies, they were also a product of his times. His view of the nature of theory-construction, and his rejection of old-style reductionism and mechanism, were part of a growing awareness within the world scientific community that explanations based on reducing complex phenomena to ultimate particles or units were clearly inadequate. The success of the Mendelian-chromosome theory had obscured that fact for many geneticists, but to Goldschmidt it was a point that could not be allowed to pass unnoticed. (shrink)

Throughout the history of genetics, the concept of the gene has been a hot topic. Theories of the gene as a coherent structured particle, a large molecule, or part of such molecule, were prominent from the 1920s until well after the discovery of DNA structure and its function in the production of proteins in the 1950s and 1960s. As knowledge of the material basis of heredity advanced, new and more sophisticated definitions were proposed (see, for example, Gerstein et al. (...) 2007; Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2012). But rapid growth of knowledge about the molecular basis of biological heredity and individual development during the last half-century has made the idea of a particulate “gene” more and more elusive. Or .. (shrink)

One claim found in the received historiography of the biometrical school (comprised primarily of Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and W. F. R. Weldon) is that one of the biometricians' great flaws was their inability to look past their population-focused, statistical, gradualist understanding of evolutionary change – which led, in part, to their ignoring developments in cellular biology around 1900. I will argue, on the contrary, that the work of the biometricians was, from its earliest days, fundamentally concerned with connections between (...) statistical patterns of inheritance and the underlying cellular features that gave rise to them. Such work remained current with contemporary knowledge of chromosomes, cytology, and development; in this article, I explore the first case. The biometricians were thus well positioned to understand the relationship between the patterns of Mendelian inheritance and the statistical distributions with which they primarily occupied themselves. Ignorance of this connection, then, is not the reason why they rejected Mendelism. Further, both Galton and Weldon – though each in their own unique way – decided to turn to biological detail as a way to better justify the generality of their statistical approaches to heredity. Perhaps paradoxically, then, for these biometricians, detail offered an approach to theoretical generality. (shrink)

Linkage (or genetic) maps are graphs, which are intended to represent the linear ordering of genes on the chromosomes. They are constructed on the basis of statistical data concerning the transmission of genes. The invention of this technique in 1913 was driven by Morgan's group's adoption of a set of hypotheses concerning the physical mechanism of heredity. These hypotheses were themselves grounded in Morgan's defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes are the (...) physical basis of genes. In this paper, I analyze the 1919 debate between William Castle and Morgan's group, about the construction of genetic maps. The official issue of the debate concerns the arrangement of genes on chromosomes. However, the disputants tend to carry out the discussions about how one should model the data in order to draw predictions concerning the transmission of genes; the debate does not bear on the data themselves, nor does it focus on the hypotheses explaining these data. The main criteria that are appealed to by the protagonists are simplicity and predictive efficacy. However, I show that both parties' assessments of the simplicity and predictive efficacy of different ways of modeling the data themselves depend on background theoretical positions. I aim at clarifying how preference for a given model and theoretical commitments articulate. (shrink)

From its very beginnings, this century has been under the sign of genetics. Indeed, it was in 1900 that the laws established by Mendel in the mid-nirieteenth century were rediscovered. In that same year, Landsteiner identified the first human blood typing, the ABO system. At that time, agronomists, eugenicists, and physicians were the principal agents of the development of genetics. The chromosome theory of heredity was asserted beginning in 1911; it was followed in the 1940s by the (...) understanding of the role of the gene in cellular metabolism, and in 1954 by the explanation of the structure of the DNA double helix. The pre-eminence of genetics was to increase through the second half of the century, particularly in the 1970s with the advent of genetic engineering. (shrink)

