For much of the last forty years, certain shared epistemological concerns have guided research in both the history and the philosophy of science: the testing of theory , the assessment of evidence, the bearing of theoretical and metaphysical assumptions on the reality of scientific objects, and, above all, the interaction of subjective and objective factors in scientific inquiry. This essay proposes a turn toward ontology—more specifically, toward the ontologies created and sustained by scientific observation. Such a (...) shift in focus would invite a rethinking of the neo‐Kantian distinctions that have, implicitly or explicitly, informed much of late twentieth‐century history and philosophy of science. In particular, the current gap between psychology and epistemology might be bridged, if the psychology in question were collective rather than individual and the epistemology oriented toward discovery rather than warranting and testing. (shrink)

This book makes a compelling case for the significance of the long, surprising, and epistemologically significant history of scientific observation, a history ...

There is an overlooked similarity between three classic accounts of the conditions of object experience from three distinct disciplines. Sociology: the “inversion” that accompanies discovery in the natural sciences, as local causes of effects are reattributed to an observed object. Psychology: the “externalization” that accompanies mastery of a visual–tactile sensory substitution interface, as tactile sensations of the proximal interface are transformed into vision-like experience of a distal object. Biology: the “projection” that brings forth an animal’s Umwelt, as impressions on its (...) body’s sensory surfaces are reconfigured into perception of an external object. This similarity between the effects of scientific practice and interface-use on the one hand, and of sensorimotor interaction on the other, becomes intelligible once we accept that skillful engagement with instruments and interfaces constitutes a socio-material augmentation of our basic perceptual capacity. This enactive interpretation stands in contrast to anti-realism about science associated with constructivist interpretations of these three phenomena, which are motivated by viewing them as the internal mental construction of the experienced object. Instead, it favors a participatory realism: the sensorimotor basis of perceptual experience loops not only through our body, but also through the external world. This allows us to conceive of object experience in relational terms, i.e., as one or more subjects directly engaging with the world. Consequently, we can appreciate scientific observation in its full complexity: it is a socio-materially augmented process of becoming acquainted with the observed object that—like tool-use and perceiving more generally—is irreducibly self, other-, and world-involving. (shrink)

Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical (...) Realism is proved by showing how the response of a standard instrument is 'read' as if it were a 'text'. Conclusions are then drawn about a number of topics, including Scientific Realism, Conventionalism, and Cultural Relativism. (shrink)

Why and how have lay people participated in scientific observation? And on what terms have they collaborated with experts and professionals? We have become accustomed to the involvement of lay observers in the practice of many branches of science, including both the natural and human sciences, usually as subordinates to experts. The current surge of interest in this phenomenon, as well as in the closely related topic of how expertise has been constructed, suggests that historians of science can (...) offer a valuable contribution to these vital questions. A historical approach to lay participation allows us to better understand the making of expert-lay relations in science, and it offers a broader, long-term perspective on contemporary debates about that boundary. (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, it is a rather undisputed idea that our concepts, conceptions and theories are strongly constrained by what we observe. But the epistemic authority of observation is threatened by its widely acknowledged lack of autonomy: to have observation yield knowledge through observation reports, one has to already possess a conception of (some aspects of) the self and the world. My goal in this paper is to give a satisfying account of the concept of (...) observation, one that reconciles these two seemingly incompatible yet indisputable aspects of observation: its epistemic authority and its lack of autonomy. My main suggestion is that observation reports can be characterized by a form of uniqueness, namely, that no other judgment that would contradict an observation report could rationally be sustained. I will show that this claim is consistent with the two aforementioned features of observation by using Anil Gupta's innovative treatment of the contribution of experience to knowledge in his recent Empiricism and Experience (2006) based on the logic of interdependent definitions. (shrink)

... the topic of 'meaning' is the one topic discussed in philosophy in which there is literally nothing but 'theory' - literally nothing that can be labelled or even ridiculed as the 'common sense view'. Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning' This book explores some truths behind the truism that experimentation is a hallmark of scientific activity. Scientists' descriptions of nature result from two sorts of encounter: they interact with each other and with nature. Philosophy of science has, by and (...) large, failed to give an account of either sort of interaction. Philosophers typically imagine that scientists observe, theorize and experiment in order to produce general knowledge of natural laws, knowledge which can be applied to generate new theories and technologies. This view bifurcates the scientist's world into an empirical world of pre-articulate experience and know how and another world of talk, thought and argument. Most received philosophies of science focus so exclusively on the literary world of representations that they cannot begin to address the philosophical problems arising from the interaction of these worlds: empirical access as a source of knowledge, meaning and reference, and of course, realism. This has placed the epistemological burden entirely on the predictive role of experiment because, it is argued, testing predictions is all that could show that scientists' theorizing is constrained by nature. Here a purely literary approach contributes to its own demise. The epistemological significance of experiment turns out to be a theoretical matter: cruciality depends on argument, not experiment. (shrink)

