Many writers claim that democratic government rests on a principled commitment to the ideal of political equality. The ideal of political equality holds that political institutions ought to be arranged so that they distribute political standing equally to all citizens. I reject this common view. I argue that the ideal of political equality, under its most plausible characterizations, lacks independent justificatory force. By casting doubt on the ideal of political equality, I provide indirect support for the claim that democratic government (...) is only instrumentally justified. (shrink)

In Demokratien gibt es gewöhnlich ein gesetzliches Mindestalter, durch das Kinder und Jugendliche von politischen Wahlen ausgeschlossen werden. Je nach Altersstruktur der Bevölkerung dürfen ungefähr 20 bis 25 Prozent der Staatsbürger eines Landes nicht wählen. In diesem Aufsatz werden der Ausschluss Minderjähriger von Wahlen in Demokratien sowie mögliche alternative Stellungen Minderjähriger im Wahlrecht einer ethischen Analyse unterzogen. Die erste zentrale These des Aufsatzes lautet, dass der Ausschluss und die Nichtrepräsentation von Minderjährigen ungerecht ist, dass die Regierungsgewalt über Minderjährige in demokratischen (...) Staaten nicht ausreichend legitimiert ist und dass Kinder und Jugendliche gute Gründe dafür haben, sich gegen Gesetze und Maßnahmen ihrer Regierung mit Akten des zivilen Ungehorsams zu wehren. Die zweite zentrale These des Aufsatzes lautet, dass der beste Weg zur Aufhebung dieses Zustands der Ungerechtigkeit und mangelnden Legitimation in der Einführung einer Pflicht der Eltern besteht, stellvertretend für ihre Kinder zu wählen. Diese elterliche Pflicht sollte durch ein Vetorecht der Minderjährigen ab 14 Jahren ergänzt werden. (shrink)

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, (...) however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology. (shrink)

Most laypersons and political theorists endorse the claims that all adults should be enfranchised and all children should be disenfranchised. The first claim rejects epistocracy; the second...

A minimum voting age is defended as the most effective and least disrespectful means of ensuring all members of an electorate are sufficiently competent to vote. Whilst it may be reasonable to require competency from voters, a minimum voting age should be rejected because its view of competence is unreasonably controversial, it is incapable of defining a clear threshold of sufficiency and an alternative test is available which treats children more respectfully. This alternative is a procedural test for minimum electoral (...) competence. A procedural test for minimum electoral competence also succeeds in fulfilling adults’ duties to promote children’s rational and moral engagement with democracy. A minimum voting age should therefore be rejected, all things considered. A procedural test for minimum literacy and independent voting is the most justified means to ensure competency from voters and to promote the democratic agency of children. (shrink)

Thomas Christiano argues that democracies acquire a right to rule by being the unique embodiment of publicly accessible rules. Justice requires the equal advancement of the interests of all. However, due to the need for citizens to shape a common world despite disagreement and limitations of human cognition, publicity is a necessary constraint on the pursuit of justice. Given that democracy is necessary to secure public equality, democratic authority is thus justified, as democracy is the only political arrangement that satisfies (...) both the publicity constraint and equality requirement. Christiano’s argument depends on a claim that individuals should be given the right to advance what they take to be their interests. This right is defended through two interlocking claims. First, according individuals this right advances three fundamental interests: i) correcting cognitive biases; ii) being at home in the world; and iii) equal moral standing. Second, the three fundamental interests imply that any collective decision-making procedure must be publicly accessible. Thus, any argument against the right to judge for oneself either violates the publicity requirement or the equality constraint. In this paper, I argue that Christiano’s argument faces a problem—under a two-stage plural voting system, an unequal distribution of voting rights can satisfy both the publicity requirement and the equality constraint. Thus, Christiano’s claim that public equality requires an equal distribution of the right to judge for oneself is mistaken. (shrink)

Thomas Christiano argues that democracies acquire a right to rule by being the unique embodiment of publicly accessible rules. Justice requires the equal advancement of the interests of all. However, due to the need for citizens to shape a common world despite disagreement and limitations of human cognition, publicity is a necessary constraint on the pursuit of justice. Given that democracy is necessary to secure public equality, democratic authority is thus justified, as democracy is the only political arrangement that satisfies (...) both the publicity constraint and equality requirement. Christiano’s argument depends on a claim that individuals should be given the right to advance what they take to be their interests. This right is defended through two interlocking claims. First, according individuals this right advances three fundamental interests: i) correcting cognitive biases; ii) being at home in the world; and iii) equal moral standing. Second, the three fundamental interests imply that any collective decision-making procedure must be publicly accessible. Thus, any argument against the right to judge for oneself either violates the publicity requirement or the equality constraint. In this paper, I argue that Christiano’s argument faces a problem—under a two-stage plural voting system, an unequal distribution of voting rights can satisfy both the publicity requirement and the equality constraint. Thus, Christiano’s claim that public equality requires an equal distribution of the right to judge for oneself is mistaken. (shrink)

Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy working today endorses democracy in one variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping us theorise about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, (...) each is rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have been represented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian) democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a positive, not negative, manner. (shrink)

Children are among the few social groups that are systematically and universally disenfranchised. Although children are citizens worthy of equal moral treatment and rights, their right to vote is restricted in almost all states, and this is seen as legitimate by most democratic theories. What is particular about childhood that justifies the restriction of their right to vote? How can democratic systems legitimise the exclusion of a section of their citizenry? This article provides a critical analysis of the principles that (...) ground child disenfranchisement, and of the allocative mechanisms proposed for restricting the right to vote. It shows that most arguments in favour of child disenfranchisement are unsatisfactory, as they are inconsistently used to target the child population (but not other groups) or are incompatible with a commitment to equality. Among the principles for child disenfranchisement, only those that appeal to political incompetence may be valid for excluding children. Regarding the allocative method of exclusion, this article shows that age thresholds cannot be justified to restrict franchise, and that, while competence tests fare better in theory, there may be issues of implementation. The article contributes by providing a clear and systematic analysis of the core arguments in favour of child disenfranchisement, and the conditions that must be met to justify such a practice. (shrink)

The distinction between equality and sufficiency, much discussed in the distributive justice literature, is here applied to democratic theory. Overlooking this distinction can have significant normative implications, undermining some defences and criticisms of political equality, as I show by discussing the work of three prominent democratic theorists: Thomas Christiano, David Estlund, and Mark Warren. Most importantly, Christiano sometimes defends egalitarian conclusions using sufficientarian premises, or worries about inequality in situations where insufficiency is also part of the problem; inequality above the (...) level of sufficiency is not always as troubling. Estlund makes the reverse error. He attacks rather than defends political egalitarianism, but insufficiency seems to explain some of his concerns. Nonetheless, I show that political egalitarians may need to specify a sufficientarian threshold, to avoid levelling-down objections. Democratic theorists should thus take seriously the distinction between political equality and political sufficiency. More generally, political theorists and philosophers should be aware of omitted variable bias and interaction effects due to conceptual stretching arising from under-theorised distinctions in their thought experiments. (shrink)

This article aims to put into dialogue Philosophy for Children (P4C) and education rights. Whereas rights have robust conceptualizations and have been the topic of many scholarly discussions, scholarship on P4C still has a lot to unpack for a more expansive understanding, especially when scaled up to the level of rights. This work asks whether or not the rhetoric of “rights” can be used to discuss if P4C has a rightful place to be a mandatory part of school curriculum. Thus (...) the article explores how P4C is positioned between children education and rights discourses. The range of views on P4C is broad enough to prevent the concentration of discursive power in a single source or authority in terms of scale of discussion. P4C is therefore subject to both scrutiny and praise in the same way that other human rights ideologies have been. In conclusion, this work hopes to speak and contribute to the literature on P4C by problematizing children’s discursive positions as learners and citizens with rights. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that given a choice between a global epistocracy and a global democracy, we ought to choose epistocracy. The reason for this is the need for stopping the ongoing climatic change that will cause a massive amount of suffering and death. Accordingly, I will demonstrate why the democratic process is inadequate in preventing the future climate disaster, and why an epistocracy have a better chance to succeed in this endeavour. My argumentation relies on four steps. (...) First, I shall start with some initial housekeeping that explains why the outcome of continuing climate change is so repugnant. Secondly, I will demonstrate why implementing policies that halt climate change is something we ought to do and why it takes priority over other political concerns. Thirdly, I will argue that given psychological barriers coupled with the Condorcet Jury Theorem we have reason to believe a global democracy will fail to implement these necessary policies. Finally, I shall defend some fundamental claims that the epistocratic method relies on. This I do for two reasons: first, to give some moral credence to the epistocratic method and as a consequent close the door to radical authoritarianism. I do this because even if our priority is to prevent the impending climate disaster, we need to safeguard against a decision-making process that possibly could enact morally repugnant policies, e.g., bestow only one person with all political power. Secondly, the defence of epistocracy will demonstrate why a proceduralist argumentation for democracy does not yield a great moral advantage vis-à-vis the epistocratic method. (shrink)