This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Feminist Turn Psyche and Soma Embodiment and Knowing The Body and Cognition Learning between the Biological and Symbolic Implications for Education Acknowledgement References.

Motivation plays an immense role and is one of the key factors for successful and qualitative performance in all spheres of personal and professional engagement of individuals. Therefore, educational institutions, including academia, pay special attention to finding tools for motivating students, but also for motivation of their academic staff. Increased motivation has shown to lead to better performance and better performance inevitably contributes to quality enhancement at both individual and institutional level. The aim of this paper is to present (...) an institutional Ranking and Remuneration Policy based on Key Performance Indicators in four areas identified as the most crucial for successful operation of a higher education institution: teaching and learning, research, staff digital profile, service to society and project-based activities. Southeast European University in North Macedonia has developed KPIs in these four areas through an inclusive and transparent process based on its unique Total Quality Management approach. The policy has been created after many consultations, trials and simulations and its main objective is to enhance institutional academic productivity and effectiveness through a human resource vibration that starts from individual evaluation, motivation and performance differentiation and leads to stimulation for achieving excellence. It is at an initial stage and if tested well in practice, it can serve as a model for other higher education institutions in the country and wider. (shrink)

Bhabha, Georges Didi-Huberman, David Morgan and Lee Siegel, as well as a series of focused contributions by Yve-Alain Bois, Wendy Doniger, Kenneth Frampton, Martin E. Marty, John Hallmark Neff, Annemarie Schimmel, and Helen Tworkov consider how rapture resonate's both in a cultural context and within the experience of a single human being.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has begun to encourage innovative market-based approaches to address nonpoint source water pollution. These water quality trading programs have the potential to achieve environmental standards at a lower overall cost. Two fundamental questions must be answered before these benefits can be realized: How will trades between point and nonpoint sources be monitored and enforced? and, How will nonpoint sources be included within a trading market? ;Point-nonpoint source trading can be accommodated through either a (...) technology-based or performance-based approach. The technology-based approach accommodates trading through the use of a proxy for unobservable, individual nonpoint source emission reductions. While trading ratios can effectively deal with the uncertainty associated with using a proxy for actual abatement, they are inefficient and ineffective for dealing with problems of hidden action. The alternative use of performance-based trading approaches requires the use of team contracts that provide individual incentives linked to the performance of the entire group. Such contracts must be designed to overcome both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Performance-based approaches promise efficiency gains in terms of reducing the problems of asymmetric information, and by introducing flexibility into the choice of nonpoint source abatement technologies and practices. ;Nonpoint sources are exempted from direct regulation under the polluter-pays-principle. As a result, their participation in trading markets is voluntary, thus preventing a baseline cap on pre-trade emissions. To determine whether this arrangement should be changed, we must ask if there something that morally prohibits the direct regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution. While a morally relevant distinction can be made between point and nonpoint sources of emission based on differences in the ability to observe individual emission levels, this relevance is limited to the case of performance-based policy instruments. The moral legitimacy of applying the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution must be made on a case by case basis, as it is dependent upon existing social, economic, and other practical factors. However, it can be stated that there is no general moral barrier to prohibit the application of the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution. (shrink)

Poor quality medical care is sometimes attributed to physicians’ unwillingness to act on evidence about what works best. Evidence-based performance standards (EBPSs) are one response to this problem, and they are increasingly employed by health care regulators and payers. Evidence in this instance is judged according to the precepts of evidence-based medicine (EBM); it is probabilistic, and the randomized controlled trial (RCT) is the gold standard. This means that EBPSs suffer all the infirmities of EBM generally—well rehearsed problems with (...) the external validity of research findings as well as the inferential leap from study results in the aggregate to individual patient care. These theoretical weaknesses promise to have a practical impact on the care of patients. To avoid this, EBPSs should be understood as guidelines indicative of average effectiveness rather than standards to be applied in every case. (shrink)

BackgroundThe issue of stigma is very important in the battle against HIV/aids in Africa since it may affect patient attendance at healthcare centres for obtaining antiretroviral medications and regular medical check-ups. Stigmatization creates an unnecessary culture of secrecy and silence based on ignorance and fear of victimization. This study was designed to determine if there is external stigmatization of people living with HIV and AIDS by health care workers at a tertiary hospital in KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. The study investigated (...) the impact of knowledge of HIV/aids by HCWs on treatment of patients, as well as the comfort level and attitude of HCWs when rendering care to PLWHA.MethodsA descriptive cross sectional study was designed to collect data using an anonymous self-administered structured questionnaire from 334 HCWs. The study was conducted in clinical departments of a large multidisciplinary 922-bed tertiary care teaching hospital in Durban, KZN.ResultsOverall HCWs had an above average knowledge about HIV/aids although some gaps in knowledge were identified. Tests of statistical significance showed that there was association between level of education and knowledge of HIV/aids ; occupation and knowledge of HIV/aids ; and gender and knowledge of HIV/aids. Test for comfort level was only significant for gender, with males showing more comfort and empathy when dealing with PLWHA. The study also revealed that patients were sometimes tested for HIV without informed consent before surgery, due to fear of being infected, and there was some gossiping about patients' HIV status by HCWs, thereby compromising patient confidentiality. The majority of HCWs showed a willingness to report incidents of stigmatization and discrimination to higher authorities, for better monitoring and control.ConclusionsAlthough knowledge, attitude and comfort level of HCWs taking care of PLWHA was above average, enforcement of existing antidiscrimination laws and continuing education in medical ethics and healthcare law, would greatly improve the performance of HCWs taking care of PLWHAs. More psychological support and counselling should be provided to HCWs, to further reduce the impact of stigmatization and discrimination against PLWHA. (shrink)

BACKGROUND -/- The importance of ontologies in the biomedical domain is generally recognized. However, their quality is often too poor for large-scale use in critical applications, at least partially due to insufficient training of ontology developers. -/- OBJECTIVE -/- To show the efficacy of guideline-based ontology development training on the performance of ontology developers. The hypothesis was that students who received training on top-level ontologies and design patterns perform better than those who only received training in the basic principles (...) of formal ontology engineering. -/- METHODS -/- A curriculum was implemented based on a guideline for ontology design. A randomized controlled trial on the efficacy of this curriculum was performed with 24 students from bioinformatics and related fields. After joint training on the fundamentals of ontology development the students were randomly allocated to two groups. During the intervention, each group received training on different topics in ontology development. In the assessment phase, all students were asked to solve modeling problems on topics taught differentially in the intervention phase. Primary outcome was the similarity of the students’ ontology artefacts compared with gold standard ontologies developed by the authors before the experiment; secondary outcome was the intra-group similarity of group members’ ontologies. -/- RESULTS -/- The experiment showed no significant effect of the guideline-based training on the performance of ontology developers (a) the ontologies developed after specific training were only slightly but not significantly closer to the gold standard ontologies than the ontologies developed without prior specific training; (b) although significant differences for certain ontologies were detected, the intra-group similarity was not consistently influenced in one direction by the differential training. -/- CONCLUSION -/- Methodologically limited, this study cannot be interpreted as a general failure of a guideline-based approach to ontology development. Further research is needed to increase insight into whether specific development guidelines and practices in ontology design are effective. (shrink)

According to international longitudinal studies, the quality of preschool education is of great importance for children’s further development. The modern research’s greatest interest in the field of studying the quality of preschool education is precisely the assessment of the relationship between the teacher and children as well as the teaching quality in kindergarten groups. In this regard, the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) seems to be the one of the most relevant for the educational environment quality (...) evaluation. The CLASS methodology (which includes emotional support, classroom organization, and instrumental support) is based on the cultural-historical approach, which shows the interaction between students and adults as the main mechanism for child’s development. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationships between different aspects of the classroom organization quality in kindergarten groups and executive functions components (such as cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory) in 5–6-year-old children. The quality of classroom interaction was measured by the CLASS. The study used the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) method to assess cognitive flexibility and the NEPSY-II subtests “Inhibition” to assess inhibitory control and “Memory for Designs” and “Sentences Repetition” to assess visuo-spatial and verbal working memory, respectively. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology at Lomonosov Moscow State University. The study involved 26 kindergarten groups in Moscow. While conducting the research, extreme groups were identified (5 with low quality and 10 with high-quality levels of classroom interaction). Then, three kindergarten groups with low level (65 children) and three groups with high level (68 children) of interaction within classroom were selected and compared. The results revealed that children from groups with low level of classroom interaction have higher results in cognitive flexibility tasks when compared with children from groups with high level of interaction. Also, children from groups with high-quality classroom interaction demonstrated higher results in visuo-spatial working memory tasks and inhibitory control tasks as contrasted with children from low-quality groups. These findings attest to the importance of classroom interaction quality for the executive functions development in the preschool age. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

Drawing on conservation of resources theory, this study examined how and when sense of control influence safety behavior. Linear regression analysis was performed on data collected from 481 students in 58 classes at a university. The results indicated that psychological stress mediated the negative effect of sense of control on safety compliance, as well as the positive effect of sense of control on safety participation. They further showed that perceptions of stronger safety regulations heightened the positive relationship between student psychological (...) stress and safety compliance, and buffered the negative effects of psychological stress on safety participation. These results provide a benchmark against which the effectiveness and relevance of epidemic prevention and control in higher education institutions can be assessed. (shrink)

Expanded universal carrier screening (EUCS) entails a population‐wide screening offer for multiple disease‐causing mutations simultaneously. Although there is much debate about the conditions under which EUCS can responsibly be introduced, there seems to be little discussion about its aim: providing carrier couples with options for autonomous reproductive choice. While this links in with current accounts of the aim of foetal anomaly screening, it is different from how the aim of ancestry‐based carrier screening has traditionally been understood: reducing the disease burden (...) in the population. The reasons why the aim of EUCS is presented in terms of ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘prevention’ have not been spelled out in the literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap by considering the morally relevant similarities and dissimilarities between foetal anomaly screening, ancestry‐based carrier screening and EUCS. When carrier screening is performed in the prenatal period, enhancing autonomy appears the most appropriate aim of EUCS, as the alternative of ‘prevention through selective abortion’ would urge women to terminate wanted pregnancies. However, when screening is conducted in the preconception period, carrier couples can avoid the birth of affected children by other means than selective abortion, for instance preimplantation genetic diagnosis. To the extent that this increased control over passing on a genetic disorder raises questions of parental responsibility, it seems necessary that the account of the aims of EUCS is wider than only in terms of enhancing reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