La parution récente en français du livre de M. Denton : “Evolution. Une théorie en crise” , qui traite des theories explicatives actuelles de l'évolution, nous amine à rappeler les caracteres généraux des grandes theories biologiques et à présenter une critique sommaire du livre en question.La science West pas une simple accumulation de connaissances. Le scientifique ne doit pas se contenter de decrire et de mesurer des faits. Son but eat d'essayer de les relier et de construire des théories qui (...) tentent de nous faire comprendre le “reel”, objet de ses recherches.Cependant, la nature du matériel biologique — c'est-à-dire les espèces vivantes et les catégories qu'on y a reconnues, classe ou ordre par exemple — est si complexe qua la biologie actuelle est fort loin encore Wavoir réalisé une synthèse qui ressemble, méme très approximativement, à la classification de Mendéleiev pour les éléments chimiques.Malgré cette complexité, les biologques ont réussi à construire la th6orie du fait de l'evolution et ils proposent aujourd'hui une théorie explicative de cette évolution qui, bien qua critiquée, est incontestablement bien étayee. Nous allons essayer de définir la structure des grandes théories biologiques; ensuite nous analyserons sommairement quelques-unes des critiques qui sont adressees aux theories de l'évolution.Considering the publication in French version of Michael Denton's book, Evolution : A Theory in crisis , in which he critizes the synthetical theory of the biological evolution, we thought it useful to point out the main errors of argumentation contained in that book by first referring to the characteristics of general biological theories.In biology, there exist elementary theories - such as that dealing with the extinction of giant Reptiles - and general theories - such as the chromosomic theory of heredity and the explanatory theory of evolution. The latter generally consist of a group of elementary theories imbricated so that they form a whole like a jig-saw puzzle. An example is provided by the synthetic theory of evolution that can be defined in 20 propositions divided into two categories : the propositions relating to the naturalists' observations - which correspond to descriptive concepts - and those relating to the data of the population genetics - which correspond to explanatory concepts . The general scheme of the theory is formed by a network of relations between the descriptive concepts and the explanatory concepts. There also exist other theories in general biology supported by thousands of minor facts which only together can be of proof of validity. These theories are quite reliable and cannot be questioned by facts still to be explained. Questioning can only happen if they are confronted to well-established data in nearly equal numbers.In his work, Denton does not deny the phenomenon of biological evolution, but he criticizes the syntheticians' ideas by emphasizing that no great evolutive changes can be accounted for by the complex mechanism of random mutations and selection. He goes back to a typological concept of the zoological classification in some way similar to that of Vialleton's. However, Denton agrees with the phenomenon of the biological evolution and accepts the existence of "saltations" among the great zoological groups. The arguments used by Denton merely show that he is not conversant with the complexity of sciences particularly in comparative anatomy and zoology, the teaching of which is being somehow neglected today.By giving as an example the structure of the aortic arches in Amphibians and by a summary of the variations of those structures and the evolution of the blood-circulation in Vertebrates, we proved that the typological argument is of no value. As a matter of fact, a study of the now living beings clearly shows the gradual transition - e.g. a transition by a very large number of feasible stages - from the Lower Vertebrates to the Higher Vertebrates. In particular, there have been several attempts at double circulation and there still exist many species in which the blood of the double circulation is mixed. It seems therefore obvious that the double circulation has been achieved, stage by stage, with many intermediate schemes; we are inclined, therefore, to conclude that this succession of small transformations was produced by a huge mechanism of selected small mutations.Our present-day biological knowledge includes a number of examples large enough to consider the “argument of the impossible” used by Denton is due to inadequate fossil data and not to any mysterious mechanism such as macromutations. Let us say again that the typological structures seem to occur only when the data of comparative anatomy and zoology are over-simplified. (shrink)

Cytogenetics was born of the confluence of two so-far independent fields: cytological studies and breeding studies, which merged through the identification of genes with chromosomes. In this paper I argue that genes were introduced as functional entities. Functional explanations are presented here as a subclass of inferences to the best explanation and I argue that abductive arguments do not offer conclusive proof for the existence of the entities postulated through them. However, functional explanations usually follow a scheme laid out by (...) Fodor (1968): there is a first phase where hypothetical entities are postulated and individuated through their effects; there is a second phase where the physical structures responsible for these effects are sought. I analyze the development of both phases in the construction of the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance. I will argue that first-phase theories are important to set conditions of identification for the functions played by a certain structure in a given containing system. (shrink)

