Un método de investigación en historia de la filosofía basado en las estructuras conceptuales parte del supuesto de que las doctrinas filosóficas, en autores y épocas diversas, se relacionan en función de semejanzas y diferencias, no tanto por motivos puramente históricos (sucesión de sistemas) o textuales (declaraciones expresas de los auto res), cuanto por las relaciones que guardan entre sí las estructuras en que se organizan los conceptos que las constituyen. Las estrucuras concep tuales de las filosofías se articulan en (...) torno a dos principios básicos, pro venientes ambos del aristotelismo: la unión preconstitutiva de materia y forma y el uso de una doble lógica analógica de proporcionalidad propia y de atribución. La historia de la filosofía, desde el método de investigación de las estruc turas analógicas de los conceptos, trata de establecer un diálogo más fecundo entre el pasado del pensamiento occidental y la actualidad de las nuevas producciones del intelecto humano. (shrink)

Un método de investigación en historia de la filosofía basado en las estructuras conceptuales parte del supuesto de que las doctrinas filosóficas, en autores y épocas diversas, se relacionan en función de semejanzas y diferencias, no tanto por motivos puramente históricos (sucesión de sistemas) o textuales (declaraciones expresas de los auto res), cuanto por las relaciones que guardan entre sí las estructuras en que se organizan los conceptos que las constituyen. Las estrucuras concep tuales de las filosofías se articulan en (...) torno a dos principios básicos, pro venientes ambos del aristotelismo: la unión preconstitutiva de materia y forma y el uso de una doble lógica analógica de proporcionalidad propia y de atribución. La historia de la filosofía, desde el método de investigación de las estruc turas analógicas de los conceptos, trata de establecer un diálogo más fecundo entre el pasado del pensamiento occidental y la actualidad de las nuevas producciones del intelecto humano. (shrink)

Un método de investigación en historia de la filosofía basado en las estructuras conceptuales parte del supuesto de que las doctrinas filosóficas, en autores y épocas diversas, se relacionan en función de semejanzas y diferencias, no tanto por motivos puramente históricos (sucesión de sistemas) o textuales (declaraciones expresas de los auto res), cuanto por las relaciones que guardan entre sí las estructuras en que se organizan los conceptos que las constituyen. Las estrucuras concep tuales de las filosofías se articulan en (...) torno a dos principios básicos, pro venientes ambos del aristotelismo: la unión preconstitutiva de materia y forma y el uso de una doble lógica analógica de proporcionalidad propia y de atribución. La historia de la filosofía, desde el método de investigación de las estruc turas analógicas de los conceptos, trata de establecer un diálogo más fecundo entre el pasado del pensamiento occidental y la actualidad de las nuevas producciones del intelecto humano. (shrink)

Duns Escoto formuló los principios de una teología filosófica basada en el formalismo y el voluntarismo y, poco después, Guillermo de Ockham extraería las consecuencias más radicales de los principios escotistas, particularmente para la filosofía práctica. Una de las paradojas de la nueva teoría moral que sirven para ilustrar el modo en que la voluntad se autonomiza respecto a su fin propio es la posibilidad de que Dios pueda mentir o de que pudiera llegar a ser meritorio odiar a Dios (...) en lugar de amarle. De esta última hipótesis, denominada del odium Dei, nos ocuparemos en este breve ensayo. (shrink)

Un método de investigación en historia de la filosofía basado en las estructuras conceptuales parte del supuesto de que las doctrinas filosóficas, en autores y épocas diversas, se relacionan en función de semejanzas y diferencias, no tanto por motivos puramente históricos (sucesión de sistemas) o textuales (declaraciones expresas de los auto res), cuanto por las relaciones que guardan entre sí las estructuras en que se organizan los conceptos que las constituyen. Las estrucuras concep tuales de las filosofías se articulan en (...) torno a dos principios básicos, pro venientes ambos del aristotelismo: la unión preconstitutiva de materia y forma y el uso de una doble lógica analógica de proporcionalidad propia y de atribución. La historia de la filosofía, desde el método de investigación de las estruc turas analógicas de los conceptos, trata de establecer un diálogo más fecundo entre el pasado del pensamiento occidental y la actualidad de las nuevas producciones del intelecto humano. (shrink)

