The most studied source for Gerald Odonis' doctrine of the beatific vision is the text of his Advent 1333 disputed question known as his Quodlibet. The polemic nature of the question and its structural idiosyncrasies have led to difficulties in interpreting Odonis' theory of the “middle vision” of the divine essence that the separate souls of the blessed have, as well as in understanding his defense of Pope John XXII's controversial opinion (which excludes such a middle (...) class='Hi'>vision). By relating Odonis' 1333 disputation to his earlier commentary on the Sentences, most notably his systematic discussion of the beatific vision in book IV, this paper shows how Odonis tried to fit his doctrine of the “middle vision” with his previous discussion, which itself reflects the influence of the 1317 publication of the acts of the 1311-12 Council of Vienne. (shrink)

Does human happiness consist in God, as the widespread medieval view that God is the last end of human beings would suggest, or does it consist in the experience of God, the view suggested by medieval readings of Aristotle? In response to this theological problem, the important fourteenth-century philosopher John of Ripa developed one of the most innovative and subtle late medieval theories of the metaphysics of awareness. This article provides an account of Ripa’s theory of awareness and shows how (...) the theory was both motivated by and intended to solve this central theological problem for late medieval thought. In Section 1, I present the theological problem. In Section 2, I examine Ripa’s innovative theory of the metaphysics of awareness. In Section 3, I show how Ripa uses his account of the metaphysics of awareness to offer a solution to the theological problem. (shrink)

The beatific vision is a subject of considerable importance both in the Christian Scriptures and in the history of Christian dogmatics. In it, humans experience and see the perfect immaterial God, which represents the final end for the saints. However, this doctrine has received less attention in the contemporary theological literature, arguably, due in part to the growing trend toward materialism and the sole emphasis on bodily resurrection in Reformed eschatology. As a piece of retrieval by drawing from (...) the Scriptures, Medieval Christianity, and Reformed Christianity, we motivate a case for the Reformed emphasis on the immaterial and intellectual aspects of human personal eschatology and offer some constructive thoughts on how to link it to the contemporary emphasis of the body. We draw a link between the soul and the body in the vision with the help of Christology as reflected in the theology of John Calvin, and, to a greater extent, the theology of both John Owen and Jonathan Edwards. (shrink)

그리스도교철학자들은 대체로 사람은 누구나 궁극적으로 행복을 추구한다는 아리스토텔레스의 통찰을 수용하면서 행복의 실질적 내용을 ‘지복직관’에서 찾는다. 그런데 이러한 행복론은 중대한 문제를 내포하고 있다. 지복직관은 신의 본질에 대한 완전한 인식에서 성립하는 것이다. 그런데 신의 본질에 대한 인식은 신의 본질에 상응하는 인식의 방식으로 이루어져야만 완전할 수 있다. 그러나 신을 제외한 어떠한 존재자도 신을 그의 본질에 상응하는 방식으로 인식할 수 없다. 그런데 이 경우 지복직관은 신 자신의 자기 자신의 본질에 대한 인식에서 성립된다고 말해야만 한다. 그러나 이러한 행복을 인간의 행복이라고 말할 수는 없을 것이다. 이러한 (...) 문제 상황에서 아우구스티누스 그리고 특히 토마스는 인간의 행복이 신의 본질에 대한 직관에 있음을 인정하면서도 신의 본질에 대한 인간의 인식에 한계를 설정함으로써 인간의 지복을 신의 자기인식으로서의 지복직관과 구별하였다. 한편 이러한 지복은 엄밀한 의미의 지복에는 미치지 못한다는 비판에 직면할 수 있다. 이에 대해 디트리히는 지복직관을 엄밀한 의미에서 추구하여, 원리의 양태에 따라 원리를 인식하면서 자기 자신을 인식하는 능동지성을 통한 신의 본질의 인식으로 파악하였다. 더 나아가 에크하르트는 지복직관에서 인간과 신은 구분되지 않는 하나라는 주장으로까지 나아갔다. 그러나 이러한 지복직관론은 신의 본질을 통한 신의 본질의 직관이라는 정의에 충실하지만, 인간이 더 이상 인간이 아닐 때 인간의 지복이 있다는 역설적 상황에 직면하게 된다. (shrink)