This paper examines the process that led to the identification of chromosomes as carriers of genes. It focuses on the role played by explanations in theory construction and analyzes the status given to the entities and processes introduced through such explanations. I argue that the theory of the gene was a functional explanation that, as such, could not offer decisive support for the existence of genes. However, I maintain that functional explanations set the conditions of identification needed to (...) discover the physical structure that has a certain function in a given system. In this case, the theory of the gene helped to select the chromosomes as the physical structure responsible for the Mendelian segregation of genes. In its turn, the theory of chromosome inheritance helped to reduce the permissive character of the theory of the gene, regulating its further development. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Italian cytologist Paolo Della Valle developed a theory of instable chromosomes (teoria dei cromosomi labili). He radically criticized the so-called Sutton–Boveri hypothesis (Martins and Martins, Genetics and Molecular Biology, 22:261–271, 1999), focusing on numerical constancy in the species and individuality. On the basis of bibliographical review and personal observations, he maintained that the chromosomes were neither stable bodies, nor permanent structures, but transitory cellular materials, resulting from the periodical re-arrangement of the (...) chromatin during the cell division. German and English-speaking biologists reacted. The paper shows some content of the argumentations used by Thomas H. Montgomery and especially Edmund B. Wilson. The discussion was characterized by the same data which is interpreted by different scholars in different ways. And the point is that no one of them had the decisive test to demonstrate his own point of view. Wilson simply invoked on his behalf a certain ‘common sense’, defending at least a ‘high degree of constancy’. The debate waned along with the reception of Morgan’s chromosome theory of heredity, but only the advent of molecular biology definitively stated the nature of chromosomes as permanent structures of the cell. (shrink)

Genetics was established on a strict particulate conception of heredity. Genetic linkage, the deviation from independent segregation of Mendelian factors, was conceived as a function of the material allocation of the factors to the chromosomes, rather than to the multiple effects (pleiotropy) of discrete factors. Although linkage maps were abstractions they provided strong support for the chromosomal theory of inheritance. Direct Cytogenetic evidence was scarce until X-ray induced major chromosomal rearrangements allowed direct correlation of genetic and cytological rearrangements. (...) Only with the discovery of the polytenic giant chromosomes in Drosophila larvae in the 1930s were the virtual maps backed up by physical maps of the genetic loci. Genetic linkage became a pivotal experimental tool for the examination of the integration of genetic functions in development and in evolution. Genetic mapping has remained a hallmark of genetic analysis. The location of genes in DNA is a modern extension of the notion of genetic linkage. (shrink)

To some, a misguided Lamarckian and a fraud, to others a martyr in the fight against Darwinism, the Viennese zoologist Paul Kammerer (1880-1926) remains one of the most controversial scientists of the early 20th century. Here his work is reconsidered in light of turn-of-the-century problems in evolutionary theory and experimental methodology, as seen from Kammerer's perspective in Vienna. Kammerer emerges not as an opponent of Darwinism, but as one would-be modernizer of the 19th-century theory, which had included a (...) role for the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Kammerer attempted a synthesis of Darwinism with genetics and the chromosome theory, while retaining the modifying effects of the environment as the main source of favorable variation, and he developed his program of experimentation to support it. Kammerer never had a regular university position, but worked at a private experimental laboratory, with sidelines as a teacher and a popular writer and lecturer. On the lecture circuit he held forth on the significance of his science for understanding and furthering cultural evolution and he satisfied his passion for the arts and performance. In his dual career as researcher and popularizer, he did not always follow academic convention. In the contentious and rapidly changing fields of heredity and evolution, some of his stances and practices, as well as his outsider status and part-Jewish background, aroused suspicion and set the stage for the scandal that ended his career and prompted his suicide. (shrink)