Despite the vast amount of work produced by philosophers, historians and sociologists on the nature of scientific activity, “observation itself is rarely the focus of attention and almost never the subject of historical inquiry in its own right”. This general lack of interest in the nature of scientific observation was perhaps most clearly reflected in the Vienna Circle’s attempt to establish an analysis of science beginning at the level of protocol sentences. To do so, of course, (...) they had to disregard the humidity and fogged lenses facing the primatologist in the jungle, or the way in which flights aboard military aircraft were once sought by physicists in order to expose... (shrink)

Hermann von Helmholtz allows for not only physiological facts and psychological inferences, but also perspectival reasoning, to influence perceptual experience and knowledge gained from perception. But Helmholtz also defends a version of the view according to which there can be a kind of “perspectival truth” revealed in scientific research and investigation. Helmholtz argues that the relationships between subjective and objective, real and actual, actual and illusory, must be analyzed scientifically, within experience. There is no standpoint outside experience from which (...) we can reason, no extra-sensory knowledge of the constitution of the “ideal subject” or of the properties of “real objects.” In the tradition of psychophysics inherited by Helmholtz, we can arrive at a kind of perspectival analysis of perceptual experience, which embeds an account of that experience within the context of the history and situation of the perceiving subject. That analysis is relative to the perceiving subject, but the perspectival explanations Helmholtz constructs are not thereby relativist: in fact, for Helmholtz, the more squarely the perceiving subject is placed in a scientific, perspectival context, the more facts we are able to learn about her experience and the objects with which she interacts. (shrink)

En este trabajo se plantea, en primer lugar, la conveniencia de distinguir en el proceso de la contrastación empirica de hipótesis y teorías entre observación cientifíca y percepción y, en segundo lugar, se muestra como el munda procesado a través de la percepción se erige en base o soporte empírico del conocimiento científico. Una de las consecuencias del trabajo es que Ia tesis de “la carga teórica" de Ia observación ha sido mal planteada, al dar par sentado que esa carga (...) teórica afecta tambien al procesamiento perceptivo de los outputs proporeionados al científico por el instrumental de observación.This paper first suggests that, in analyses of the empirical testing of hypotheses and theories, scientific observation should be distinguished from perception; and goes on to say that the world, as processed by perception, is the basis or empirical foundation of scientific knowledge. This thesis that observation is “theory-laden” has been flawed by its being articulated as applying not only to scientific observation but also to the perceptional processing of the output provided to the scientists by observational instruments. (shrink)

ArgumentThe nineteenth century witnessed the advent of the modern zoo. Nearly everyone who came to watch the exotic animals was a “lay person” in the sense that virtually none had formal training in zoology. This paper provides a typology of these observers: the zoo directors, assistants, keepers, animal painters, and the “common” visitor. What did they observe and what were their motivations? Did they pursue a certain agenda? What kind of knowledge, if any, did they produce? Soon the issue of (...) the reliability of these observations emerged. Lay observers insisted on the veracity of their intimate and personal knowledge of animals while academics complained that their claims could not be generalized and were tainted by anthropomorphism. Hence the focus on the observations of these laymen will reveal contemporary assumptions on what may count as “scientific.” This is closely linked to the question of how far the zoo may qualify as a site of scientific investigation in the first place. The constraints on doing research on animals in a public space such as the zoo were numerous. Yet despite these obstacles the zoological garden contributed to the rise of ecological thinking as well as to the formation of ethology as a scientific discipline. (shrink)

Frente a la tesis de la "carga teórica", se muestra como en el proceso de contrastación de hipótesis y teorías es conveniente distinguir entre observación científica y percepción y, luego, se defiende que en los procesos de percepción no están implicados los conceptos teóricos de la ciencia sino conceptos de otro nivel, los que toman cuerpo en la codificación de la estimulación sensorial procedente de los ítems identificados perceptivamente. De donde se sigue que el mundo identificado a través de los (...) procesos de percepción es la base o soporte empírico del conocimiento científico. (shrink)

