Summary The article deals with a complex of issues connected with the campaign waged by the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336–335 BC. The author clears up the aims set for the advance-guard, its command structure, strength and composition. He also describes the relevant military operations and reveals the reasons both for the Macedonians’ successes in 336 and their failures in 335. The idea is argued that despite the final failures, it is hardly possible to say that the (...) campaign the expeditionary corps conducted ended in its total defeat. Besides, it is noted that those military operations had major significance for Alexander’s campaign in Asia Minor in 334, because a number of preconditions for its full success had been created right in their course. (shrink)

Que pourrait être, désormais, un discours théologique sur la ou " les religion ", sur l'"interreligieux "? A partir de quel lieu le penser? Comment pourrait-il advenir? La réponse offerte ici passe par un déplacement de la discussion vers l'éthique. Exode donc hors du lieu habituel pour aborder la question. Exode hors de la dogmatique ou de la théologie fondamentale car, là, il y va de connaissance, d'appartenance fidèle, de théologalité. Mais comment déthéologaliser la religion sans la déthéologiser? Comment la (...) penser autrement que comme une expérience humaine du divin, de l'Absolu ou de l'Ultime réel? Le déplacement proposé table moins sur les registres cognitifs ou affectifs investis par les recherches sur le phénomène religieux ou l'option herméneutique du pluralisme religieux que sur un registre de l'agir ou d'une posture éthique marquée d'actes et de paroles. Comment faire travailler la notion de religion en théologie autrement qu'à partir de l'identité, de la mémoire et plus à partir de l'estime de soi? Au moyen d'une lecture du traitement de la vertu de religio et des vices s'y opposant dans la Summa theologice de Thomas d'Aquin. A partir de ce travail de lecture, une structure formelle heuristique de la religion est reconstituée dans la différence et les rapports entre religio, superstitio et irreligiositas. Une catégorie lentement élaborée, " instance éthique advenant en posture subjective ", sous-tend cette diffraction heuristique : sur une " scène de la béatitude ", l'advenir de l'instance éthique se joue dans l'inscription désirée, choisie, réitérée et énoncée pour elle-même d'un mouvement en-vers Dieu. Pour produire ce chemin de réflexion, il aura fallu opérer et proposer une inscription contemporaine d'un discours thomasien dans le champ des discussions théologiques actuelles. (shrink)

The nature of biological autonomy and the choice of an appropriate framework for understanding it are subjects of ongoing debates in philosophy of biology and cognitive science. The enactivist view, originating with Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, emphasizes the concepts of organizational or operational closure and structural coupling between the organism and its environment as central in the context of autonomy. The proponents of this view contrast it with the traditional cybernetic paradigm based on inputs, outputs, feedback, and internal representations. (...) This essay takes a synoptic view of the relevant issues and situates them in the context of modern theory of systems and control, in particular the behavioral approach developed by Jan Willems. It is argued that the behavioral approach, which favors a fairly liberal notion of control as interconnection without any prefigured designation of inputs and outputs, provides a more fruitful background for understanding and modeling of biological autonomy. (shrink)

On doit à l’économiste américain d’origine allemande, Richard A. Musgrave, la formulation des critères d’Équité Horizontale (ÉH) et d’Équité Verticale (ÉV). Étant donnée une base fiscale, l’ÉH veut que les égaux soient traités également, alors que l’ÉV exige que les inégaux soient traités inégalement (par exemple que les plus riches payent proportionnellement plus d’impôts). Musgrave opère en 1959 une redescription créative de considérations d’équité qui ont une longue histoire de Hobbes à Buchanan, en passant notamment par la fameuse maxime de (...) Adam Smith. La reconstruction généalogique montre que l’ÉV et l’ÉH relèvent de la justice distributive au sens aristotélicien du terme. Un critère purement formel, l’équité en matière d’impôt signifie l’égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des charges communes à tous les individus membres d’une communauté politique. À défaut d’un consensus théorique sur la manière de conceptualiser les contribuables, l’ÉH conserve tout de même une valeur de principe régulateur dans le cadre non idéal de débats de réforme fiscale.Codes JEL : H20, B11, B12, B20, B40, D63. (shrink)