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are (...) enumerated and discussed. These include deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.3 (2000) 265-281 [Access article in PDF] Scope Note 39 Genes, Patents, and Bioethics-Will History Repeat Itself? Susan Cartier Poland Gene patenting--the very notion sounds absurd! How can anyone claim to have invented the genes with which one is born? To make matters worse, genetic makeup precedes birth, meaning the existence of the invention predates the existence of the inventor. So, do we really (...) own our genes, or do they belong to our parents, or our governments, or a Supreme Being? Ownership is only one bioethical issue involved in gene patenting. But before looking at the issues, some essential and basic terms must be understood, namely genes and patents. Genes In his book On the Origin of Species, published in 1859, the biologist Charles Darwin proposed a theory called "natural selection," whereby living things changed over time or evolved through generations due to competition and variation. By experimenting with the garden pea in the 1860s, Gregor Mendel, a monk and accomplished horticulturalist, provided the mechanism of inheritance supporting the natural selection theory of his contemporary Darwin. That mechanism is the gene, or, as Mendel described it, a discrete "factor." The gene has also been defined as "the fundamental unit of heredity" (United States 1987, p. 157). Each individual has two copies of a gene, one from each parent, but that individual passes down to offspring only one of the two copies. Because of Mendel, the gene has become a scientific concept and the basis of a new scientific field: genetics.David C. Page (2000) of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained today's terms for genetics structures using an analogy taken from the home. In his view, the cell is a kitchen, the genome is a shelf in the kitchen, the chromosome is a cookbook on the shelf, the gene is a recipe in the cookbook, and a base-pair (either adenine with thymine or guanine with cytosine) is a single letter in the recipe. A protein, the [End Page 265] working molecule blueprinted by a gene, is a dish ready to eat, and an ingredient in the dish is an amino acid, which is a building block of the protein as specified by a string of base-pairs.Colin Tudge (1993), a British science journalist, would disagree with Page's description of the gene as a recipe. A recipe is like a blueprint: both are directions that precede the work. But a gene is not passive according to Tudge; it actively administers the cell's work, and it also responds to cellular events (Aldridge 1996).The current focus of scientific research and funding is on the gene and the completion of the sequencing of all the genes that comprise the human genome, portrayed in the press as a race between the U.S. government's Human Genome Project and the private corporation Celera Genomics. The real action, however, is at the protein level. The gene only holds the information to produce a protein; it is the three-dimensional shaped protein that does the work. In order to produce energy, eliminate waste, and perform other functions specific to a cell or tissue, proteins must bind, thus creating "biological pathways." Proteins bind (or not) and detach as a function of their shapes, which are determined by their precise chemical composition as spelled out in their genetic code. IBM will spend the next five years making one computer, Blue Gene, that will then take an entire year to come up with the chemical map for only one protein (Gillis 2000). It is estimated that there are about 40,000 proteins in the human body.Despite these overwhelming numbers, modern biology has been able to achieve significant results within the Human Genome Project's 15-year time frame, from 1990 to 2005. The genetic map was completed in 1993; the physical map was completed in 1995; and the genetic sequence is expected to be completed in 2002, with 97 to 99 percent completed as of 26 June 2000. This... (shrink)

Galton greeted Darwin's theory of pangenesis with enthusiasm, and tried to test the assumption that the hereditary particles circulate in the blood by transfusion experiments on rabbits. The failure of these experiments led him to reject this assumption, and in the 1870s he developed an alternative theory of heredity, which incorporated those parts of Darwin's theory that did not involve the transportation of hereditary particles throughout the system. He supposed that the fertilized ovum contains a large (...) number of hereditary elements, which he collectively called the "stirp," a few of which are patent, developing into particular cell types, while the rest remain latent; the latent elements can be transmitted to the next generation, while the patent elements, with rare exceptions, cannot since they have developed into cells. The problem with this theory is that it does not explain the similarity between parent and child unless there is a high correlation between latent and patent elements. Galton probably came to realize this problem during his subsequent statistical work on heredity, and he quietly dropped the idea that patent elements are not transmitted in Natural Inheritance (1889). Galton thought that brothers and sisters had identical stirps, and he attributed differences between them to variability in the choice of patent elements from the stirp, that is to say to developmental variability. He attributed the likeness of monozygotic twins to the similarity of their developmental environment. Galton's twin method was to track the life history changes of twins to see whether twins who were similar at birth diverged in dissimilar environments or whether twins who were dissimilar at birth converged in similar environments. It is quite different from the modern twin method of comparing the similarities between monozygotic and dizygotic twins, on the assumption that monozygotic twins are genetically identical whereas dizygotic twins are not. It has been argued that Galton foreshadowed Weismann's theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm, but this is only true in a weak sense. They both believed that the inheritance of acquired characters was either rare or impossible, but Galton did not forestall the essential part of Weismann's theory, that the germ-plasm of the zygote is doubled, with one part being reserved for the formation of the germ-cells. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore the philosophical argument regarding an account of the development of management orientations and attributes a historical succession of these orientations to a human hereditary. It is hard to find such a consolidate and plausible theory which may provide deep insight into the history and theory of management. This paper is theoretical, based on literature and philosophical analysis. It argues that human behaviours become a force and its treatment cause the variance in human management. (...) The management with respect to human has periodically recognised these forces and acquired the tools for treatment of such forces. In this paper, theoretically through deductive-partial inductive approach, human forces are classified into six dimensions (gender, attain, social, relational, metaphysical and heredity force) and subsequently in four orientations of management (demo, socio, psycho-socio and meta-oriented management). Demo and socio-oriented management are explored with historical context, while the psycho-socio oriented management is argued with theoretical considerations, i.e., theories related to human work behaviour, performance, need and satisfaction. In last, a plausible argument is presented for meta-oriented management by considering its application in existing corporate structure management. (shrink)