En este artículo nos ocupamos de la Polémica conceptual entre la lectura de la metafísica de Aristóteles que hace el profesor suizo André de Muralt, que se vertebra sobre la doctrina analogía del ser, y la interpretación de Pierre Aubenque, que defiende una Interpretación aporética, que niega la presencia de tal doctrina en los textos aristotélicos. Esbozaremos, por tanto, dos imágenes muy distintas del pensamiento aristotélico. El Aristóteles de Aubenque es un filósofo que fracasa en su pretensión científica y que (...) acaba reconociendo la imposibilidad de unificación de la ciencia física y la ciencia de los principios, inaugurando un pensamiento del límite y del ideal inalcanzable de la perfecta univocidad, lo que constituye el problema de/ser que no alcanza una solución El Aristóteles de Muralt es el artífice de la invención del discurso metafísico, que se estructura sistemáticamente, proveyendo los temas, los conceptos y las grandes líneas de fuerza que en su desarrollo analógico impulsarán el nacimiento de las diversas formas del pensamiento Occidental. (shrink)

Un método de investigación en historia de la filosofía basado en las estructuras conceptuales parte del supuesto de que las doctrinas filosóficas, en autores y épocas diversas, se relacionan en función de semejanzas y diferencias, no tanto por motivos puramente históricos (sucesión de sistemas) o textuales (declaraciones expresas de los auto res), cuanto por las relaciones que guardan entre sí las estructuras en que se organizan los conceptos que las constituyen. Las estrucuras concep tuales de las filosofías se articulan en (...) torno a dos principios básicos, pro venientes ambos del aristotelismo: la unión preconstitutiva de materia y forma y el uso de una doble lógica analógica de proporcionalidad propia y de atribución. La historia de la filosofía, desde el método de investigación de las estruc turas analógicas de los conceptos, trata de establecer un diálogo más fecundo entre el pasado del pensamiento occidental y la actualidad de las nuevas producciones del intelecto humano. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo reflete sobre a pesquisa em andamento da autora, na linha de processos educacionais em artes cênicas, investigada pela via do Teatro em Comunidades, eixo específico abraçado pelo campo da Pedagogia do Teatro e fundamentado pela obra dos mestres contemporâneos Bertolt Brecht, Augusto Boal e Paulo Freire. O ponto de tensão desta discussão é o questionamento acerca da possibilidade de investigar a prática do Teatro em Comunidades como capaz de contribuir para construção de uma sistematização de procedimentos pedagógicos (...) teatrais em Educação Não Formal dirigida à formação de artistas e educadores, analisando de maneira crítico-reflexiva os resultados do estudo teórico-prático com enfoque em duas noções-chave: o gestus social e a dialogicidade. O estudo está sendo desenvolvido com jovens, professores e artistas da comunidade sede do município de Seabra, Bahia. Ao tecer considerações sobre a pesquisa de campo em andamento, conclui-se que um estudo desta natureza é relevante por conduzir a formação de artistas e educadores por um território de prática artística teatral que contribui para a edificação de um conhecimento consolidado a partir da ação coletiva, da experimentação prática e elaboração reflexiva pelo estudo das relações sociais. (shrink)

Kate Distin introduces the theory of the selfish meme – and questions whether we are all ‘meme machines’.

In this book, Kate Distin proposes a theory of cultural evolution and shows how it can help us to understand the origin and development of human culture. Distin introduces the concept that humans share information not only in natural languages, which are spoken or signed, but also in artefactual languages like writing and musical notation, which use media that are made by humans. Languages enable humans to receive and transmit variations in cultural information and resources. In this way, (...) they provide the mechanism for cultural evolution. The human capacity for metarepresentation - thinking about how we think - accelerates cultural evolution, because it frees cultural information from the conceptual limitations of each individual language. Distin shows how the concept of cultural evolution outlined in this book can help us to understand the complexity and diversity of human culture, relating her theory to a range of subjects including economics, linguistics, and developmental biology. (shrink)

