A critical but underdeveloped part of the libertarian debate about immigration is the question of who, if anyone, owns public property, and the consequences of the answer to this question. Libertarians who favor restrictive immigration policies, such as Hans-Hermann Hoppe, argue that taxpayers own public property, and that the state, while it is in control of such property, should manage it on behalf of taxpayers in the same way private owners would manage their own (...) class='Hi'>property. In other words, it should be quite selective about who may enter. Walter Block, who takes an “open borders” position, does not appear to dispute the claim that taxpayers own public property, but nevertheless argues that immigrants are entitled to ignore the state’s control of, and thus may freely enter, such property. In this article I explore the question of public property ownership using Rothbardian property rights principles. I conclude that, at least with respect to a particular type of public property, neither Hoppe’s nor Block’s reasoning is consistent with these principles. I also consider the idea that the state ought to have a role in managing public property in light of some libertarian anarchist ideas about the state. I conclude that supporting a legitimate role for the state as an immigration gatekeeper is inconsistent with Rothbardian and Hoppean libertarian anarchism, as well as with the associated strategy of advocating always and in every instance reductions in the state’s role in society. (shrink)

Libertarians often assume that a free society will be one in which all (or nearly all) property is private. I have previously expressed my dissent from this consensus, arguing that libertarian principles instead support a substantial role for public property. (" In Defense of Public Space ," Formulations, Vol. III, No. 3 (Spring 1996).) In this article I develop this heretical position further.

In the ancient Greek city, was sacred land distinct from public land? Were there points of intersection or areas of overlap between the two or was there no distinction at all? First, evidence from Athens is examined through a discussion of N. Papazarkadas' recent monograph, Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens. Three criteria for classifying landed property as sacred are proposed in that study: the prohibition or authorization to cultivate sacred land; the use of revenues for (...) cultic purposes; and the inalienability of sacred land. But this trio of criteria does not in fact allow us to establish a clear division between sacred land and public land. The evidence from other cities shows the existence of land defined simultaneously as and the possibility of co-ownership and joint possession between god and city; a distinct place within the city's total property could also be reserved for sacred property (either land or funds). (shrink)

Political theory lacks a compelling account of public property. Addressing this gap, I present a “deep public ownership” model, according to which the body politic ultimately owns all the resources within its jurisdiction. I argue that this model is compatible with liberal intuitions regarding private property. I then contend that the model expands the scope of government’s duty to uphold the equality of all citizens, by challenging private property constraints on antidiscriminatory government policies. I anticipate (...) the worry that the model supports excessive government intrusion into private affairs. I close by discussing abuse of public property by elected leaders. (shrink)

In this paper, first, I want to clarify the nature and function of private property. Second, I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property, and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property. Third, I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.

In accordance with the principle of historical materialism, nature of the property depends primarily on the fact that the actual possession of the property, rather than on their legal ownership first. Accordingly, the Isle of Man from the stock of the "separation of ownership 'departure, the actual property is not recognized joint-stock private property, but" social property ", so they also hopes to achieve socialism in stock. However, the situation at the time, the Isle of (...) Man is sometimes still only legal private ownership of property from the stock starting to think so, sometimes with analysis of private enterprise, "Das Kapital" residual value analysis on the model of joint-stock company, joint-stock property changes on the significant underestimate, even such as the stock is still equivalent to private ownership. According to the principle of materialism, the feature of property first depends on the reality of factual possession of property, but does not first depend on its legal ownership. Hence, from the theory of share holding system of its "separdtion of ownership and manageship" , Marx and Engels considered that the property of share holding system is actually not the private property, but the "public property". They, therefore, put the hope of realizing socialism on the share holding system. But under that situation, Marx and Engels could only consider the problems from the legal private ownership of the property of share holding system by using the theory of surplus values ​​and even regard the share holding system as private ownership. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Contractualist Justification and Private Property Three Models of Welfare Rights The Proposals as Reasonable Alternatives Objections Conclusion References.

No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking – encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants – coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important differences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment (...) of zones of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the limitations of liberal political theory in relation to the notions of public property and public interest. I argue that the fundamentally atomistic and individualistic ontological foundations of the liberal tradition preclude any coherent notion of public goods and public interest.

