In this article I argue that Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 gives expression to a new form ofresponsibility. I begin by suggesting thatresponsible behaviour has shifted from prohibiting orrequiring particular actions: we now exhibitresponsibility by our attitude towards our actions. I then examine where this new conception ofresponsibility has come from. Through an examinationof the work of post-liberal theorists, principallyMichael Sandel, I argue that a changing view ofpersonhood within post-liberal theory has led to aquestioning of the possibility of (...) choice, and that theabsence of choice necessitates a shift in thedefinition of responsible behaviour. If we are createdby our decisions then we cannot be held to account forour decisions, but only for the care we have takenover them. Responsibility is therefore measured notby our level of self-control but by our level ofself-awareness. Finally I examine the consequences ofthis shift in the meaning of responsibility. Withinthis framework autonomy is illusory thereforedecisions do not need to be respected. This explainswhy the implementation of Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 has been called into question. Within thisframework responsibility is relative therefore itextends indefinitely. This enables the Family Law Actto be uniquely intrusive and judgmental: everydivorcing couple, on being held up to scrutiny, isfound lacking. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse à l’évolution non seulement quantitative mais aussi qualitative du phénomène du divorce. Dans le divorce, d’un cas à l’autre, on observe de grandes différences suivant le degré d’accomplissement du travail psychique de deuil des ex-partenaires. Mais son extrême banalisation entraîne aussi un important changement d’état d’esprit général, avec des problèmes nouveaux, voire des mutations d’ordre psycho-culturel concernant la vie de couple. La puissante médiatisation contemporaine contribue à amplifier les transformations en cours, modifiant considérablement non seulement (...) les comportements et les mœurs, mais aussi certaines représentations, y compris dans leurs dimensions inconscientes. On voit poindre, entre autres, la représentation d’un « destin » inéluctable qui condamnerait à l’avance tout projet de vie amoureuse durable. Certaines conséquences cliniques en sont perceptibles dans le choix amoureux des couples actuels, où s’atténue parfois la distinction entre couple projeté à long terme et aventure passagère. (shrink)

Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: I promise to love, honour, and cherish .... But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in (...) far too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles. (shrink)

Is divorce reasonable, given that marital promises are often apparently unqualified? I explain a variety of ways in which one can take promises seriously and recognize the value of genuinely unqualified love in marriage while recognizing that it may be reasonable in particular cases to treat marital promises as non-binding.

Does the viability of the discovery program depend on showing either (1) that methods of generating new problem solutions, per se, have special probative weight (the per se thesis); or, (2) that the original conception of an idea is logically continuous with its justification (anti-divorce thesis)? Many writers have identified these as the key issues of the discovery debate. McLaughlin, Pera, and others recently have defended the discovery program by attacking the divorce thesis, while Laudan has attacked the (...) discovery program by rejecting the per se thesis. This disagreement over the central issue has led to communication breakdown. I contend that both friends and foes of discovery mistake the central issues. Recognizing a form of divorce helps rather than hurts the discovery program. However, the per se thesis is not essential to the program (nor is the related debate over novel prediction); hence, the status of the per se thesis is a side issue. With these clarifications in hand, we can proceed to the next stage of the discovery debate--the development (or revival) of a generative conception of justification which goes beyond consequentialism to forge a strong linkage of generation (or rather, generatability) with justification. (shrink)

At the annual conference of The American Psychiatric Association (APA) in Miami, there was a workshop entitled "Family Crisis". The results of a study said that in the last 30 years, 60% of families in the United States ended in divorce, and 70% of their children did not develop well, behave deviant or antisocial. For example seen juvenile delinquency, abuse of NAZA (Narcotics, Alcohol, and other Addictive Substances), promiscuity, deviant sexual behavior and so on. It was also stated that (...) divorce rates are increasing, marriages are decreasing because many people choose to live together without marriage or single life and free sex. Disloyalty (abuse) among families in the US turned out not to be the monopoly of husbands alone, but 40% of the wives there were also involved in affair with third parties. Of the five marriages in the first five years, three divorces occurred. The author gives the purpose of writing to discuss the crisis in the household, rebuild the household and give Christian values ​​in counteracting divorce. The author uses descriptive literature research method data and provides research results: How a harmonious family can be established dynamically if we base our family building on the basis of strong Christian spirituality values ​​accompanied by a fabric of good communication between us and our children. Surprisingly few studies have explored the implications of divorce happened because family can not be established, especially in young adulthood. This study addresses several theoretical arguments linking divorce in the side of spiritual value with reduced religious involvement in young adulthood and tests relevant hypotheses using data from a unique sample. Results show that divorce in the side of spiritual value is associated with substantially lower communicate religious involvement among young adults in their families house. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 gives expression to a new form ofresponsibility. I begin by suggesting thatresponsible behaviour has shifted from prohibiting orrequiring particular actions: we now exhibitresponsibility by our attitude towards our actions. I then examine where this new conception ofresponsibility has come from. Through an examinationof the work of post-liberal theorists, principallyMichael Sandel, I argue that a changing view ofpersonhood within post-liberal theory has led to aquestioning of the possibility of (...) choice, and that theabsence of choice necessitates a shift in thedefinition of responsible behaviour. If we are createdby our decisions then we cannot be held to account forour decisions, but only for the care we have takenover them. Responsibility is therefore measured notby our level of self-control but by our level ofself-awareness. Finally I examine the consequences ofthis shift in the meaning of responsibility. Withinthis framework autonomy is illusory thereforedecisions do not need to be respected. This explainswhy the implementation of Part II of the Family LawAct 1996 has been called into question. Within thisframework responsibility is relative therefore itextends indefinitely. This enables the Family Law Actto be uniquely intrusive and judgmental: everydivorcing couple, on being held up to scrutiny, isfound lacking. (shrink)

