In Just Fodder, Josh Milburn defends the view that sentient animals have negative rights. Since non-human animals are not moral agents, and can’t themselves violate anyone’s rights, wild predation is normally ethically unproblematic. However, Milburn argues, there are occasions when humans can become morally responsible for an animal’s predation. In cases like these, predation does violate the prey animal’s rights. The difficulty here lies in determining when a human is ‘sufficiently’ morally responsible for an animal’s predation (...) for the predation to count as a rights violation. In this paper, I pick out what I take to be the relevant criteria Milburn identifies for moral responsibility: creating increased predation risk, foreseeability of increased predation risk, intending predation to happen, having some kind of special responsibility for the predator, and having some kind of special relationship to the prey. I argue that, at least as applied by Milburn, these criteria can lead to a kind of moral over-extension, one that rules out most forms of wild animal rehabilitation, species reintroduction and rewilding. (shrink)

Without modification, Rolston’s environmental ethics is biased in favor of plants, since he gives them stronger protection than animals. Rolston can avoid this bias by extending his principle protecting plants (the principle of the nonloss of goods) to human interactions with animals. Were he to do so, however, he would risk undermining his acceptance of meat eating and certain types of hunting. I argue,nevertheless, that meat eating and hunting, properly conceived, are compatible with this extended ethics. As the quintessential (...) natural process, carnivorous predation is rightfully valued and respected by such environmentalists as Rolston. Because the condemnation of human participation in predation by animal activists suggests a hatred of nature, the challenge for Rolston’s animal activist critics is to show that one can properly appreciate natural predation while consistently and plausibly objecting to human participation in it. (shrink)

Without modification, Rolston’s environmental ethics is biased in favor of plants, since he gives them stronger protection than animals. Rolston can avoid this bias by extending his principle protecting plants to human interactions with animals. Were he to do so, however, he would risk undermining his acceptance of meat eating and certain types of hunting. I argue,nevertheless, that meat eating and hunting, properly conceived, are compatible with this extended ethics. As the quintessential natural process, carnivorous predation is rightfully (...) valued and respected by such environmentalists as Rolston. Because the condemnation of human participation in predation by animal activists suggests a hatred of nature, the challenge for Rolston’s animal activist critics is to show that one can properly appreciate natural predation while consistently and plausibly objecting to human participation in it. (shrink)

A speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) in behavioural decisions is known to occur in a wide range of vertebrate and invertebrate taxa. Accurate decisions often take longer for a given condition, while fast decisions can be inaccurate in some tasks. Speed-accuracy tactics are known to vary consistently among individuals, and show a degree of flexibility during colour discrimination tasks in bees. Such individual flexibility in speed-accuracy tactics is likely to be advantageous for animals exposed to fluctuating environments, such as changes in (...) class='Hi'>predation threat. We therefore test whether individual speed-accuracy tactics are fixed or flexible under different levels of predation threat in a model invertebrate, the bumblebee Bombus terrestris. The flexibility of speed-accuracy tactics in a foraging context was tested in the laboratory using a ‘meadow’ of artificial flowers harbouring ‘robotic’ crab spider predators. We found that while the ranking of bees along the speed and accuracy continuums was consistent across two levels of predation threat, there was some flexibility in the tactics used by individual bees – most bees became less accurate at colour discrimination when exposed to predation threat when flower types were rewarding. The relationship between decision speed and accuracy was influenced by predator detectability and the risk associated with making incorrect choices during the colour discrimination task. Predator crypsis resulted in a breakdown in the relationship between speed and accuracy, especially when making an incorrect floral choice incurred a distasteful quinine punishment. No single speed-accuracy tactic was found to be optimal in terms of foraging efficiency under either predation threat situation. However, bees that made faster decisions achieved higher nectar collection rates in predator free situations, while accurate bees achieved higher foraging rates under predation threat. Our findings show that while individual bees remain relatively consistent in terms of whether they place greater emphasis on speed or accuracy under predation threat, they can respond flexibly to the additional time costs of detecting predators. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that the phenomenon of predation is the source of several problems for Donaldson and Kymlicka's account of our duties towards wild and liminal animals. According to them, humans should adopt a general policy of non-intervention with respect to predatory behaviour involving wild and liminal animals. They justify this recommendation by appealing to the status of those animals as, respectively, members of sovereign communities and denizens of human-animal societies. Our goal is not to question their (...) recommendation, but to challenge the reasons given in its support. On the one hand, we argue that, insofar as wild animal communities are incapable of dealing with massive predation, they do not possess the competence required for sovereignty. Moreover, we argue that, even if we leave the issue of competence aside, attributing sovereignty rights to communities including both predators and preys may not be the best way to protect wild animals’ fundamental interests. On the other hand, we argue that there exist two important disanalogies between human denizens and liminal animals, which render Donaldson and Kymlicka's denizenship framework problematic. We suggest that the ultimate justification for a general policy of non-intervention lies in the significant risk of causing greater harm by acting otherwise, due to our limited knowledge and resources. (shrink)