Culture is a unique and fascinating aspect of the human species. How did it emerge and how does it develop? Richard Dawkins suggested culture evolves and that memes are cultural replicators, subject to variation and selection in the same way as genes are in the biological world. Thus human culture is the product of a mindless evolutionary algorithm. Does this imply, as some have argued, that we are mere meme machines and that the conscious self is an illusion? This highly (...) readable and accessible book extends Dawkins's theory, presenting for the first time a fully developed concept of cultural DNA. Distin argues that culture's development can be seen as the result of memetic evolution and as the product of human creativity. Memetic evolution is perfectly compatible with the view of humans as conscious and intelligent. This book should find a wide readership amongst philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and non-academic readers. (shrink)

Kate Distin introduces the theory of the selfish meme meme machines’.

Open peer commentary on the article “Radical Constructivism and Radical Constructedness: Luhmann’s Sociology of Semantics, Organizations, and Self-Organization” by Loet Leydesdorff. > Upshot: Leydesdorff emphasises the uncertainties involved in the communication of meaning. Luhmann posited three types of media, each of which reduces one type of communicative improbability. The theory of cultural evolution supports Leydesdorff’s emphasis on the uncertainty of communication, and agrees that different media are needed for communication within and across social boundaries. But it highlights the distinction between (...) media and the symbolic codes that give them structure; and it raises the question whether Luhmann’s symbolically generalized communication media are really media at all. (shrink)

Natural language provides a mechanism for cultural evolution by ensuring the persistent heredity of variations in both cultural information and information about its own construction. In the process, it not only facilitates but also limits our thinking to the ways its vocabulary and structures make possible. But the human capacity for metarepresentation frees cultural information from the restrictions of any one medium or language, and has also propelled the evolution of artefactual languages, which provide evolutionary mechanisms for specialist areas of (...) culture. And cooperation between diverse cultural specialists can stimulate further, innovative competition between the cultural information that they share. (shrink)

Change is the fundamental idea of evolution. Explaining the extraordinary biological change we see written in the history of genomes and fossil beds is the primary occupation of the evolutionary biologist. Yet it is a surprising fact that for the majority of evolutionary research, we have rarely studied how evolution typically unfolds in nature, in changing ecological environments, over space and time. While ecology played a major role in the eventual acceptance of the population genetic viewpoint of evolution in the (...) synthetic era (circa 1918-1956), it held a lesser role in the development of evolutionary theory until the 1980s, when we began to systematically study the evolutionary dynamics of natural populations in space and time. As a result, early evolutionary theory was initially constructed in an abstract vacuum that was unrepresentative of evolution in nature. The subtle synthesis between ecology with evolutionary biology (eco-evo synthesis) over the past 40 years has progressed our knowledge of natural selection dynamics as they are found in nature, thus revealing how natural selection varies in strength, direction, form, and, more surprisingly, level of biological organization. Natural selection can no longer be reduced to lower levels of biological organization (i.e., individuals, selfish genes) over shorter timescales but should be expanded to include adaptation at higher levels and over longer timescales. Long-term and/or emergent evolutionary phenomena, such as multilevel selection or evolvability, have thus become tenable concepts within an evolutionary biology that embraces ecology and spatiotemporal change. Evolutionary biology is currently suspended at an intermediate stage of scientific progress that calls for the organization of all the recent knowledge revealed by the eco-evo synthesis into a coherent and unified theoretical framework. This is where philosophers of biology can be of particular use, acting as a bridge between the subdisciplines of biology and inventing new theoretical strategies to organize and accommodate the recent knowledge. Philosophers have recommended transitioning away from outdated philosophies that were originally derived from physics within the philosophical zeitgeist of logical positivism (i.e., monism, reductionism, and monocausation) and toward a distinct philosophy of biology that can capture the natural complexity of multifaceted biological systems within diverse ecosystems—one that embraces the emerging philosophies of pluralism, emergence, and multicausality. Therefore, I see recent advances in ecology, evolutionary biology, and the philosophy of biology as laying the groundwork for another major biological synthesis, what I refer to as the Second Synthesis because, in many respects, it is analogous to the aims and outcomes of the first major biological synthesis (but is notably distinct from the inorganic and contrived progressive movement known as the extended evolutionary synthesis). With the general development of a distinctive philosophy of science, biology has rightfully emerged as an autonomous science. Thus, while the first synthesis legitimized biology, the Second Synthesis autonomized biology and afforded biology its own philosophy, allowing biology to finally realize its full scientific potential. (shrink)

