Large protein assemblies are usually the effectors of major cellular processes. The intricate cell homeostasis network is divided into numerous interconnected pathways, each controlled by a set of protein machines. One of these master regulators is the CCR4‐NOT complex, which ultimately controls protein expression levels. This multisubunit complex assembles around a scaffold platform, which enables a wide variety of well‐studied functions from mRNA synthesis to transcript decay, as well as other tasks still being identified. Solving the structure (...) of the entire CCR4‐NOT complex will help to define the distribution of its functions. The recently published three‐dimensional reconstruction of the complex, in combination with the known crystal structures of some of the components, has begun to address this. Methodological improvements in structural biology, especially in cryoelectron microscopy, encourage further structural and protein‐protein interaction studies, which will advance our comprehension of the gene expression machinery. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Nature Communications Ukleja and co‐workers reported a cryo‐EM 3D reconstruction of the Ccr4‐Not complex from Schizosaccharomyces pombe with an immunolocalization of the different subunits. The newly gained architectural knowledge provides cues to apprehend the functional diversity of this major eukaryotic regulator. Indeed, in the cytoplasm alone, Ccr4‐Not regulates translational repression, decapping and deadenylation, and the Not module additionally plays a positive role in translation. The spatial distribution of the subunits within the structure (...) is compatible with a model proposing that the Ccr4‐Not complex interacts with the 5′ and 3′ ends of target mRNAs, allowing different functional modules of the complex to act at different stages of the translation process, possibly within a circular constellation of the mRNA. This work opens new avenues, and reveals important gaps in our understanding regarding structure and mode of function of the Ccr4‐Not complex that need to be addressed in the future. (shrink)

Although mathematical descriptions of the dynamics of system are widely employed in the physical sciences, they are employed infrequently in the biological sciences. The explanation for this usually appeals to the complexity of biological systems. I contend that quite the opposite is true and that such descriptions, in fact, enable complexity to be tamed. Moreover, in those areas in which mathematical descriptions have been used in the biological sciences, they provide a powerful vehicle for expanding our understanding of the systems (...) through an exploration of the mathematical models. Such investigations yield surprising information about the dynamics of the system some of which cannot be discovered through empirical investigation alone. (shrink)

Computer-simulated scenarios have been part of psychological research on problem solving for more than 40 years. The shift in emphasis from simple toy problems to complex, more real-life oriented problems has been accompanied by discussions about the best ways to assess the process of solving complex problems. Psychometric issues such as reliable assessments and addressing correlations with other instruments have been in the foreground of these discussions and have left the content validity of complex problem solving in (...) the background. In this paper, we return the focus to content issues and address the important features that define complex problems. (shrink)

Michael Nair-Collins and Franklin Miller are right to emphasise that, in order to deliberate responsibly about ethical and legal questions related to brain death and organ donation, it is crucial to answer the question of whether or not ‘brain death’i does indeed mark the biological death of the organism. Nonetheless, I disagree with the authors’ conclusion that brain death does not indicate the death of the human organism. Death can never be defined in merely biological terms, because any biological conception (...) of death relies on metaphysical presuppositions regarding what it means to be an ‘organism as a whole’, rather than an aggregate of cells and tissues. Death is a change in substance —that is, a change from one type of entity to another — not the cessation of all biological life. Organismal death occurs well before all of the organism’s parts irreversibly cease vital activity and decompose into inorganic matter. Biological life in some form can and usually does continue after organismal death at least for a time, with recent evidence indicating that animal cell networks continue to perform complex functions like stress response, immune response and inflammation response up to several days postmortem.1 With external support, many cells and tissues can continue to perform their functions ex vivo for long periods of time or even indefinitely.2 Henrietta Lax died in 1951, but cells derived from her cancerous cervical cells …. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary.We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified based (...) on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making. (shrink)