Using the methodology and findings of conversation analysis, we analyze changes in the talk of a man with aphasia (a language disorder acquired following brain damage) at two points in his spontaneous recovery period in the first months post-stroke. We note that in the earlier conversation (15 weeks post-stroke) two of the turn constructional methods he particularly makes use of are replacement (a form of repair) and extension. By the time of the latter conversation (30 weeks poststroke) these methods are (...) less prevalent, while another repair operation, insertion, is now used in a particular way not seen in the earlier conversation. We suggest that these methods are means by which the aphasic speaker adapts his limited linguistic resources to the demands of constructing a turn-at-talk in conversation in order to lessen the extent of repair and delay with the turn and thus lessen the exposure of his linguistic noncompetence and his identity as ‘different’, ‘disabled’, or ‘language impaired’. These turn constructional methods are dynamic and change as the speaker recovers. We suggest that communication disorders such as aphasia can be problematic not only because of difficulties they can cause in conveying information or producing other social actions, but also because they can create difficulties in the presentation of self in everyday life. (shrink)

By the Riesz representation theorem for the dual of C [0; 1], if F: C [0; 1] → ℝ is a continuous linear operator, then there is a function g: [0;1] → ℝ of bounded variation such that F = ∫ f dg . The function g can be normalized such that V = ‖F ‖. In this paper we prove a computable version of this theorem. We use the framework of TTE, the representation approach to computable analysis, (...) which allows to define natural computability for a variety of operators. We show that there are a computable operator S mapping g and an upper bound of its variation to F and a computable operator S ′ mapping F and its norm to some appropriate g. (shrink)

We introduce and study several nonstandard representations of Banach-valued operators defined on the space of Bochner integrable functions. They will be less restrictive than the usual standard representation. In particular, without any hypothesis, we shall find a representation whose kernel belongs to a space of “extended Bochner integrable functions”, introduced by Zimmer by using Loeb measures.

Primeaux and Stieber clearly articulate that good ethics maximize profits. The authors show that in the long run business must operate within the value systems of a society.

Maximize Presupposition! is an economy condition that adjudicates between contextually equivalent competing structures. Building on data discovered by O. Percus, I will argue that the constraint is checked in the local contexts of embedded constituents. I will argue that this architecture leads to a general solution to the problem of antipresupposition projection, and also allows I. Heim’s ‘Novelty/Familiarity Condition’ to be eliminated as a constraint on operations of context change.

Related Works: Part II: C. T. Chong, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part II: Tame $\Sigma_2$ Coding and the Jump Operator. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 87, no. 2, 103--116. Mathematical Reviews : MR1490049 Part III: C. T. Chong, Lei Qian, Theodore A. Slaman, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part III: Prompt Sets, Minimal Paries and Shoenfield's Conjecture. Mathematical Reviews : MR1818378.

Generalizations of partial meet contraction are introduced that start out from the observation that only some of the logically closed subsets of the original belief set are at all viable as contraction outcomes. Belief contraction should proceed by selection among these viable options. Several contraction operators that are based on such selection mechanisms are introduced and then axiomatically characterized. These constructions are more general than the belief base approach. It is shown that partial meet contraction is exactly characterized by adding (...) to one of these constructions the condition that all logically closed subsets of the belief set can be obtained as the outcome of a single (multiple) contraction. Examples are provided showing the counter-intuitive consequences of that condition, thus confirming the credibility of the proposed generalization of the AGM framework. (shrink)

