The goals of linguistic theory are to answer such questions as “What is language?” and “What properties must something (an organism or a machine) have in order for it to learn and use language?” Different theories provide different answers to these questions, and there is at present no general consensus as to what theory gives the best answers. Moreover, most linguists, when pressed, would say that these questions have not yet been answered satisfactorily by any theory.

The impetus for this volume developed from the 1982 University of Western Ontario Learnability Workshop, which was organized by the editors and sponsored by that University's Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Cognitive Science. The volume e~plores the import of learnability theory for contemporary linguistic theory, focusing on foundational learning-theoretic issues associated with the parametrized Government-Binding framework. Written by prominent re searchers in the field, all but two of the eight contributions are pre viously unpublished. The (...) editor's introduction provides an overview that interrelates the separate papers and elucidates the foundational issues addressed by the volume. Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein's "Learning Theory and Natural Language" first appeared in Cognition ; Matthews's "The Plausi bility of Rationalism" was published in the Journal of Philosophy. The editors would like to thank the publishers for permission to reprint these papers. Mr. Marin Marinov assisted with the preparation of the indices for the volume. VB ROBERT 1. MATTHEWS INTRODUCTION: LEARNABILITY AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 1. INTRODUCTION Formal learning theory, as the name suggests, studies the learnability of different classes of formal objects under different formal models of learning. The specification of such a model, which specifies a learning environment, a learn ing strategy, and a criterion for successful learning, determines a class of formal objects, namely, the class that can be acquired to the level of the specified success criterion by a learner implementing the specified strategy in the specified enviroment. (shrink)

Through a number of illuminating cases studies which draw in large part on the largely under-utilized data of Romance dialectal varieties, the present article sets out to highlight the importance that Romance data, especially those of non-standard varietites, can play in testing and enriching currents theories of syntax. In particular, we shall show that dialectal varieties, although frequently overlooked in the past, offer an immensely fertile and still relatively unexplored experimental territory in which to profitably investigate new ideas about language (...) structure, change and variation. At the same time, we champion the mutual benefits for theoretical linguists and Romanists of adopting a more integrated and reciprocally-informed approach in their respective treatments of linguistic evidence, highlighting how a familiarity with the key tools and ideas established in both fields has the potential to enrich linguistic and empirical analyses considerably. (shrink)

We question the widespread assumption that linguistic theory should guide the formulation of mechanistic accounts of human language processing. We develop a pseudo‐linguistic theory for the domain of linguistic stress, based on observation of the learning behavior of a perceptron exposed to a variety of stress patterns. There are significant similarities between our analysis of perception stress learning and metrical phonology, the linguistic theory of human stress. Both approaches attempt to identify salient characteristics (...) of the stress systems under examination without reference to the workings of the underlying processor. Our theory and computer simulations exhibit some strikingly suggestive correspondences with metrical theory. We show, however, that our high‐level pseudo‐linguistic account bears no causal relation to processing in the perception, and provides little insight into the nature of this processing. Because of the persuasive similarities between the nature of our theory and linguistic theorizing, we suggest that linguistic theory may be in much the same position. Contrary to the usual assumption, it may not provide useful guidance in attempts to identify processing mechanisms underlying human language. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to argue for the fruitfulness for linguistic theory of an approach to semantics that has been developed primarily by logicians and philosophers. That the theory of possible worlds semantics has been extremely fruitful for logic and philosophy is widely if not universally accepted, and I will not try to convince remaining skeptics on that score. But the goals of linguistics are sufficiently different from those of philosophy and logic that there are (...) independent and highly reasonable grounds for skepticism about the appropriateness of such a theory for linguistics, and I will address what seem to me the most important of these in addition to offering positive evidence in favor of such an approach to semantics. (shrink)

Up until today, the term linguistics has never figured in the title of any chair in the Collège de France. However, those having a rapport with language have not been lacking, among them those of “language and literature,” “history and philology” of various cultures, philology, although it does not study language itself, having recourse to it. There are four personalities to be kept in mind in the twentieth century: Abbé Rousselot, whose teaching of phonetics, although briefly, left a permanent mark (...) on his listeners; Mario Roques, who gave a course in the “Histoire du vocabulaire français” from 1937 to 1946; Roland Barthes, who rendered “Sémiologie littéraire” illustrious from 1976 to 1980; and M. Zemb, who two years ago was the first linguist in the modern sense to enter the Collège, with a chair of “Grammaire et pensée allemandes.”. (shrink)

Record of papers given at a symposium held at the University of Texas at Austin, April 1967; includes; C.J. Fillmore - The case for case; E. Bach - Nouns and noun phrases; J.D. McCawley - The role of semantics in a grammar; P. Kiparsky Linguistic universals and linguistic change.

