Divorce, Disorientation, and Remarriage

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):531-544 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper asks three inter-related questions, proceeding chronologically through a divorcee’s experience: is it responsible and rational to make an unconditional marital vow in the first place? does divorce break that unconditional marital vow? And the main question: can the divorcee make a second unconditional marital vow in all moral seriousness? To the last question I answer yes. I argue that the divorce process is so disorienting – to use Amy Harbin’s term – as to transform the divorcee and therefore partly release her from the original vow. Arguing this will require a specific understanding of personal identity and change.

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Christopher Cowley
University College Dublin

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References found in this work

Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
Disorientation and Moral Life.Ami Harbin - 2016 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.

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