In ‘The Complex Case of Ellie Anderson’, Joona Rasanen and Anna Smajdor raise several ethical questions about the case. One question asks, but does not answer, whether Ellie faced discrimination for being transgender when her mother was not allowed access to Ellie’s sperm following her death. In raising the question, the authors imply anti-trans bias may have influenced this determination. However, this inference is not supported by current ethical and legal guidance for posthumous use of gametes, with which Ellie’s (...) case is consistent. We consider the authors’ responses to their other ethical queries, and how their suggestions for what options might have been available to Ellie and her family are instructive for addressing attempts in the USA and UK to restrict minors’ access to gender-affirming medical treatment, including puberty-blocking therapy. (shrink)

Although Burt clearly explains how modern genomic techniques work, and describes their limitations, her conclusion that they are therefore not valuable additions to understanding social outcomes is unwarranted. Understanding the causes of complex social outcomes depends on understanding how social, individual, and genetic factors complexly interact with each other. None can be understood without reference to the others.

This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that knowledge of the micro-level behavior of the components of systems is necessary, but only combined with a full specification of the contingent context sufficient for a full explanation of systems phenomena. The paper takes seriously fundamental principles independent and transcendent of the laws of quantum mechanics that govern most of real-world phenomena. It will conclude in showing how the recent postgenomic revolution, taking seriously the physical principle (...) of organization and collective behavior, can be understood as attempting to complement a reductionist investigative strategy with an antireductionist explanatory strategy. (shrink)

Upon hearing “Some of Michelangelo’s sculptures are in Rome,” adults can easily generate a scalar implicature and infer that the intended meaning of the utterance corresponds to “Some but not all Michelangelo’s sculptures are in Rome.” Comprehension experiments show that preschoolers struggle with this kind of inference until at least 5 years of age. Surprisingly, the few studies having investigated children’s production of scalar expressions like some and all suggest that production is adult-like already in their third year of life. (...) Thus, children’s production of implicatures seems to develop at least 2 years before their comprehension of implicatures. In this paper, we present a novel account of scalar implicature generation in the framework of Bidirectional Optimality Theory: the Asymmetry Account. We show that the production–comprehension asymmetry is predicted to emerge because the comprehension of some requires the hearer to consider the speaker’s perspective, but the production of some does not require the speaker to consider the hearer’s perspective. Hence, children’s comprehension of scalar expressions, but not their production of scalar expressions, is predicted to be related to their theory of mind development. Not possessing fully developed theory of mind abilities yet, children thus have difficulty in comprehending scalar expressions such as some in an adult-like way. Our account also explains why variable performance is found in experimental studies testing children’s ability to generate scalar implicatures; moreover, it describes the differences between children’s and adults’ implicature generation in terms of their ability to recursively apply theory of mind; finally, it sheds new light on the question why the interpretation of numerals does not require implicature generation. (shrink)

Awais Aftab’s response to my article is informative because it expresses what I suspect is a widespread but confused inclination among psychiatrists to “have their cake and eat it.” On the one hand they do not want to be branded as reductionists, so they deny they are equating mental disorder with brain disease or brain mechanisms. Yet, they want to maintain a role for physical causation in mental disorder, because without it the link between psychiatry and medicine starts to look (...) tenuous.Reductionism is the implication of what Aftab is saying, however. By denying any important distinction between behavior produced by a brain disease and other, non-disease driven behavior (which I refer to here as “ordinary... (shrink)

One might be tempted to grant to Sagoff the homely adage that values come from the heart, not the head; and, moreover, be tempted to grant to him the naive simplification that science is a value-fr...

I have two aims for the present paper, one narrow and one broad. The narrow aim is to show that a class of data originally described by Lynsey Wolter empirically undermine the leading treatments of complex demonstratives that have been described in the literature. The broader aim of the paper is to show that Wolter demonstratives, as I will call the constructions I focus on, are a threat not just to existing treatments, but to any possible theory that retains (...) the uncontroversial assumptions that relative clauses always form a constituent with the nouns they modify, and that semantic composition proceeds sequentially and locally, with the inputs to interpretation having the structure syntax tells us they do. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian tradition, the psychological difference between virtue and continence is commonly understood in terms of inner harmony versus inner conflict. Virtuous agents experience inner harmony between feeling and action because they do not care to do other than what their circumstances call for, whereas continent agents feel conflicted about doing what is called for because of competing concerns. Critics of this view argue, however, that when the circumstances require sacrificing something of genuine value, virtuous agents can indeed feel (...) conflicted about acting well. But if this is so, what differentiates virtuous from merely continent agency? This essay argues that the traditional distinction conflates two aspects of virtue as well as two species of continence. And distinguishing between them provides resources for making sense of the complex relationship between inner conflict and good moral agency. (shrink)