An important aspect of Sellars' philosophy is his attempt to explicate the concept of thought on the "model" of the concept of speech. More specifically, Sellars has argued that the intentionality of "inner" episodes or thoughts is to be understood in terms of the "semantical" characteristics of intelligent linguistic behavior, and not the other way around as the "classical tradition" had supposed.To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to realize that Sellars' claim, as he explains, in Aristotelian terminology, is a (...) claim "in the order of conceiving" as contrasted with "the order of being." That is, Sellars accepts, as an integral part of his theory, the classical claim that meaningful speech is the manifestation or overt causal expression of ''inner" thoughts, but argues that our concept of such thoughts is a derivative concept, a concept which, in the order of theoretical reconstruction, is "modelled on," is an analogical extension of, the concept of meaningful linguistic behavior. (shrink)

Russell and Strawson sparked a well known debate on the subject of Linguistic Presupposition inspiring many linguists and philosophers to follow suit, including Frege, whose work initiated the modern study in this area. Beaver begins with the most comprehensive overview and critical discussion of this burgeoning field published to date. He then goes on to motivate and develop his own account based on a Dynamic Semantics. This account is a recent line of theoretical work in which the Tarskian emphasis (...) on truth conditions is questioned. The central plank of the theory of meaning is a formal account of the change in information effected by use of language on hearers or readers. The proposal thus consolidates ideas of Stalnaker, Karttunen and Heim, all of whom had suggested that such an account was needed. At the same time it provides a new impulse and motivation to Dynamic Semantics itself. (shrink)

This paper is an exposition as well as a critical examination of M. Frank's response to the Derrida/Searle debate. It argues that Frank's critique of Derrida and Searle is partly justified but suffers from a number of shortcomings. The author agrees with Frank's argument that Derrida fails to explain how linguistic meaning is possible on the basis of purely differential relations between signs (différance) and supports his view that the human subject, in spite of its lack of complete self-transparency, (...) is endowed with more autonomy and semantic creativity than Derrida is willing to grant it. The paper tries to show, however, that much of Frank's critique of linguistic theory as represented by the work of Searle is unjustified because it is informed by a questionable notion of linguistic determinism rooted in Schleiermacher and Saussurean structuralism, a notion of ineffable or non-conceptual individual meaning that remains insufficiently explicated, and a generally anti-naturalist attitude towards language which leads to a misunderstanding of the role linguistics and related cognitive sciences can (and cannot) play in the hermeneutic sciences. (shrink)

_In the normal course of events, children manifest linguistic competence equivalent to that of adults in just a few years. Children can produce and understand novel sentences, they can judge that certain strings of words are true or false, and so on. Yet experience appears to dramatically underdetermine the com- petence children so rapidly achieve, even given optimistic assumptions about children’s nonlinguistic capacities to extract information and form generalizations on the basis of statistical regularities in the input. These considerations (...) underlie various (more specific) poverty of stimulus arguments for the innate specification of linguistic principles. But in our view, certain features of nativist arguments have not yet been fully appreciated. We focus here on three (related) kinds of poverty of stimulus argument, each of which has been supported by the findings of psycholinguistic investigations of child language. (shrink)

Recent discussions of ontology have shown an interest in the relation between logic, language and ontology. Quine, for example, has shown how sentences translated into canonical form determine ontological commitment in terms of the values over which bound variables range, while Strawson has maintained that conditions inherent to language determine a system of ontological concepts. But in these discussions the role linguistics might have in the construction of ontological schemes is seldom seriously considered. Except for Benjamin Lee Whorf’s examination through (...) the use of descriptive linguistic techniques of the relation between ontological schemes and the structure of languages, little has been done to apply the results of linguistic research to questions of ontology. In the past this could be attributed to the absence in structural linguistics of significant generalizations about language above the morphophonemic level. This situation has altered with the development of transformational linguistic theory. That theory contains an extensive set of generalizations about the form and content of any natural language. (shrink)