Predation games—games in which the player is actively encouraged and often required to hunt and kill in order to survive—have historically been the purview of male players. Females, though now much more involved in digital games than before, generally play games that stress traditionally feminine values such as socializing with others, shopping, and nurturing. This article argues that playing games that virtually simulate predation has many benefits for female players. Predation play teaches participants how to survive and (...) succeed in stressful, competitive, aggressive environments. To remain in the game, players have to understand and enjoy the acquisition and negotiation of power, learn to face fear, willingly accept challenges, and accept the inevitability of failure without allowing it to deter future attempts. Through predation play, females can learn to excel in and enjoy high-risk high-reward environments. The author proposes that such play might help address gender disparities outside of play. (shrink)

This article explores the effects of our technological way of war, for the first time driving toward total combatant immunity, on the psyche of combatants and the ethos of a warrior. It is a plea for the preservation of a warrior spirit, or at least a warrior class, that views war in a philosophical and personal manner. The article posits that without a sense of the tragic, without a personal test of will and skill often at great individual risk, (...) we can find no real meaning in war. It argues that the warrior dimension of immunity in warfare has somehow altered our experience of war, yet the effects of this ‘virtual war’ are still ambiguous – we do not yet know whether executing warfare through long-distance video desensitizes the ‘remote warrior’ or enhances his/her experience of killing. We do not yet know how combatants ‘commuting’ to war from home and being transported 7000 miles into battle through this ‘miracle’ of technology will handle the consequences of what the nation is asking them to do. We kn.. (shrink)

The phenomenon of malaise is on the rise at universities, reflecting a deteriorating psychological state that is a combination of anxiety and stress factors. This psychological and emotional upheaval within students is indicative of a fundamental existential issue. In fact, hidden behind the choice of an educational program is the significance given by the student to their life goals. It is this dimension of attributing meaning to one’s education and, more broadly, to one’s life (the existential dimension) that we have (...) sought to explore. We hypothesized that a stable investment in one’s life goals and a sense of psychological wellbeing during one’s studies could be fostered by reflective work done alongside the educational process. Our research took the form of a mixed methodological approach to the attribution of meaning to education, including an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA), and the experimentation of support for the meaning of education. Four dimensions of meaning were found to be observable in varying degrees in all students, each playing a specific role. Moreover, this research has confirmed that the meaning of studies is not to be understood solely in terms of education, but is part of a singular life story. Reflective work, developing meaning, facilitated by others (advisor, teacher, etc.) can help preserve/restore the feeling of wellbeing. It should be noted that, as the work presented in this article predates the pandemic, we will not address the amplifying effects of this health crisis on existential issues, which some recent studies are beginning to highlight. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

There has been relatively little empirical research into the causes of research misconduct. To begin to address this void, the authors collected data from closed case files of the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). These data were in the form of statements extracted from ORI file documents including transcripts, investigative reports, witness statements, and correspondence. Researchers assigned these statements to 44 different concepts. These concepts were then analyzed using multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis. The authors chose a solution consisting of (...) seven clusters: (1) personal and professional stressors, (2) organizational climate, (3) job insecurities, (4) rationalizations A, (5) personal inhibitions, (6) rationalizations B and, (7) personality factors. The authors discuss the implications of their findings for policy and for future research. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the philosophical underpinnings of current experimental investigation into animal affect-related decision-making. Animals’ affective states are standardly operationalised by linking positively valenced states with “approach” behaviours and negatively valenced states with “avoidance” behaviours. While this operationalisation has provided a helpful starting point to investigate the ecological role of animals’ internal states, there is extensive evidence that valenced and motivational states do not always neatly align, namely, instances where “liking” does not entail “wanting” (and vice versa). To address (...) this limitation, this paper proposes the (re-)integration of dominance as a dimension of affect. In particular, I argue that dominance, construed as a measure of organisms’ self-assessed behavioural control, can provide the necessary nuance to understand animal affect-related decision-making. Thus, after addressing the theoretical and methodological challenges related to incorporating dominance into a definition of “core affect”, this paper introduces the “Valence-Arousal-Dominance” model of animal affect. This model is explored for its potential applications in two domains. Firstly, in the study of animal affect-related decision-making under predation risk, and secondly, in the study of animal wellbeing. Through these applications, this model aims to bring experimental paradigms of animal affect-related behaviour closer to ecologically relevant scenarios. (shrink)