The centerpiece of Jeffrey Bub's book Interpreting the Quantum World is a theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996) which correlates each member of a large class of no-collapse interpretations with some 'privileged observable'. In particular, the Bub-Clifton theorem determines the unique maximal sublattice L(R,e) of propositions such that (a) elements of L(R,e) can be simultaneously determinate in state e, (b) L(R,e) contains the spectral projections of the privileged observable R, and (c) L(R,e) is picked out by R and e alone. (...) In this paper, we explore the issue of maximal determinate sets of observables using the tools provided by the algebraic approach to quantum theory; and we call the resulting algebras of determinate observables, "maximal *beable* subalgebras". The capstone of our exploration is a generalized version of Bub and Clifton's theorem that applies to arbitrary (i.e., both mixed and pure) quantum states, to Hilbert spaces of arbitrary (i.e., both finite and infinite) dimension, and to arbitrary observables (including those with a continuous spectrum). Moreover, in the special case covered by the original Bub-Clifton theorem, our theorem reproduces their result under strictly weaker assumptions. This added level of generality permits us to treat several topics that were beyond the reach of the original Bub-Clifton result. In particular: (a) We show explicitly that a (non-dynamical) version of the Bohm theory can be obtained by granting privileged status to the position observable. (b) We show that Clifton's (1995) characterization of the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation is a corollary of our theorem in the special case when the density operator is taken as the privileged observable. (c) We show that the 'uniqueness' demonstrated by Bub and Clifton is only guaranteed in certain special cases -- viz., when the quantum state is pure, or if the privileged observable is compatible with the density operator. We also use our results to articulate a solid mathematical foundation for certain tenets of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. For example, the uncertainty principle asserts that there are strict limits on the precision with which we can know, simultaneously, the position and momentum of a quantum-mechanical particle. However, the Copenhagen interpretation of this fact is not simply that a precision momentum measurement necessarily and uncontrollably disturbs the value of position, and vice-versa; but that position and momentum can never in reality be thought of as simultaneously determinate. We provide warrant for this stronger 'indeterminacy principle' by showing that there is no quantum state that assigns a sharp value to both position and momentum; and, a fortiori, that it is mathematically impossible to construct a beable algebra that contains both the position observable and the momentum observable. We also prove a generalized version of the Bub-Clifton theorem that applies to "singular" states (i.e., states that arise from non-countably-additive probability measures, such as Dirac delta functions). This result allows us to provide a mathematically rigorous reconstruction of Bohr's response to the original EPR argument -- which makes use of a singular state. In particular, we show that if the position of the first particle is privileged (e.g., as Bohr would do in a position measuring context), the position of the second particle acquires a definite value by virtue of lying in the corresponding maximal beable subalgebra. But then (by the indeterminacy principle) the momentum of the second particle is not a beable; and EPR's argument for the simultaneous reality of both position and momentum is undercut. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, (...) a maximal proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q. (shrink)

In this paper, we prove that the lattice of all closure operators of a complete Almost Distributive Lattice L with fixed maximal element m is dual atomistic. We define the concept of a completely meet-irreducible element in a complete ADL and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a dual atom of Φ (L) to be complemented.

Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by (...) transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and the behavior occasioned by the rules. (shrink)

For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. (...) But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from. (shrink)

In this article, we describe and attempt to solve a puzzle arising from the interpretation of modified numerals like less than five and between two and five. The puzzle is this: such modified numerals seem to mean different things depending on whether they combine with distributive or non-distributive predicates. When they combine with distributive predicates, they intuitively impose a kind of upper bound, whereas when they combine with non-distributive predicates, they do not. We propose and explore in detail four solutions (...) to this puzzle, each involving some notion of maximality, but differing in the type of maximality involved and in the source of maximality. While the full range of data we consider do not conclusively favor one theory over the other three, we do argue that overall the evidence goes against the view that modified numerals lexically encode a ‘standard’ maximality operator, and suggests the need for a pragmatic blocking mechanism that filters out readings of sentences that are generated by the grammar but intuitively unavailable. (shrink)

Hasok Chang is developing a new form of pragmatic scientific realism that aims to reorient the debate away from truth and towards practice. Central to his project is replacing truth as correspondence with his new notion of ‘operational coherence’, which is introduced as: 1) A success term with probative value to judge and guide epistemic activities. 2) A more useful alternative than truth as correspondence in guiding scientific practice. I argue that, given its current construal as neither necessary nor sufficient (...) for success, operational coherence is too weak and fails to satisfy both 1) and 2). I offer a stronger construal of operational coherence which aims to improve on Chang’s account by tying it to systematic success. This makes operational coherence necessary and sufficient for success. This new account, if successful, rescues 1) but not 2). I then take a step back and try to locate Chang’s pragmatic realism within the broader pragmatist tradition by comparing his views to the founding fathers Peirce, James and Dewey. I also assess to what extent we should consider Chang’s position ‘realist’, arguing that despite the many relativists threads running through it, Chang’s pragmatic realism is deserving of the realist label because its aims to maximize our learning from reality, even if it falls short of what many traditional realist are happy to accept as realism. I finish with comments on the epistemology of science pointing out that there is nothing intrinsic about a practice-based philosophy of science that precludes having both operational coherence and correspondence and highlighting that given a proper understanding these two notions could, in fact, be understood as complementary. I suggest one way this could be done. (shrink)