Lo studio prende in esame sei questioni di Thomas Wylton sulla visione beatifica e una questione dal Quodlibet di Siberto di Beka, carmelitano, contemporaneo di Wylton. Il saggio confronta in modo analitico le posizioni dei due autori sul ruolo e la necessità del lumen gloriae nella visione beatifica nelle singole questioni di cui si dà a seguito l'edizione. I codici sono V’ = Vat. Borgh. 36; T' = Tortosa 88; S' = Vat. Borgh. 39. L'edizione, posta in appendice allo studio, (...) riguarda le seguenti porzioni testuali: Thomas Wylton, q. 2 [V', ff. 55va-56va]; q. 3 [V', ff. 56va-58ra]; q. 4 [V', ff. 58ra-va] T16 [T', ff. 46ra-48rb]; T19 [T', ff. 50ra-61vb]; T20 [T', ff. 61vb-62vb]; Siberto di Beka, Quodlibet, q. 16 [S', ff. 270va-272vb]. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l'A. nous propose une solution à un vexant problème théologique, à savoir la façon dont la vision béatifique complète la nature humaine tout en demeurant un don au delà du don divin qui est notre être naturel. En se penchant sur l'oeuvre de Thomas d'Aquin, Ryan encadre d'abord le problème. Ensuite il étudie l'émergence de la théorie dite de «pure nature» comme réponse à Baius, lequel affirmait qu'avant la chute d'Adam la vision béatifique n'était que (...) le complément, dû nécessairement à la nature humaine. L'auteur nous présente également la défense offerte par Garrigou-Lagrange de la théorie de «pure nature», ainsi que la critique offerte par de Lubac. Nous remarquons effectivement que la prise de position des partisans de «pure nature» et celle adoptée par de Lubac se réfutent mutuellement. Ensuite nous étudions la position de Rahner. Selon Ryan, l'apport de Rahner est important; cependant une solution basée sur «l'existentiel surnaturel» rahnerien reste intenable. En fin de compte, l'auteur nous propose une solution qui tire profit de ces points de vue divergents, tout en évitant les pièges qui les accompagnent. (shrink)

It has been shown that the thirteenth-century Dominican friar, St Thomas Aquinas, was an important theological influence on John Owen, the seventeenth-century English puritan theologian, chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, especially in the areas of the divine being, grace and Chalcedonian Christology. Suzanne McDonald has argued that, while Aquinas is unmistakably a source for Owen's doctrine of the beatific vision, Owen surpassed Aquinas's doctrine in a manner she judges to be correct, theologically speaking, and (...) which exposes the deficiency of Aquinas's account. Owen achieved this particular ‘Reforming’ or rather ‘re-forming’ of Aquinas's doctrine, she argues, by way of a ‘Christological re-orientation of the doctrine’ in terms of what is seen in the beatific vision and how it is seen, that is, its content and means. This article replies to McDonald from a Catholic and Thomist perspective, in response to her suggestion that Owen's account of the beatific vision opens up possibilities for ecumenical dialogue. The article attempts to achieve this first by reassessing the Christological contrasts McDonald draws between Owen and Aquinas in terms of content and means, and then by offering several suggestions as to why one might want to prefer Aquinas's account over Owen's. (shrink)