The right to private property is among the most fundamental in liberal theory. For many liberals the idea of the state is grounded in its role as a protector of private property. If the liberal state is justified by its ability to protect property, the modern welfare state is often justified by its ability to meet needs. According to a view commonly referred to as “welfarism,” the very fact that needs exist implies there is a moral obligation (...) to meet them. In this Article I appeal to Rawlsian contractualist justification, including the “criterion of reciprocity,” in developing a third manner of thinking about the relationship between property and welfare. I argue that welfare rights are necessary conditions for justifying a role for the state in enforcing the “right to exclude,” a fundamental element of private ownership. My Article thus aims to use Rawls’ account of justification, outlined in his later works, to theorize the notion of property-owning democracy from Theory of Justice. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could (...) or may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

Generally, in liberal democratic systems, it is assumed that government should forbear from interference with existing individual property entitlements. It is assumed that existing individual property entitlements should be respected, with government reluctant to interfere. Despite the ubiquity of this assumption, the theoretical underpinning for it is not obvious. A sovereign must respond to the needs of all of the members of the greater community for which it speaks. In view of this obligation, irrevocably assigning property rights (...) to some, and not to others, is an inherently troublesome proposition. In this Article, the reasons for this state of affairs are examined. The conclusion is reached that conventional theories advanced by courts and commentators for government forbearance — such as protecting individual reliance interests, or advancing other independent policies — fail to explain the forbearance phenomenon. A more convincing reason can be found in a public fiduciary theory of government. However, recognition of this reveals that the property/sovereignty relationship is far more complex than a simple forbearance model would dictate. In fact, it mandates — in some circumstances — government nonforbearance, as well. (shrink)

May a hotel owner that objects to same-sex marriage on religious grounds refuse to host a same-sex wedding in its ballroom or deny the couple the right to book the honeymoon suite? Do public accommodation laws oppress religious dissidents by forcing them to act contrary to their religious beliefs or does discriminatory exclusion threaten equal access to the market economy and deny equal citizenship to LGBTQ persons? Answering these questions requires explaining why one property claim should prevail over (...) another and why one liberty should prevail when it clashes with another. And answering those questions requires analysis of the relationship between property and sovereignty. Sovereign power both creates and regulates the types of property rights that can be tolerated in a free and democratic society that values each person equally. Should we view sovereignty as a threat to property or property as a threat to sovereignty? Libertarians choose the first and liberals the second. But this is the wrong way to understand the relation between property and sovereignty. Property and sovereignty are not separate and independent concepts or spheres of social life that can be brought into relationship with each other. Rather, they are imbricated; they overlap like roof tiles. Our aspiration to live in a free and democratic society places certain constraints on both property and sovereignty. Such societies do not recognize absolute power, whether public or private. Free and democratic societies are committed to a substantive vision of both social relations and politics. We have fruitful debates about property and sovereignty and, in the end, must construct a legal system that effects an acceptable compromise between access and exclusion in the property regime. Our historic practices regarding racial and other forms of discrimination and our evolving norms suggest that public accommodation laws enable access to the marketplace without regard to invidious discrimination. Religious freedom cannot operate to deny equal citizenship or opportunity. For that reason, a same-sex couple should not have to call ahead to see if they are welcome to book the honeymoon suite. Public accommodation laws do not infringe on legitimate property rights or religious freedoms; rather, they define the legitimate contours of liberty and property in a society that treats each person with equal concern and respect. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could (...) or may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

For many readers, Rousseau's views on property represent the most ambiguous and contradictory aspect of an already undeveloped economic theory. In this paper, I re-examine this popular criticism from the standpoint of the philosopher's well-known critique of public opinion to argue that property is a more consistent and systematically articulated concept in Rousseau's writings than may appear. I argue that opinion, rather than private property, poses the greatest danger to self-made law and that the narrowness and (...) peculiarity of its political threat demonstrates Rousseau's restrictions against private wealth to be less comprehensive than many believe. (shrink)

Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms (...) relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. (shrink)

The negotiations of the intergovernmental group known as the ‘IGWG’, undertaken by the Member States of the WHO, were the result of a deadlock in the World Health Assembly held in 2006 where the Member States of the WHO were unable to reach an agreement on what to do with the 60 recommendations in the report on ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights submitted to the Assembly in the same year by a group of experts designated by (...) the Director General of the WHO. The result of these negotiations was the ‘Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property’ which was approved by the World Health Assembly in 2008. The intention of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action (GSPOA) which was produced by the IGWG was to substantially reform the pharmaceuticals' research and development system in view of the findings that this system, whose purpose is to produce medicines for diseases which affect the greater part of the world population which lives in developing countries, had failed. The intellectual property rights imposed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the recent trade agreements could become one of the main obstacles to access to medicines. The GSPOA makes a critical analysis of this reality, and opens the door to searching for new solutions to this problem. (shrink)