Divorce is not only a personal choice, but also a sign of the lack of confidence in the institution of marriage. The issue of divorce raises questions that are sociological, theological, experiential, philosophical and political. This article traces the arguments with particular reference to the situation in Taiwan where women have no right to initiate divorce. It surveys the biblical and theological arguments, locating issues of divorce in the area of gender justice within patriarchal systems. Marriage, (...) as well as divorce, is complex. To impose a monolithic definition of divorce is to fail to recognize the diversity of marital conflict and breakdown, generally to the advantage of a patriarchal society. This was as true of Hebrew society as it is of modern Taiwan, with its history of political struggle. The article concludes by challenging the Taiwanese churches to provide insights for people in their relationships with one another and with God. (shrink)

Le divorce entre théologie dogmatique et théologie spirituelle depuis le Bas Moyen Âge a été fréquemment dénoncé. Il a souvent été associé à la décadence de la théologie scolastique qui se serait éloignée de ses sources bibliques et aurait privilégié une technicité dialectique, finissant par tourner à vide. Le succès du nominalisme a été également invoqué comme cause à cet état de fait. On suggère ici une nouvelle hypothèse explicative: le Moyen Âge tardif voit l’avènement d’une nouvelle conception de (...) la volonté, non plus liée organiquement au jugement de l’intellect pratique mais conçue comme une instance auto-déterminante autonome par rapport à l’intellect. Les affects, l’influence d’autres volontés deviennent alors des instances importantes de la décision par laquelle la volonté opte pour Dieu. (shrink)

On the basis of in-depth interviews with 75 divorced New York fathers, the phenomenon of postdivorce paternal absence is investigated. The accounts provided by the interviewees suggest that father absence is more than a literal practice: it is also a perceived option and a standard of comparison. Father absence is a strategy of action, the objective of which is to control situations of conflict and tension and emotional states. That the majority of the fathers in the study shared common explanations (...) with regard to father absence is an indiction of their participation in a “masculinist discourse of divorce.” A primary theme in the discourse is the rhetoric of rights. (shrink)

Theories of threats and offers can blind us to some wrongs even as they illuminate others. Spouses sometimes negotiate divorce settlements by proposing to litigate custody unless given financial concessions. Supported by theories that rely exclusively on rights, courts often uphold these settlements saying things like "[s]imply insisting upon ... what one believes to be his legal rights is not coercive." I suggest a means of distinguishing (divorcing) threats from offers that explains why it is sometimes coercive to insist (...) on one's rights in negotiations. (shrink)

Many epistemologists treat rationality and justification as the same thing. Those who don’t lack detailed accounts of the difference, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justification. In this paper, I offer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Specifically, it turns on a version (...) of the familiar distinction in meta-ethics between possessing apparent normative reasons (which may be merely apparent) and possessing objective normative reasons. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I discuss the history of indifference to the distinction between rationality and justification in epistemology and the striking contrast with meta-ethics. I introduced the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons in §2 and provide a deeper basis for it in §3. I explain how the ideas extend to epistemology in §4 and explore the upshots for some central issues in §5. (shrink)

Divorce amongst married couples is a disturbing phenomenon amongst the Yoruba people of southern Nigeria. Unfortunately, the church in Yoruba land, which has focused much of its teachings on financial prosperity, has started facing the consequences of these lopsided teachings. Using a phenomenological approach, this study argues that the lack of sexual satisfaction, poverty, activities of fake pastors, infidelity and lies from any of the partners are the major causes of increasing divorce rates amongst Yoruba Christians. Existing literature (...) has not adequately addressed the issue of divorce amongst Yoruba Christians. This study explores the growing divorce rates from the lens of Yoruba Christians and how it impacts on the family, children and the church at large. As part of this recommendation, church leadership should start organising marriage seminars for married couples where they are taught a nonviolent approach to conflict resolution in the family.Contribution: This study indicates that the activities of some churches and their leaders indirectly support divorce, and the consequence is mostly felt by the children. This study argues that divorce is not supported by the church in Yoruba land. The study implicated practical theology. (shrink)