There is a systemic condition inherent in contemporary markets that compel managers not to pursue more morally preferable initiatives if those initiatives will require actions that conflict with profit maximization. Normative arguments for implementing morally preferable practices within the existing system fail because they are insufficient to counter-act the systemic conditions affecting decision-making that is focused on maximizing profit as the primary operational value. To overcome this constraint we must elevate a more normatively preferable value, ‚ideal environmental sustainability,’ to the (...) level of being the primary filtering value through which other competing values are evaluated, prioritized, and implemented. In order for this to occur in practice, a change must be made relative to the laws, rules, and regulations that define and guide the market. This can be done by suitably defining the epistemic constraint of impartiality utilizing Rawls’ notion of a ‚veil of ignorance’ as a heuristic device. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to analyze the possibility of social justice as fair maximal utility starting from two different perspectives about justice – justice as fairness and justice as social choice or mutual advantage. The thesis I defend and reconstruct here is that a co-operative solution can be implemented only in a democratic society where a certain kind of justice principles is applied. This solution, however, is not a solution, if we do not really understand the principles which (...) are being involved in it or if we do not use a proper concept of justice. My proposal here could bring some light both upon this issue and on the logical clarification. In order to realize this, I take into account at least two problems: 1) the problem of compatibility between the announced concept and the existence of social inequalities; 2) Nozick’s objection concerning the compensation of inequalities involved by this kind of justice. I intend to analyze Rawls’ solution of compensatory beneficial in order to test whether it could be considered dangerous for the preservation of equidistance of the rules and, hence, for the justice as impartiality, as Nozick claims in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia, the concept of reasonability which is used here as being complementary to the concept of rationality and useful for this matter. (shrink)

In this paper, the notions of tense operators and tense filters in \-algebras are introduced and several characterizations of them are obtained. Also, the relation among tense \-algebras, tense \-algebras and tense Boolean algebras are investigated. Moreover, it is shown that the set of all tense filters of a \-algebra is complete sublattice of \\) of all filters of \-algebra \. Also, maximal tense filters and simple tense \-algebras and the relation between them are studied. Finally, the notions of (...) tense congruence relations in tense \-algebras and strict tense \-algebras are introduced and an one-to-one correspondence between tense filters and tense congruences relations induced by tense filters are provided. (shrink)

In this paper, the notions of tense operators and tense filters in \-algebras are introduced and several characterizations of them are obtained. Also, the relation among tense \-algebras, tense \-algebras and tense Boolean algebras are investigated. Moreover, it is shown that the set of all tense filters of a \-algebra is complete sublattice of \\) of all filters of \-algebra \. Also, maximal tense filters and simple tense \-algebras and the relation between them are studied. Finally, the notions of (...) tense congruence relations in tense \-algebras and strict tense \-algebras are introduced and an one-to-one correspondence between tense filters and tense congruences relations induced by tense filters are provided. (shrink)

We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four (...) interaction properties between certainty and plausibility and study how these properties translate into properties of belief. We then prove that all the logics considered are minimal logics for the highlighted theorems. We also consider a number of possible interpretations of plausibility, identify the corresponding logics and show that some notions considered in the literature are special cases of our framework. (shrink)