Advances in the empirical sectors of biology are beginning to reveal evolvability as a major evolutionary process. Yet evolvability’s theoretical role is still intensely debated. Since its inception nearly thirty years ago, the evolvability research front has put a strong emphasis on the non-genetic mechanisms that influence the short-term evolvability of individuals within populations by causing phenotypic heterogeneity, such as developmental trait plasticity, phenotypic plasticity, modularity, the G-P map, robustness, and/or epigenetic variation. However, genetic evolvability mechanisms such as mutation or (...) recombination have a deeper history in evolutionary thought that is often overlooked by those in the evolvability research front, with recent evidence suggesting that species switch to genetic evolvability mechanisms when short-term evolvability strategies fail to relieve selective pressures. For this reason, a causal distinction must be made between genetic evolvability and the more recently emphasized non-genetic (or evo-devo) evolvability to allow for its maturation as a central explanatory concept. I conclude by arguing that the anachronisms of the scientific process are the main culprit behind recent divisions in biology and likely beyond. To streamline theoretical progress, we need to build a new science with new underlying philosophies like restricted pluralism. (shrink)

Evolvability—which, in its broadest sense, means any causal factor that influences an evolutionary system’s ability to evolve (e.g., epistatic interactions, constraints, standing genetic variation)—could be the most significant addition to evolutionary theory since neutral theory in the 1980s, and Hansen and colleagues’ Evolvability: A Unifying Concept in Evolutionary Biology? (2023) is a major step forward for the maturation of the concept of evolvability. According to Hansen and colleagues, since evolvability research exploded onto the scene in the 1990s, the concept has (...) developed divergently within the fields of evolutionary developmental biology, evolutionary quantitative genetics, paleobiology, and computational biology. No comprehensive attempt has so far been made to synthesize the expansive plurality of conceptions of evolvability. For this reason alone, I believe Hansen and colleagues' Evolvability: A Unifying Concept in Evolutionary Biology? (2023) is the steppingstone from which all future conceptual and empirical research on evolvability must build on. However, despite the acknowledged success of Hansen and colleagues (2023), the onerous tasks of maturing the concept of evolvability and successfully integrating it into modern evolutionary theory are now within reach but are still left incomplete. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:138 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY entier sans en ~tre l'eselave; toujours menace, mais toujours supdrieur. Le p~ch~ est alors d$truit par la vertu; il n'y a plus de conflit int~rieur. La puret~ du coeur est de vouloir une seule chose. Et c'est alors une mani~re d'immortalit~ par le Jugement. Une derni~re remarque de G. Price: les hommes d'aujourd'hui ont changd &attitude i~ l'~gard de Dieu. La question serait maintenant: Dieu (...) est-il pour ou contre les hommes? Et quel est le sons de l'Etre humain? Telle serait donc la valeur r~elle du probl~me kierkegaardien. Sans doute, G. Price pose l'Un, l'Individuel, en dehors de toute Eglise humaine; mais ainsi se comprend la querelle incessante entre Kierkegaard et l'Eglise de son temps. L'Homme-Dieu a souvent ~t~ consid~rd avec quelque m~fiance par le Dieu trop humanis~ et celui-ci, peut-r est touj ours vu et senti comme trop engag4 dans les structures soeiales du temps present. ANDRE LOUIS LEROY Sorbonne, Paris Cinquant'anni di esperienza idealistica in Italia. By Augusto Guzzo. (Padova: Cedam, 1964.) Con la delicata finezza di tocco che egli ~ propria, Augusto Guzzo, uno dei pifi impegnati protagonisti nel superamento dell'idealismo d'antico stampo, ha sobriamente tratteggiato (in cinque succose lezioni tenure, coli~invitato da Marino Gentile e dall'intera Facolti~ di Lettere e Filosfia presso l'Universit~ di Padova) lo sviluppo della cultura filosofica italiana nella prima met~ del nostro secolo. Assai opportunamente le sue magistrali lezioni sono state test~ pubblicare nella raccolta di Opuscoli Accademici edita dall'Ateneo patavino col titolo suggestivo: Cinquant'anni di espcrienza idealistica in Italia. Quel che eolpisee anzitutto ~ la calda umanit~ del tono, l'alto affiato morale che anima la parola dell'illustre Maestro. Questi, pur trattando dei pifi ardui problemi metafisici e gnoseologici, mai non cade nell'astruso e nell'astratto. Sa cogliere, inveee, con fine introspezione psicologica la genesi delle idee pifi ardue dalla personalit~ di coloro ehe le eoncepirono e eh'Egli individua con sottile discernimento e con artistica vivacitY. Ed alla base della sun intelligente eomprensione e della perspicace sua ermeneutiea psicologia ~ una disposizione morale che vorremmo dire di affettuosa indulgenza e di calore meridionale, anzi schiettamente napoletano, se non fosse pi5 giusto dirla apertura eristiana al colloquio tra le anime e quindi fra gli intelletti. E'questo che ineanta nella nitida prosa del Guzzo, che non ~ mai arcigno e sprezzante, non mai amaro e caustico, bensl sempre si sforza di comprendere e di giustificare. In lui rivive in effetti l'alta ispirazione della perennis philosophia di quel Leibniz che soleva ripetere con quella bonti~ ed umanitk propria solo agli ingegni sublimi: "So debbo ingannarmi, preferisco farlo piuttosto a favore che a svantaggio delle persone. Provo la stessa propensione leggendo gli seritti altrui eh~ mi sforzo di scoprire non quel ehe potrei critieare, bensl quanto merita d'essere approvato e di cui posso approfittare." D'altro canto