NOTAS ACERCA DO CRIME DE FURTO DE COISA COMUM.

Today the question of the moral foundations of democracy is more important then ever. In this book the author helps to explain when and why democracy is important and also gives us guidance as to how democracies ought to be shaped.

There is no problem more crucial to contemporary political thought than the status of democracy, its role, and its problems in the contemporary world. In this survey of democratic theory, Thomas Christiano introduces the reader to the principles underlying democracy and to the problems involved in applying these principles to real life situations.B.

Algorithmic communications pose several challenges to democracy. The three phenomena of filtering, hypernudging, and microtargeting can have the effect of polarizing an electorate and thus undermine the deliberative potential of a democratic society. Algorithms can spread fake news throughout the society, undermining the epistemic potential that broad participation in democracy is meant to offer. They can pose a threat to political equality in that some people may have the means to make use of algorithmic communications and the sophistication to be (...) immune from attempts at manipulation, while other people are vulnerable to manipulation by those who use these means. My concern here is with the danger that algorithmic communications can pose to political equality, which arises because most citizens must make decisions about what and who to support in democratic politics with only a sparse budget of time, money, and energy. Algorithmic communications such as hypernudging and microtargeting can be a threat to democratic participation when persons are operating in environments that do not conduce to political sophistication. This constitutes a deepening of political inequality. The political sophistication necessary to counter this vulnerability is rooted for many in economic life and it can and ought to be enhanced by changing the terms of economic life. (shrink)

This collection of 24 essays, written by eminent philosophers and political theorists, brings together fresh debates on some of the most fundamental questions in contemporary political philosophy, including human rights, equality, constitutionalism, the value of democracy, identity and political neutrality. Presents fresh debates on six of the fundamental questions in contemporary political philosophy Each question is treated by a pair of opposing essays written by eminent scholars Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, invites the reader to participate in the (...) exchange of arguments and paves the way for further discussion Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in political philosophy, whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers Offers the unique opportunity to observe leading philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. (shrink)

This volume collects some of the leading essays in contemporary democratic theory published in the past thirty years. The anthology presents the work of a select group of contributors (including Peter Singer, Joshua Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson, and others) and covers many foundational approaches defended by scholars from a range of different disciplines. The chapters address many issues that are central to philosophical reflections on democracy, such as questions pertaining to deliberative and economic approaches, as well as to such (...) topics as intrinsic fairness, the role of equality in relation to minority groups, and the limits of democracy. Covering representative work in economics, political science, legal theory, and philosophy, this comprehensive volume is suited to courses in political theory and political philosophy. (shrink)

I develop a conception of voluntary exchange and its value that helps us understand the fundamental source of difficulty with voluntary exchange. We can make a great deal of progress in understanding the promise and the perils of voluntary exchange by elaborating an analogy between voluntary exchange and democracy. To be sure, this is a hazardous activity since there are many differences between these areas. But a careful effort here will illuminate the domain of voluntary exchange in both normative and (...) descriptive dimensions. I argue that there is a fundamental tension between the normative principle that applies to voluntary exchange and the basic mechanism by which voluntary exchange operates. The fundamental normative principle, I will argue, is the principle that power over the making of an agreement with another ought to be proportioned among the persons to the interests each person has at stake in the making of the agreement. The fundamental mechanism of voluntary exchange, on the other hand, is that power is inversely proportioned to the stakes someone has in making the agreement. The more interests I have at stake in making an agreement, the more say over the content of the agreement I should have, and, yet, the more my interests hang on an agreement, the less bargaining power I have and so the less say I have in the making of the agreement. Hence, the inherent tendency of voluntary exchange is to work against the realization of the fundamental normative principle that regulates voluntary exchange. Hence, we have a deep and pervasive opposition between fact and norm in the very nature of voluntary exchange. All is not entirely hopeless, however, since there is a unique point where this opposition does not appear and that is in equality in the background conditions of exchange. (shrink)

The basic question I want to ask is: can the exercise of private property rights abridge fundamental norms of democratic decision-making? And, under what conditions can it do so? To the extent that we view democratic decision making as required by justice, the issue is whether there is a deep tension between certain ways of exercising the rights of private property and that part of social justice that is characterized by democracy. To the extent that this tension holds, I will (...) argue that commitment to democratic norms implies that private capitalist firms must cooperate with a democratic assembly and government in the pursuit of the aims of a democratic assembly even when this implies some diminution of the profits of the firms. The cooperation I have in mind goes beyond the norm of faithful compliance with the law. To be sure, there are limits to this requirement as we will see in the later part of the paper. To the extent that private capitalist firms fail to do this and partially undermine the pursuit of the aims of a democratic assembly, they act in a way that is incompatible with fundamental norms of democratic governance. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's case for smaller government and “foot voting” rests on at least two questionable assumptions. The first is that voter ignorance is based on rational calculation. This assumption requires arbitrary stipulations about the degree of voter altruism and the low values voters assign to the victory of their candidates. The second is that voter ignorance betokens bad public policy. But there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. How can this be the case? One explanation is that individually ignorant (...) voters are small pieces of a large system that divides intellectual labor through discussions among elites, opinion leaders, and ordinary citizens. This system may entitle voters to trust in the opinions of others, sparing them the need to be well informed. (shrink)

The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To show this we offer a defence (...) of, and partial elaboration of, what we call a common good conception of the principle of equality, which principle favours states in which everyone is better off to those in which everyone is worse off. We contrast this with what we call a purely structural conception of the principle of equality. The common good conception of equality involves two basic components: (1) in each circumstance there exists an ideal egalitarian distribution, which distributes equally all the available good in the distribution with the highest average welfare and (2) in evaluating how just the world is, it will matter how far the actual distribution is from the ideal distribution. The ideal egalitarian distribution in the circumstance is Pareto optimal and the approximation rule implies that Pareto superior states are less unjust than Pareto inferior states. 1. (shrink)