In this paper, by using the adaptive dynamics approach, we investigate how the adaptive evolution of defense ability promotes the diversity of prey species in an initial one-prey–two-predator community. We assume that the prey species can evolve to a safer strategy such that it can reduce the predation risk, but a prey with a high defense ability for one predator may have a low defense ability for the other and vice versa. First, by using the method of critical (...) function analysis, we find that if the trade-off is convex in the vicinity of the evolutionarily singular strategy, then this singular strategy is a continuously stable strategy. However, if the trade-off is weakly concave near the singular strategy and the competition between the two predators is relatively weak, then the singular strategy may be an evolutionary branching point. Second, we find that after the branching has occurred in the prey strategy, if the trade-off curve is globally concave, then the prey species might eventually evolve into two specialists, each caught by only one predator species. However, if the trade-off curve is convex–concave–convex, the prey species might eventually branch into two partial specialists, each being caught by both of the two predators and they can stably coexist on the much longer evolutionary timescale. (shrink)

We present a dynamic programming model which is used to investigate hypothermia as an adaptive response by small passerine birds in winter. The model predicts that there is a threshold function of reserves during the night, below which it is optimal to enter hypothermia, and above which it is optimal to rest. This threshold function decreases during the night, with a particularly sharp drop at the end of the night, representing the time and energy costs associated with returning to normal (...) body temperature. The results of the model emphasise the trade-off between energy and predation, not just between foraging options, but also between foraging during the day and entering hypothermia at night. The value of being able to use hypothermia represents not just energy savings, but also reduced predation risk due to changes in the optimal foraging strategy. Conditions which give a high value of hypothermia are short photoperiod, variable food supply, low temperatures, poor and scarce food supplies. (shrink)

Traditional social worlds enable plural modes of self‐expression and communication across both public and private realms. Our identity involves a variety of aspects of self. Moreover, plural and conflicting aspects of self are often presented within the context of one relationship, role, or encounter. The presentation of less chosen aspects of our selves often also provides the object for the expression of certain relational aspects of respect for one another's privacy. Self‐presentation and shared activity in many online social worlds can (...) also enable autonomy and privacy. The online revolutions in access to information and to one another have provided unprecedented opportunities to expand our knowledge, to pursue our social and working lives, and to carry on all sorts of interests and activities. One specific example of how some of our fears about online evils have been claimed to be exaggerated and misguided concerns fears of risks to our children from online sexual predators. (shrink)

In this paper, our goal is to survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In Violence Risk Assessment and the Law, we briefly examine the role currently (...) played by predictions of violence in three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing, civil commitment hearings, and sexual predator statutes. In Clinical vs. Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment, we briefly examine the distinction between traditional clinical methods of predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk software created by John Monahan and colleagues as part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence [1]. In The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy, we explore what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some recent advances in both data collection and data analysis that we believe will play an important role when it comes to future neuroscientific research on violence. In The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction, we discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction, we explore some potential evidentiary, constitutional, and moral issues that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of violence. (shrink)

This chapter compares the social behaviour of human hunter-gatherers with that of the better-studied chimpanzee species, Pan troglodytes, in an attempt to pinpoint the unique features of human social evolution. Although hunter-gatherers and chimpanzees living in central Africa have similar body weights, humans live at much lower population densities due to their greater dependence on predation. Human foraging parties have longer duration than those of chimpanzees, lasting hours rather than minutes, and a higher level of mutual dependence, through the (...) division of labour between men and women ; which is in turn related to pair-bonding, and meat sharing to reduce the risk of individual hunters' failure on any particular day. The band appears to be a uniquely human social unit that resolves the tension between greater dispersion and greater interdependence. (shrink)