Laudan's thesis that conceptual problem solving is at least as important as empirical problem solving in scientific research is given support by a study of the relation between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian research program. It will be shown that there existed a conceptual tension between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program. This tension was to be resolved by changing the constraints of the Mendelian program. The relation between the chromosome theory and (...) the Mendelian program is shown to be a good illustration of the influence of science itself on the rational standards governing scientific development. (shrink)

Laudan's thesis that conceptual problem solving is at least as important as empirical problem solving in scientific research is given support by a study of the relation between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian research program. It will be shown that there existed a conceptual tension between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program. This tension was to be resolved by changing the constraints of the Mendelian program. The relation between the chromosome theory and (...) the Mendelian program is shown to be a good illustration of the influence of science itself on the rational standards governing scientific development. (shrink)

Inbreeding introduced by R. Bakewell (1725-1795) in England for creating new animal races, was opposed by animal breeders on the Continent on religious grounds, and was soon introduced in sheep breeding for wool production in Moravia. In 1790-1840 the protagonists repeatedly rejected 'the spectre of inbreeding' and included consanguineous matching in scientific breeding. In 1836 they even formulated the research question of heredity and next year proposed the inductive method for its investigation. The achievements of sheep breeders instigated German (...) breeders to reject the dogma of the constancy of race and to elaborate the theory of individual potency. Treating heredity as the force under the influence of environment they could not solve the enigma. The question formulated in 1836 was explained in 1865 by Gregor Mendel. His theory was not perceived by animal breeders as well as by biologists up to the end of the century. (shrink)

This article discusses the development of the statistical methods employed by psychiatrists to study heredity as a causative factor of mental diseases. It argues that psychiatric asylums and clinics were the first institutions in which human heredity became the object of systematic research. It also highlights the different concepts of heredity prevalent in the psychiatric community. The first of four parts traces how heredity became a central category of asylum statistics in the first half of the (...) nineteenth century. The second part deals with attempts to introduce new methods of surveying in order to generate more precise data about psychopathological inheritance in the 1860s and 1870s. The third part discusses how, by the end of the nineteenth century, a widespread discontent with the results of asylum statistics led to an increasing interest in the use of family studies. Finally, the fourth part examines the impact of Mendelian theory on psychiatric statistics in the early twentieth century. (shrink)

This paper aims to construct a comprehensive theory of royal succession of Mencius. Basically, there are three distinct modes of royal succession described in the Mencius: abdication, hereditary succession, and revolution. Abdication involves the voluntary transfer of power by the incumbent ruler to a virtuous minister. Hereditary succession entails the transmission of power to the son of the incumbent ruler. Revolution marks the foundation of a new dynasty by deposing the incumbent ruler. What are their exact relationships? In contrast (...) to hereditary succession, which represents “rule by heredity,” abdication and revolution are often categorized together as “rule by virtue,” which became the backbone of the Confucian virtue politics. However, Mencius' writings, especially 5A5 and 5A6, suggest his clear intention to establish a coherent, or at least, compatible relationship between abdication and hereditary succession. This paper analyzes Mencius' discussions on royal succession to elucidate how he perceived the connection between abdication and hereditary succession, and to explore why he considered revolution as a separate category. In this study, I refer to the former as the “entrenched‐trust model” and distinguish the latter as “anticipated‐trust model.” The final section of the paper compares the three modes of royal succession in terms of the nature of the people's trust, the susceptibility of the people's approval, and the candidate's disinterest in power. (shrink)