This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: can the divorcee make a second unconditional marital vow in all moral seriousness? To the last question I answer yes. I argue that the divorce process is so disorienting – to use Amy Harbin’s term – as to transform the divorcee (...) and therefore partly release her from the original vow. Arguing this will require a specific understanding of personal identity and change. (shrink)

C. S. Lewis takes us on a profound journey through both heaven and hell in this engaging allegorical tale. Using his extraordinary descriptive powers, Lewis introduces us to supernatural beings who will change the way we think about good and evil.

Chacun s’interroge sur les effets de la séparation de couple sur l’enfant. Dans la mesure où il module les relations familiales après la séparation, le mode de garde semble être une variable centrale. Pour y voir plus clair, nous nous sommes intéressées à la période de la post-adoles-cence, qui voit le développement du second processus de séparation-individuation (Blos, 1967). Nous avons rencontré 29 jeunes femmes de 18 à 23 ans et analysé, par une série d’outils cliniques, la manière dont chaque (...) mode de garde a pu moduler l’individuation de ces sujets par rapport à leur famille. Chacun d’entre eux semble bien avoir un effet différent sur les dynamiques d’emprise et de dégagement propres à la post-adolescence, ainsi que sur la qualité des relations de l’enfant à son père et sa mère. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the benefits of discussing moral issues concerning the domestic realm in an introductory ethics course, especially moral issues surrounding divorce. The subject of divorce in introductory courses can illustrate to students significant dimensions in ethical theory and also serves as a useful pedagogical tool to bridge the gap between abstract ethical theories and students’ daily lives. Divorce is a common experience that allows students to personally engage with ethical questions that often have often (...) immediate relevance to their personal morality. (shrink)

Based on interviews with 104 women and men, this article argues that marriage constrains while divorce liberates men and women to develop relationships, but they do so in different ways with different consequences for each. The separated and divorced women were better than the men or themselves while married at building and maintaining old, and intimate, relationships. In this sense, separation and divorce proved generous; marriage, greedy. However, because of the structure of their lives and the opportunities available (...) to them, separated and divorced women were not so good at developing new and casual ties. It was the structure of the men's lives that provided access to “instant networks.” Developed to alleviate loneliness, these groups provided a place in the wider community that men did not seek while married. (shrink)

An examination of some of the ethical issues that arise in making policy decisions about divorce child-custody disputes. It is argued in this paper that what needs to be resolved is the dilemma that occurs when the legislator is faced with a choice between using a discretionary standard that promotes the best interests of the child or a non-discretionary standard that settles disputes by an arbitrary assignment of custody. The dilemma is resolved through a normative analysis of various types (...) of dispute-settling processes and a canvas of standard that allow for the automatic but non-arbitrary settling of disputes between contending parents. (shrink)

This study reviews several empirical researches which highlight the effect of post-divorce parental conflict as one of the most important factors on adolescents’ delinquency in divorced families. Research consistently shows that parental conflict affects parental relationship and this poor parental quality may transfer into poor parent-child relationship that may negatively influence adolescent functions and behaviors. Research showed that adolescents who are exposed to post-divorce parental conflict are at increased risk for high level of delinquency. Positive associations between parental (...) conflict and adolescent delinquency have been accounted for by parental rejection or withdrawal, parental hostility toward adolescents, lack of parental warmth, and corporal punishment and parent-adolescent conflict. (shrink)

This article examines the cross-national relationship between a divorce culture on a national level and gender equality in intact marriages. Based on multilevel analysis of data from 22 countries in the International Social Survey Programme, the results indicate that a divorce culture on the national level is associated with greater marital equality. In other words, in countries where divorce is accepted and practiced, the distribution of work between women and men in marriage is more equal. These findings (...) support the enhanced equality hypothesis that the possibility of divorce provides women with leverage to gain more equal status within marriage. (shrink)

Although the exclusion of LGBTs from the rites and rights of marriage is arbitrary and unjust, the legal institution of marriage is itself so riddled with injustice that it would be better to create alternative forms of durable intimate partnership that do not invoke the power of the state. Card's essay develops a case for this position, taking up an injustice sufficiently serious to constitute an evil: the sheltering of domestic violence.

: Although the exclusion of LGBTs from the rites and rights of marriage is arbitrary and unjust, the legal institution of marriage is itself so riddled with injustice that it would be better to create alternative forms of durable intimate partnership that do not invoke the power of the state. Card's essay develops a case for this position, taking up an injustice sufficiently serious to constitute an evil: the sheltering of domestic violence.