Expanded universal carrier screening (EUCS) entails a population‐wide screening offer for multiple disease‐causing mutations simultaneously. Although there is much debate about the conditions under which EUCS can responsibly be introduced, there seems to be little discussion about its aim: providing carrier couples with options for autonomous reproductive choice. While this links in with current accounts of the aim of foetal anomaly screening, it is different from how the aim of ancestry‐based carrier screening has traditionally been understood: reducing the disease burden (...) in the population. The reasons why the aim of EUCS is presented in terms of ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘prevention’ have not been spelled out in the literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap by considering the morally relevant similarities and dissimilarities between foetal anomaly screening, ancestry‐based carrier screening and EUCS. When carrier screening is performed in the prenatal period, enhancing autonomy appears the most appropriate aim of EUCS, as the alternative of ‘prevention through selective abortion’ would urge women to terminate wanted pregnancies. However, when screening is conducted in the preconception period, carrier couples can avoid the birth of affected children by other means than selective abortion, for instance preimplantation genetic diagnosis. To the extent that this increased control over passing on a genetic disorder raises questions of parental responsibility, it seems necessary that the account of the aims of EUCS is wider than only in terms of enhancing reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

In the words of Aristotle, "The state is a union of families and villagers having for an end, a perfect and self-sufficing life by which we mean a happy and honourable life. A state exists for the sake of good life and not for the sake of life only". This definition has given a clear vision on the relationship between man and the state. The state, in modern times is regarded as an important agency or in other words a human (...) organization for maintaining disciplined and a well-arranged environment for education. In contemporary world, the functions to be performed by a state are going wide day by day. So, one of the functions of a state is to give proper education and to create a proper environment for imparting knowledge among people. In a democratic country the role of state in spreading education is very much important. These states provide educational aims and objectives, open schools and colleges; arrange the syllabus and curriculum, plan, control and direct educational activities for their citizens. Performing these functions the modern states can create such an environment in every society where every citizen can be made educated enough to understand the complexities of modern world. Besides these, the modern world can make proper arrangements for research and experiments in various fields of education. For this a state should establish such institutions and organisations to inspire the eligible individuals. In a big country like India, the state makes educational policies based on needs, ideals and aspirations of the people. For this there are various administrative unites are established. Each such unites maintain an educational department of it’s own for providing liberal and vocational education up to highest standard. States also maintain one or more universities for higher education. Thus, it can be said that a state exerts it’s direct and indirect influences on all aspects of education. (shrink)

As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the ways in which knowledge--scientific, social, and cultural--is produced are undergoing fundamental changes. In The New Production of Knowledge, a distinguished group of authors analyze these changes as marking the transition from established institutions, disciplines, practices, and policies to a new mode of knowledge production. Identifying such elements as reflexivity, transdisciplinarity, and heterogeneity within this new mode, the authors consider their impact and interplay with the role of knowledge in social relations. (...) While the knowledge produced by research and development in science and technology is accorded central focus, the authors also outline the changing dimensions of social scientific and humanities knowledge and the relations between the production of knowledge and its dissemination through education. Placing science policy and scientific knowledge within the broader context of contemporary society, this book will be essential reading for all those concerned with the changing nature of knowledge, with the social study of science, with educational systems, and with the correlation between research and development and social, economic, and technological development. "Thought-provoking in its identification of issues that are global in scope; for policy makers in higher education, government, or the commercial sector." --Choice "By their insightful identification of the recent social transformation of knowledge production, the authors have been able to assert new imperatives for policy institutions. The lessons of the book are deep." --Alexis Jacquemin, Universite Catholique de Louvain and Advisor, Foreign Studies Unit, European Commission "Should we celebrate the emergence of a 'post-academic' mode of postmodern knowledge production of the post-industrial society of the 21st Century? Or should we turn away from it with increasing fear and loathing as we also uncover its contradictions. A generation of enthusiasts and/or critics will be indebted to the team of authors for exposing so forcefully the intimate connections between all the cognitive, educational, organizational, and commercial changes that are together revolutionizing the sciences, the technologies, and the humanities. This book will surely spark off a vigorous and fruitful debate about the meaning and purpose of knowledge in our culture." --Professor John Ziman, (Wendy, Janey at Ltd. is going to provide affiliation. Contact if you don't hear from her.) "Jointly authored by a team of distinguished scholars spanning a number of disciplines, The New Production of Knowledge maps the changes in the mode of knowledge production and the global impact of such transformations. . . . The authors succeed . . . at sketching out, in very large strokes, the emerging trends in knowledge production and their implications for future society. The macro focus of the book is a welcome change from the micro obsession of most sociologists of science, who have pretty much deconstructed institutions and even scientific knowledge out of existence." --Contemporary Sociology "This book is a timely contribution to current discussion on the breakdown of and need to renegotiate the social contract between science and society that Vannevar Bush and likeminded architects of science policy constructed immediately after World War II. It goes far beyond the usual scattering of fragmentary insights into changing institutional landscapes, cognitive structures, or quality control mechanisms of present day science, and their linkages with society at large. Tapping a wide variety of sources, the authors provide a coherent picture of important new characteristics that, taken altogether, fundamentally challenge our traditional notions of what academic research is all about. This well-founded analysis of the social redistribution of knowledge and its associated power patterns helps articulate what otherwise tends to remain an--albeit widespread--intuition. Unless they adapt to the new situation, universities in the future will find the centers of gravity of knowledge production moving even further beyond their ken. Knowledge of the social and cognitive dynamics of science in research is much needed as a basis of science and technology policymaking. The New Production of Knowledge does a lot to fill this gap. Another unique feature is its discussion of the humanities, which are usually left out in works coming out of the social studies of science." --Aant Elzinga, University od Goteborg. (shrink)

Background Ethical nurse leaders play a pivotal role in helping their nurse employees deliver high-quality healthcare services. However, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of the mediating and moderating mechanisms by which ethical leadership improves job performance. Purpose This study aims to investigate: (1) whether ethical leadership would enhance nurses’ job performance; (2) whether learning goal orientation acts as a mediator; and (3) whether co-worker support operates as a moderator. Participants and research context We collected two-wave data from 218 (...) nurses working in hospitals located in Jiangsu, China. Research design A time-lagged study based on an online survey design was utilized for data collection between September 2022 and January 2023. PROCESS Model 5 was employed to test the research hypotheses. Ethical considerations We obtained ethics approval from the University Ethics Committee. The nursing participants were assured that their survey responses were completely anonymous. Results and discussion Ethical leadership is not significantly correlated with job performance. However, ethical leadership has an indirect impact on nurses’ job performance through the mediator (learning goal orientation). Moreover, co-worker support moderates the relationship between ethical leadership and job performance. Conclusion The conceptual model provides us with a fine-grained understanding of the relationship between ethical leadership and nurses’ job performance. We highlight the mediating role of learning goal orientation and the moderating role of co-worker support. We suggest that healthcare organizations should devote more efforts to promoting ethical leadership, co-worker support, and learning goal orientation. (shrink)