"Complexity" is a catchword of certain extremely popular and rapidly developing interdisciplinary new sciences, often called accordingly the sciences of complexity. It is often closely associated with another notably popular but ambiguous word, "information"; information, in turn, may be justly called the central new concept in the whole 20th century science. Moreover, the notion of information is regularly coupled with a key concept of thermodynamics, viz. entropy. And like this was not enough it is quite usual to add one more (...) at present extraordinarily popular notion, namely chaos, and wed it with the abovementioned concepts. It is my aim in this paper to critically analyse this conceptual mess from a logical and philosophical point of view concentrating on the concepts of complexity and information and the question concerning the true relation between them. (shrink)

A longstanding philosophical premise perceives simplicity as a desirable attribute of scientific theories. One of several raised justifications for this notion is that simple theories are more likely to indicate the true makeup of natural systems. Qualitatively parsimonious hypotheses and theories keep to a minimum the number of different postulated entities within a system. Formulation of such ontologically simple working hypotheses proved to be useful in the experimental probing of narrowly defined bio systems. It is less certain, however, whether qualitatively (...) parsimonious theories are effective indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. This paper assesses the success of ontologically simple theories in envisaging the makeup of three complex systems in bacteriology, immunology, and molecular biology. Evidence shows that parsimonious theories completely misconstrued the actual ontologically complex constitutions of the three examined systems. Since evolution and selective pressures typically produce ontologically intricate rather than simple bio systems, qualitatively parsimonious theories are mostly inapt indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. (shrink)

Based on their social bonding hypothesis, Savage et al. predict a relation between “musical” behaviors and social complexity across species. However, our qualitative comparative review suggests that, although learned contact calls are positively associated with complex social dynamics across species, songs are not. Yet, in contrast to songs, and arguably consistent with their functions, contact calls are not particularly music-like.

ABSTRACT The financial crisis was caused by the complex, constantly growing web of regulations designed to constrain and redirect modern capitalism. This complexity made investors, bankers, and perhaps regulators themselves ignorant of regulations promulgated across decades and in different “fields” of regulation. These regulations interacted with each other to foster the issuance and securitization of subprime mortgages; their rating as AA or AAA; and previously their concentration on the balance sheets (and off the balance sheets) of many commercial and (...) investment banks. As a practical matter, it was impossible to predict the disastrous outcome of these interacting regulations. This fact calls into question the feasibility of the century‐old attempt to create a hybrid capitalism in which regulations are supposed to remedy economic problems as they arise. (shrink)

As the number of computational models of eye-movement control in reading increases, so too will their coverage and complexity. This will make their comparison and testing increasingly challenging. We argue here that there is a need to develop a methodology for constructing and evaluating such models, and outline aspects of a possible methodology.

This article draws attention to the ethical complexity researchers may be confronted with during fieldwork should an adult participant with intellectual disabilities disclose that harm or an illegal activity is occurring or has occurred in the past. The need to gain ethical approval and the positioning of people with intellectual disabilities as vulnerable within ethics review procedures can result in the adoption of paternalistic approaches as researchers are encouraged to break confidentiality to report concerns to other professionals. Whilst this may (...) fulfil a researcher’s duty to ensure no harm occurs to participants, if it takes place against the participant’s wishes it may also violate participant autonomy, reinforce unequal relations of power, and may unwittingly contribute to subsequent harm occurring. Whilst the article begins from our experience as two UK-based researchers working with people with intellectual disabilities, it draws on existing literature and guidelines to expose the ethical tensions which may be encountered. It is intended that the paper acts as a starting point for researchers wishing to reflect on their practice and ethical decision-making, whilst contributing to wider debates on the position of people with intellectual disabilities within society. (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if (...) and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

Several complexity theorists draw a sharp and ontologically robust distinction between (merely) complicated systems and (genuinely) complex systems. I argue that this distinction does not hold. Upon fine-grained analysis, ostensibly complicated systems turn out to be complex systems. The purported boundary between the complicated and the complex appears to be vague rather than sharp. Systems are complex by degrees.