En 1885, le Bureau des longitudes se voit contraint d’adapter les éphémérides de la Connaissance des temps aux besoins des navigateurs. En procédant à un audit sur les éphémérides en usage dans les ports, le Bureau redécouvre que depuis 1836 sont publiées à Saint-Brieuc des Éphémérides maritimes,véritables extraits de la CDT. Nous avons ainsi identifié une affaire de contrefaçon d’éphémérides nautiques. Les pièces de son jugement par un tribunal rennais posent la question cruciale de la propriété intellectuelle des calculs astronomiques. (...) Au-delà de cette affaire concernant des imprimeurs-libraires briochins et parisiens, nous interrogeons aussi l’insuffisance de la réponse apportée par le Bureau des longitudes aux demandes répétées de simplification des éphémérides à destination des marins. (shrink)

Natural Property Rights presents a novel theory of property based on individual, pre-political rights. The book argues that a just system of property protects people's rights to use resources and also orders those rights consistent with natural law and the public welfare. Drawing on influential property theorists such as Grotius, Locke, Blackstone, and early American statesmen and judges, as well as recent work in in normative and analytical philosophy, the book shows how natural rights guide (...) political and legal reasoning about property law. It examines how natural rights justify the most familiar institutions in property, including public property, ownership, the system of estates and future interests, leases, servitudes, mortgages, police regulation, and eminent domain. Thought-provoking and comprehensive, the book challenges leading contemporary justifications for property and shows how property both secures individual freedom and serves the common good. (shrink)

Since the publication of David Lewis's ''New Work for a Theory of Universals,'' the distinction between properties that are fundamental – or perfectly natural – and those that are not has become a staple of mainstream metaphysics. Plausible candidates for perfect naturalness include the quantitative properties posited by fundamental physics. This paper argues for two claims: (1) the most satisfying account of quantitative properties employs higher-order relations, and (2) these relations must be perfectly natural, for otherwise the perfectly natural properties (...) cannot play the roles in metaphysical theorizing as envisaged by Lewis. (shrink)

The moral justification of intellectual property is often called into question when placed in the context of pharmaceutical patents and global health concerns. The theoretical accounts of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick provide an excellent ethical framework from which such questions can be clarified. While Nozick upholds an individuals right to intellectual property, based upon its conformation with Lockean notions of property and Nozicks ideas of just acquisition and transfer, Rawls emphasizes the importance of basic liberties, (...) such as an individuals right to health, superceding such secondary rights as intellectual property rights. From a policy perspective, patent protection for pharmaceutical products necessarily entails the balancing of corporate intellectual property interests and public interests in healthcare. The moral dilemma that occurs when these two interests clash is not easily resolved. Aside from corporate and public interests, the state maintains an interest in creating and preserving policies that regulate the moral dilemma itself. This paper analyzes the economic and ethical factors surrounding the production and distribution of the anti-HIV medication, AZT. Potential policy implications and recommendations are also discussed. (shrink)

From a pre-publication review by the late Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, of George Mason University: -/- "The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a "labor theory of property" which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from (...) neoclassicism. It traces roots of such ideas in some fascinating and largely forgotten strands of the history of economics. It draws attention to the question of "responsibility" which neoclassicism has utterly lost sight of. It is startlingly fresh in its overall approach, and unusually well written in its presentation. ... It constitutes a better case for its economic democracy viewpoint than anything else in the literature." . (shrink)

The present study aims to assess the restriction of private ownership on the cultural-historical property based on the public interest and evaluate how this restriction is explained and what restrictions the cultural heritage rules and regulations impose on the private ownership. The present descriptive and analytical study seeks to examine the above-mentioned questions using the library method. Based on the results, statute law has defined a large number of restrictions for the owner including the owner restriction in the (...) obligation to declare, implement protection plans, as well as sale and transfer of the cultural-historical property. Theories such as public interest are considered as the basis for the restriction of ownership on historical-cultural property. (shrink)

Surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: when should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? Also, what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive? The recent case of Kelo v. New London revitalized the debate, (...) but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use. (shrink)