GREGORY MIKKELSON | : Animal and environmental ethics should converge on the following three value judgments: natural ecosystems generally involve more good than harm; predation in nature tends to yield positive net benefits; and, at least on a global scale, livestock farming is destroying more value than it is creating. But the ecocentric criteria of environmental ethics and the sentientist criteria of animal ethics may have divergent implications for capitalism’s main effect on the world: the collapse of wild nature (...) due to explosive growth in the human economy. Sentientism risks counting this effect as a net gain, whereas ecocentrism surely rates it a massive net loss. While supporting the above claims, I show how they fit into a larger argument in favour of the broader, ecocentric value theory of environmental ethics and against the narrower, sentientist axiology of animal ethics. | : Les éthiques animale et environnementale devraient converger vers les trois jugements de valeur suivants: les écosystèmes naturels impliquent généralement plus de bien que de mal, la prédation dans la nature a tendance à produire des avantages nets positifs et, au moins à l’échelle mondiale, l’élevage animal détruit plus de valeur qu’il n’en crée. Mais les critères écocentriques de l’éthique environnementale et les critères de l’éthique animale fondés sur la sentience pourraient avoir des implications divergentes sur l’effet principal du capitalisme sur le monde: l’effondrement de la nature sauvage dû à la croissance explosive de l’économie humaine. Le sentientisme risque de considérer cet effet comme un gain net, alors que l’écocentrisme le considère sûrement comme une perte nette massive. Tout en soutenant les affirmations ci-dessus, je montre comment elles s’intègrent dans un argument plus large en faveur d’une théorie de la valeur écocentrique plus englobante propre à l’éthique environnementale et contre l’axiologie sentientiste plus étroite de l’éthique animale. (shrink)

Nature in its wider cosmic sense is not at risk from human exploitation and predation. To see life on Earth as but a local manifestation of this wider, indestructable and inexhaustible nature is to shield ourselves from despair over the fate of our Earth. But to take this wide view also appears to make interventionist political action on behalf of nature-which is to say, conservation-superfluous. If we identify with nature in its widest sense, as deep ecology prescribes, then (...) the “self-defence” argument usually advanced by deep ecologists in support of conservation appears not to work. I argue that the need for eco-activism can be reconciled with a rejection of despair within the framework of deep ecology, and that in the process of this reconciliation the meaning of the term conservation acquires a new, spiritual dimension. (shrink)

Nature in its wider cosmic sense is not at risk from human exploitation and predation. To see life on Earth as but a local manifestation of this wider, indestructable and inexhaustible nature is to shield ourselves from despair over the fate of our Earth. But to take this wide view also appears to make interventionist political action on behalf of nature-which is to say, conservation-superfluous. If we identify with nature in its widest sense, as deep ecology prescribes, then (...) the “self-defence” argument usually advanced by deep ecologists in support of conservation appears not to work. I argue that the need for eco-activism can be reconciled with a rejection of despair within the framework of deep ecology, and that in the process of this reconciliation the meaning of the term conservation acquires a new, spiritual dimension. (shrink)

Freezing is a common sign of panic, a response to accidents or events that overflow our capacity to react. Just as all civil airspace was cleared after the 9/11 attacks, the US-Canada border was also frozen, causing economic slowdowns. Border policies are caught between these two panics: security failures and economic crisis. To escape this paradox, American and Canadian authorities have implemented a series of security measures to make the border ‘smarter’, notably the implementation of biometric identity documents and surveillance (...) by UAV Predator drones. Psychoanalytic theory can help us explain why the Canadian and American governments have invested so much money for so little evident or measurable increase in either security or economic flows. The article uses the notion of phantastic objects to explain these (over-)reactions to risk management at the US-Canada border. (shrink)

Unlike other organs that operate continuously, such as the heart and kidneys, many of the operations of the nervous system shut down during sleep. The evolutionarily conserved unconscious state of sleep that puts animals at risk from predators indicates that it is an indispensable integral part of systems operation. A reasonable expectation is that any hypothesis for the mechanism of the nervous system functions should be able to provide an explanation for sleep. In this regard, the semblance hypothesis is (...) examined. Postsynaptic membranes are continuously being depolarized by the quantally released neurotransmitter molecules arriving from their presynaptic terminals. In this context, an incidental lateral activation of the postsynaptic membrane is expected to induce a semblance (cellular hallucination of arrival of activity from its presynaptic terminal, which forms a unit for internal sensation) of the arrival of activity from its presynaptic terminal as a systems property. This restricts induction of semblance to a context of a very high ratio of the duration of the default state of neurotransmitter-induced postsynaptic depolarization to the total duration of incidental lateral activations of the postsynaptic membrane. This requirement spans within a time-bin of a few sleep-wake cycles. Since the duration of quantal release remains maximized, the above requirement can be achieved only by ceiling the total duration of incidental lateral activations of the postsynaptic membrane, which necessitates a state of sleep. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractA hunter gatherer in our evolutionary history would have faced many threats when physically active, including the risks of predation, snakebite and fractured limbs. In article number 1900156, John R. Speakman argues that these threats in our evolutionary past selected us to be as sedentary as possible. Image credit: Stephanie Summers.