In this paper I defend two claims regarding complex demonstratives. On the one hand I argue that, when one of these expressions misdescribes the referred object, the right semantic analysis is to treat the expression as uninterpretable. On the other, I claim that the uninterpretability thesis finds itself in trouble when it comes to dealing with non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives, i.e., uses of “that F” in which the speaker has no acquaintance or direct perception of any object (...) that could satisfy the predicative material. In order to make these two claims compatible, I set out to modify the way the uninterpretability thesis has been traditionally formulated. (shrink)

This book asks not only how the study of white-collar crime can enrich our understanding of crime and justice more generally, but also how criminological ...

BackgroundEvolving medical technology, advancing biomedical and drug research, and changing laws and legislation impact patients’ healthcare options and influence healthcare practitioners’ (HCPs’) practices. Conscientious objection policy confusion and variability can arise as it may occasionally be unclear what underpins non-participation. Our objective was to identify, analyze, and synthesize the factors that influenced HCPs who did not participate in ethically complex, legally available healthcare.MethodsWe used Arksey and O’Malley’s framework while considering Levac et al.’s enhancements, and qualitatively synthesized the evidence. We (...) searched Medline, CINAHL, JSTOR, EMBASE, PsychINFO, Sociological Abstracts, and ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global from January 1, 1998, to January 15, 2020, and reviewed the references of the final articles. We included articles written in English that discussed the factors that influenced physicians and registered nurses (RNs) who did not participate in end-of-life (EOL), reproductive technology and health, genetic testing, and organ or tissue donation healthcare areas. Using Covidence, we conducted title and abstract screening, followed by full-text screening against our eligibility criteria. We extracted the article’s data into a spreadsheet, analyzed the articles, and completed a qualitative content analysis using NVivo12.ResultsWe identified 10,664 articles through the search, and after the screening, 16 articles were included. The articles sampled RNs (n = 5) and physicians (n = 11) and encompassed qualitative (n = 7), quantitative (n = 7), and mixed (n = 2) methodologies. The care areas included reproductive technology and health (n = 11), EOL (n = 3), organ procurement (n = 1), and genetic testing (n = 1). One article included two care areas; EOL and reproductive health. The themed factors that influenced HCPs who did not participate in healthcare were: (1) HCPs’ characteristics, (2) personal beliefs, (3) professional ethos, 4) emotional labour considerations, and (5) system and clinical practice considerations.ConclusionThe factors that influenced HCPs’ who did not participate in ethically complex, legally available care are diverse. There is a need to recognize conscientious objection to healthcare as a separate construct from non-participation in healthcare for reasons other than conscience. Understanding these separate constructs will support HCPs’ specific to the underlying factors influencing their practice participation. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to show how supramolecular complexity of cell organization can dramatically alter the functions of individual macromolecules within a cell. The emergence of new functions which appear as a consequence of supramolecular complexity, is explained in terms of physical chemistry. The book is interdisciplinary, at the border between cell biochemistry, physics and physical chemistry. This interdisciplinarity does not result in the use of physical techniques but from the use of physical concepts to study biological problems. (...) In the domain of complexity studies, most works are purely theoretical or based on computer simulation. The present book is partly theoretical, partly experimental and theory is always based on experimental results. Moreover, the book encompasses in a unified manner the dynamic aspects of many different biological fields ranging from dynamics to pattern emergence in a young embryo. The volume puts emphasis on dynamic physical studies of biological events. It also develops, in a unified perspective, this new interdisciplinary approach of various important problems of cell biology and chemistry, ranging from enzyme dynamics to pattern formation during embryo development, thus paving the way to what may become a central issue of future biology. (shrink)