Deliberative scholars have suggested that citizens should be able to exchange arguments in public forums. A key element in this exchange is the rational mode of communication, which means speaking through objective argumentation. However, some feminists argue that this mode of communication may create or intensify epistemic injustices. Furthermore, we should not assume that everyone is equally equipped to take part in deliberation. Certain groups, such as Indigenous peoples, for instance, who may not be versed in rational forms of argumentation, (...) may not be listened to or involved sufficiently in the deliberative process. Therefore, it seems we need an alternative mode of communication, such as storytelling, which is a first-person or collective narrative. Given this, how should we pursue this goal? This article aims to answer this question by analysing a local conflict involving an Indigenous tribe and a neighbouring community in Brazil and exploring the underlying testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. I argue that storytelling has an important normative and institutional role in public deliberation and show that its applied version could overcome epistemic injustices and lead to better public policies. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to explain what kind of responsibility citizens should assume for structural corruption. To delve into this topic, we analyze the components of a concept of structure as applied to the features of corruption, as well as the notions of guilt, responsibility and political responsibility. Thus, we argue that citizens who do not participate directly in acts of bribery are politically responsible for systemic corruption. Assuming political responsibility implies taking actions in the public sphere to (...) combat the structure of corruption in conjunction with other citizens. (shrink)

Spinoza concebe a natureza humana em sua obra Ethica como constituída por modos de dois dos infinitos atributos de Deus, o pensamento e a extensão, ou a ideia e seu objeto, o corpo, respectivamente. A mente humana, enquanto essencialmente uma ideia, e o objeto desta ideia, o corpo, pressupõe uma relação não causal entre um modo finito do atributo pensamento e do atributo extensão. O corpo, enquanto certa relação composta ou complexa de movimento e de repouso se mantém através de (...) todas as mudanças que afetam suas partes, está continuamente sujeito ao acaso dos encontros, ou ao impacto dos múltiplos e variados corpos a sua volta. A mente reflete estes encontros e através deles, ou das afecções corporais, conhece os corpos externos. É a ideia-afecção. É o conhecimento imaginativo, ou o conhecimento condicionado pela situação de nosso próprio corpo, por nosso temperamento, nossa experiência prévia e nossos preconceitos. (shrink)

A partir de uma análise da obra de Francis Kaplan L'Étique de Spinoza et Ia méthode Géométrique, complementada com análises de comentadores clássicos do Espinosismo, como por exemplo, Victor Delbos e Harry Austryn Wolfson, entre outros, o autor procura traçar um historial da utilização do método ou da ordem geométrica, por parte de diversos pensadores, visando apontar, reconhecer ou apenas supor, uma possível influência sobre Bento de Espinosa. /// Starting from Francis Kaplan's analysis in his work L'Étique de Spinoza et (...) Ia méthode Géométrique, complemented with classic commentator's of spinozisme, as for example, Victor Delbos and Harry Austryn Wolfson, the author of the present article attempts to trace a report of the use of the geometrical method or of the geometric order, on the part of several thinkers, seeking to reveal, to recognize or just to suggest, a possible influence on Benedictus de Spinoza. (shrink)

Hay casos en los que se transforman y trastocan los objetivos de las instituciones por resoluciones y jurisprudencia de los tribunales, situación que se presentó en el análisis de una sentencia del 15 de mayo de 2019, por la 1ª Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (México), derivado del amparo en revisión 1388/ 2015, por la negativa del hospital de realizar la interrupción del embarazo, por motivos de salud, a pesar de que el niño tendría una (...) vida relativamente normal, perturbando el derecho a la salud, la conciencia social y el valor ético sobre la terapia y de la dignidad humana de todas las personas, discriminando al feto bajo un paradigma eugenésico. (shrink)

El orden geométrico consiste en partir de definiciones y axiomas evidentes por sí mismos. El paralelismo entre ambos órdenes en el sistema de Spinoza, el ordo cognoscendi y el ordo essendi, hace posible postular la intensidad total de lo real, implicando necesariamente una semejanza entre el entendimiento finito, en cuanto productor del primer orden, y el entendimiento infinito, en cuanto productor del segundo orden, ausente en el cartesianismo. Martial Gueroult afirma el método como geométrico en Descartes porque obedece estrictamente a (...) la regla que asegura a la Geometría todo su rigor; mientras que en Spinoza lo es porque, como Geometría, construye los conceptos de los objetos. (shrink)

Waldron argues that recent treatments of justice have neglected reasonable disagreement about justice itself. So Waldron offers a procedural account of democratic legitimacy, in which contending views of justice can be brought together to arrive at a decision without deciding which one is correct. However, if there is reasonable disagreement about everything, then this includes his preferred account of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not clear that Waldron is right to count so much disagreement as reasonable. But then (...) Waldron has not undermined the view he opposes in which some prevailing disagreement about justice is held to be unreasonable. (shrink)

Democratic theorists stress the importance of free and equal discussion and debate in a well-functioning democratic process. In this process, citizens attempt to persuade each other to support legislation by appealing to considerations of justice, liberty or the common good and are open to changing their minds when hearing the arguments of others. They are concerned to ground policy and legislation on the most defensible considerations of morality and the best empirical evidence. To be sure, majority rule remains important in (...) democratic decision making because of the persistence of disagreement. But many have argued that debates over legislation that appeal to moral considerations ought to be given a much larger place in our understanding of the ideals of democracy than theorists have given them in the past. This emphasis on the importance of moral debate and discussion in democracy is characteristic of what I call the wide view of deliberative democracy. (shrink)