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The Complex Reality of Pain

Routledge (2020)

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  1. The Bodily Theory of Pain.Erlend Winderen Finke Owesen - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    One use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable (...)
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  • The Complex Reality of Pain, by Jennifer Corns.Colin Klein - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):986-995.
    The Complex Reality of Pain, by CornsJennifer. New York: Routledge, 2020. Pp. xi + 217.
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  • A Multidimensional Phenomenal Space for Pain: Structure, Primitiveness, and Utility.Sabrina Coninx - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (1):1-21.
    Pain is often used as the paradigmatic example of a phenomenal kind with a phenomenal quality common and unique to its instantiations. Philosophers have intensely discussed the relation between the subjective feeling, which unites pains and distinguishes them from other experiences, and the phenomenal properties of sensory, affective, and evaluative character along which pains typically vary. At the center of this discussion is the question whether the phenomenal properties prove necessary and/or sufficient for pain. In the empirical literature, sensory, affective, (...)
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  • A multidimensional phenomenal space for pain: structure, primitiveness, and utility.Sabrina Coninx - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):223-243.
    Pain is often used as the paradigmatic example of a phenomenal kind with a phenomenal quality common and unique to its instantiations. Philosophers have intensely discussed the relation between the subjective feeling, which unites pains and distinguishes them from other experiences, and the phenomenal properties of sensory, affective, and evaluative character along which pains typically vary. At the center of this discussion is the question whether the phenomenal properties prove necessary and/or sufficient for pain. In the empirical literature, sensory, affective, (...)
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