As many as two million people in the United Kingdom repeatedly see people, animals, and objects that have no objective reality. Hallucinations on the border of sleep, dementing illnesses, delirium, eye disease, and schizophrenia account for 90% of these. The remainder have rarer disorders. We review existing models of recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) in the awake person, including cortical irritation, cortical hyperexcitability and cortical release, top-down activation, misperception, dream intrusion, and interactive models. We provide evidence that these can (...) neither fully account for the phenomenology of RCVH, nor for variations in the frequency of RCVH in different disorders. We propose a novel Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model for RCVH. A combination of impaired attentional binding and poor sensory activation of a correct proto-object, in conjunction with a relatively intact scene representation, bias perception to allow the intrusion of a hallucinatory proto-object into a scene perception. Incorporation of this image into a context-specific hallucinatory scene representation accounts for repetitive hallucinations. We suggest that these impairments are underpinned by disturbances in a lateral frontal cortex–ventral visual stream system. We show how the frequency of RCVH in different diseases is related to the coexistence of attentional and visual perceptual impairments; how attentional and perceptual processes can account for their phenomenology; and that diseases and other states with high rates of RCVH have cholinergic dysfunction in both frontal cortex and the ventral visual stream. Several tests of the model are indicated, together with a number of treatment options that it generates. Key Words: Blindness; Charles Bonnet; cholinergic; cortical release; delirium; dementia; dream intrusion; hallucination; Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model; schizophrenia. (shrink)

Ruiping Fan (2010), employing a Confucian values framework, appropriately critiques Michael Sandel's (2007) absolutist rejection of genetic enhancement. As described by Fan, Sandel believes genetic...

When analyzing complex longitudinal data, especially data from different educational settings, researchers generally focus only on the mean part (i.e., the regression coefficients), ignoring the equally important random part (i.e., the random effect variances) of the model. By using Project English Language and Literacy Acquisition (ELLA) data, we demonstrated the importance of taking the complex data structure into account by carefully specifying the random part of the model, showing that not only can it affect the variance estimates, the (...) standard errors, and the tests of significance of the regression coefficients, it also can offer different perspectives of the data, such as information related to the developmental process. We used xxM (Mehta, 2013), which can flexibly estimate different grade-level variances separately and the potential carryover effect from each grade factor to the later time measures. Implications of the findings and limitations of the study are discussed. (shrink)

This book employs contemporary philosophy, scientific research, and clinical reports to argue that pain, though real, is not an appropriate object of scientific generalisations or an appropriate target for medical intervention. Each pain experience is instead complex and idiosyncratic in a way which undermines scientific utility. In addition to contributing novel arguments and developing a novel position on the nature of pain, the book provides an interdisciplinary overview of dominant models of pain. The author lays the needed groundwork for (...) improved models and targeted treatments at a time when pain science, pain medicine, and philosophy are explicitly searching for both and failing to find them. The Complex Reality of Pain will be of interest to a broad range of researchers and students, including those working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, cognitive science, neuroscience, medicine, health, cognitive and behavioural psychology, and pain science. (shrink)

Kinship terminologies are basic cognitive semantic systems that all human societies use for organizing kin relations. Diversity in kinship systems and their categories is substantial, but constrained. Rácz, Passmore, and Jordan explore hypotheses about such constraints from learning theories and social pressures, testing the impact of a community‐size driven learning bottleneck against the social coordination demands of different kinds of marriage and resource systems.