This essay traces the intellectualist position of Pierre Rousselot (1878–1915) as he developed it in reaction to neo‐Thomist scholasticism, and argues that at the heart of Rousselot's approach lay a sacramental ontology. Rousselot's 1908 dissertations on St. Thomas's intellectualism and on love in the Middle Ages are best understood in the context of the 1907 condemnations of Modernism. Rousselot questioned the firmly entrenched rationalist approach of the neo‐Thomist revival. While continuing in the Thomist intellectualist tradition, he argued for a chastened (...) epistemology in which the intellect aimed beyond discursive knowledge at union with God. The implication, for Rousselot, was that in its current condition, the human intellect could arrive at knowledge only in an indirect fashion. Accepting Thomas's view of the unity between love of desire and love of friendship, Rousselot emphasized the continuity between nature and the supernatural. Furthermore, his insistence that rational judgements of credibility were powerless without corresponding ‘eyes of faith’ implied a sacramental view of the natural order as pointing to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. His moderated intellectualism, with its implied sacramental ontology, would prove an attractive paradigm for the later movement of nouvelle théologie. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to give a high-level overview of Irenaeus’s beatific vision, and to suggest that for him, the beatific vision has a temporal dimension (now and future) and a dimension of degree (lesser now, greater in the future). His beatific vision is witnessed as it intersects with at least four main ideas in his writing—the Trinity, anthropology, resurrection, and his eschatology. Irenaeus famously held that ‘the glory of God is living (...) man, and the life of man is the vision of God’ (AH 4.20.7), which speaks to the reality of seeing God in the present, but he could also look forward in anticipation to beholding the face of God in the resurrected body in the new creation. What made the latter possible is the gradual beholding of God in the present that makes one prepared to see God’s glory in the future. Additionally, the visio Dei is Trinitarian. We behold God in Christ, since God the Father is invisible, and it is the Holy Spirit who prepares us incrementally to see God. (shrink)

The beatific vision is widely perceived as a Roman Catholic doctrine. Many continue to view deification as a distinctively Eastern Orthodox doctrine incompatible with the Western theological tradition, especially its Protestant expressions. This essay will demonstrate that several Reformers of the first and second generation promoted a vision of redemption that culminates with deification and beatific vision. They affirmed these concepts without apology in confessional statements, dogmatic works, biblical commentaries, and polemical treatises. Attention will focus (...) on figures in the Reformed tradition though one could produce similar surveys for the Lutheran and Anglican branches of the Reformation as well. John Calvin will receive extended treatment because some scholars dispute whether he affirmed deification. This essay presents important evidence thus far overlooked which should settle the question. (shrink)

The understanding of the human person as a natural desire for the beatific vision prompted fierce and convoluted debate between those who, like de Lubac, espoused la nouvelle théologie, and those who sought to maintain the standard view of the nature-grace relationship. This paper attempts to draw attention to the criticisms which Rahner addressed towards la nouvelle théologie, and to suggest that the distinction which Emmanuel Levinas makes between need (besoin) and desire (désir) offers a useful way of (...) progressing the debate and articulating the understanding of the person as desiderium naturale beyond the language of logical and ontological coherence, and in the language of proximity, ethical summons, and responsibility. (shrink)

The beatific vision is central to St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the soul’s enlightenment. In its vision of the essence of God, the soul/intellect achieves its telos, its highest goal. But the resurrection of the body is a central dogma of the Christian faith, so the main question of this essay concerns the manner in which the resurrected body of the blessed benefits from the soul’s apprehension of the beatific vision. For St. Thomas, the physical (...) eyes do not see the beatific vision, since they can only see magnitude and proportion, and God is beyond both. The soul is the body’s substantial form, and a person is not fully a person without the union of soul and body. As the body’s substantial form, the soul/intellect has the beatific vision as its substantial form. The result of the enlightened intellect with the resurrected body will be that the physical eyes will be able to see more readily the glory of God in creation and in redeemed humanity, and more supremely in the incarnate Christ himself. (shrink)