This is a condensed description of the contents and overarching argument found in Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. In that work, I maintain that the basic medical ethical problem concerns iatrogenic harm. I focus particularly on what I refer to as ‘role-conflation’. This most egregious form of iatrogenic harm occurs when a physician deliberately adopts the role of wounder. A contemporary practice such as physician-assisted suicide exemplifies a doctor’s deliberate wounding. I argue that the (...) author of the Hippocratic Oath – aware of the chronic risk of role-conflation – responds to this threat by having the oath-taker specifically forswear signal acts that wound the sick, such as giving a deadly drug even if asked, giving an abortifacient, sexual predation, and gossiping. I argue that by means of the Oath, Hippocrates founds medicine as a profession, a practice intimately involving promising. (shrink)

Loin de constituer une figure nouvelle dans l’histoire de la migration africaine, l’aventurier se pose en figure récurrente et connaît un regain de visibilité, dès lors que les politiques migratoires se durcissent un peu partout sur la planète et que la libre circulation des hommes est rendue de plus en plus problématique. À l’heure où les principes du salariat et de la fonction publique sont sérieusement contestés sur le continent africain, des itinéraires d’accumulation inédits prospèrent, tout comme de nouveaux modèles (...) de réussite fondés sur la ruse, la bravoure et l’exploit sont célébrés. L’aventure migratoire s’identifie totalement aux risques encourus et à l’intensité de la vie vécue ; elle permet à l’homme d’advenir et de s’aguerrir. Si elle a un commencement, elle a aussi une fin : au temps des projets aventureux doit succéder la construction de sa carrière. L’aventure doit être aussi interrogée dans ses déterminations imaginaires. Pour les uns, c’est l’imaginaire de la prédation qui prime, pour d’autres encore c’est celui de la contestation, pour d’autres enfin l’aspiration à l’Ailleurs s’apparente à la geste épique.The adventurer is not a new emblem in the history of African migration. It is rather a recurrent symbol more perceptible today as soon as migratory politics, the world over, take a harder line, and free circulation of men becomes increasingly difficult. As being salaried or State employee is widely contested on the African continent, unprecedented accumulation itineraries are thriving, and new success strategies emerge, based on tricks, ruse, braveness and feat. The migratory adventure is tightly correlated with risk or intensity of life ; it allows men to fulfil themselves, to become harder. The adventure is a well-identified period of life which ends with the elaboration of a professional career. Adventure has to be examined in its imaginary origins. For some people the imaginary of predation prevails, for others it is contestation, and for yet others, the wish for an « Elsewhere » bears a resemblance to an epic journey. (shrink)

This commentary on Isabelle Stengers's article, “Comparison as a Matter of Concern” is an assessment of her stance toward experimental psychology. At the various points in her work where she considers that discipline, she tends to accuse it of failing to embrace the “risk” that she sees as defining the “collective games” of science. Brown invokes the behavioral approach to experimental psychology of the early to mid-twentieth century to contextualize Stengers's treatment of continuous comparison conducted by scientists around “matters (...) of concern.” Her use of the metaphor of predator/prey relationships between practices is seen as reversing the usual direction of critique within psychology, such that experimental psychology appears to have, in the Wistar rat, an object grounding a community that is capable of performing continuous comparison, which its critics contrastingly lack. Stengers's ecological view of practices may then ultimately lead to a reappraisal of branches of the human sciences, such as experimental psychology, which she tends, on occasion, to dismiss. (shrink)

In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory, containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that (...) both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value of biodiversity. (shrink)

Abstract. Since Darwin, scholars have contemplated what our growing understanding of natural selection, combined with the fact that great suffering occurs, allows us to infer about the possibility that a benevolent God created the universe. Building on this long line of thought, I develop a model that illustrates how undesirable characteristics of the world (stylized “evils”) can influence long-run outcomes. More specifically, the model considers an evolutionary process in which each generation faces a risk from a “natural evil” (e.g., (...) predation, disease, or a natural disaster) subsequent to a basic resource allocation game. This allows both resource allocation and the natural evil to influence the number of surviving offspring. As the model shows, when the risk from the natural evil can be mitigated through the benevolent behavior of neighbors, the population may have increasing benevolence as a result of (1) greater risk from the natural evil and (2) a greater degree to which selfish individuals transfer resources to themselves in the resource allocation game. The main implication is that a world with evolutionary processes (in contrast to a world of static design) can allow two factors that have traditionally been considered “evils”—namely, the indiscriminate cruelty of the natural world and the capacity for humans to harm each other—to promote desirable long-run outcomes. (shrink)