This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: can the divorcee make a second unconditional marital vow in all moral seriousness? To the last question I answer yes. I argue that the divorce process is so disorienting – to use Amy Harbin’s term – as to transform the divorcee (...) and therefore partly release her from the original vow. Arguing this will require a specific understanding of personal identity and change. (shrink)

This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: can the divorcee make a second unconditional marital vow in all moral seriousness? To the last question I answer yes. I argue that the divorce process is so disorienting – to use Amy Harbin’s term – as to transform the divorcee (...) and therefore partly release her from the original vow. Arguing this will require a specific understanding of personal identity and change. (shrink)

In a magisterial book-length study, Professor E. Christian Brugger concludes that the canons of the Council of Trent, given the beliefs and intentions of its participants, provide “a dogmatic definition of the absolute indissolubility of marriage as a truth of divine revelation” (original italics). The present concern is whether Brugger’s arguments support this conclusion. Also subject to scrutiny are the relevance, plausibility, and consistency of the conciliar thinking on which his arguments are premised. It will be argued that Brugger’s conclusion (...) is unwarranted, leaving the question of divorce and remarriage an open one. (shrink)

Protecting women and children is one of the core values of the Islamic legal tradition. In Muslim countries religious, constitutional, and legal frameworks obligate the state to take special measures to provide protection to women and children within families and in society. However, despite such provisions, post-divorce maintenance rights are not granted to women in Pakistan and Iran. Family law enacted in Pakistan and Iran still differs in form and substance from what has been mentioned in the primary sources (...) of Islamic law and from the previous articulations of early Islamic law scholars. Moreover, patriarchal notions of male authority are still sustained through law and judicial interpretations when it comes to the question of giving post-divorce maintenance to women. As a result in the absence of a welfare system divorced women are left in a vulnerable situation. Although in Iran, some financial compensation under the concept of Ujrat ul Misl is given to divorced women, but it remains unclear whether the right to Mata’at-ul-Talaq has been recognised under the family law. In Pakistan the law does not include any provision for giving women Ujrat ul Misl and Mata’at- ul -Talaq. Moreover in the absence of a welfare system, divorced Muslim women in both countries are left in a vulnerable situation. This article engages with plural normative sources and contemporary notions of human rights to make the case for family law reform and for awarding post-divorce maintenance rights to Muslim women in Pakistan and Iran. (shrink)

As he neared 80 Russell was more financially secure than he had been for decades. But to remain so he needed to maintain his prodigious output as a writer, broadcaster and lecturer (see Papers 26, forthcoming). Meanwhile, the breakdown of his third marriage threatened to undermine his much-improved financial position. The monetary concerns addressed in both the text prepared by Russell and the related commentary hint at a lifetime’s scrupulous regard for his personal finances.

This chapter expresses that radical feminist perspectives on marriage and motherhood are in danger of being lost in the quest for equal rights. For more than a decade, feminist philosophers and lesbian/gay activists have been optimistic about the potentialities of legal marriage and legitimated motherhood. Feminist philosophers are taking as valuable theoretical paradigms for ethics many kinds of caring relationships that have been salient in women's lives. "Family" is itself a family resemblance concept. Apart from the institution of marriage and (...) historical ideals of the family, it is uncertain what characteristics mother‐child relationships would have, for many alternatives are possible. Historically, motherhood has been a core element of patriarchy. Moral philosophy might also be transformed by greater attention to the fact that adult experience and its potentialities are significantly conditioned by the childhoods of adults and of those children's relationships to adults. (shrink)

The essay proposes that children should not participate in custody proceedings because they lack a place in the public world, a concept which was developed by Arendt and which I elaborate on the basis of her writings. Arendt’s concepts of place in the world and of childhood are correlated, polar ethical concepts. ‘Place in the world’ as described by Arendt combines commitment to worldbuilding as a collaborative enterprise, relations of mutual-recognition among equal co-builders of the public world, an inviolable place (...) in public and private realms, and self-disclosure through the staging of public appearances. We should recognize children as rightful participants in divorce proceedings when we are ready to treat them as occupants of place in the world, split between public and private realms and corresponding public and private voices. Recent practices of children’s participation undermine the intimate realm of childhood as well as the public world. (shrink)

The validity of dream recall is discussed. What is the relation between the actual dream and its later reflection? Nielsen proposes differential sleep mentation, which is probably determined by dream accessibility. Solms argues that REM sleep and dreaming are double dissociable states. Dreaming occurs outside REM sleep when cerebral activation is high enough. That various active sleep states correlate with vivid dream reports implies that REM sleep and dreaming are single dissociable states. Vertes & Eastman reject that REM sleep is (...) involved in memory consolidation. Considerable evidence for this was obtained by REM deprivation studies with the dubious water tank technique. [Nielsen; Solms; Vertes & Eastman]. (shrink)