Recall that a subset X of a Boolean algebra A is independent if for any two finite disjoint subsets F , G of X we have ∏ x∈F x ∏ y∈G −y≠0. The independence of a BA A , denoted by Ind, is the supremum of cardinalities of its independent subsets. We can also consider the maximal independent subsets. The smallest size of an infinite maximal independent subset is the cardinal invariant i , well known in the case (...) A= P / fin . In this article we consider the collection of all cardinalities of infinite maximal independent subsets of a BA A ; we call this set the spectrum of infinite maximal independent subsets , denoted by Spind. Note that infinite maximal independent subsets exist in any BA which is not superatomic. The main result is that any set of infinite cardinals can occur as Spind for some infinite BA A . Beyond this we give results concerning the way that Spind changes under various algebraic operations. However, the basic components of most algebras that we deal with are free algebras. (shrink)

By his definition of them, David Gauthier's co-operative constrained maximizers are not necessarily unsharing and disposed to exclude straight maximizers from benefits of their co-operation. Here is Gauthier's full and exact account, his official account, of constrained maximization.

In this paper we analyze some aspects of the question of using methods from model theory to study structures of functional analysis.By a well known result of P. Lindström, one cannot extend the expressive power of first order logic and yet preserve its most outstanding model theoretic characteristics (e.g., compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem). However, one may consider extending the scope of first order in a different sense, specifically, by expanding the class of structures that are regarded as models (e.g., (...) including Banach algebras or other structures of functional analysis), and ask whether the resulting extensions of first order model theory preserve some of its desirable characteristics.A formal framework for the study of structures based on Banach spaces from the perspective of model theory was first introduced by C. W. Henson in [8] and [6]. Notions of syntax and semantics for these structures were defined, and it was shown that using them one obtains a model theoretic apparatus that satisfies many of the fundamental properties of first order model theory. For instance, one has compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem, and omitting types theorems. Further aspects of the theory, namely, the fundamentals of stability and forking, were first introduced in [10] and [9].The classes of mathematical structures formally encompassed by this framework are normed linear spaces, possibly expanded with additional structure,e.g., operations, real-valued relations, and constants. This notion subsumes wide classes of structures from functional analysis. However, the restriction that the universe of a structure be a normed space is not necessary. (This restriction has a historical, rather than technical origin; specifically, the development of the theory was originally motivated by questions in Banach space geometry.) Analogous techniques can be applied if the universe is a metric space. Now, when the underlying metric topology is discrete, the resulting model theory coincides with first order model theory, so this logic extends first order in the sense described above. Furthermore, without any cost in the mathematical complexity, one can also work in multi-sorted contexts, so, for instance, one sort could be an operator algebra while another is. say, a metric space. (shrink)

The concept of “acculturation” is closely linked to the history of European colonialism. In spite of all efforts to endow it with a “neutral” or “positive” meaning, the term has never meant anything other than the subjection of indigenous cultures to Western civilization in all its forms.

In a recent issue of the Journal of Business Ethics, Filipe M. Santos posits that social entrepreneurs maximize not on value capture, but on value creation, only satisficing on value capture to fuel operations, reinvesting in growth, whatever the specific combination of institutional means is deemed appropriate. No doubt the analytical framework of value creation and value capture casts new light on the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship, but we think Santos is asking too much by advocating a shift in focus (...) away from the organization. On the contrary, we maintain that by refocusing the theory on the organizational level and away from the system it is possible to understand that not all organizational solutions available to social entrepreneurs are able to create value and not all value capture strategies can serve a social goal. Indeed, there is only one form of organization that fulfills the criteria of maximizing on value creation, while satisficing on value capture and that is the social enterprise. (shrink)

Market economics can overreach and reduce all human activities to market-governed activities. More than a market-inspired explanation for human activities, it offers a normative account of how all goods and services should be distributed by private parties negotiating mutually agreeable terms. This paper argues that market values and practices are constrained by other fundamental values and practices. Liberal values are generally consistent with, though they are not reducible to, market values. Democratic and egalitarian values often contrast with market values. The (...) distribution of market benefits should accommodate those democratic and egalitarian values which constitute a polity's core commitments (and those core commitments need to be reasserted regularly). Indeed, market stability depends upon a general distribution of its benefits. Incentives to productive activity entail inequalities, but the terms of those inequalities are subject to review. Internal refinements to specific markets can reduce inequalities by promoting the fairness of market operations and by increasing the number of effective participants. (shrink)

In an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. -/- Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues (...) that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions. (shrink)