This is an important volume of seventeen essays that historicizes observation as a practice, concept and ideal. It belongs to the historiographical tradition of scrutinizing central aspects of the scientific enterprise such as experiments and objectivity that once appeared too self-evident to be probed. The challenge of historicizing such a significant idea is that it has to be a collective enterprise.The volume starts with three essays that provide a chronological survey of the period from 500 to 1800. Katherine (...) Park, covering the period from 500 to 1500, explains how observation for Cicero and Pliny had nothing to do with experiment or systematic investigation, but rather was a collective and largely anonymous process, associated with originary phrases of natural knowledge of a distant past and intelligible even by the illiterate. It was the basis for conjectural knowledge that lacked causal explanation. Observation of celestial events occurred from time to time, but in the context o .. (shrink)

A major intellectual shift between Copernicus and the mid-17th century was the rejection of Aristotelian assertions concerning the relationship of mathematics to physical nature. Aristotle asserted that “The minute accuracy of mathematics is not to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter. Therefore its method is not that of natural science; for presumably all nature has matter.” Thus, he pulled out the rug from under the feet of the aspiration to a (...) mathematically based natural sciences, asserting that: “And at the same time not even this is true, that mensuration deals with perceptible and perishable magnitudes; for then it would have perished, when they perished. And astronomy also cannot be dealing with perceptible magnitudes nor with this heaven above us. For neither are perceptible lines such lines as the geometer speaks of, nor are the movement and complex orbits in the heaven like those which astronomy treats, nor have geometrical points the same nature as the actual stars.”. (shrink)

Observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific practice have a long pedigree in writings on science. There has, however, been little attempt to delineate observation and experiment with respect to analysing scientific practice; in particular, scientific experimentation, in a systematic manner. Someone who has presented a systematic account of observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific experimentation is Ian Hacking. In this paper, I present a detailed analysis of Hacking’s observation (...) versus experiment account. Using a range of cases from various fields of scientific enquiry, I argue that the observation versus experiment account is not an adequate framework for delineating scientific experimentation in a systematic manner. (shrink)

With the recent rise of the philosophy of scientific practices, SSK (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), and feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, a new perspective is gradually coming into being, holding that the starting point for scientific research is opportunity. Opportunistic features in solar neutrino experiments, Opportunistic features of complexity studies emerging from economics, and the measurement of insects' flight can prove the above perspective from different angels. It is important and significant to determine whether the (...) starting point for scientific research is opportunity, a problem, or an observation. /// 近年来由于科学实践哲学的兴起，以及 SSK 和女性主义科学哲学研究的兴起， 科学研究始于机会的观点正在悄然形成之中。太阳中微子实验、复杂性研究和昆虫 飞行测量等案例都从不同角度证明了 "科学研究始于机会" 的观点。区别科学研究 "始于机会"、"始于问题" 和 "始于观察" 这三种观点，是重要而且有意义的。. (shrink)

This paper argues against general claims for the epistemic superiority of experiment over observation. It does so by dissociating the benefits traditionally attributed to experiment from physical manipulation. In place of manipulation, we argue that other features of research methods do confer epistemic advantages in comparison to methods in which they are diminished. These features better track the epistemic successes and failures of scientific research, cross-cut the observation/experiment distinction, and nevertheless explain why manipulative experiments are successful when (...) they are. (shrink)

With the recent rise of the philosophy of scientific practices, SSK (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), and feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, a new perspective is gradually coming into being, holding that the starting point for scientific research is opportunity. Opportunistic features in solar neutrino experiments, Opportunistic features of complexity studies emerging from economics, and the measurement of insects’ flight can prove the above perspective from different angels. It is important and significant to determine whether the (...) starting point for scientific research is opportunity, a problem, or an observation. (shrink)

We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires (...) an examination of theory-ladenness in attention, perception, data interpretation, data production, memory, and scientific communication. We conclude that the evidence for theory-ladenness does not lead to a relativist account of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Recent longitudinal observations show that human menstrual cycles, sleep‐wake cycles and manic‐depressive cycles can become synchronized with lunar cycles, but do so in uniquely complex and heterogeneous ways that are unlikely to have been detected by past studies. Past studies’ negative results have given rise to a scientific consensus that human biology and behavior are unaffected by lunar cycles. The recent observations show that synchrony can be temporary, and can occur with more than one type of lunar cycle, more (...) than one phase of a lunar cycle and more than one resonant frequency of a lunar cycle. Given the variability of human responses to lunar cycles, aggregate analyses used in almost all previous studies would likely have cancelled out individuals’ responses and led to false negative results. In light of these observations, the question of lunar influence should be investigated further, with longitudinal observations and case‐by‐case analyses of individuals’ data. (shrink)