l'apertura mentale del Guzzo non ~insidiata da quel pericoloso indifferentismo etico ed inttellettuale che, sotto la veste della comprensione e dell'indulgenza, lascia passar tutto, anche le tesi pifl pericolose, attraverso un facile contrabbando. Quella del Guzzo ~una intelligenza aperta e comprensiva, ma che non smarrisce in un sincretismo venato di scetticismo il discrimen trail vero ed il falso, la gerarchia dei valori intellettuali e morali. Egli tratteggia in un arguto viaggio immaginario lo stato dell'Italia aecademica ai principi del secolo, illustrando i fermenti complessi e molteplici che s'agitavano in quella che si suol rappresentare come una eultura positivistica piatta ed informe. Comunque eceo emergere in polemica battagliera e mordace contro di essa la figura dl Benedetto Croce, che le contrappone un hegelismo interpretato alquanto unilateralmente. I1 Guzzo sagacemente lumeggia la grande opera di rinnovamento culturale operata dal grande meridionale e tenta di illuminarne lo spirito profondo riportandosi alla testimonianza, --ch'~ poi un'interpretazione-- di uno dei mlgliori discepoli: Carlo Antoni. Secondo quest'ul- BOOK REVIEWS 139 timo Croce avrebbe avuto coscienza dell'abissale differenza tra lo Spirito universale e l'uomo transeunte. "Croce lo sapeva quando-secondo la testimonianza di Antoni--intendeva lo Spirito come... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 295 A study of Heidegger faces serious difficulties, for Heidegger is a difficult philosopher to comprehend. It is all too easy to fall into an oracular mode of presentation and to become obscure in that needless way of which one suspects Heidegger himself on many occasions. Seidel avoids these dangers admirably. His is a clear and careful, reasoned and unassuming account of Heidegger's views concerning the pre-socratics (...) and the historical fate of Being. His book should be a help to the scholar of Heidegger's thought and a stimulating, though perplexing, introduction to his philosophy. If it fails in the ways I have mentioned, it succeeds in many more ways than I have had the space to mention. It is a positive contribution to the literature concerning Iteidegger. STEPI-IEI~"A. ERICKSOR" Pomona College FiIosofia dell'arte. By Nicola Petruzzellis. Terza edizione riveduta ed accresciuta. (Napoli, Libreira Scientifica Editrice, 1964. I6~ pp. 642.) E' una terza edizione ma in cui l'ampiezza delle aggiunte ~ tale da far sl che non si possa parlare di un rifacimento soltanto perch~ i criter~ fondamentali dell'indagine tentata dall'autore (ed integrata dal felice volume su L'estetica dell'idealismo) sono rimasti gli stessi. Ma quello che prima era soltanto un motivo tematico s'~ sviluppato in una vogorosa e posscnte sinfonia, specie se ci si riferisce al panorama dell'estetica contemporanea, che, con ampiezza di vedute e spregiudicata freschezza d'informazione---integrando e continuando le note storie dell'estetica e della critica dello Zimmermann, dello Schlaser, del Bosanquet, del Croce e del Wellek--il Petruzzellis traccia all'inizio del libro "I1 panorama dell'estetica contemporanea, col quale si apre il volume---avverte--non vuol essere un'esposizione manualistica, e tanto meno un repertorio bibliografico pifl o meno completo, ma uno strumento d'indagine.... e vuo|e altresl fornire all'attento lettore le ragioni storiche e critiche deUe posizioni conclusive alle quali siamo pervenuti e dei consensi e dissensi in esse impliciti" (p. 6). II quadro ~ davvero completo, non solo in riferiment~ all'Italia, ch~ l'autore felicemente riassume e criticamente definisce, rendendo giustizia alle legittime esigenze di ognuno, le ricerche estetiche de Croce e Gentile, di Carlini e di Guzzo, di Stefanini e di Aliotta, di Rensi e di Baratono, di Carbonara e di Della Volpe. Il Petruzzellis 6 e~uriente anche circa le analisi sottili (che si ricoUegano all'esttismo ed al moralismo di SSren Kirkegaard) condotte intorno all'arte da Martin Heidegger e da Karl Jaspers, da Gabriel Marcel e da Jean Paul Sartre, mentre acutamente illustra quelle--ispirate ad un esistenzialismo positivo--di Nicola Abbagnano. Meno note le concezioni estetiche di Nicolai Hartmann e quelle fenomenologiche del Banff, del Morpurgo Tagliabue e del Dufrenne, sicch~ si deve dar atto al Petruzzellis della benemerenza d'averle minutamente illustrate, cosl come ha fatto con il problematicismo estetico di Ugo Spirito e del suo discepolo Armando Plebe. Sottilissima ~ poi l'analisi dei riflessi sulla filosofia dell'arte di correnti speculative ehe oggi (forse ~ effetto di moda) occupano, dal neoempirismo al marxismo, il palcoscenico culturale. Ms se tall correnti si agitano e si dimenano con notevole fracas~o in altri campi, penetrano solo furtivamente nel giardino delle Muse. Percib c'~ voluta tutta la paziente intelligenza del Petruzzellis per presentarci le riflessioni sull'arte (assai poco divulgatc specie in Italia) di John Dewey, di I. A. Richards, di Charles Morris, di B. C. Heyl, di Ernest Cassirer, di Susanne K. Langer e di GySrgy Luke. Quest'ultimo, in veritY, a differenza dei precedenti (mi riferisco sempre al solo lato estetico), ~ alquanto famoso, peraltro in effetti mal noto, ch~ la sua fortuna, dovuta prevalentemente a contingenti motivi politici, fa sl ch'egli sia pi~ citato che effettivamente letto. Un posto particolare in questo gran quadro il Petruzzellis assegna poi alle indagini semantiche di Guido Calogero e soprattuito a quelle penetranti ed acutissime di Antonino 296 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Pagliaro, mentre sviscera con intelletto d'amore il contributo estetico arrecato da grandi contemporanei ispiratisi alla Scolastica quali Maritain, Petit e Gilson. Quest'adesione alle loro vibrazioni spirituali ci svela il profondo motivo animatore di questa: Filosofia d;ell'arte che scritta "nel momento pi... (shrink)