Arthur Kaufmann is one of the most prominent figures among the contemporary philosophers of law in German speaking countries. For many years he was a director of the Institute of Philosophy of Law and Computer Sciences for Law at the University in Munich. Presently, he is a retired professor of this university. Rare in the contemporary legal thought, Arthur Kaufmann's philosophy of law is one with the highest ambitions — it aspires to pinpoint the ultimate foundations of law (...) by explicitly proposing an ontology, a general theory of knowledge and concept of a person. Kaufmann's work derives, first of all, from the thinking of Gustav Radburch, his teacher, and then from ideas of Karl Engish and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The philosophy undertakes to pursue the ultimate foundation of law, law which is understood by Kaufmann, first of all, as a "concrete judgement" that is, what is right in a concrete situation. Justice belongs to the essence of law and "unjust law" is contradictio in adiectio. Kaufmann opposes all those theories, which as the only foundation for establishing just law (Recht) adopt legal norms (Gesetz). In Kaufmann's opinion , such theories are powerless in the face of all types of distortions of law rendered by political forces. He suggests that the basic phenomenon which needs to be explained and which cannot be disregarded by a philosopher of law is so-called "legal lawlessness" ("Gestzliches Unrecht"). "Legal lawlessness" which forms a part of life experience for the people of twentieth century totalitarian states. It proved "with the accuracy of scientific experiment" that the reality of law consists of something more than bare conformity with legal norms. The existence of lex corrupta indicates that law contains something "non-dispositive" which requires acknowledgment of both law-maker and judge. Kaufmann, accepting the convergent concept of truth and cognition, assumes that "non-dispositive" content, emerging as the conformity of a number of cognitive acts of different subjects (inter-subjective communicativeness and verifiability), indicates the presence of being in this cognition. The questions "What is law?" and "What are the principles of a just solution?" lead straight to the ontology of law, to the question about the ontological foundations of law. Kaufmann discerns the ontological foundations of law in the specifically understood "nature of things" and, ultimately, in a "person". He proposes a procedural theory of justice, founded on a "person". In my work, I undertake to reconstruct the train of thought which led Kaufmann to the recognition of a "person" as the ontological foundation of law. In the first part, the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, initial characteristics of law — of reality which is the subject of analysis, as well as, the requirements for proper philosophical explanation of law posed by Kaufmann are introduced. In the second, Kaufmann's reconstruction of the process of the realisation of law is presented. Next, the conception of analogy which Kaufmann uses when explaining law is analyzed. In the fourth part, Kaufmann's conception of ontological foundations of law is discussed. A critical analysis is carried out in which I demonstrate that the theory of the ontological foundation of law proposed by Kaufmann and the concept of a person included in it do not allow a satisfac¬tory explanation of the phenomenon of "legal lawlessness" and lead to a number of difficulties in the philosophical explanation of law. Finally, the perspectives of a proper formulation of the issue of the ontological foundations of law are drafted in the context of the analyzed theory. My interest is centered on the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, according to which the existence of the reality is inferred on the basis of a certain configuration of the content of consciousness, whereas at the point of departure of philosophy of law, the data to be explained is a certain process, which is, basically, a process of cognition, while the reality appears only as a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process. I wish to argue that the difficulties which appear in the explanation of law are a consequence of the assumed fundamental philosophical solu¬tions, which seem to be characteristic, though usually not assumed explicitly, in philoso¬phy and theory of law dominant at present in continental Europe. Thereby, I wish to show the significance of ontological and epistemological solutions to the possibility of a proper formulation of the problems posed by philosophy and theory of law. Kaufmann proclaims himself in favour of a philosophy which poses questions about the ultimate foundations of understanding of the reality. In epistemology, he assumes that answers to the questions "What is reality like?" and ultimately "What is real?" are inferred on the basis of uniformity of a cognitive acts of different subjects. Cognition of the reality is accomplished exclusively through the content of conceptual material. The two fundamental questions posed by philosophy of law are "What is just law?" and "How is the just law enacted?" The latter is a question about the process of achieving a solution to a concrete case. Since, in Kaufmann's opinion, law does not exist apart from the process of its realisation, an answer to the question about the manner of realisation of law is of fundamental significance to answering the question: "What is law?" and to the explanation of the question about the ontological grounding of law, which is, as well, the foundation of justice. The proper solution has to take into account the moment of "non-dispositive" content of law; its positiveness understood as the reality and, at the same time, it has to point to the principles of the historical transformation of the content. Law, in the primary meaning of the word, always pertains, in Kaufmann's opinion, to a concrete case. A legal norm is solely the "possibility" of law and the entirely real law is ipsa res iusta, that which is just in a given situation. Determination of what is just takes place in a certain type of process performed by a judge (or by man confronted with a choice). Kaufmann aims to reconstruct this process. A question about the ontological foundation of law is a question about the ontological foundations of this process. In the analyzed theory it is formulated as a question about the transcendental conditions, necessary for the possibility of the occurrence of the process: how the reality should be thought to make possible the reconstructed process of the realisation of law. Kaufmann rejects the model for finding a concrete solution based on simple subsump¬tion and proposes a model in which concrete law ensues, based on inference by analogy, through the process of "bringing to conformity" that which is normative with that which is factual. Kaufmann distinguishes three levels in the process of the realisation of law. On the highest level, there are the fundamental legal principles, on the second legal norms, on the third — concrete solutions. The fundamental principles of law are general inasmuch as they cannot be "applied" directly to concrete conditions of life, however, they play an important part in establishing norms. A judge encounters a concrete situation and a system of legal norms. A life situation and norms are situated on inherently different levels of factuality and normativeness. In order to acquire a definite law both a norm (system of norms) and a life situation (Lebenssachverhalt) should undergo a kind of "treatment" which would allow a mutual conformity to be brought to them. Legal norms and definite conditions of life come together in the process of analogical inference in which the "factual state" ("Tatbestand") — which represents a norm, and in the "state of things" ("Sachverhalt") — which represents a specific situation are constructed. A "factual state" is a sense interpreted from a norm with respect to specific conditions of life. The "state of things" is a sense constructed on the basis of concrete conditions of life with respect to norms (system of norms). Legal norms and concrete conditions of life meet in one common sense established during the process of realisation of law. Mutatis mutandis the same refers to the process of composition of legal norms: as the acquisition of concrete law consists in a mutual "synchronization" of norms and concrete conditions of life, so acquisition of legal norms consists of bringing to conformity fundamental principles and possible conditions of life. According to Kaufmann, both of these processes are based on inference through analogy. As this inference is the heart of these processes it is simultaneously a foundation finding just law and justice. How does Kaufmann understand such an inference? As the basis for all justice he assumes a specifically interpreted distributive justice grounded on proportionality. Equality of relations is required between life conditions and their normative qualification. Concrete conditions of life are ascribed normative qualification not through simple application of a general norm. More likely, when we look for a solution we go from one concrete normative qualified case to another, through already known "applications" of norms to a new "application". The relation between life conditions and their normative qualifica¬tion has to be proportional to other, earlier or possible (thought of) assignments of that which is factual to that which is normative. Law as a whole does not consist of a set of norms, but only of a unity of relations. Since law is a, based on proportion, relative unity of a norm and conditions of life, in order to explain law in philosophical manner, the question about ontological base of this unity has to be asked. What is it that makes the relation between a norm and conditions of life "non-dispositive"? What is the basis for such an interpretation of a norm and case which makes it possible to bring a norm and conditions of life into mutual "conformity"? This is a question about a third thing (next to norms and conditions of life), with respect to which the relative identity between a norm and conditions of life occurs, about the intermediary between that which is normative and that which is factual and which provides for the process of establishing of norms, as well as, finding solutions. It is the "sense" in which the idea of law or legal norm and conditions of life have to be identical to be brought to mutual "conformity". In Kaufmann's opinion such a sense is nothing else but the "nature of things" which determines the normative qualification of the reality. Since establishment of this "sense" appears to be "non-dispositive" and controlled inter-subjectively (namely, other subjects will reach a similar result) so, in conformity with the convergent concept of truth, the "nature of things" must be assigned a certain ontological status. According to Kaufmann this is a real relation which occurs between being and obligation, between the conditions of life and normative quality. However, it should be underlined that from the point of view of the analyzed system the "nature of things" is a correlate of constructed sense, a result of a construction which is based on the principle of consistent understanding of senses ("non-normative" and "normative") and is not a reality which is transcendent against the arrangement of senses. In Kaufmann's theory, inference from analogy appears to be a process of reshaping the concepts (senses) governed by tendency to understand the contents appearing in relations between that which is factual and that which is normative in a consistent way. The analogical structure of language (concepts) and recognition of being as composed of an essence and existence is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of the realisation of law, based on specifically understood inference from analogy. It is necessary to assume a moment of existence without content which ensures unity of cognition. Existence emerges thus as a condition of the possibility of cognition. According to Kaufmann, the "nature of things" is the heart of inference through analogy and the basis for establishment of finding of law. Inference from the "state of things" to a norm or from a norm to the "state of things" always means inference through the "nature of things". The "nature of things" is the proper medium of objective legal sense sought in every cognition of law. In Kaufmann's view, the question whether the "nature of things" is ultima ratio of interpretation of law or is only a means of supplement gaps in law or whether it is one of the sources of law, is posed wrongly. The "nature of things" serves neither to supplement the gaps nor is it a source of law as, for example, a legal norm may be. It is a certain kind of "catalyst" necessary in every act of making law and solving a concrete case. Owing to "nature of things" it is possible to bring to a mutual conformity the idea of law and possible conditions of life or legal norms and concrete conditions of life. In Kaufmann's conception the "nature of things" is not yet the ultimate basis for understanding the "non-dispositiveness" of law. The relation between obligation and being is determined in the process of the realisation of law. Both the process itself and that which is transformed in this process are given. A question about the ontological bases of "material" contents undergoing "treatment" in the process of the realisation of law and about being which is the basis of regularity of the occurrence of the process arises. Only this will allow an explanation that the result of the process is not optional. Thus, a question about reality to which law refers and about the subject realising the law has to be formed. To this, Kaufmann gives the following answer: that which is missing is man but not "empirical man" but man as a "person". A "person" understood as a set of relations between man and other people and things. A "person" is the intermediary between those things which are different — norm and case are brought to conformity. A "person" is that which is given and permanent in the process of the realisation of law. It determines the content of law, is "subject" of law; this aspect is described by Kaufmann as the "what" of the process of realisation of law. A "person" consists of precisely just these relations which undergo "treatment" in the process. On the other hand, a "person" is "a place" in which the processes of realisation of law occur, it is the "how" of normative discourse, a "person" is that which determines the procedure of the process, being "outside" of it. This aspect of a "person" is connected with the formal moment of law. A "person" being, at the same time, the "how" and the "what" of the process of the realisation of law, is also, to put it differently, a structural unity of relation and that which constitutes this relation (unity of relatio and relata). According to this approach a "person" is neither an object nor a subject. It exists only "in between". It is not substance. Law is the relation between being and obligation. That which is obligatory is connected with that which is general. That which is general does not exist on its own, it is not completely real. Accordingly, a "person" as such is also not real. It is relational, dynamic and historical. A "person" is not a state but an event. In Kaufmann's opinion, such a concept of a "person" helps to avoid the difficulties connected with the fungibility of law in classical legal positivism. A "person" is that which is given, which is not at free disposal and secures the moment of "non-dispositiveness" of law. Kaufmann concludes: "The idea (»nature«) of law is either the idea of a personal man or is nothing". Theory points at the structure of realising law and explains the process of adoption of general legal norms for a concrete situation. The analysis has shown however, that in this theory a satisfactory answer to the question about the ultimate foundations of law is not given. It seems that in the analyzed theory the understanding of human being takes place through understanding of law. What is good for man as a "person", what is just, what a "person" deserves may be determined only against the existing system of law. A "per¬son" adopted as a basis of law is the reality postulated in the analysis of the process of the realisation of law. It is a condition of possibility of this process ( explaining, on one hand, its unity and, on the other hand, the non-dispositive moments stated in this process). A "person" in the discussed theory is entirely defined by the structure of law, it can be nothing more than that which is given in law, what law refers to, what law is about. Being, which is a "person", is constituted by relations between people and objects, the relations which are based on fundamental links between norms and conditions of life established in a process of bringing them to conformity. It has to be assumed that man as a "person" is a subject of law only as far as realising law "treats" given senses according to their current configuration. The system of law is a starting point and it describes in content what man is as a "person". Moreover, being a "person" is the condition for entering legal relations. Consistently, Kaufmann writes that "empirical man" is not the subject of law, man is not "out of nature" a "person". People become "persons" due to the fact that they acknowledge each other as "persons" — acknowledging, at the same time, law. This acknowledgement is a con¬dition of existence, of the possibility of the occurrence of process of realisation of law and of constituting legal relations which ultimately constitute a "person". Kaufmann assumes, that law tends towards a moral aim: it may and must create an external freedom, without which the internal freedom to fulfil moral obligations cannot develop. However, this postulate is not based on the necessary structure of human being. From the point of view of his system, it is nothing more than only a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of the realisation of law — lack of freedom would destroy the "how" of this process. Thus, the postulate to protect the freedom of personal acts has to be interpreted, in accordance with the analyzed theory, as a postulate, the fulfilment of which aims ultimately at the accomplishment of the very same process of realisation of law itself and not the realisation of a given man. Kaufmann considers a "person" to be an element which unites the system of law as a whole. Law is a structure of relations, which are interdependent and inter-contingent. Consequently, a "person" which is to form the ontological basis of law has to be entity consisting of all relations. Being also the "how" of the process of realisation of law, if a "person" is to warrant its unity, it has to be a common source for all procedures. Hence, a single "person" would constitute a subject of law. Man appears to be only a moment of a certain entirety, realisation of which should be an aim of his actions. Law, creating a "person" as an object and subject of law becomes a primary entity. In the analyzed theory, the basis for determination of aims which law sets to man is not the allocation of man-subject to something which improves him but rather, such relation is only just constituted by law. A question appears, why should aims set in law also be the aims of "empirical man"? Why is this "empirical man" to be punished in the name of a "person" understood in such a way? If, however, it is assumed that what is man is determined by a system which is superior to him, then man has to be understood only as a part of a whole and there are no grounds to prohibit istrumental treatment of man and so the road to all aspects of totalitarianism might be opened. A problem of the application of created theory to the reality arises, the reality which the theory pretends to explain. Ultimately in his theory Kaufmann does not give any systemic grounds for a radical questioning of the validity of any legal norms. Every new norm becomes an equal part of system of norms. It is only its interpretation and application to given conditions of life that may be disputable, however, this refers to all norms without exception. Cohesive inter-pretation of norms and applications is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of just law. New norms have to be interpreted in the light of others, correspondingly, the other norms require reinterpretation in the light of the new ones. Contradiction in interpretation of a norm does not form a basis for questioning norms but may serve only to question the manner of their interpretation (understanding). Therefore, no grounds exist to assume any legal norm as criminal or unjust, and in consequence, to question any consistently realised system based on formally, properly established norms, as "legal lawlessness". As law and a "person" do not exist without the process of realisation of law, the role of legal safety becomes crucial as the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Denying legal safety would be tantamount to negation of law in general (also of moral law) as negation of safety takes away, at the same time, the basis for occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Moreover, any lack of legal safety would also mean lack of a basis for the existence of man as a "person". Kaufmann's thesis, that civil disobedience is legalized only when it has a chance to lead to success, consistent with his concept of the foundations of law, seems to point directly to conclusions which deny the facts taken under consideration and doubtlessly Kaufmann's own intentions, since it would have to be assumed that accordingly there are no grounds to question a legal system in force based on violence which secures its operation. Force finally seems to determine which one of the mutually irreconcilable normative systems constitute law and which does not. A legitimate position is one which leads to success, it is the weaker system which is negated. If so, then basically violent imposition of law is not an act directed against the law in force but, to the contrary, realisation of law. In the context of the new system the former system of law may be talked about as unjust solely in the sense of being incapable of being consistently united with the new. However, at the base, ultimately, lies force which reaffirms differences and excludes from the process of realisation of law certain norms and their interpretations. Kaufmann was aiming at grounding of that which is "non-dispositive" in a certain given framework of interpretation. Nevertheless, he does not provide foundations for the understanding of phenomena, which he undertakes to explain at a point of departure. Instead of explaining them the theory negates the possibility of their existence. The reality postulated in regard to "non-dispositive" moments of the reconstructed process of acquiring law consist of a specifically understood "person", which appears in Kaufmann's conceptions as a condition of the possibility of the realisation of law. According to this approach understanding of a "person" may be only a function of law. To understand "legal lawlessness" and foundations of justice it is necessary to look for such theory of law in which understanding of man as a "person" and being is not a function of understanding of law (in which a "person" is not only a condition for possibility of reconstructed process of realisation of law; for possibility of cognition processes). It seems necessary to start from theory of being and a "person" based on broader experience than the one assumed by Kaufmann and reconstruct the ontological foundations of the process of realisation of law only in such perspective. Kaufmann points out that that to which law refers is ipsa res iusta a concrete relation of man to other people and things. This relation, in his theory, appears to be basically only just constituted by law (normative senses "applied" to conditions of life). Therefore, understanding the relation between a given man and other people and things which constitute the aim of his actions, that is understanding of good, is enacted against the background of constitution of senses; constitution which is a result of a process aiming towards consistent understanding of particular contents (of nor¬mative and non-normative senses). "Being" is secondary towards constructed senses it is only their correlate. The primary relation consists of relation of a man to law (system of norms), while the secondary relation is one of man to something which is the aim of his action (relation between man and good). Considering such approach it is difficult to envision a satisfying answer to the fundamental question: why does law put concrete man under any obligation to obey it? The source of this problem can be seen in reduction of the base for understanding good to content of obligation formulated in auto-reflection. Such reduction seems to be a consequence of Kaufmann's adoption of "convergent concept of truth" and in con¬sequence his recognition of indirect, essentialistic grasp of reality formulated in concepts as the basic and only foundation of theory of being and of law. In view of such an approach, analogy of law, concepts and being is the condition for the possibility of the process of transformation of senses which aims at consistent interpretation of all law. Existence is postulated with respect to the possibility of unity of experience and cognition. However, also a different approach to understanding of the problem of being and good is possible. In spontaneous cognition being is affirmed, first of all, not as a certain, non-contradictory, determined content, but as something existing. Together with a cer¬tain content (passed indirectly through notions) existence of being is co-given. The basis for unity of being is not formed by the consistence of content, as it is in the case of the theories departing from the analysis of cognition processes, but by an act of existence realising content (essence). Such an approach makes it also possible to go beyond the convergent concept of truth. It is worth mentioning that allocation of an agent to good is realised not only by the content of duty. A statement that something is good is primary with respect to determination of this good in content. The recognised good always bears some content, however, there are no reasons to base the concept of good exclusively on indirect, formulated in concepts cognition. As primary, can be adopted the relation of man to good and not of man to law. Determination in content appears to be only an articulation of aspectual cognition of being, as an object of action. In such a case the basis for relative unity of norm and conditions of life is not the "nature of things" understood as correlate of sense but it is relation to good based on internal constitution of man as potential, not self-sufficient being. It does not mean, that the moments of the process of realisation of law singled out by Kaufmann are not important to determination of what is just. He, quite rightly, points to significant role played by norms in the evaluation of concrete situations, in man's search for closer specification in content of good innate to him. The structure of process of determining law for a concrete situation, to a great degree corresponds to the processes of determining law which take place not only in the legal sciences. Kaufmann's analyses of the process of realisation of law show the complexity of the structure of these processes and point towards important moments allowing a better understanding of law and man. Nevertheless, these analyses cannot be a basis for construction of philosophical theory of law, theory which hopes to point out the ultimate, ontological foundations for understanding law. Kaufmann's results may become fully valid only in a more general perspective including broader experience at the point of departure. (shrink)