This essay examines the funeral sermon given by the Baptist theologian Andrew Fuller (1754–1815) for his friend and deacon Beeby Wallis in 1792 as a vantage-point from which to pursue reflection on Fuller’s concept of heaven and the beatific vision. The sermon has two main themes: the rest and rewards of those who die in Christ. The essay examines how Fuller interprets both of these phrases and then, looking at the rest of Fuller’s corpus, notes that ultimately God (...) himself is the believer’s reward. (shrink)

Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous. I claim that one species of horrendous evil is what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. I distinguish two subspecies of horrendous-difference disabilities based in part on the temporal relation between one’s rational moral wishing for a certain human function F and its being thwarted by intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Next, I offer a theodicy for each subspecies of horrendous-difference disability. Although I appeal to some (...) claims made by Marilyn Adams for this theodicy, I reject one particular claim. I deny that one must be aware that one participates in a horrendous evil when the horrific event occurs. To develop this point and its relevance for a theodicy for horrendous-difference disabilities, I engage with Andrew Chignell’s work on infant suffering. In doing so, I show that what partly motivates the claim is a time-bias, i.e., near-bias. By rejecting this time-bias, I show how it is possible, given post-mortem life, for persons with profound cognitive disabilities to participate in horrendous evils and how these might be defeated by God. (shrink)

Paradise is often conceived as a place where suffering is not possible, so much so that the possibility of suffering in paradise has been used by various philosophers as a defeater for the possibility of paradise. [1] Employing a “reverse-engineered-theodicy,” I use Eleonore Stump’s morally-sufficient-reason for why God allows suffering in this earthly world to explore one condition that must obtain for suffering to remain impossible in paradise, namely, that internal fragmentation is not possible in paradise. After developing an intellectualist (...) explanation of the primal sin, I suggest one reason to believe that the internal fragmentation of redeemed humans in paradise is not possible. However, this reason does not extend to other non-human inhabitants of paradise, and so I suggest that it remains possible that these other inhabitants might yet become internally fragmented. Given that Christ-like consensual suffering that aids a third party’s internal integration is presumably morally justifiable, I conclude by suggesting that the suffering of the redeemed in paradise is in fact possible. Therefore, even in paradise, there is a place for hope that the redeemed do not suffer, and for trust in others that they do not bring such suffering into being. [1] For one example see. (shrink)

The most studied source for Gerald Odonis' doctrine of the beatific vision is the text of his Advent 1333 disputed question known as his Quodlibet. The polemic nature of the question and its structural idiosyncrasies have led to difficulties in interpreting Odonis' theory of the “middle vision” of the divine essence that the separate souls of the blessed have, as well as in understanding his defense of Pope John XXII's controversial opinion . By relating Odonis' 1333 disputation (...) to his earlier commentary on the Sentences, most notably his systematic discussion of the beatific vision in book IV, this paper shows how Odonis tried to fit his doctrine of the “middle vision” with his previous discussion, which itself reflects the influence of the 1317 publication of the acts of the 1311-12 Council of Vienne. (shrink)

Malebranche's proof of the existence of God "by mere sight" is opposed to Descartes' a priori proof. Its origin as the origin of vision in God is in the theory of beatific vision developed by Aquinas.

One vexed philosophical question that once enjoyed great esteem is this: in the Beatific Vision that the saints enjoy in heaven, does happiness (beatitudo) consist in the vision of God, in delight in God, or in a combination of the vision and the delight? The answer that one gives to this question apparently commits one to a view about what happiness is ultimately about. It has long been thought that Aquinas holds that happiness consists in the (...) vision of God alone. In this essay, I argue that, on this important issue, Aquinas actually maintains that happiness consists both in the vision of God and delight in God, but that—unlike some of his contemporaries—Aquinas unequivocally affirms that the vision is more important in happiness than the delight. After arguing for this interpretation, I consider the quite compelling account of perfect and imperfect happiness that seems to follow from it. (shrink)