A standard platitude about the function of causal knowledge or theories is that they are valuable because they support prediction, explanation, and control. Knowledge of predator-prey relations enables us to predict future animal populations, as well as design policies or interventions that help influence those populations. If we understand the underlying biochemical mechanisms of some disease, then we can predict who is at risk for it, explain why it produces particular symptoms, and develop interventions to try to reduce its (...) prevalence or the symptom severity. Of course, there are many situations in which one has, for practical reasons, only some of these desiderata; for example, control might be infeasible for technical or ethical reasons. But these remain, for many researchers, the ideal for why causal knowledge is a valuable end of scientific inquiry, including biological inquiry. There are, however, certain types of systems—in particular, chaotic systems—in which it appears that these ends are unattainable, and these systems appear to be widespread in the biological domain, broadly construed. In this paper, we will show why it is natural to think that causal models of chaotic systems cannot satisfy any of the three functions. But we will also show why this natural thought is wrong: we can have usable causal knowledge about even chaotic systems. Moreover, the ways in which we can have such knowledge lead us naturally to rethink a standard understanding of how causal learning and modeling proceed. In particular, just as we often must find the appropriate variables for a causal system, we also must determine the proper level or granularity of description for the dynamics of that system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clarifying the Relationship Between Vice and Mental Disorder: Vice as Manifestation of a Psychological DysfunctionMichael B. First (bio)KeywordsDSM-IV, psychiatric diagnosis, impulse control disorders, sexually violent predator commitmentIndividuals generally present for psychiatric evaluation for one of two reasons: either because they themselves are suffering from a psychiatric symptom that causes distress (e.g., severe panic) or impairs their ability to function effectively (e.g., memory loss), or else they are brought to (...) clinical attention because their behavior or attitudes are considered by others to be problematic. There are a wide range of behaviors that fall into this second category. In some cases, the individual is pressured to seek treatment because of the negative impact that a behavior has on a relationship partner (e.g., sexual dysfunction, anger outbursts) or an employer (e.g., excessive alcohol use). Often, however, the external trigger for a clinical evaluation falls under Sadler’s definition of vice, that is, criminal (illegal) behaviors or attitudes that could be considered “wrongful” or “immoral” in the social arena because the behavior violates the law or an important social more.Given that one of the most important goals of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is to facilitate clinical practice (First et al. 2004) and in doing so provide a diagnostic code to cover any patient that might present himself or herself to a mental health professional, the DSM has evolved over its various editions to become a veritable laundry list of psychological and behavioral ills, some of which may constitute a violation of the rights of others or society. The DSM-III (and its successors) have adopted a descriptive approach wherein disorders are defined in terms of their presenting surface symptomatology, which was necessitated by the field’s lack of knowledge about the underlying etiology of mental disorders. Given this reliance on presenting symptoms, it is therefore inevitable that some disorders are defined in terms of behaviors that can be considered vices. For example, impaired impulse [End Page 35] control often leads to acting out behavior that, at its mildest is inappropriate, and at its most severe is destructive to self and others. Many of the disorders cited by Sadler as being vice-laden fall into this category, namely, pyromania (failure to resist impulses to set fires), kleptomania (failure to resist impulses to steal), intermittent explosive disorder (failure to resist aggressive impulses), certain forms of substance abuse (i.e., those involving possession and use of illegal substances) and paraphilias (i.e., those involving nonconsenting victims).It is important to clarify from the outset that the criteria for determining whether a behavior is a “vice” (i.e., whether it is illegal or immoral) is not equivalent to the criteria for determining whether a behavior is indicative of a mental disorder. According to the DSM-IV-TR definition, a mental disorder is conceptualized as a “clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom” (American Psychiatric Association [APA] 2000, xxxi). The definition warns against considering “deviant behavior[s] (e.g., political, religious, or sexual)” and “conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society” to be evidence of mental disorder except in those cases in which the “deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.” Thus, when considering whether a particular “vice” behavior is a component of a mental disorder, it is crucial to determine whether the behavior is a manifestation of an underlying psychological dysfunction, such as a dysfunction in impulse control. If so, it may potentially be appropriate for that individual to be treated as “medically ill” in addition to, or instead of, being treated simply as a criminal.Let us examine some illustrative examples of cases that demonstrate the relationship between vice and mental disorders and the different ways in which the legal and mental health systems might deal with such cases. Consider the case of an individual who breaks... (shrink)