The primary purpose of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) is to protect the rights and welfare of human research participants. Evaluation and measurement of how IRBs satisfy this purpose and other important goals are open questions that demand empirical research. Research on IRBs, and the Human Research Protection Programs (HRPPs) of which they are often a part, is necessary to inform evidence-based practices, policies, and approaches to quality improvement in human research protections. However, to date, HRPP and IRB engagement in (...) empirical research about their own activities and performance has been limited. To promote engagement of HRPPs and IRBs in self-reflective research on HRPP and IRB quality and effectiveness, barriers to their participation need to be addressed. These include: extensive workloads, limited information technology systems, and few universally accepted or consistently measured metrics for HRPP/irb quality and effectiveness. Additionally, institutional leaders may have concerns about confidentiality. Professional norms around the value of participating in this type of research are lacking. Lastly, obtaining external funding for research on IRBs and HRPPs is challenging. As a group of HRPP professionals and researchers actively involved in a research consortium focused on IRB quality and effectiveness, we identify potential levers for supporting and encouraging HRPP and IRB engagement in research on quality and effectiveness. We maintain that this research should be informed by the core principles of patient- and community-engaged research, in which members and key stakeholders of the community to be studied are included as key informants and members of the research team. This ensures that relevant questions are asked and that data are interpreted to produce meaningful recommendations. As such, we offer several ways to increase the participation of HRPP professionals in research as participants, as data sharers, and as investigators. (shrink)

Reducing the global treatment gap for mental health conditions in low- and middle-income countries requires not only an expansion of clinical psychology training but also assuring that graduates of these programs have the competency to effectively and safely deliver psychological interventions. Clinical psychology training programs in LMICs require standardized tools and guidance to evaluate competency. The World Health Organization and UNICEF developed the “Ensuring Quality in Psychological Support” platform to facilitate competency-based training in psychosocial support, psychological treatments, and foundational (...) helping skills, with an initial focus on in-service training for non-specialists. Our goal was to design the first application of EQUIP to implement competency-based training into pre-service education for clinical psychology trainees. With Makerere University in Uganda as a case study, we outline an approach to develop, implement, and evaluate a competency-based curriculum that includes seven steps: Identify core clinical psychology competencies; Identify evaluation methods appropriate to each competency; Determine when competency evaluations will be integrated in the curriculum, who will evaluate competency, and how results will be used; Train faculty in competency-based education including conducting competency assessments and giving competency-based feedback; Pilot test and evaluate the competency-based education strategy with faculty and students; Modify and implement the competency-based education strategy based on pilot results; and Implement ongoing evaluation of the competency-based curriculum with continuous quality improvement. This approach will be formally evaluated and established as a foundation for pre-service training in other low-resource settings. (shrink)

Employing the National Institute of Mental Health-funded Prevention of Suicide in Primary Care Elderly Collaborative Trial as a case study, we discuss 2 sets of ethical issues: obtaining informed consent for a clinic-based intervention study and using treatment as usual (TAU) as the control condition. We then address these ethical issues in the context of the debate about the quality improvement efforts of health care organizations. Our analysis reveals the tension between ethics and scientific integrity involved with using TAU (...) as a control condition and the difficulty in designing high-quality research in a community-based setting. (shrink)

In this text, our question is what is the current regulatory trend in countries that are not considered central in the development of artificial intelligence, such as Brazil: a preventive approach, or an experimental approach? We will analyze the bills (PL) that are being processed in legislative houses at the state level, and at the federal level, highlighting some elements, such as: Delimitation of the object (conceptualization), fundamental principles, ethical guidelines, relationship with human work, human supervision, and guidelines for public (...) authorities. Based on these elements, we identified how the issues that drive the contemporary debate on AI have been addressed in these legislative initiatives. The results indicate that the strongest national regulation proposal mentions risks, rights, governance, economic agents; these mentions dialogue with the concerns discussed by researchers around the world, regarding the mitigation and prevention of risks, regarding the preservation of individual and collective rights, the role of the State as a regulator and supervisor, and, as was to be expected, the maintenance of economic policies that possibly tend to protect the market; proposes that the foundations of the development, implementation and use of AI have values consistent with ‘human centered AI’ (Bingley et al. 2023), but also points to the neoliberal matrix; introduces human supervision as an effective element in the AI systems cycle; the trend that we can observe in Brazil is the configuration of a regulation that harmonizes articles that favor the preventive approach, with the presence of articles that favor the experimentation approach. (shrink)