According to Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), it is impossible for the second person of the Trinity to assume into unity of person an irrational nature (e.g., a stone nature), or to assume a rational nature that does not enjoy the beatific vision. He argues that the assumption of a nature to a divine person entails both that the nature has the sort of powers that could exercise supernatural activities and that these powers are exercised. Henry’s Franciscan opponents (...) argue against this. Existent irrational natures (like existent rational natures) are not necessarily subsistent and belonging to a kind does not require the opportunity to exercise the causal powers associated with that kind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. The Concept of Beatific EnjoymentThe locus classicus for the medieval scholastic discussion of beatific enjoyment is the first distinction of Book I of Peter Lombard's Sentences. Lombard extracts three distinct formulations of the term "enjoyment" from Augustine's writings. The first formulation is borrowed from the first book of Augustine's treatise On Christian Learning . The formulation states that "to enjoy is to inhere with love in (...) something for its own sake." The other two formulations are taken from Book X of Augustine's work On the Trinity . The first reads as follows: "we enjoy the things that we know, when the will rests, by delighting in them for their own sake." The second says that "to enjoy is to use with gladness , not merely through hope, but already in reality." These truncated statements served as technical definitions of the concept of enjoyment in scholastic Sentences commentaries. It was thought that the definitions call attention to the various psychological factors required for enjoyment to occur. For instance, the theologian Alexander of Hales explains that the definitions reveal distinct aspects of enjoyment with respect to the subject experiencing it and with respect to the object motivating the enjoyment. The expression "to inhere with love" refers to the soul on the part of the subject and to God on the part of the object. The saying "to use with gladness" relates to the power of the soul on the side of the subject and to created beatitude on the side of the object. Finally, the phrase "we enjoy the things that we know" corresponds to the faculty of the will as well as to the uncreated divine persons. Alexander would thus say that an adequate treatment of Augustine's concept of enjoyment must take into account the subject involved in the activity of enjoyment – e.g., the human soul, the faculty of the will, the faculty of cognition, etc. – and the object or objects of an act of enjoyment – created beatitude, the persons of the Trinity, or simply God.A slightly different reading of Augustine's definitions of enjoyment is found in Thomas Aquinas's Sentences commentary. In his literal exposition of the first distinction of Lombard's Sentences, Thomas notes that a perfect definition of a thing must disclose all of its proper causes. He then offers an explanation of the way in which Augustine's three definitions aim to clarify the concept of enjoyment. According to Thomas, the statement "to inhere in something with love for its own sake" portrays the act of enjoyment in relation to the object as a thing worthy for its own sake and the habit of love causing the enjoyment. The second formulation – "we enjoy the things that we know, etc." – links the act of enjoyment with the faculty of cognition required for the activation of the will. The third formulation – "to enjoy is to use with gladness" – refers primarily to the property of delight , which accompanies the obtainment of the desired object and perfects the act of enjoyment. Thomas, thus, identifies three factors contributing to the occurrence of an act of enjoyment – habit, cognition, and delight . In the first article of the first question of his commentary on Book I of the Sentences, Thomas states that enjoyment is the ultimate happiness of a human being. Enjoyment requires the clear intellectual vision of God, it involves an union as well as a sort of a mutual penetration through love between the one who sees and the thing that is seen, and it culminates in supreme delight . Thomas also says that enjoyment is an act of the will manifesting the habit of charity. In his Summa theologiae Ia IIae, Thomas defines enjoyment as an act of the appetitive faculty , and.. (shrink)

What may seem astonishing is the near dismissal of the beatific vision doctrine in the last 50+ years of biblical and theological scholarship in contrast to the emphasis given to it throughout church history. The state of theological scholarship is changing. In what follows, we set forth a short survey of a theology of the beatific vision, while also introducing the rest of the volume on the beatific vision and theosis, of which we take (...) to have an intimate and overlapping relationship. The editorial article has four parts: it begins by (1) introducing some of the relevant biblical material on the vision, proceeding to (2) develop a theological interpretation of those passages, and then (3) offer a short historical survey of the doctrine, focusing on the relevant medieval and Reformed developments. It finally (4) introduces the articles of the issue. (shrink)

In Aquinas's account of the beatific vision, human beings are joined to God in a never-ending act of contemplation of the divine essence: a state which utterly fulfills the human drive for knowledge and satisfies every desire of the human heart. In this paper, I argue that this state represents less a fulfillment of human nature, however, than a transcendence of that nature. Furthermore, what’s transcended is not incidental on a metaphysical, epistemological, or moral level.

