Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die Rationalität der Metapher" verfügbar.

Nach Orientierung fragt man erst, wenn man sie verloren hat. Kant hat das Bedürfnis nach Orientierung sowohl in den unscheinbarsten Regungen des Alltags wie in den großen Fragen des Glaubens aufgespürt. Die Idee zu einer Philosophie der Orientierung findet sich bereits in seinen vorkritischen Schriften. Kant hat sie jedoch erst anläßlich des Pantheismusstreits zwischen Mendelssohn und Jacobi expliziert, als seine Vernunftkritik ihren Kredit unter den Zeitgenossen und bei der preußischen Obrigkeit zu verlieren drohte. Insbesondere die These einer Leiblichkeit der Orientierung (...) verbindet Kants Position mit der phänomenologischen Tradition bei Cassirer, Merleau-Ponty und Plessner. Welches Potenzial in Kants Naturgeschichte und Phänomenologie der Orientierung steckt, zeigt die vorliegende Untersuchung, indem sie einen weiten Bogen von der Genealogie des Orientierungsdiskurses im 18. Jahrhundert zur diskursiven Praxis der Vernunft in der Gegenwart spannt. (shrink)

T. 1. Von den Anfängen bis Aristoteles.

In Roman literature, the Argo commonly ranks as the first ship. The Flavian poet Valerius Flaccus seems to place himself in this line of tradition too by constantly stressing the Argo’s pioneer status. Yet it has rightly been noted that nowhere in the Argonautica is the Argo explicitly said to be the first ever ship. Her exceptional role is based rather on her status as the first sea-going ship to sail across the open sea from Europe to Asia, opening the (...) seas to global marine trade. From this perspective, the hitherto inadequately explained mentions of ships in the Phlegyas simile (3,124–132) and the Lemnos episode (2,107–114; 285–305) can also be analysed as only apparent inconsistencies. The interpretive effort required here draws the attention of the reader or audience, which is called upon to compare the earlier ships to the Argo. In this, the poet suggests a pessimistic judgement: a consequence of the opening of the seas was shipping disasters and human tragedies. Also, it did not only lead to the expansion of civilising achievements, but also held the danger that rituals and customs of a periphery which is read as barbaric would penetrate into the cultural space of the Mediterranean world. (shrink)

We have grown used to leading the hermeneutics to its philosophical honorary status up various steps. It begins relatively innocently with the skill of interpretation and explanation: it goes on with philosophical hermeneutics which prepares the general epistemological and theoretical framework for methodical understanding, and it ends with the hermeneutic philosophy, in which both philosophizing and pre-philosophical life are decisively defined as understanding and mutual understanding. This hermeneutic philosophy need not restrict itself to the hermeneutics of texts, but can extend (...) to encompass the hermeneutics of senses, images and that of human comportment. The touchstone for determining the direction in which hermeneutics is going will be otherness. The crucial question is: can otherness be overcome on the grounds of hermeneutics or can hermeneutics itself become questionable by otherness? In dealing with this question we are mostly referring to the third of the above-mentioned phases, i.e. the philosophical core of hermeneutic philosophy, which finds its most effective expression in Gadamer’s Truth and Method. That this effect is not without its doubts is not evident only from the German debates, in which the older, »traditional« hermeneutics presents various arguments defending its rights against Gadamer’s attempt at overcoming it, but also from a variety of types of hermeneutics from Italy. If we side with Jean Greisch in defining the contemporaneousness as »the age of hermeneutic reason«, it may well be that this definition of our age also reveals its limits. (shrink)