The long 19th century was a period of many developments and technical innovations in agriculture and animal biology, during which actors sought to incorporate new practices in light of new information. By the middle of the century, however, while heredity steadily became the dominant concept in animal husbandry, some policies related to livestock improvement in Brazil seemed to have been tailored following a climate-deterministic concept established in the mid-18th century by the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon. (...) His theory of animal degeneration posited, among other things, the necessity of recurrent crossbreeding to preserve animal species living in nonnative environments from climate-induced degeneration. Although largely discredited by the early 19th century, the teachings of the French naturalist seem to have found supporters in a Brazilian program to modernize national agriculture through the application of the natural sciences. Herein I examine the revival of Buffon’s theories in that government-sponsored program to improve animal husbandry and breeding techniques, including actual applications of this theory in the real world. Ultimately, I argue that Buffon’s theory of degeneration was used to tailor public policies and funding for the improvement of domesticated animals in Brazil between 1856 and 1860. (shrink)

A recent cover of the German news magazine Der Spiegel announced: “Victory over Genes. Smarter, healthier, happier: How we can outwit our genome” (2010). The magazine’s article, instead, emphasizes the importance of epigenetics. According to Florian Maderspacher (2010), who reprinted the cover in his editorial in Current Biology, the relief or “schadenfreude” about the apparent victory over genes—which the cover, the article, and commentaries to it reveal—is, in part, a German phenomenon. It echoes “a latent anti-scientific attitude in parts of (...) the German public,” which for historic reasons is particularly strong with regard to genetics: “After all, the idea that people’s properties—good or bad—are determined by .. (shrink)

The target article by Denis Noble is an excellent overview of the illusions of the Modern Synthesis that still remains in textbooks despite of the recent criticism. Overcoming these illusions shows the active role of organisms in the evolutionary process and accounts for additional mechanisms such as plasticity of embryo development, epigenetic heredity, multilevel selection, Baldwin effect, and niche construction, which are components of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Adding these mechanisms is certainly an important step forward, but I argue (...) that it is not sufficient for building a new theory of evolution. What is missing is a clear understanding of such notions as agency, autonomy, semiosis, interpretation, and goal-directedness, which so far belong to the humanities and have not been applied seriously in science. Organisms are autonomous and goal-directed semiotic agents capable of interpreting hereditary signs and making meaningful models of their environment. Evolutionary biology needs a semiotic vocabulary to talk about higher level functions in organisms, where specific molecules and mechanisms are only means for integrating functions over the life cycle and adapting to the environment without compromising organism integrity and identity. Such a vocabulary is being developed in biosemiotics; thus, I expect the emergence of a biosemiotic theory of evolution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. Probability and statistics play an important role in contemporary -philosophy of causality. They are viewed as glasses through which we can see or detect causal relations. However, they may sometimes act as blinding glasses, as I will argue in this paper. In the 19th century, Francis Galton tried to statistically analyze hereditary phenomena. Although he was a far better statistician than Gregor Mendel, his biological theory turned out to be less fruitful. This was no sheer accident. His knowledge (...) of statistics generated two explananda (unknown to Mendel) which in turn generated constraints for any theory of heredity. These constraints misguided Galtons search for the causal mechanism of inheritance. This is not just. an interesting case for philosophers and historians of ·science. Notwithstanding the progress made by statitics, Galtons problem is still relevant today. In the final section, I briefly explore the implications for statistical techniques such as structural equation modelling. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

TheConstitution of Manby George Combe (1828) was probably the most influential phrenological work of the nineteenth century. It not only offered an exposition of the phrenological theory of the mind, but also presented Combe's vision of universal human progress through the inheritance of acquired mental attributes. In the decades before the publication of Darwin'sOrigin of Species, theConstitutionwas probably the single most important vehicle for the dissemination of naturalistic progressivism in the English-speaking world. Although there is a significant literature on (...) the social and cultural context of phrenology, the role of heredity in Combe's thought has been less thoroughly explored, although both John van Wyhe and Victor L. Hilts have linked Combe's views on heredity with the transformist theories of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. In this paper I examine the origin, nature and significance of his ideas and argue that Combe's hereditarianism was not directly related to Lamarckian transformism but formed part of a wider discourse on heredity in the early nineteenth century. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