In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism.

In Veritas, Gerald Vision defends the correspondence theory of truth -- the theory that truth has a direct relationship to reality -- against recent attacks, and critically examines its most influential alternatives. The correspondence theory, if successful, explains one way in which we are cognitively connected to the world; thus, it is claimed, truth -- while relevant to semantics, epistemology, and other studies -- also has significant metaphysical consequences. Although the correspondence theory is widely held today, Vision points (...) to an emerging orthodoxy in philosophy that claims that truth as such carries no significant weight in philosophical explanations. He devotes much of the book to a criticism of that outlook and to a less vulnerable formulation of the correspondence theory.Vision defends the correspondence theory by both presenting evidence for correspondence and examining the claims made by such alternative theories as deflationism, minimalism, and pluralism. The techniques of the argument are thoroughly analytic, but the problem confronted is broadly humanistic. The question examined -- how we, as thinking beings, are connected to and manage to cope in a world that was not designed for our comfort or convenience -- is more likely to be raised by continentalists, but is approached here with the tools of clarity and precision more highly prized in analytic philosophy. The book seeks to avoid both the obscurantism that infects much continental thought and the overly technical concerns and methodology that limit the interest of much work in analytic philosophy. It thus provides a rigorous but largely nontechnical treatment of the topic that will be of interest not only to readers familiar with philosophy but also to those with a background in literary theory and linguistics. (shrink)

In virtue of its form [‘I am here’] must be true on any occasion on which [it is] asserted, and yet the proposition it expresses on each occasion [is] contingent. Intuitively, [‘I am here now’] is deeply, and in some sense universally, true. One need only understand the meaning of [it] to know that it cannot be uttered falsely. The sentence ‘I am here’ has the peculiar property that whenever I utter it, it is bound to be true. Even if (...) I am lost and do not know where I am, I can bravely say ‘I am here’, and know that I am expressing a truth. (shrink)

The evidence of blindsight is occasionally used to argue that we can see things, and thus have perceptual belief, without the distinctive visual awareness accompanying normal sight; thereby displacing phenomenality as a component of the concept of vision. I maintain that arguments to this end typically rely on misconceptions about blindsight and almost always ignore associated visual (or visuomotor) pathologies relevant to the lessons of such cases. More specifically, I conclude, first, that the phenomena very likely do not result (...) from dissociations within a single system, but from the interaction of evolutionarily distinct, if interacting, systems; second, that a closer study of spared motor abilities indicates that verbal responses of patients result not from degraded vision but from proprioception; and, finally, above chance verbal responses, being forced guesses, are not tentative beliefs and cannot become beliefs just by training patients to have more confidence in their responses. (shrink)

I present an outline of the Omega Point theory, which is a model for an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, evolving, personal God who is both transcendent to spacetime and immanent in it, and who exists necessarily. The model is a falsifiable physical theory, deriving its key concepts not from any religious tradition but from modern physical cosmology and computer science; from scientific materialism rather than revelation. Four testable predictions of the model are given. The theory assumes that thinking is a purely (...) physical process of the brain, and that personality dies with the brain. Nevertheless, I show that the Omega Point theory suggests a future universal resurrection of the dead very similar to the one predicted in the Judeo‐Christian‐Islamic tradition. The notions of “grace” and the “beatific vision” appear naturally in the model. (shrink)

I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...