In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers a barrage of objections to the view, held by David Hume, that conceivability implies possibility. In this paper, I present Reid's first two objections to the ‘maxim of conceivability’ and defend Hume from them. The first objection concerns our ability to understand impossible claims, while the second concerns thoughts about impossible claims (such as, for instance, the thought that they are impossible). Reid's objections have special force against Hume (...) because of his commitment to analyse all operations of the understanding in terms of conception. I argue that these objections fail, on the grounds that they presuppose substantive views about language which we are not warranted in attributing to Hume. Ultimately, Reid's objections help us draw out a set of intertwined issues about the language-mind relationship in Hume. (shrink)

Logical frameworks that are sensitive to features of sentences’ subject-matter—like Berto’s topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)—demand a maximally faithful model of the topics of sentences. This is an especially difficult task in the case in which topics are assigned to intensional formulae. In two previous papers, a framework was developed whose model of intensional subject-matter could accommodate a wider range of intuitions about particular intensional conditionals. Although resolving a number of counterintuitive features, the work made an implicit assumption that the subject-matter (...) of an intensional conditional is a function of the subject-matters of its subformulae. This assumption—which I will call a principle of topic sufficiency—runs counter to some natural intuitions concerning topic. In this paper, we will investigate topic sufficiency and offer a semantic account that is state-sensitive, providing an implementation through the introduction of topic-sensitive logics related to William Parry’s prototypical $\mathsf {PAI}$. (shrink)

Faced with hate speech, oppressed groups can use their own speech to respond to their verbal oppressors. This “counterspeech,” however, sometimes itself takes on a hateful form. This paper explores the moral standing of such “hateful counterspeech.” Is there a fundamental moral asymmetry between hateful counterspeech, and the hateful utterances of dominant or oppressive groups? Or are claims that such an asymmetry exists indefensible? I argue for an intermediate position. There _is_ a key moral asymmetry between these two forms of (...) speech. But, this asymmetry notwithstanding, hateful counterspeech is capable of enacting serious harms—and so, contrary to what many legal theorists have argued, it is in principle an appropriate object of legal regulation. I begin by considering the central argument for thinking that hateful counterspeech is not seriously troubling. This argument holds that oppressed groups lack authority—and, by extension, “speaker power.” Yet this argument, I suggest, sits in tension with the fact that low-status members of dominant groups can, through their utterances, seriously harm members of oppressed groups. Philosophers of language have developed sophisticated arguments to explain this last phenomenon: they have argued that speaker power is relativised to particular jurisdictions; that it can be acquired dynamically in local settings; and that it is socially dispersed. I argue that, in light of these arguments, it appears that hateful counterspeech, too, can generate serious harms. Nevertheless, I show that this conclusion is compatible with recognising a crucial moral asymmetry between hateful counterspeech and the hate speech of oppressors. (shrink)

How do words stand for things? Taking ideas from philosophical semantics and pragmatics, this book offers a unique, detailed, and critical survey of central debates concerning linguistic reference in the twentieth century. It then uses the survey to identify and argue for a novel version of current 'two-dimensional' theories of meaning, which generalise the context-dependency of indexical expressions. The survey highlights the history of tensions between semantic and epistemic constraints on plausible theories of word meaning, from analytic philosophy and modern (...) truth-conditional semantics, to the Referentialist and Externalist revolutions in theories of meaning, to the more recent reconciliatory ambition of two-dimensionalists. It clearly introduces technical semantical notions, theses, and arguments, with easy-to-follow, step-by-step guides. Wide-ranging in its scope, yet offering an accessible route into literature that can seem complex and technical, this will be essential reading for advanced students, and academic researchers in semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

Suppose that Paul, while looking at a tree, sees that that thing over there is a red bird. Paul is having what we may call a ‘singular’ perceptual experience. How should we characterise the representational content of his perceptual experience? I will sketch an original answer to this question, building on the internalist accounts propounded by Searle (1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 2) and Recanati (2007. Perspectival Thought. Oxford University Press. Ch. 17). Pace Searle, the content of Paul's experience (...) is not a (general) proposition. Pace Recanati, whose account draws on Lewis’s (1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” Philosophical Review 88 (4): 513–543) internalist view of de se attitudes, it is not a property of the perceiving subject. Instead, I submit, it is a property of the perceived object. The content is the property of being a red bird, which determines a set of centred worlds whose centre (an object taken at a time) is a red bird; the object (here, the bird) is part of the relevant situation of evaluation for the experience; and the experience is veridical only if the actual world centred on the object belongs to the set of centred worlds determined by that property. I will argue that this view retains the benefits of Searle's and Recanati's accounts while improving on them. (shrink)