BackgroundOver the last decades there has been a change in the way schooling is perceived recognizing that children’s learning is closely linked to children’s health. Children spend most of their time at school, which is often the place where problems are identified and interventions are offered, not only for treatment but also prevention. Embedding arts therapies into the educational system may help address children’s emerging needs and have a positive impact on their wellbeing.MethodsA pilot cross-over randomized controlled design was employed (...) to investigate the effectiveness of an arts therapies intervention on a series of child- and teacher-reported outcome measures, specifically, health related quality of life, wellbeing and life functioning, emotional and behavioral difficulties, as well as duration of sleep. Sample size calculations for future large-scale studies were also performed, and the sustained impact of the intervention was evaluated at 3, 6, and 12 months follow-up. The pluralistic theoretical and therapeutic framework of this intervention was informed by a systematic review on school-based arts therapies interventions and is presented in detail in the study protocol. Participants were 62 children with mild emotional and behavioral difficulties.ResultsImprovements in HRQOL and CORS were greater in those engaged in the arts therapies intervention than the control groups and were maintained at the follow-up stages. Significant improvements were only found for duration of sleep and SDQ. Minimal clinically important differences as defined in the published protocol were found for CORS, SDQ and duration of sleep, but not HRQOL.DiscussionFindings indicate that the arts therapies interventions were having a clinically significant effect on life functioning, duration of sleep, emotional and behavioral difficulties. Findings also indicate a small effect size for health related quality of life, suggesting the intervention was having a small positive effect on this outcome measure. The study indicates that all outcome measures assessed here would be suitable for inclusion in a larger randomized controlled study utilizing these arts therapies interventions, and that a sample size of 225 participants would be required if these outcome measures were used. (shrink)

The fact that the mystical experience is a repetitive phenomenon in different social, cultural and religious structures in different periods and has a mysterious element in it has caused that mysticism has taken its place among the basic subjects of the field since the first periods of psychology of religion. One of the sections of The Varieties of Religious Experience, which is regarded as the main source of the area, is mysticism. In general, "mystical experience" is considered as a subcategory (...) of "religious experience", which is a wider area. For this reason, it also carries the characteristics of religious experience. Due to these common features, it can be seen that they are used in place of each other in the literature. If the religious experience is defined as the experience of the individual at the time of encounter with the sacred, such experience can be obtained in two ways. In the “religion-based mystical experience”, which is the first way, institutional or established religious thoughts and understandings and holly writings are influential. The second way, “non-religious or natural mystical experience”, can be said to be spiritual quests that individual needs play an important role in them are effective. Personality is used as one of the basic variables in social and health sciences in general, and in psychology because it is among the main subjects in particular. The common emphasis of research on personality is that the phenomenon is extremely complicated. Despite its widespread use, the abstraction of the concept has been influenced by the diversity of the researchers' perspectives and this has led to a lack of clear consensus on the definition. However, in order to investigate the phenomenon in recent periods, dimensional approaches that their basic assumption is personality can be categorized under certain factors have begun to be preferred. In this study, HEXACO was used, because it was thought that it could make a more detailed measurement of personality. The sample of this study is composed of 345 students studying at Erciyes University Theology Faculty in 2017-2018 academic year. When looked at the gender distribution of the sample, the rate of male students was 21.2% (n=73); and the rate of female students was 78.8% (n=272). This reflects the current situation in the faculty. The average age was 21,13 (sd=1,761). The age range is 18-26. Class distribution was 23,5% (n = 81) in Preparatory class; 15.4% (n = 53) in first-grade; 19.4% (n = 67) in second-grade; 18.3% (n=63) in third grade (n = 63); and 23.5% (n = 81) in the fourth grade. It has been noted that distributions are homogeneous in terms of class variables. The "Mystical Experience Scale" which is developed by Ralph W. Hood to measure the criteria which are offered by Walter T. Stace and which must be in the mystical experience has been used in determining the tendency of mystical experience. Hood et al. have reported reasonable reliabilities for subscales based on 3-factor solution. Alpha coefficients of the original scale were ,76, ,69, and ,76 for the extrovertive mysticism, introvertive mysticism and religious interpretation respectively. The adaptation of the scale to Turkish culture and the validity and reliability study were carried out by Mehmet Süheyl Unal as a graduate thesis and it was stated that the Alpha coefficient was ,89. In this study, the Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of scale is ,91. HEXACO, developed by Lee and Ashton, was used to determine personality traits. The scale was adapted to Turkish by Wasti, Lee, Ashton and Somer. The scale consists of Honesty-humility (H), Emotionality (E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to experience (O) factors. Pearson Moments Multiplication Correlation Analysis was performed to determine if there is a relationship between mystical experience tendencies and personality traits when the data were analyzed in accordance with the aim of the study. Later, it was tried to determine the power of explaining the variables with Multiple Linear Regression Analysis. In addition, One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there was any relationship between significance levels. Moreover, descriptive statistics of relevant variables are included in the study. Findings show that participants have the highest average to Positive Affect (m=3,69; sd.=,77) and the lowest average to Temporal/Spatial Quality (m=2,94; sd.=,89) factor in terms of mystical experience. Additively, they obtained close values in Ego Quality, Noetic Quality and Ineffability factors. When the students were evaluated in terms of gender, it was seen that there was a difference in level of significance only in terms of Unifying Quality (t=1,770; p=,028). ANOVA analysis was carried out to determine whether there was any variation in class variable. As a result of this analysis, it is seen that all of the factors are significantly differentiated in terms of class variable. From the standing point of class variable, it is seen that the first grades differed negatively compared to the other classes. According to the data, the scores on the mystical experience scale for preparation and first grade are high while the averages for the next grade are falling. There is no difference on level of significance between age and mystical experience factors, the last independent variable. When looked at the correlations among mystical experience factors, it is understood that all of the factors are in a meaningful relationship with each other. The highest correlation is between Religious Quality and Ineffability (r=,661); the lowest correlation is between the Unifying Quality and the Temporal/Spatial Quality (r=,346). Among the six factors of HEXACO that have been developed to determine the personality traits, the students have the highest average on Humility-Honesty (m=3,76; sd.=,55); the lowest average on eXtraversion (m=3,04; sd.=0,65). In terms of gender, there is a statistically significant difference in factors of Humility-Honesty (t=,606; p=,004), Emotionality (t=,334; p=,000), and Constientiousness (t=,022; p=,033). There is no significant difference between class and age variables and personality traits. According to Linear Regression analysis, Agreeableness, Constientiousness and Openness to Experience factors of personality traits are predictive of mystical experience in a significant level statistically. Personality dimensions that are most related to mystical experience as a result of analysis are Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience. When the mystical experience is compared with the personality traits, it is concluded that Openness to Experience factor is related to all the factors of the mystical experience except for the Ineffability. Although the relationship is regarded as weak in terms of correlation, it is an important finding that there are positive relations in between. In other words, as personality traits evolve, the mystical experience level also increases. The lack of a similar work in the literature in this respect removes the possibility of making comparisons. (shrink)

This article analyzes organizational mechanisms, and their contexts, leading to gender inequality among stockbrokers in two large brokerages. Inequality is the result of gender differences in sales, as both firms use performance-based pay, paying entirely by commissions. This article develops and tests whether performance-support bias, whereby women receive inferior sales support and sales assignments, causes the commissions gap. Newly available data on the brokerages’ internal transfers of accounts among brokers allows measurement of performance-support bias. Gender differences in the quality (...) and quantity of transferred accounts provide a way to measure gender differences in the assignment of sales opportunities and support. Sales generated from internally transferred accounts, controlling for the accounts’ sales histories, provide a “natural experiment” testing for gender differences in sales capacities. The evidence for performance-support bias is women are assigned inferior accounts and women produce sales equivalent to men when given accounts with equivalent prior sales histories. (shrink)

Employing the National Institute of Mental Health-funded Prevention of Suicide in Primary Care Elderly Collaborative Trial as a case study, we discuss 2 sets of ethical issues: obtaining informed consent for a clinic-based intervention study and using treatment as usual (TAU) as the control condition. We then address these ethical issues in the context of the debate about the quality improvement efforts of health care organizations. Our analysis reveals the tension between ethics and scientific integrity involved with using TAU (...) as a control condition and the difficulty in designing high-quality research in a community-based setting. (shrink)

The empirical basis for self-control in Dohsa-hou as it relates to effects on cognitive processes has been explored in a few studies of the Japanese psychotherapy, but not under standardized conditions with a strong predictive theory of control. This study reports on a series of experiments with the Dual Mechanisms of Control framework to clarify the possible regulatory mechanism of Dohsa-hou by focusing on shoulder movement, a key body movement task used by practitioners across applied settings. Cognitive control was operationalized (...) with the AX version of Continuous Performance Test paradigm for proactive control and a modified Stroop task paradigm for reactive control in a 3-arm parallel group trial study design. Healthy Japanese university students were assigned to a Dohsa-hou group that performed a shoulder movement task for few minutes, an active control group that performed a similar task, or a passive control group comprised of a resting condition. A total of 55 participants performed the AX-CPT and 57 participants performed the modified Stroop task before and after the group manipulation. In the AX-CPT, an increase in the error rate of AY trial from pre- to post-test was observed in the passive control group only, and found to be marginally higher in the passive control group relative to Dohsa-hou group at post-test. This indicated that Dohsa-hou moderated the activation of proactive control by repeated AX-CPT performance. The error rate of the Proactive Behavioral Index did not differ from zero at post-test only in the Dohsa-hou group, indicating flexible cognitive control. In the modified Stroop task, there was no difference between congruent and incongruent trials at post-test for the Dohsa-hou group only, indicating the facilitation of reactive control. The evidence for a balancing effect for the Dohsa-hou-based shoulder movement task indicates that clients experience a form of continuous self-monitoring, which might reduce mind-wandering from their focus on movement execution combined with iterative verbal feedback from the therapist. Overall, the results of the present study suggest that the self-regulatory mechanism promoted in clinical Dohsa-hou emphasizes guided shifts in attention to the reactive mode toward a balance of cognitive control. (shrink)