Large-scale genetics cohort studies that link genotypic and phenotypic information hold special promise for clinical medicine, but they demand long-term investment and enduring trust from human research participants. Currently, there are a handful of large-scale studies that aim to succeed where others have failed, seeking to generate significant private-sector investment while preserving long-term interest and trust of studied communities. With project planners looking for new modes of managing such complex collective endeavors, the idea of using a charitable trust structure for (...) genomic biobanks has received increasing scholarly and policy attention. This article clarifies how thorny questions around property rights, the right to withdraw from research, access to materials, and funding might be handled within such a charitable trust structure to help produce a viable participatory framework for genomics. (shrink)

In Homelessness, Liberty and Property, Terry Skolnik establishes a novel theory about the government's duties to end homelessness, maintain public property's value, and legitimize laws that regulate public space. In doing so, Skolnik provides new insight into how the property law system and the regulation of public space limit unhoused persons' freedom and political equality. The book deepens our understanding of how various areas of law, such as constitutional law, legal philosophy, criminal law, and (...) property law, approach the reality of homelessness and advances original arguments to provide new justifications for the right to housing. Skolnik concludes by offering a set of concrete proposals for how the government can reduce the incidence of homelessness and treat unhoused persons with greater concern and respect. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available open access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details. (shrink)

Waters aries that the demands of indigenous bio-prospecting programs need to be considered against the needs of indigenous communities. Issues of sovereignty and rights to self-determination need to be resolved in the context of negotiating bio-prospecting plans. By setting out clear guidelines and priorities, as determined through the eyes and values of indigenous peoples, indigenous communities may have an opportunity to participate in the global sharing of biomedical information and healing for all our relations. Before any projects get underway, however, (...) social, political, and legal issues ought to be settled so that informed decision can be made on the part of indigenous communities to partake of the invitation to bio-prospecting, or not. (shrink)

A common criticism of the use of algorithms in criminal justice is that algorithms and their determinations are in some sense ‘opaque’—that is, difficult or impossible to understand, whether because of their complexity or because of intellectual property protections. Scholars have noted some key problems with opacity, including that opacity can mask unfair treatment and threaten public accountability. In this paper, we explore a different but related concern with algorithmic opacity, which centers on the role of public (...) trust in grounding the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions. We argue that algorithmic opacity threatens the trustworthiness of criminal justice institutions, which in turn threatens their legitimacy. We first offer an account of institutional trustworthiness before showing how opacity threatens to undermine an institution’s trustworthiness. We then explore how threats to trustworthiness affect institutional legitimacy. Finally, we offer some policy recommendations to mitigate the threat to trustworthiness posed by the opacity problem. (shrink)

The scope and type of property rights recognized over the effectiveness of antibiotics have a direct effect on how those claiming ownership engage in the exploitation and stewardship of this scarce resource. We examine the different property claims and rights the four major interest groups are asserting on antibiotics: (i) the inventors, (ii) those demanding that the resource be treated like any other transferable commodity, (iii) those advocating usage restrictions based on good stewardship principles and (iv) those considering (...) the resource as common heritage of humankind. (shrink)

In the history of political thought, the relationship between property and power has been a central preoccupation. The very nature of private property, on many accounts, is to put owners in a position of self-serving power to make decisions about matters of concern to others. In many legal systems, the vast power of owners is pervasive, as an ever greater range of resources is brought within the property regime and subjected to private power backed by the coercive (...) power of the state. Political and legal philosophers have long puzzled over how to reconcile the nature of private property with the limits and social responsibilities upon which, at least for some accounts, property’s legitimacy depends. The perennial question, then, is how best to understand the nature of property such that property’s limits can also be accounted for coherently within our legal and constitutional arrangements. Robé’s book Property, Power and Politics provides us with a wide-ranging analysis of property. There is much that we agree with and applaud here. In this contribution we seek to situate a key aspect of his work within this larger context, and to offer a criticism of one element of his view: his rejection of an understanding of ownership as an office. In Robé’s analysis, offices belong in the public sphere, where officeholders are held to account by their constituencies. We argue that Robé’s rejection of the idea of ownership-as-office rests on a misunderstanding of the legal concept of “office.” Moreover, this idea, properly understood, provides sound conceptual support for the normative aims of Robé’s account: to bind property and social responsibility tightly together. Robé’s project to criticize the virtually unlimited power of private owners in the contemporary world is served, not undermined, by understanding property as an office. First, we provide a brief summary of the key elements of Robé’s view of property (Part II). We then introduce a theoretical perspective on property as office as it has been developed in legal theory (Part III). Finally, we argue that this perspective fits better with Robé’s stated purposes than his own rejection of it suggests and raises some questions for future discussion (Part IV). (shrink)