Now available in English for the first time, The Visibility of the Image explores the development of an influential aesthetic tradition through the work of six figures. Analysing their contribution to the progress of formal aesthetics, from its origins in Germany in the 1880s to semiotic interpretations in America a century later, the six chapters cover: Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), the first to separate aesthetics and metaphysics and approach aesthetics along the lines of formal logic, providing a purely syntactic (...) way of using signs, regardless of objective content; Alois Riegl (1858-1905), who went on to further develop aesthetics on the model of formal logic, creating a theory of style in response to Zimmermann's call for an aesthetics oriented toward formal logic; Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945), who represents a step toward an understanding of consciousness by using pictures as cognitive tools; Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895), the Saxon philosopher who considered the possibility that some kinds of images are made and viewed not for what they show, but for their visibility's sake alone; Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), responsible for taking up the connections between the problems of reducing the range of potential meanings and contexts of a given image down to just the picture surface; Charles William Morris (1901-1979), who set out to establish whether a picture with no objective reference, such as an abstract painting, still counts as a sign, and if so, in what sense. Bringing these thinkers together and interlinking their ideas, Lambert Wiesing presents an engaging history of formal aesthetics, while reconstructing the philosophical foundations for the appearance of new image forms in the 20th century, including the video-clip, abstract collage, digital simulation and virtual reality. Using this original approach, The Visibility of the Image introduces the rise of modern image theory and provides a valuable account of our engagement with pictures in the 21st century. (shrink)