This study has focused on the mystical experience which is one of the most important topics of psychology of religion, but it is a subject not examined enough in Turkey and also tried to determine the relationship between personality traits and personality. Data were collected from 345 students who were studying at Erciyes University Faculty of Theology by questionnaire method. “The Mysticism Scale”which is developed by Ralph Hood and widely used in international literature to measure the mystical experience and “HEXACO (...) Personality Inventory”were used to measure the personality traits of students. In addition to descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics of the sample, The Pearson Moments Multiplication Correlation Analysis, Independent Sample t-Test and One-Way ANOVA techniques were used in the analysis. Findings show that participants have the highest average to Positive Affect and the lowest average to Temporal/Spatial Quality factor. In addition, they obtained close values in Ego Quality, Noetic Quality and Ineffability factors. When the students were evaluated in terms of gender, it was seen that there was a difference in level of significance only in terms of Unifying Quality. ANOVA analysis was carried out to determine whether there was any variation in class variable. As a result of this analysis, it is seen that all of the factors are significantly differentiated in terms of class variable. There is no difference in level of significance between age and mystical experience factors, the last independent variable. When looked at the correlations among mystical experience factors, it is understood that all of the factors are in a meaningful relationship with each other. Among the six factors of HEXACO, the students have the highest average on Humility-Honesty; the lowest average on eXtraversion. In terms of gender, there is a statistically significant difference in the level of Humility-Honesty, Emotionality, and Conscientiousness. There is no significant difference between class and age variables and personality traits. According to Linear Regression analysis, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience factors of personality traits are predictive of mystical experience in a statistically significant level. Summary: The fact that the mystical experience is a repetitive phenomenon in different social, cultural and religious structures in different periods and has a mysterious element in it has caused that mysticism has taken its place among the basic subjects of the field since the first periods of psychology of religion. One of the sections of The Varieties of Religious Experience, which is regarded as the main source of the area, is mysticism. In general, "mystical experience" is considered as a subcategory of "religious experience", which is a wider area. For this reason, it also carries the characteristics of religious experience. Due to these common features, it can be seen that they are used in place of each other in the literature.If the religious experience is defined as the experience of the individual at the time of encounter with the sacred, such experience can be obtained in two ways. In the “religion-based mystical experience”, which is the first way, institutional or established religious thoughts and understandings and holly writings are influential. The second way, “non-religious or natural mystical experience”, can be said to be spiritual quests that individual needs play an important role in them are effective.Personality is used as one of the basic variables in social and health sciences in general, and in psychology because it is among the main subjects in particular. The common emphasis of research on personality is that the phenomenon is extremely complicated. Despite its widespread use, the abstraction of the concept has been influenced by the diversity of the researchers' perspectives and this has led to a lack of clear consensus on the definition. However, in order to investigate the phenomenon in recent periods, dimensional approaches that their basic assumption is personality can be categorized under certain factors have begun to be preferred. In this study, HEXACO was used, because it was thought that it could make a more detailed measurement of personality.The sample of this study is composed of 345 students studying at Erciyes University Theology Faculty in 2017-2018 academic year. When looked at the gender distribution of the sample, the rate of male students was 21.2% (n=73); and the rate of female students was 78.8% (n=272). This reflects the current situation in the faculty. The average age was 21,13 (sd=1,761). The age range is 18-26. Class distribution was 23,5% (n = 81) in Preparatory class; 15.4% (n = 53) in first-grade; 19.4% (n = 67) in second-grade; 18.3% (n=63) in third grade (n = 63); and 23.5% (n = 81) in the fourth grade. It has been noted that distributions are homogeneous in terms of class variables.The "Mystical Experience Scale" which is developed by Ralph W. Hood to measure the criteria which are offered by Walter T. Stace and which must be in the mystical experience has been used in determining the tendency of mystical experience. Hood et al. have reported reasonable reliabilities for subscales based on 3-factor solution. Alpha coefficients of the original scale were,76,,69, and,76 for the extrovertive mysticism, introvertive mysticism and religious interpretation respectively. The adaptation of the scale to Turkish culture and the validity and reliability study were carried out by Mehmet Süheyl Unal as a graduate thesis and it was stated that the Alpha coefficient was,89. In this study, the Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of scale is,91. HEXACO, developed by Lee and Ashton, was used to determine personality traits. The scale was adapted to Turkish by Wasti, Lee, Ashton and Somer. The scale consists of Honesty-humility (H), Emotionality (E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to experience (O) factors.Pearson Moments Multiplication Correlation Analysis was performed to determine if there is a relationship between mystical experience tendencies and personality traits when the data were analyzed in accordance with the aim of the study. Later, it was tried to determine the power of explaining the variables with Multiple Linear Regression Analysis. In addition, One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there was any relationship between significance levels. Moreover, descriptive statistics of relevant variables are included in the study.Findings show that participants have the highest average to Positive Affect (m=3,69; sd.=,77) and the lowest average to Temporal/Spatial Quality (m=2,94; sd.=,89) factor in terms of mystical experience. Additively, they obtained close values in Ego Quality, Noetic Quality and Ineffability factors. When the students were evaluated in terms of gender, it was seen that there was a difference in level of significance only in terms of Unifying Quality (t=1,770; p=,028). ANOVA analysis was carried out to determine whether there was any variation in class variable. As a result of this analysis, it is seen that all of the factors are significantly differentiated in terms of class variable. From the standing point of class variable, it is seen that the first grades differed negatively compared to the other classes. According to the data, the scores on the mystical experience scale for preparation and first grade are high while the averages for the next grade are falling. There is no difference on level of significance between age and mystical experience factors, the last independent variable. When looked at the correlations among mystical experience factors, it is understood that all of the factors are in a meaningful relationship with each other. The highest correlation is between Religious Quality and Ineffability (r=,661); the lowest correlation is between the Unifying Quality and the Temporal/Spatial Quality (r=,346).Among the six factors of HEXACO that have been developed to determine the personality traits, the students have the highest average on Humility-Honesty (m=3,76; sd.=,55); the lowest average on eXtraversion (m=3,04; sd.=0,65). In terms of gender, there is a statistically significant difference in factors of Humility-Honesty (t=,606; p=,004), Emotionality (t=,334; p=,000), and Constientiousness (t=,022; p=,033). There is no significant difference between class and age variables and personality traits. According to Linear Regression analysis, Agreeableness, Constientiousness and Openness to Experience factors of personality traits are predictive of mystical experience in a significant level statistically.Personality dimensions that are most related to mystical experience as a result of analysis are Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience. When the mystical experience is compared with the personality traits, it is concluded that Openness to Experience factor is related to all the factors of the mystical experience except for the Ineffability. Although the relationship is regarded as weak in terms of correlation, it is an important finding that there are positive relations in between. In other words, as personality traits evolve, the mystical experience level also increases. The lack of a similar work in the literature in this respect removes the possibility of making comparisons. (shrink)

In dynamic system control, cognitive mechanisms and abilities underlying performance may vary depending on the nature of the task. We therefore investigated the effects of system structure and its interaction with cognitive abilities on system control performance. A sample of 127 university students completed a series of different system control tasks that were manipulated in terms of system size and recurrent feedback, either with or without a cognitive load manipulation. Cognitive abilities assessed included reasoning ability, working memory capacity, and cognitive (...) reflection. System size and recurrent feedback affected overall performance as expected. Overall, the results support that cognitive ability is a good predictor of performance in dynamic system control tasks but predictiveness is reduced when the system structure contains recurrent feedback. We discuss this finding from a cognitive processing perspective as well as its implications for individual differences research in dynamic systems. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo determine the effects of learning interventions aimed at optimizing the quality of physical education on psychomotor, cognitive, affective and social learning outcomes in children and adolescents.DesignA systematic review and meta-analysis.Data SourcesAfter searching PsycInfo, ERIC, and SportDiscus electronic databases, we identified 135 eligible studies published between January 1, 1995 to May 1, 2021.Eligibility Criteria for Selecting StudiesWe included randomized controlled trials, quasi-experimental studies, and controlled trials that assessed the effect of a PE-based intervention against one of the four identified (...) learning domains in youth at school.ResultsOne hundred and thirty five studies with over 42,500 participants and 193 calculated effect sizes were included in the study. The mean effect across all the learning and development outcomes was small to medium. When adjusted for publication bias using the Duval and Tweedie Trim and Fill Method, this mean effect size increased to d = 0.40. Effect sizes varied significantly based on learning and development outcomes. Interventions that consistently report above or below the mean d = 0.40 effect are identified based on learning outcome. The greatest effects across interventions were witnessed in psychomotor learning outcomes followed by affective, social, and cognitive learning outcomes. A minority of PE interventions captured by this systematic review and meta-analysis reported having a negative effect on student learning and development.ConclusionThe interventions with the greatest effects on student learning and development were dependant on the learning domains. Some PE interventions with a pedagogical focus such as games-based approaches, TARGET/Mastery Teaching, and Sport Education were found to be strong investments across multiple domains. The evidence is limited however by consistency in intervention dosage, study design, and data collection instruments. The study received no internal or external funding and was not prospectively registered. (shrink)

In the absence of shared beliefs and even common interests, it should not be surprising that so much of the well-intentioned art acquired for public spaces has failed—failed as art and as art for a civic site. The conventional wisdom of simply choosing “the best artist” and then turning him or her loose to create a work within time and budget guidelines lost much credibility with the drama of Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc commission: the process of selection, erection, litigation, rejection, (...) and removal of the sculpture from the Federal Building plaza in New York City. The new conventional wisdom? The jury, not the artist, was ultimately responsible. For Serra did precisely the kind of work for which he is respected worldwide but in a context and for a specific public whose requirements, in their view, were not met but even abrogated by what Serra had done so well: made a Serra.The issues raised by this particular controversy as well as by the very different response now accorded the once-controversial Vietnam Veterans Memorial by Maya Lin, together with firsthand frustration with the selection process for public commissions, were some of the specific reasons for organizing the day-long symposium held 16 September 1989 in First Chicago Center under the auspices of Sculpture Chicago, a biennial exhibition and educational series. John Hallmark Neff, director of the First National Bank of Chicago’s art program, is a former director of the Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago. He is the author of Anselm Kiefer: Brüch und Einung , and he is currently working on a book on Max Neuhaus and a catalogue essay for the forthcoming Agnes Denes retrospective exhibition. (shrink)

Mitochondrial function is key for maintaining cellular health, while mitochondrial failure is associated with various pathologies, including inherited metabolic disorders and age‐related diseases. In order to maintain mitochondrial quality, several pathways of mitochondrial quality control have evolved. These systems monitor mitochondrial integrity through antioxidants, DNA repair systems, and chaperones and proteases involved in the mitochondrial unfolded protein response. Additional regulation of mitochondrial function involves dynamic exchange of components through mitochondrial fusion and fission. Sustained stress induces a selective autophagy (...) – termed mitophagy – and ultimately leads to apoptosis. Together, these systems form a network that acts on the molecular, organellar, and cellular level. In this review, we highlight how these systems are regulated in an integrated context‐ and time‐dependent network of mitochondrial quality control that is implicated in healthy aging. (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure the idea that the adoption of managerial principles to ensure the quality of DNA evidence is an accident of history which has changed the ways forensic biology is conducted and forensic biologists think. I begin by defining managerialism and tracking its entry into the contentious world of forensic biology, asking how it is that a focus on efficiency and precise process control is affecting these labs. My analysis unfolds in two (...) parts. I first look at the external inspection routines that assure quality in forensic labs and the degree to which these routines represent ‘‘self” rather than ‘‘peer” assessment. I next look at the internal lab quality assurance routines that facilitate managerial control of technical and scientific workers, noting that QA is a trope flexible enough to govern both the numerically auditable and quasirobotic activities of technicians along with the less tangible more consensus-based human interactions of scientists. Illustrating that ‘‘science” is being pushed aside by management imperatives, I examine the consequences of this new emphasis for both the lab workers and the criminal justice system. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