This study rationally reconstructs Novalis’s linguistic theory. It traces Novalis’s assessment of earlier linguistic debates, illustrates Novalis’s transformation of their central questions and uncovers Novalis’s unique methodological proposal. It argues that in his critical engagement with Idealism, particularly regarding problems of representation and regulative positing, Novalis recognizes the need for both a philosophy of language and the artistic language designed to execute it. The paper contextualizes Novalis’s linguistic appropriation and repudiation of Kant and explains how, even (...) while Novalis’s linguistic theory issues Kantianism such a challenge, it also begins to demonstrate the application of Kantian designs to linguistic philosophy. The modernity and potential of Novalis’s proposal is evaluated and its significance for discussions in linguistic philosophy and aesthetics is advocated. (shrink)

Branigan & Pickering (B&P) present a case that linguistic theory should pay heed to the results of structural priming studies. I can agree with this wholeheartedly. Since the pioneering work of Bock (Reference Bock1986), structural priming has provided interesting evidence for the construction of linguistic representations as part of the process of sentence generation and understanding. B&P are somewhat ambivalent on the question of whether linguistic theory should pay heed only to structural priming (as seems (...) implied in the abstract) or simply add it to the repertoire of methodologies for testing the predictions of theories. If simply an addition to the repertoire, again, I am in thorough agreement. (shrink)

Linguists have habitually phrased their accounts of language knowledge as sound/meaning correspondences about which no mention need be made of differences that might exist between knowledge of how to analyze input versus knowledge of how to construct output . However, evidence from many sources increasingly indicates that the dissimilarities between language as comprehension versus language as production are so profound that they nullify attempts to describe language in a 'non-directional' manner, 'neutral' with respect to interpretive versus expressive functions. A two-component (...) model of idealized linguistic performance can be devised on the basis of much past and present linguistic scholarship. Elements needed for the comprehension component are derivable from 'taxonomic' distributional analyses of phonotactics, morphosyntax, and lexical semantics, as well as from recent cognitive psychological work on 'perceptual strategies', while the production component can be formulated in terms of 'generative-semantic' and 'generative-phonological' rules recast as meaning-to-sound transformational processes. Interaction between these two components may well be the crucial determinant of the 'creative aspect of language use'. (shrink)

This book, a revised and expanded version of a paper delivered at an international congress of linguists, is chiefly concerned with technical questions in the science of linguistics, particularly the superiority of transformational models over taxonomic models in developing an adequate theory of syntax and phonemics. Underlying these technical questions is a sustained criticism of traditional empiricist theories of knowledge. The taxonomic model assumes that the scientific approach to language is an atomistic one, classifying the basic invariant units, sounds, (...) or grammatical slots and fillers, and then specifying the laws that govern the combination of these units. The transformational model, Chomsky's own development, does not presuppose fully specified units, but intricate mental structures whose laws give a determination to the component parts. As a professional scientist, Chomsky argues that the transformational model is superior on three levels of adequacy: observational, descriptive, and explanatory. As a part-time philosopher, he feels that such structures reflect the general nature of the mind and show the inadequacy of atomistic accounts of mental phenomena.—E. M. M. (shrink)

According to current cognitive linguistic theory, the abstract notion of TIME in many languages of the world is expressed through a metonymic relation involving direc-tion, irreversibility, continuity, segmentation, and measurability and one of two possible versions of the TIME AS ORIENTATION IN SPACE metaphor: either the observer moves or time does. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues for the possibility of understanding what he calls 'our primordial experience'of time through an exploration, analysis, comparison, and evaluation of the (...) different metaphors for time, not as they exist in themselves but as they are grounded in what other cognitive linguists have explored with respect to subjectivity, concept formation, and conceptual integration. This 'primordial experience' of time is possible because of the embodiment of ourselves in the world and gives rise to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of an ontology of the flesh; the fact that we are 'of' rather than 'in' the world gives rise to his theory of time as depth. In this paper, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of time might 1) clarify the picture Lakoff and Johnson give of the existence of time and 2) provide a philosophical foundation that integrates various contemporary cognitive linguistic theories. (shrink)