Reintroduction programs in which captive-bred or reared animals are released into natural habitats are considered a key approach for conservation; however, success rates have generally been low. Accounting for factors that enable individual animals to have a greater chance of survival can not only improve overall conservation outcomes but can also impact the welfare of the individual animals involved. One such factor may be individual personality, and personality research is a growing field. This type of research presents animal welfare scientists (...) with the opportunity to develop behavior profiles that may predict how particular individuals cope with challenges. This has direct implications for both in situ and ex situ populations and can bridge the gap between animal welfare and conservation. We designed a project to ascertain the presence of personality traits in Blanding’s turtles (Emydoidea blandingii), a species of special concern in the state of Michigan, and assess potential links between traits and post-release success. As hypothesized, the Blanding’s turtles in this study displayed behavioral responses to modified open field tests indicative of distinct personality traits: exploration, boldness and aggression. Additionally, the personality traits were correlated differently with survival and behavior patterns when the turtles were released into the Shiawassee National Wildlife Refuge. More exploratory turtles had higher survival rates, while neither boldness nor aggression were related to survival. Exploratory turtles were also more likely to travel longer distances after release. The use of muskrat dens was related to increased survival, and both bolder and more exploratory turtles made higher use of this feature. Exploratory and aggressive turtles were found basking outside of water more often, while bold turtles were more likely to be found at the water surface. Both of these basking behaviors may increase the risk of predation and may be reflective of a trade-off between risk and behaviors related to physiological health. Understanding how personality affects behavior and survival post-release can be a critical tool for improving reintroduction success. Zoo animal welfare scientists and practitioners can implement approaches that improve the welfare of individuals within the context of conservation initiatives. (shrink)

The use of lateralised cues by predators and fellows may not strongly affect lateralisation. Conservatism of development is a possible source of consistency across vertebrates. Individuals with partial reversal, affecting only one ability, or with varying degree of control of response by one hemisphere do exist. Their incidence may depend on varying selection of behavioural phenotypes such as risk taking.

The Social Security system is expected to go bankrupt in approximately 2032. The debate on how to reform the system currently revolves around the issue of privatization. Advocates of privatization claim that allowing individuals to invest some of their SSI contributions would provide greater returns and protect the system from insolvency. Opponents of privatization argue that such a move would expose individuals to excessive risk.The debate should be resolved through a rational examination of alternative proposals. Unfortunately, defenders of the (...) status quo are again resorting to the type of iconography seen in other recent public policy debates. They are equating defense of the current government-financed system with protecting the elderly from evil predators who wish to "starve the old folks" for their own gain. The purpose of this paper is to show how iconography could harm future retirees by stifling debate on an important public policy issue. (shrink)

In “Risk Based Passenger Screening in Aviation Security: Implications and Variants of a New Paradigm”, Sebastian Weydner-Volkmann describes the current paradigm shift from ‘traditional’ forms of screening to ‘risk based passenger screening’ (RBS) in aviation security. This paradigm shift is put in the context of the wider historical development of risk management approaches. Through a discussion of Michel Foucault, Herfried Münkler and Ulrich Beck, Weydner-Volkmann analyses the shortcomings of such approaches in public security policies, which become especially (...) evident in the aviation security context. As he shows, the turn towards methods of RBS can be seen as an attempt to address a trade-off ‘trilemma’ between the effective provision of security, the implied costs for industry and passengers, and the ethical, legal and societal implications of the screening procedures. In order to analyse foreseeable outcomes of embracing RBS, he differentiates three prototypical variants of the new paradigm on the basis of their main referent and rationale. For each variant, he then subsequently assesses the implications for the ‘trilemma’, after having unveiled the criteria of analysis that will necessarily have to be followed within a serious appraisal of RBS methods. (shrink)

One challenge to the idea that animals have a moral right to life claims that any such right would require us to intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. I argue that belief in an animal right to life does not commit us to supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. One common retort to the predator challenge contends that we are not required to save animals from predators because predators are not moral agents. I suggest (...) that this retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. I seek to articulate a more satisfactory argument explaining why we are not required to save wild prey from predators and how this position is perfectly consistent with the idea that animals have a basic right to life. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself of (...) the shared vulnerability to risks and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

One common objection to ethical vegetarianism—that is, vegetarianism for ethical reasons—concerns the morality of the predator-prey relationship. If it is morally acceptable for wolves to kill sheep for food, why is it wrong for human beings to eat meat? The objection raised here is sometimes called the “predation argument.” In this article, I critically examine three versions of the argument.