This paper investigates the socio-technical construction, quality control, and coordination of the credence quality attribute “halal” throughout the halal meat chain. The paper is framed within Actor-Network Theory and economic Conventions Theory. Islamic dietary laws or prescriptions, and how these are translated into production and processing standards using a HACCP-like approach, are discussed. Current halal quality coordination is strongly based on civic and domestic logics in which Muslim consumers prefer transacting with Muslim butchers, that is, individuals of (...) known reputation with similar moral and religious obligations. The HACCP-like approach with identification of critical halal control points, as presented in this paper, fits with the industrial quality convention mechanism and ideally yields guaranteed and trustworthy halal credence quality, eventually marked by a halal meat label. The socio-technical construction of halal credence quality, for example with respect to ritual slaughter, and the quality coordination mechanism aimed at reducing halal quality uncertainty among Muslim consumers, for example through labeling, are identified as key attention points in the future research agenda. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Human Genome Project and BioethicsEric T. Juengst, Ph.D. (bio)The fifteen-year "human genome project" at the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy officially began on October 1, 1990. With it began a new dimension in federally supported scientific research: concurrent funding for work to anticipate the social consequences of the project's research and to develop policies to guide the use of the knowledge it produces. (...) As a result, the National Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) at NIH will support the largest public investment in bioethical analysis to date.NCHGR was established to work with other federal, private, and international organizations on the scientific effort to characterize the form and content of the human genome. The research will yield information—high-resolution genetic linkage and physical maps of all the human chromosomes as well as human DNA sequence data—that will be a resource for studies of gene structure and function. It will greatly increase our understanding of the genetic aspects of human health and disease. That increased understanding will eventually provide insights into the prevention and treatment of the 3,000 known inherited disorders, and of conditions caused by our (gene-governed) physiological reactions to pathogens, toxins, and mutagens of external origin.It has been clear since the conception of the human genome project, however, that professional and public deliberations concerning the responsible use of genetic information must be a part of the process. The most immediate consequence of genome research will be the development of new diagnostic and predictive tests, well in advance of corresponding therapeutic or curative advances. The implications of acquiring and using that knowledge about individuals raise policy questions at many levels within society. The primary purpose of the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Program at the NCHGR is to anticipate and address these questions early in the life of the scientific project, to help optimize the [End Page 71] benefits to human welfare and opportunity from the new knowledge, and to guard against its misuses.The program has identified three sets of questions as particularly important to pursue as the genome initiative proceeds:1.Issues involved in the integration of new genetic tests into medical practice. Human genome research is expected to increase greatly the number of gene-based diagnostic and prognostic tests available to health professionals. The bioethical policy problems involved in integrating those tests effectively into medical practice include developing standards for:— accuracy and quality control of genetic tests;— medical indications for testing and design of testing protocols;— professional responsibilities of clinicians who perform tests;— confidentiality of information obtained from testing;— access to and use of test results by third parties, such as health insurers; and— reimbursement for testing and test-related counseling.These are problems for both those charged with regulating the use of new genetic tests and for those establishing the standards of practice within the health professions. Thus, in addition to soliciting and funding scholarly research proposals on both the factual and normative questions raised by these problems, the program is commissioning a major new study by the National Academy of Sciences/Institute of Medicine aimed at providing professional guidelines for the integration of genetic services into mainstream medical practice.2. Issues involved in educating and counseling individuals about genetic test results. The primary risk that health professionals will face in using genetic tests is the misinterpretation of their findings and the resulting potential for psychological trauma, stigmatization, and discrimination. Sometimes, out of ignorance, patients, families, and social institutions already stigmatize genetic disorders and treat those with them unfairly. This risk broadens as the genetic elements of more health problems are uncovered and gene-based tests for susceptibilities and carrier states are developed.To protect against these risks, NCHGR is soliciting and supporting projects aimed at improving professional and public understanding of these tests and their implications. For example, a philosopher is leading a team of geneticists and physicians in a scholarly effort to clarify [End Page 72] concepts of genetic susceptibility and draw out the social meaning of their different interpretations. Other projects involve social scientific studies of genetic risk perceptions, stigmatization, and discrimination. The conclusions of these studies, and... (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine has returned the problem of medical error to the top of the health-care agenda. Its report that 44,000 to 98,000 patients die each year as a result of medical errors in American hospitals has renewed scholarly interest in health system quality control. In To Err Is Human, the IOM provides a vivid picture of a health-care system riven with serious quality problems. It calls for systems-based error-reduction methods borrowed from other high-risk industries and forcefully (...) argues against the traditional tendency to assign accountability primarily to individual physicians. Most errors, the IOM argues, can be successfully addressed by engineering systemic fail-safe protections against the inevitable failings of human actors. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine has returned the problem of medical error to the top of the health-care agenda. Its report that 44,000 to 98,000 patients die each year as a result of medical errors in American hospitals has renewed scholarly interest in health system quality control. In To Err Is Human, the IOM provides a vivid picture of a health-care system riven with serious quality problems. It calls for systems-based error-reduction methods borrowed from other high-risk industries and forcefully (...) argues against the traditional tendency to assign accountability primarily to individual physicians. Most errors, the IOM argues, can be successfully addressed by engineering systemic fail-safe protections against the inevitable failings of human actors. (shrink)

Due to the frequent occurrence of ethical transgressions and unethical employee behaviors, there has lately been an increasing interest in the ethical foundations of contemporary organizations. However, large-scale comprehensive analyses of organizational ethics are still comparatively limited. Our study contributes to both management control and business ethics literature by empirically examining potential antecedents as well as resulting effects of ethical work climates on organizational-level outcomes. Based on a cross-sectional survey among 295 large- and medium-sized companies, we find that more (...) informal means of control constitute important elements of a broader organizational control context that are strongly related to the emergence of coherent ethical work climates with an increased awareness of ethical issues. Moreover, our results show that the relationship between ethical work climates and organizational performance can be considered as rather indirect as it is fully mediated by increased mutual trust among employees. Overall, our study thus supports the particular importance of ethical work climates and identifies appropriate means to encourage ethical conduct. (shrink)

Digitalization reveals the world in new varieties and forms. This power to unveil not only transforms human outreach and actions, but also changes our conceptions; about whom we are, about our uses and about human horizons for sense-making. In this paper, I explore experience design and the aesthetic turn in contemporary research in human–computer interaction and interaction design. This rather recent interest in aesthetic experience is in my view a move away from a view of digitalization as instances of (...) objects aligned in networks, with certain features, qualities and properties, towards an understanding of digitalization as a relation to the world, to itself, and to what it means to be human (e.g. Technology and the character of contemporary life. A philosophical inquiry. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, Holding on to reality. The nature of information at the turn of the millennium. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999; Questioning technology. Routledge, New York, 1999; The question concerning technology and other essays. Harper and Row, New York, 1977; Technology and the lifeworld, from garden to earth. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990). As such my attempt in this text is to outline a conceptual account concerning what it might mean to designate digitalization as experienced rather than as what we traditionally think of it—as a cause of what we perceive. The paper is based on some previous work suggesting that a focus on the beauty of digitalization (i.e. the beast) entails the possibility to investigate ambiguous meanings of digitalization, meanings that are intrinsic to digitalization but have so far received little or no attention. My suggestion is that there are aesthetic and/or sublime dimensions inherent in digitalization that involves the realization of meaning that are becoming increasingly important in both use and design of digital materials. Hence, the particular focus on aesthetics as implied by the title of this text refers to a pervasive quality harbouring meaning that through a phenomenological lens could be regarded as the material basis of digitalization. The paper concludes that it is crucial to conduct more thorough studies of the relationship between aesthetics and digitalization if we are truly interested in exploring the potential of digitalization in our lives. (shrink)

Researchers have long been interested in how owners affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. However, owners face diverging ethical preferences between funding and potentially benefiting from their firms’ CSR performance. To better understand owners’ influence on firms’ CSR performance, we focus on ultimate controlling owners with the highest control rights over their firms. We theorize that ultimate controlling owners with more control rights have stronger motivations and greater decision-making power to promote firms’ CSR performance to demonstrate that they (...) are responsible owners and gain legitimacy and goodwill from their stakeholders. Moreover, we explore how this positive relationship is strengthened when ultimate controlling owners and their firms share similar corporate names and receive increased financial analyst coverage, as these conditions increase the likelihood of gaining legitimacy and goodwill through their firms’ improved CSR performance. We test our theory using a sample of 852 publicly listed Chinese firms from 2008 to 2017. Our findings support our theoretical predictions and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how differences in ownership structure and owner type associated with ultimate controlling owners shape their motives and power to affect CSR performance in their firms. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an empirically based Monte Carlo bus-network model as a test bed to simulate intervention strategies to overcome the inefficiencies of bus bunching. The EMB model is an agent-based model which utilizes the positional and temporal data of the buses obtained from the Global Positioning System to constitute a set of empirical velocity distributions of the buses and a set of exponential distributions of interarrival time of passengers at the bus stops. Monte Carlo sampling is then (...) performed on these two derived probability distributions to yield the stochastic dynamics of both the buses’ motion and passengers’ arrival. Our EMB model is generic and can be applied to any real-world bus network system. In particular, we have validated the model against the Nanyang Technological University’s Shuttle Bus System by demonstrating its accuracy in capturing the bunching dynamics of the shuttle buses. Furthermore, we have analyzed the efficacy of three intervention strategies: holding, no-boarding, and centralized-pulsing, against bus bunching by incorporating the rule set of these strategies into the model. Under the scenario where the buses have the same velocity, we found that all three strategies improve both the waiting and travelling times of the commuters. However, when the buses have different velocities, only the centralized-pulsing scheme consistently outperforms the control scenario where the buses periodically bunch together. (shrink)