I defend a conception of Logic as normative for the sort of activities in which inferences super-vene, namely, reasoning and arguing. Toulmin’s criticism of formal logic will be our framework to shape the idea that in order to make sense of Logic as normative, we should con-ceive it as a discipline devoted to the layout of arguments, understood as the representations of the semantic, truth relevant, properties of the inferences that we make in arguing and reason-ing.

We present a formal system, E, which provides a faithful model of the proofs in Euclid's Elements, including the use of diagrammatic reasoning.

I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages.

Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning, 2/e is an introductory volume that teaches students to recognize and construct correct deductions. It takes students through all logical steps--from premise to conclusion--and presents appropriate symbols and terms, while giving examples to clarify principles. Logic, 2/e uses models to establish the invalidity of arguments, and includes exercise sets throughout, ranging from easy to challenging. Solutions are provided to selected exercises, and historical remarks discuss major contributions to the theories covered.

In a recent paper, “The Concept of Logical Consequence,” W. H. Hanson criticizes a formal-structural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski and Sher. Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view. Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says.

In addition to a somewhat detailed exposition of certain portions of what may be called the book-work of formal logic, the following pages contain a number of problems worked out in detail and unsolved problems, by means of which the student may test his command over logical processes. In the expository portions of Parts I, II, and III, dealing respectively with terms, propositions, and syllogisms, the traditional lines are in the main followed, though with certain modifications; e.g., in the (...) systematisation of immediate inferences, and in several points of detail in connexion with the syllogism. For purposes of illustration Euler's diagrams are employed to a greater extent than is usual in English manuals. In Part IV, which contains a generalisation of logical processes in their application to complex inferences, a somewhat new departure is taken. So far as I am aware this part constitutes the first systematic attempt that has been made to deal with formal reasonings of the most complicated character without the aid of mathematical or other symbols of operation, and without abandoning the ordinary non-equational or predicative form of proposition. This attempt has on the whole met with greater success than I had anticipated; and I believe that the methods formulated will be found to be both as easy and as effective as the symbolical methods of Boole and his followers. The book concludes with a general and sure method of solution of what Professor Jevons called the inverse problem, and which he himself seemed to regard as soluble only by a series of guesses. (shrink)

Formal topology aims at developing general topology in intuitionistic and predicative mathematics. Many classical results of general topology have been already brought into the realm of constructive mathematics by using formal topology and also new light on basic topological notions was gained with this approach which allows distinction which are not expressible in classical topology. Here we give a systematic exposition of one of the main tools in formal topology: inductive generation. In fact, many formal topologies (...) can be presented in a predicative way by an inductive generation and thus their properties can be proved inductively. We show however that some natural complete Heyting algebra cannot be inductively defined. (shrink)