Social transmission is at the core of cultural evolutionary theory. It occurs when a demonstrator uses mental representations to produce some public displays which in turn allow a learner to acquire similar mental representations. Although cultural evolutionists do not dispute this view of social transmission, they typically abstract away from the multistep nature of the process when they speak of cultural variants at large, thereby referring both to variation and evolutionary change in mental representations as well as in their corresponding (...) public displays. This conflation suggests that differentiating each step of the transmission process is redundant. In this paper, I examine different forms of interplay between the multistep nature of social transmission and the metric spaces used by cultural evolutionists to measure cultural variation and to model cultural change. I offer a conceptual analysis of what assumptions seem to be at work when cultural evolutionists conflate the complex causal sequence of social transmission as a single space of variation in which populations evolve. To this aim, I use the framework of variation spaces, a formal framework commonly used in evolutionary biology, and I develop two theoretical concepts, ‘technique’ and ‘technical space’, for addressing cases where the complexity of social transmission defies the handy assumption of a single variation space for cultural change. (shrink)

Syntactic complexity effects have been investigated extensively with respect to comprehension . According to one prominent class of accounts , certain structures cause comprehension difficulty due to their scarcity in the language. But why are some structures less frequent than others? In two elicited-production experiments we investigated syntactic complexity effects in relative clauses and wh-questions varying in whether or not they contained non-local dependencies. In both experiments, we found reliable durational differences between subject-extracted structures and object-extracted structures : Participants took (...) longer to begin and produce object-extractions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to be disfluent in the object-extracted constructions. These results suggest that there is a cost associated with planning and uttering the more syntactically complex, object-extracted structures, and that this cost manifests in the form of longer durations and disfluencies. Although the precise nature of this cost remains to be determined, these effects provide one plausible explanation for the relative rarity of object-extractions: They are more costly to produce. (shrink)

Although much recent social science and humanities work has been a revolt against simplification, this volume explores the contrast between simplicity and complexity to reveal that this dichotomy, itself, is too simplistic. John Law and Annemarie Mol have gathered a distinguished panel of contributors to offer—particularly within the field of science studies—approaches to a theory of complexity, and at the same time a theoretical introduction to the topic. Indeed, they examine not only ways of relating to complexity but complexity _in (...) practice._ Individual essays study complexity from a variety of perspectives, addressing market behavior, medical interventions, aeronautical design, the governing of supranational states, ecology, roadbuilding, meteorology, the science of complexity itself, and the psychology of childhood trauma. Other topics include complex wholes in the sciences, moral complexity in seemingly amoral endeavors, and issues relating to the protection of African elephants. With a focus on such concepts as multiplicity, partial connections, and ebbs and flows, the collection includes narratives from Kenya, Great Britain, Papua New Guinea, the Netherlands, France, and the meetings of the European Commission, written by anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars of science, technology, and society. _Contributors._ Andrew Barry, Steven D. Brown, Michel Callon, Chunglin Kwa, John Law, Nick Lee, Annemarie Mol, Marilyn Strathern, Laurent Thévenot, Charis Thompson. (shrink)

The consensus among evolutionists seems to be that the morphological complexity of organisms increases in evolution, although almost no empirical evidence for such a trend exists. Most studies of complexity have been theoretical, and the few empirical studies have not, with the exception of certain recent ones, been especially rigorous; reviews are presented of both the theoretical and empirical literature. The paucity of evidence raises the question of what sustains the consensus, and a number of suggestions are offered, including the (...) possibility that certain cultural and/or perceptual biases are at work. In addition, a shift in emphasis from theoretical to empirical inquiry is recommended for the study of complexity, and guidelines for future empirical studies are proposed. (shrink)

We generalize the notion of analytic/Borel equivalence relations, orbit equivalence relations, and Borel reductions between them to their continuous and quantitative counterparts: analytic/Borel pseudometrics, orbit pseudometrics, and Borel reductions between them. We motivate these concepts on examples and we set some basic general theory. We illustrate the new notion of reduction by showing that the Gromov–Hausdorff distance maintains the same complexity if it is defined on the class of all Polish metric spaces, spaces bounded from below, from above, and from (...) both below and above. Then we show that [Formula: see text] is not reducible to equivalences induced by orbit pseudometrics, generalizing the seminal result of Kechris and Louveau. We answer in negative a question of Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov on whether balls in the Gromov–Hausdorff and Kadets distances are Borel. In appendix, we provide new methods using games showing that the distance-zero classes in certain pseudometrics are Borel, extending the results of Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov. There is a complementary paper of the authors where reductions between the most common pseudometrics from functional analysis and metric geometry are provided. (shrink)