Following Birkhoff and von Neumann, quantum logic has traditionally been based on the lattice of closed linear subspaces of some Hubert space, or, more generally, on the lattice of projections in a von Neumann algebra A. Unfortunately, the logical interpretation of these lattices is impaired by their nondistributivity and by various other problems. We show that a possible resolution of these difficulties, suggested by the ideas of Bohr, emerges if instead of single projections one considers elementary propositions to be families (...) of projections indexed by a partially ordered set C(A) of appropriate commutative subalgebras of A. In fact, to achieve both maximal generality and ease of use within topos theory, we assume that A is a so-called Rickart C*-algebra and that C(A) consists of all unital commutative Rickart C*-subalgebras of A. Such families of projections form a Hey ting algebra in a natural way, so that the associated propositional logic is intuitionistic: distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle. Subsequently, generalizing an earlier computation for n x n matrices, we prove that the Heyting algebra thus associated to A arises as a basis for the internal Gelfand spectrum (in the sense of Banaschewski-Mulvey) of the "Bohrification" A̱ of A, which is a commutative Rickart C*-algebra in the topos of functors from C(A) to the category of sets. We explain the relationship of this construction to partial Boolean algebras and Bruns-Lakser completions. Finally, we establish a connection between probability measures on the lattice of projections on a Hubert space H and probability valuations on the internal Gelfand spectrum of A̱ for A = B(H). (shrink)

Following Birkhoff and von Neumann, quantum logic has traditionally been based on the lattice of closed linear subspaces of some Hilbert space, or, more generally, on the lattice of projections in a von Neumann algebra A. Unfortunately, the logical interpretation of these lattices is impaired by their nondistributivity and by various other problems. We show that a possible resolution of these difficulties, suggested by the ideas of Bohr, emerges if instead of single projections one considers elementary propositions to be families (...) of projections indexed by a partially ordered set \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{C}(A)}$$\end{document} of appropriate commutative subalgebras of A. In fact, to achieve both maximal generality and ease of use within topos theory, we assume that A is a so-called Rickart C*-algebra and that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{C}(A)}$$\end{document} consists of all unital commutative Rickart C*-subalgebras of A. Such families of projections form a Heyting algebra in a natural way, so that the associated propositional logic is intuitionistic: distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle. Subsequently, generalizing an earlier computation for n × n matrices, we prove that the Heyting algebra thus associated to A arises as a basis for the internal Gelfand spectrum (in the sense of Banaschewski–Mulvey) of the “Bohrification” \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\underline A}$$\end{document} of A, which is a commutative Rickart C*-algebra in the topos of functors from \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{C}A}$$\end{document} to the category of sets. We explain the relationship of this construction to partial Boolean algebras and Bruns–Lakser completions. Finally, we establish a connection between probability measures on the lattice of projections on a Hilbert space H and probability valuations on the internal Gelfand spectrum of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\underline A}$$\end{document} for A = B(H). (shrink)

The main results of the present paper are the following theorems: 1. There is no e ∈ ω such that for any A, B ⊆ ω, SA = Wmath image is simple in A, and if A′ [TRIPLE BOND]TB′, then SA =* SB. 2 There is an e ∈ ω such that for any A, B ⊆ ω, MA = We is incomplete maximal in A, and if A =* B, then MA [TRIPLE BOND]TMB.