Canadian and international nursing educators are increasingly concerned with the quality of university nursing education. Contemporary nursing education is fraught by a growing anti‐intellectualism coupled with the dominance of neoliberalism and corporate university business culture. Amid these challenges, nursing schools must prepare nurses to provide care in an era compounded by social and health inequities. The purpose of this paper was to explore the philosophical and contextual factors influencing anti‐intellectualism in nursing education. We use John Henry Newman's view (...) of the purpose of a university education as a heuristic perspective to examine anti‐intellectualism in nursing. We contend that the ideological worship of technological advances, a culture of consumerism, quality improvement and risk management, the primacy of doing over thinking, competency‐based curricula and business models rooted in neoliberal financial policies reinforce anti‐intellectualism in nursing. Anti‐intellectualism is a complex issue to address within the corporate university culture. We propose multiple strategies at the disciplinary, university and sociopolitical levels to decrease anti‐intellectualism. Counteracting anti‐intellectualism requires critical thinking, praxis and emancipation. Nurses should critically examine this anti‐intellectual trend as it limits the advancement of the discipline and marginalizes its contributions within the academy. If nurses do not address this challenge, the survival of nursing as an academic discipline may be jeopardized. (shrink)

The study aimed to identify the relationship between correcting the deviations in the measurement of performance and achieving the objectives of control and the performance of the job at the Islamic University in the Gaza Strip. To achieve the objectives of the research, the researchers used the descriptive analytical approach to collect information. The questionnaire consisted of (20) statements distributed to three categories of employees of the Islamic University (senior management, faculty members, their assistants and members of the administrative board). (...) A random sample of 314 employees was selected and 276 responses were retrieved with a recovery rate of 88.1%. The Statistical Analysis Program (SPSS) was used to enter, process, and analyze the data. The results of the study showed a positive relationship between correcting deviations in performance measurement and achieving the control objectives represented by the functional performance in the Islamic University from the point of view of the members (senior management, faculty and their assistants, and the administrative board), where the relative weight of all the paragraphs was (74.25%). The study recommended the need to ensure that the actual performance of the planned performance is matched and decisions are taken to correct the serious deviations and take the necessary measures in terms of retraining and change in regulations, wages and bonuses and punishment of the culprit, neglect and negligence by mistake. (shrink)

The paper examines some of the processes of the closely knit relationship between Google’s ideologies of neutrality and objectivity and global market dominance. Neutrality construction comprises an important element sustaining the company’s economic position and is reflected in constant updates, estimates and changes to utility and relevance of search results. Providing a purely technical solution to these issues proves to be increasingly difficult without a human hand in steering algorithmic solutions. Search relevance fluctuates and shifts through continuous tinkering and tweaking (...) of the search algorithm. The company also uses third parties to hire human raters for performing quality assessments of algorithmic updates and adaptations in linguistically and culturally diverse global markets. The adaptation process contradicts the technical foundations of the company and calculations based on the initial Page Rank algorithm. Annual market reports, Google’s Search Quality Rating Guidelines, and reports from media specialising in search engine optimisation business are analysed. The Search Quality Rating Guidelines document provides a rare glimpse into the internal architecture of search algorithms and the notions of utility and relevance which are presented and structured as neutral and objective. Intertwined layers of ideology, hidden labour of human raters, advertising revenues, market dominance and control are discussed throughout the paper. (shrink)

In this systematic review, we summarized and evaluated the evidence for effects of, and associations between, immersive nature-experience on mental, physical and social health promotion outcomes. Immersive nature-experience was operationalized as non-competitive activities, both sedentary and active, occurring in natural environments removed from everyday environments. We defined health according to the World Health Organization’s holistic and positive definition of health and included steady-state, intermediate, and health promotion outcomes. An electronic search was performed for Danish, English, German, Norwegian, and Swedish articles (...) published between January 2004 and May 2017. Manual approaches, e.g., bibliographies from experts, supplemented the literature search. Data were extracted from 461 publications that met the inclusion criteria. To assess the status and quality of the evidence for health promotion effects of immersive nature-experience, we focused on the subset of studies based on controlled designs (n = 133). Outcome level quality of the evidence was assessed narratively. Interventions most often involved adventure-based activities, short-termed walking, and seated relaxation in natural environments. We found positive effects on a range of health promotion outcomes grouped under psychological wellbeing (n = 97; ≈55% positive; ≈13% mixed; ≈29% non-significant; 2% negative); psychosocial function (n = 67; ≈61% positive; ≈9% mixed; ≈30% non-significant); psychophysiological stress response (n = 50; ≈58% positive; ≈18% mixed; ≈24% non-significant), and cognitive performance (n = 36; ≈58% positive; ≈6% mixed; ≈33% non-significant; 3% negative); and social skills and relationships (n = 34; ≈70% positive; ≈7% mixed; ≈22% non-significant). Findings related to outcomes categorized under physical health, e.g., risk of cardiovascular disease, were less consistent (n = 51; ≈37% positive; ≈28% mixed; ≈35% non-significant). Across the types of interventions and outcomes, the quality of the evidence was deemed low and occasionally moderate. In the review, we identify, discuss, and present possible solutions to four core methodological challenges associated with investigating immersive nature-experience and health outcomes: 1) intervention and program complexity; 2) feasibility and desirability of randomization; 3) blinding of participants and researchers; and 4) transferability and generalizability. The results of the review have been published as a popular-scientific report and a scientific research overview, both in Danish language. (shrink)

The Qurʾān was taught in the letter method for many years. After the names of the letters in the Arabic alphabet are memorized in this method, the teaching of origins and signs begins. The syllabic method was developed over time as an alternative to this method, and the letters were taught directly with their superior vowel signs without memorizing their names. Unlike these two methods, the sound-based alif ba method has begun to be used in recent years. This method coincides (...) with the primary literacy teaching method based on the sounds thatwere adopted in Turkish teaching since 2005. Basic principles such as teaching the letters one-by-one, following the sound learning stages in teaching each sound, conducting the lessons in class, reading the syllables and words formed with the learned letters from the first day are adopted in both teaching methods. The purpose of the present study was to find out how the Qurʾān can be taught by applying the sound-based alif ba method and to draw attention to the original aspects of this method for learning the Qurʾān with the right sounds. Since the correct teaching of the Qurʾān is closely related to the teacher’s content knowledge and teaching skills, the alif ba that will be used and the method to be applied are important in reaching the target more systematically and faster. The case study design was used in the study in which the qualitative method was employed. The primary data of the study were Sound-Based Alif ba, for which I was the project assistant of, and the book with the title A New Approach in Teaching the Qurʾān: Sound based Alif baand Tajwīd Method, which was an editorial book of which I was one of the authors, and the thirty-episode series We Are Children and We Are Reading the Qurʾān, published on Diyanet TV, for which I was the production coordinator. Also, to see the applicability of the method, interviews were conducted with eight instructors who used Sound-Based Alif ba in their lessons. The study received ethical approval from Ankara Social Sciences University Rectorate Social and Human Sciences Research and Scientific Publication Ethics Committee on 8 July 2021 with the decision no 12450. The main thing in the sound-based alif ba method is the correct vocalization of the Qurʾān. The letters in alif ba are arranged differently from the classical alphabet order and are divided into six groups considering the frequency of occurrence in the Qurʾān and the degree of difficulty of origins. Each letter is taught in a separate lesson with the support of the ḥarakas and the sukūn (such as اَلْ, اِلْ, اُلْ). During the teaching, attention is paid to the sound learning steps, and the student is expected to feel the sound of the letter to be learned, distinguish it from other letter sounds, and then pronounce it from the correct origin as much as possible. In the sound-based alif ba method, the teaching of the shape of the letter is done after the sound of the letter is pronounced. During the teaching of the shapes of the letters, the part of the letter that does not change when written within a word is emphasized, and the writing is used so that the shape of the letter can be placed in the mind of the student. In the sound-based alif ba teaching, reading from the Qurʾān is done in every lesson, starting from the teaching of the first letter. During the teaching of alif ba, educational games, question-answer, and narration methods are used, primarily with the taʿlīm method. In this way, the teaching of Sound-Based Alif ba is spread over a period of 40 lessons. The study findings showed that the sound-based alif ba method has similar characteristics with the sound-based primary literacy teaching method; however, Arabic has its own unique aspects with its language structure. Among these originalities, which is adopted in the teaching of letters, firstly teaching the letter with the sukūn and with the support of movable ا and then showing the shape of the letter is carried out. As a matter of fact, the teachers have the opinion that this vocalization method, which is adopted, facilitates the learning of the correct sounds, and that teaching the letters in line with the sound learning steps increases the efficiency of the lesson. Although most of the instructors pointed out to the positive aspects of teaching tajwīd sounds in alif ba, one of the instructors did not find it necessary. The opinions of the teachers showed that the sound-based alif ba method can be applied efficiently in online lessons, but the teacher-student relation is affected negatively when compared to the classroom setting. All of the instructors said that the materials used in the lessons and demonstration and educational game methods increased the quality of the course, and that the We Are Children We Are Reading the Qurʾān program is an important resource for them. (shrink)

On 11 August 1957, the Munich Opera Festival premiered a recently completed opera by the celebrated German composer Paul Hindemith, Die Harmonie der Welt. Hindemith bases the dramaturgical and musical features of this opera on the scientific and spiritual content found in the writings of the 17th-century mathematician, astronomer and philosopher Johannes Kepler. Six years before he started working on this opera, the composer responded to a commission received from the Swiss conductor and patron of contemporary composers, Paul Sacher, (...) by quickly composing and sending off the Symphony Die Harmonie der Welt which, as the composer writes in the program book for the first performance, “develops passages from the opera” in three movements entitled with terms taken from Boethius: I Musica instrumentalis, II Musica humana, and III Musica mundana. What are we to make of the explanation that the symphony “develops passages” from a work of which as yet nothing, neither libretto nor music, existed on paper? I want to show that it is tempting to assume a creative process that matures from the spiritual and aesthetic idea through a composition of musical material into components that would later serve both an instrumental and a music-dramatic representation of the subject.  . (shrink)

Water is the major contributor to the eating and keeping qualities and structure of baked products. Its management and control during preparation, processing, baking, cooling and storage is essential for the optimisation of product quality. This successful and highly practical volume describes in detail the role and control of water in the formation of cake batters, bread, pastry and biscuit doughs, their subsequent processing and the baked product. Now in a fully revised and updated second edition, the book has (...) been expanded and developed through the inclusion of new information and references related to the formation and processing of batters and dough into baked products. The new edition includes a selection of case studies based on practical experience in the manufacture and optimisation of baked products. Each case study, illustrated as appropriate, considers the various roles that water may play in different manufacturing contexts. The book is aimed at food scientists and technologists in bakery companies; ingredient suppliers; flour millers; researchers and students in academic food science departments. (shrink)