In Darwinism's Struggle for Survival Jean Gayon offers a philosophical interpretation of the history of theoretical Darwinism. He begins by examining the different forms taken by the hypothesis of natural selection in the nineteenth century and the major difficulties which it encountered, particularly with regard to its compatibility with the theory of heredity. He then shows how these difficulties were overcome during the seventy years which followed the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, and he concludes by analysing (...) the major features of the genetic theory of natural selection, as it developed from 1920 to 1960. This rich and wide-ranging study will appeal to philosophers and historians of science and to evolutionary biologists. (shrink)

It took a long time for humanity to know about biogenetics. And yet its role as a determinant in the living system was not proven until the twentieth century when DNA was discovered. Similarly, it took a long time for humanity to know about culture and civilization. And yet until now there is neither definite standards for differentiating them nor a definition that is commonly acceptable. By taking an evolutionary pluralism as ontology framework and the transdisciplinary research method of the (...) systems science, we have in the new social system model discovered the central rules that govern the social?cultural heredity: Culture?Production?Civilization. The relationship between culture and civilization is exactly that of genotype and phenotype. Culture is the S-cDNA within the social system while civilization is the social phenotype. Culture is a determinant that ultimately determines the existence, stagnation, change, and evolution of the social system. (shrink)

The interrelationships among recent theories on the regulation of gene activity and differentiation in higher organisms are reviewed. Interpretations within these theories of the various components of chromosomes are re-evaluated and a unified conceptual framework of hierarchical genetic control mechanisms in eukaryotes is presented.

Prior to August Weismann’s 1889 germ-plasm theory, social reformers believed that humans could inherit the effects of a salubrious environment and, by passing environmentally-induced modifications to their offspring, achieve continuous progress. Weismann’s theory disrupted this logic and caused many to fear that they had little control over human development. As numerous historians have observed, this contributed to the birth of the eugenics movement. However, through an examination of the work of social scientists Lester Frank Ward, Richard T. Ely, (...) Amos Griswold Warner, James Mark Baldwin, Simon Nelson Patten, Alfred Kroeber, Walter Robinson Smith, and Luther Lee Bernard, I demonstrate that Weismann’s ideas also prompted scholars to create of theories of human progress in which the social environment had a central role and biological heredity had a diminished one. Furthermore, in creating a new theory of social progress based on a concept called “social heredity,” the thinkers surveyed in this article separated biological and social thought and asserted the independence of the American social sciences. I argue that this represents an important moment in the maturation of the human sciences, and I suggest that the germ-plasm theory of heredity deserves a larger place in histories of the development of the American social scientific disciplines. (shrink)

In Darwinism's Struggle for Survival Jean Gayon offers a philosophical interpretation of the history of theoretical Darwinism. He begins by examining the different forms taken by the hypothesis of natural selection in the nineteenth century and the major difficulties which it encountered, particularly with regard to its compatibility with the theory of heredity. He then shows how these difficulties were overcome during the seventy years which followed the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, and he concludes by analysing (...) the major features of the genetic theory of natural selection, as it developed from 1920 to 1960. This rich and wide-ranging study will appeal to philosophers and historians of science and to evolutionary biologists. (shrink)

This original and thought-provoking volume examines organic life as subjective activity. It shows that organic life operates differently from objective thought and truth. The volume considers topics such as: the origin of life, the absorption of food, the operation of heredity, and the possible control of further evolutionary development.

Summary Long-standing claims have been made for nearly the entire twentieth century that the biometrician, Karl Pearson, and his colleague, W. F. R. Weldon, rejected Mendelism as a theory of inheritance. It is shown that at the end of the nineteenth century Pearson considered various theories of inheritance (including Francis Galton's law of ancestral heredity for characters underpinned by continuous variation), and by 1904 he ?accepted the fundamental idea of Mendel? as a theory of inheritance for discontinuous (...) variation. Moreover, in 1909, he suggested a synthesis of biometry and Mendelism. Despite the many attempts made by a number of geneticists (including R. A. Fisher in 1936) to use Pearson's chi-square (X 2, P) goodness-of-fit test on Mendel's data, which produced results that were ?too good to be true?, Weldon reached the same conclusion in 1902, but his results were never acknowledged. The geneticist and arch-rival of the biometricians, Williams Bateson, was instead exceptionally critical of this work and interpreted this as Weldon's rejection of Mendelism. Whilst scholarship on Mendel, by historians of science in the last 18 years, has led to a balanced perspective of Mendel, it is suggested that a better balanced and more rounded view of the hereditarian-statistical work of Pearson, Weldon, and the biometricians is long overdue. (shrink)