A variety of ethical objections have been raised against the military employment of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones). Some of these objections are technological concerns over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their inhabited counterparts. This paper sets such concerns aside and instead focuses on supposed objections to the use of UAVs in principle. I examine several such objections currently on offer and show them all to be wanting. Indeed, I argue that we have a duty to protect an (...) agent engaged in a justified act from harm to the greatest extent possible, so long as that protection does not interfere with the agent's ability to act justly. UAVs afford precisely such protection. Therefore, we are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter's operational capability. Of course, if a given military action is unjustified to begin with, then carrying out that act via UAVs is wrong, just as it would be with any weapon. But the point of this paper is to show that there is nothing wrong in principle with using a UAV and that, other things being equal, using such technology is, in fact, obligatory. (shrink)

Holmes Rolston has defended certain forms of hunting and meat eating when these activities are seen as natural participation in the food chains in which we evolved. Ned Hettinger has suggested that some of Rolston’s principles that govern our interactions with plants and animals might appear to be inconsistent with Rolston’s defense of these activities. Hettinger attempts to show that they are not. We argue that Rolston’s principles are not consistent with hunting, given Hettinger’s modifications. In his defense of Rolston, (...) Hettinger has challenged animal welfare ethicists to show that they can value animal predation while consistently condemning human hunting. We answer that hunting and meat eating by humans are “cultural” rather than “natural” activities. (shrink)

Conservation policy in New Zealand is centred around an objective to totally eradicate three invasive species; the ship rat, the brushtail possum and the stoat, by 2050. The preferred control method to achieve this is large scale poisoning operations with 1080 and similar toxins. This project is backed up by governmental and non-governmental agencies and surrounded with discourse of ‘war’ and ‘invasion’. The ‘Big Three’ predators are endowed with sinister motives as a means of mobilising support. This self-described ‘war’ is (...) evaluated in terms of ‘just war’ theory and found wanting. In particular there are issues with the recruitment of children for killing, humiliation of combatants, questionable economic motives for the ‘war’, deception by government agencies, lack of consultation, a lack of consideration of alternatives, the use of excessive suffering, and unrealistic expectations. An alternative paradigm of ‘compassionate conservation’ is proposed for New Zealand. Instead of trying to get back to a stable pre-colonial state of nature, I propose a holistic approach that respects both ecosystems and their members and takes into account new understandings of ecosystems as dynamic processes. (shrink)

Conservation policy in New Zealand is centred around an objective to totally eradicate three invasive species; the ship rat, the brushtail possum and the stoat, by 2050. The preferred control method to achieve this is large scale poisoning operations with 1080 and similar toxins. This project is backed up by governmental and non-governmental agencies and surrounded with discourse of ‘war’ and ‘invasion’. The ‘Big Three’ predators are endowed with sinister motives as a means of mobilising support. This self-described ‘war’ is (...) evaluated in terms of ‘just war’ theory and found wanting. In particular there are issues with the recruitment of children for killing, humiliation of combatants, questionable economic motives for the ‘war’, deception by government agencies, lack of consultation, a lack of consideration of alternatives, the use of excessive suffering, and unrealistic expectations. An alternative paradigm of ‘compassionate conservation’ is proposed for New Zealand. Instead of trying to get back to a stable pre-colonial state of nature, I propose a holistic approach that respects both ecosystems and their members and takes into account new understandings of ecosystems as dynamic processes. (shrink)

Conservation policy in New Zealand is centred around an objective to totally eradicate three invasive species; the ship rat, the brushtail possum and the stoat, by 2050. The preferred control method to achieve this is large scale poisoning operations with 1080 and similar toxins. This project is backed up by governmental and non-governmental agencies and surrounded with discourse of ‘war’ and ‘invasion’. The ‘Big Three’ predators are endowed with sinister motives as a means of mobilising support. This self-described ‘war’ is (...) evaluated in terms of ‘just war’ theory and found wanting. In particular there are issues with the recruitment of children for killing, humiliation of combatants, questionable economic motives for the ‘war’, deception by government agencies, lack of consultation, a lack of consideration of alternatives, the use of excessive suffering, and unrealistic expectations. An alternative paradigm of ‘compassionate conservation’ is proposed for New Zealand. Instead of trying to get back to a stable pre-colonial state of nature, I propose a holistic approach that respects both ecosystems and their members and takes into account new understandings of ecosystems as dynamic processes. (shrink)

Accumulating data suggest that the eukaryotic cell originated from a merger of two prokaryotes, an archaeal host and a bacterial endosymbiont. However, since prokaryotes are unable to perform phagocytosis, the means by which the endosymbiont entered its host is an enigma. We suggest that a predatory or parasitic interaction between prokaryotes provides a reasonable explanation for this conundrum. According to the model presented here, the host in this interaction was an anaerobic archaeon with a periplasm‐like space. The predator was a (...) small (facultative) aerobic α‐proteobacterium, which penetrated and replicated within the host periplasm, and later became the mitochondria. Plausible conditions under which this interaction took place and circumstances that may have led to the contemporary complex eukaryotic cell are discussed. (shrink)