A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within (...) which observation (and, more generally, thick epistemic access) are centralized do meet it. (shrink)

Much recent discussion in the aesthetics of nature has focused on Scientific cognitivism, the view that in order to engage in a deep and appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, one must possess certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The most pressing difficulty faced by this view is an apparent tension between the very notion of aesthetic appreciation and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this essay, I describe this difficulty, trace some of its roots and argue that attempts (...) to dismiss it fail. I then develop a response to the problem, drawing on the notion of the theory-ladenness of observation. I conclude by considering the relationship between this response and one common approach to the problem, the appeal to expressive qualities in nature. (shrink)

Much recent discussion in the aesthetics of nature has focused on Scientific cognitivism, the view that in order to engage in a deep and appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, one must possess certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The most pressing difficulty faced by this view is an apparent tension between the very notion of aesthetic appreciation and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this essay, I describe this difficulty, trace some of its roots and argue that attempts (...) to dismiss it fail. I then develop a response to the problem, drawing on the notion of the theory-ladenness of observation. I conclude by considering the relationship between this response and one common approach to the problem, the appeal to expressive qualities in nature. (shrink)

In the writings of scientists we find claim to the effect that we can observe items such as pulsars, gravity waves, quarks, electrons, etc. An epistemological theory, originally developed by Dretske and modified by Jackson, is used to give an account of such claims and the extent to which they may be deemed correct. The theory eschews talk of the theory-ladenness of observation while giving an account of how our observation reports may evolve with growth in scientific (...) knowledge. The theory is partially linked to Shapere's recent account of observation in science. (shrink)

Ian Hacking has argued that the notions of experiment and observation are distinct, not even the opposite ends of a continuum. More recently, other authors have emphasised their continuity, saying...

The first published paper on pulsars was entitled, by its five co-authors, “Observation of a Rapidly Pulsating Radio Source”. (Hewish, et al. 1968). The publication of this paper preceded by some months the coining of the word ‘pulsar’ to refer to such pulsating radio sources. Does it seem odd to talk of observing pulsars? It might seem so since much effort has subsequently gone into identifying pulsars with optically visible stars using conventional light, not radio, telescopes. We can say (...) that the moons of Jupiter are observable since either we can see them through a telescope or, at some future date, astronauts will be able to travel close enough to Jupiter to see its moons without visual aids. (shrink)

Reductive physicalism is a minority view in contemporary philosophy as well as in science, and therefore arguments for endorsing it often amount to arguments against the alternative views, in particular so-called non-reductive physicalism. In this paper we put forward a new argument for reductive physicalism, according to which it is the best account of the empirical data that we have. In particular, we show that: (a) a reductive physicalist theory of the mind forms an essential part of the very argument (...) for the existence of an external world: if one rejects psychophysical identity physicalism, one’s case for believing in the existence of an external world is substantially weakened; and (b) the success of a physical account of the mind is the most important criterion for the success of (future) physics; and (c) reductive physicalism is the only approach in which relying on science in order to account for the external world makes sense; and finally, (d) within reductive physicalism, one can provide a new criterion for theory preference in science, and a new argument for scientific realism. In our physicalist view the experience forms the initial data, which is then reduced to fundamental physics. (shrink)

The design and interpretation of self-experimentation need to be integrated with existing scientific knowledge. Otherwise observations on oneself cannot make a creative contribution to the advance of empirical understanding.

Dans la Chine de la fin du XVIIe siècle, les missionnaires jésuites français ont importé de Paris à Pékin une méthode de recherche scientifique typiquement française et aussi typiquement académique. Ce début prometteur a subi un infléchissement négatif dans le développement ultérieur des ambitions de la mission dans le champ des activités scientifiques del' Ancien Régime. On analyse ici les différences substantielles qui caractérisent la mission scientifique française jésuite à la fin du XVIIe siècle et au siècle suivant. À travers (...) une étude des éditions parisiennes de la production scientifique française jésuite en provenance de Chine, les Observations (1688, 1692, 1729), est expliqué le déclin de la mission scientifique française jésuite par la dissolution de ses liens avec l'Académie des sciences et par ses difficultés à construire et à maintenir une vision collective et une identité de corps dans l'analyse des phénomènes naturels. (shrink)