With the assumption of inactivation of small traits in bacteriophages “chromosomes” by ultraviolet irradiation the probability of multiplicity reactivation of irradiated phages is calculated. The result appears to be in agreement with the experimental results ofDulbecco.In the mathematical treatment of the problem a distinction is made between ordinary genes, with probability of inactivation negligible relative to the probability of inactivation of the whole phage, and a few vulnerable centers or genes whose probability of inactivation is not negligible. The hypothesis of (...) the existence of vulnerable centers appears necessary in order to explainDulbecco's experimental results.Postulant que de petites sections des „chromosomes” du bactériophage sont inactivés par l'irradiation ultraviolette, on a calculé la probabilité de réactivation par infection multiple des bactériophages traités par les rayons ultraviolets. Les résultats obtenus s'accordent avec les résultats expérimentaux de M.Dulbecco.Dans la tractation mathématique des problèmes une distinction a été faite entre les gènes ordinaires — dont la probabilité d'inactivation prise individuellement peut Être négligée relativement à la probabilité d'inactivation du phage entier — et quelques centres vulnérables ou gènes dont la probabilité d'inactivation ne pourrait Être négligée.L'hypothèse de l'existance des centres vulnérables s'est démontrée nécessaire à l'explication des résultats expérimentaux de M.Dulbecco.Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Reaktivation durch multiplen Infektionen ist unter Voraussetzung, dass die Ultraviolett-Bestrahlung kleine Teile der Bakteriophagenchromosomen inaktiviert, berechnet. Das Ergebnis entspricht den experimentellen ResultatenDulbecco's.In der mathematischen Behandlung des Problems ist ein Unterschied gemacht worden zwischen gewöhnlichen Genen — wovon jeder eine geringe Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung hat, in Bezug auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung der ganzen Bakteriophage — und einige verletzbare Stellen oder Genen, wovon die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Inaktivierung grössenordnungsmÄssig höher liegt. Die Hypothese über die verletzbaren Stellen war notwendig um die experimentellen ResultateDulbecco's zu erklÄren. (shrink)

At the turn of the twentieth century, biologists such as Oscar Riddle, Thomas Hunt Morgan, Frank Lillie, and Richard Goldschmidt all puzzled over the question of sexual difference, the distinction between male and female. They all offered competing explanations for the biological cause of this difference, and engaged in a fierce debate over the primacy of their respective theories. Riddle propounded a metabolic theory of sex dating from the late-nineteenth century suggesting that metabolism lay at the heart of sexual (...) difference. Thomas Hunt Morgan insisted on the priority of chromosomes, Frank Lillie emphasized the importance of hormones, while Richard Goldschmidt supported a mixed model involving both chromosomes and hormones. In this paper, I will illustrate how the older metabolic theory of sex was displaced when those who argued for the relatively newer theories of chromosomes and hormones gradually formed an alliance that accommodated each other and excluded the metabolic theory of sex. By doing so, proponents of chromosomes and hormones established their authority over the question of sexual difference as they laid the foundations for the new disciplines of genetics and endocrinology. Their debate raised urgent questions about what constituted sexual difference, and how scientists envisioned the plasticity and controllability of this difference. These theories also had immediate political and cultural consequences at the turn of the twentieth century, especially for the eugenic and feminist movements, both of which were heavily invested in knowledge of sex and its determination, ascertainment, and command. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger’s 1944 publication What is Life? is a classic of twentieth century science writing. In his book, Schrödinger discussed the chromosome fibre as the seat of heredity and variation thanks to a hypothetical aperiodic structure – a suggestion that famously spurred on a generation of scientists in their pursuit of the gene as a physico-chemical entity. While historical attention has been given to physicists who were inspired by the book, little has been written about its biologist readers. (...) This paper examines the case of the English evolutionary botanist and cytologist Irène Manton, who took an interest in What is Life? for its relevance to her own research in chromosome structure as a clue to plant phylogeny. Drawing on recently discovered correspondence between Manton and Schrödinger, the paper reconstructs Manton ‘s path to the book and her response to it by way of throwing new light on a pivotal moment in the history of the debate on chromosome structure. (shrink)