Abstract There are two kinds of beliefs. If the ultimate objective is wellbeing (util- ity), the generated beliefs are “practical.” If the ultimate objective is truth, the generated beliefs are “scientific.” This article defends the practical/scientific belief distinction. The proposed distinction has been ignored by standard rational choice theory—as well as by its two major critics, viz., the Tversky/Kahneman program and the Simon/ Gigerenzer program. One ramification of the proposed distinction is clear: agents who make errors with regard to scientific (...) beliefs (e.g., the conjunction fallacy) should not be taken as committing irrationality—because they are most probably engaging the other kind of maximization, the pursuit of wellbeing. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Sammelband analysiert die diversen Formen einer ideologisch motivierten Instrumentalisierung von Meister Eckharts Mystik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus und bietet darüber hinaus auch ganz neues, bislang noch unveröffentlichtes Quellenmaterial zu den institutionellen Hintergründen der Eckhart-Rezeption im Dritten Reich. This volume analyses the various forms of ideological instrumentalization Meister Eckhart’s mysticism has been subject to during the era of National Socialism. Furthermore, the volume includes hitherto unpublished source material concerning the institutional background of Eckhart’s reception in the Third Reich.

This article defends the democratic ideal of inclusive public discourse, as articulated in Democratic Speech in Divided Times, against the critiques offered by Billingham, Fraser, and Hannon. Specifically, it considers and responds to three core challenges. The first challenge argues, notably, that the “shared reasons” constraint should either apply everywhere or not at all, and that, if this constraint is to apply in divided circumstances, its justificatory constituency must be idealized. The second challenge contends that the resistance of hate speech (...) and misinformation to counterspeech cannot adequately be explained by considerations of salience, and therefore cannot adequately by countered (as I suggest) by “positive” forms of counterspeech. Finally, the last challenge objects that the ideal of inclusive public discourse I defend remains, as pessimists allege, excessively idealistic. (shrink)

Several recent commentators have suggested that for fully rational agents who find themselves in iterated prisoner's dilemmas of indefinite length, co-operation is the rational strategy. Their argument is that these fully rational agents can be taught, through the co-operative actions of other agents, to bypass the dominant move of noncooperation and co-operate instead. The proponents of the “teaching strategy” seem to have ignored the compelling argument of Jordan Howard Sobel. While the teaching argument may work for agents who are less (...) than purely rational, Sobel has pointed out that hyperrational utility maximizers cannot be taught; they reason deductively, not inductively, as the “teaching argument” requires. (shrink)

In this paper, we study when a set-continuous operator has a fixed-point that is the intersection of a directed family. The framework of our study is the Kelley-Morse theory KMC– and the Gödel-Bernays theory GBC–, both theories including an Axiom of Choice and excluding the Axiom of Foundation. On the one hand, we prove a result concerning monotone operators in KMC– that cannot be proved in GBC–. On the other hand, we study conditions on directed superclasses in GBC– in (...) order that their intersection is a fixed-point of a set-continuous operator. Finally, we illustrate our results with a solution to the liar paradox and a construction of maximal bisimulations. (shrink)

Motivated by the analysis of a general optimal portfolio selection problem, which encompasses as special cases an optimal consumption and an optimal debt-arrangement problem, we are concerned with the questions of how a personality trait like risk-perception can be formalized and whether the two objectives of utility-maximization and risk-minimization can be both achieved simultaneously. We address these questions by developing an axiomatic foundation of preferences for which utility-maximization is equivalent to minimizing a utility-based shortfall risk measure. Our axiomatization hinges on (...) a novel axiom in decision theory, namely the risk-perception axiom. (shrink)

Two-step proportionality-balancing [TSPB] has become the standard method for human and constitutional rights decision-making. The first step consists in determining whether a rights-provision has been infringed/limited; if the answer to that first question is positive, the second step consists in determining whether the infringement/limit is reasonable or justified according to a proportionality analysis. TSPB has regularly been the target of some criticism. Critiques have argued that both its ‘two-step’ and ‘proportionality’ elements distort reality by promoting a false picture of rights (...) and constitutional decision-making. This would cause negative moral consequences. This article seeks to defend TSPB against these criticisms and to depict it in a more appropriate and favourable light. First, it is argued that both aspects of TSPB do not have the dire moral consequences that opponents suggest they have. Second, it is argued that TSPB, deploying notions such as burdens, presumptions and prima facie/defeasible propositions, constitutes a valuable framework for public argumentation and authoritative decision-making. (shrink)