Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. Yaffe's clear account of what it is to try to do something promises to resolve the difficulties courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes.

According to influential view, using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is wrong. In this paper, I consider four related arguments against this view: a debunking argument that suggests that the intuitive appeal of this view may be due to a conflation of different ideas; a counterexamples argument that points out that there are many cases in which using the criminal law against innocent actions ("non mala" actions that are not even "mala prohibita") (...) or agents is justified; a theoretical argument, according to which the force of the reasons for and against using the criminal law is a matter of degree and it is therefore implausible to hold that the latter always defeat the former; and an analogy argument, which holds that it is implausible to maintain that harming innocents is often justified in other contexts but (almost) never in the context of the criminal law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is (...) distinguished from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm. If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as ‘normative positivism‘. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of ‘law‘. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action. (shrink)

Many retributivists appear to presume that the concept of blame that figures in their accounts of just punishment is the same one people employ in their interpersonal moral relationships. David Shoemaker contends that this presumption is mistaken. Moral blameworthiness, he maintains, tracks only the meaning of a person's action––his reasons for acting as he did––while criminal blameworthiness, which he equates with liability to punishment, tracks only the impermissibility of an agent's action. I contest the second of these two claims, (...) and in doing so defend the retributivists’ presumption. First, I argue that the purpose of a criminal trial can be plausibly construed as establishing that the defendant is morally blameworthy for criminal conduct by eliminating reasons to think she is not. Second, I defend the claim that the criminal law should punish people for their failure to act with proper regard for others’ legally protected interests against Shoemaker's arguments to the contrary. Finally, I show that.. (shrink)

Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. (...) Firms are not answerable for the crimes committed by their employees, because firms cannot answer as to why the crime was committed; they lack the authority to offer the employee’s reasons for action. Though this rules out respondeat superior as a general principle, I show contexts in which vicarious liability is still appropriate in the criminal law, and I respond to a number of other concerns raised by this picture. (shrink)

First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child -- (...) that he is my child: absent that parental relationship, I might still have a reason to feed him, as might others who are not his parents -- for instance that he is starving; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to feed this child. I have a relational reason to respond to this person's philosophical queries -- that she is my student: absent that pedagogical relationship, I might still have reason to respond to her questions, as might others who are not her teachers -- for instance that it is good to help such seekers after philosophical insight; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to respond to her queries. I have relational reason to pay John ￡10 -- that I borrowed it from him and promised to repay him today: absent that promissory relationship I might still have, and others might have, reason to give him ￡10 -- for instance that he is impoverished and I am (or they are) rich; but absent that promissory relationship, neither I nor others could have that specific relational reason to give him ￡10. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical reconsideration of the traditional doctrine that responsibility for a crime requires a voluntary act. I defend three general propositions: first, that orthodox Anglo-American criminal theory fails to explain adequately why criminal responsibility requires an act. Second, when it comes to the just definition of crimes, the act requirement is at best a rough generalization rather than a substantive limiting principle. Third, that the intuition underlying the so-called “act requirement” is better explained by what (...) I call the “practical-agency condition,” according to which punishment in a specific instance is unjust unless the crime charged was caused or constituted by the agent's conduct qua practically rational agent. The practical-agency condition is defended as a reconstruction of what is worth retaining in Anglo-American criminal law's traditional notion of an “act requirement.”. (shrink)

Deontology holds that the rules or principles that govern the permissibility of actions cannot be derived simply from the goal of promoting good consequences. The definition has to be given negatively because there is still much disagreement about what positively grounds these rules or principles. The articles in this special issue—collected mostly from papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Institute for Law and Philosophy at Rutgers UniversityOne paper in this issue, from Gerhard Øverland, was not presented at (...) the conference with the rest. He was scheduled to present his paper, but could not attend the conference because he was diagnosed with cancer. He died of cancer shortly after submitting his article to this issue. This is a great loss to his friends and collaborators, and to the philosophical community as a whole.—cover a fairly representative range of these different views. The truth about deontology—including whether it is true at all—is important to criminal law in .. (shrink)

This is the third volume of the new series Social, Political, & Legal Philosophy and it deals with the relationship between Law and The Philosophy of Action. In this volume a number of legal issues are illuminated by resource to the analysis of mental concepts. Issues in Criminal Law, Contract Law, Acceptance of Legal Systems, and the nature of Legal Norms are some of the main issues dealt in the papers that constitute the volume. Conceptual analysis is used and (...) new overtures are made into current findings in the Cognitive Sciences. All of this results in illuminating accounts that throw new light on traditional fundamental legal issues. This volume is a precursor in the powerful theorizing of the Cognitive Sciences that is being brought to bear in the Philosophy of Mind and in the theory of Law, and this theorizing will increase in the coming years. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Actions and the Criminal Law Objects or Conditions of Criminal Responsibility? Actions and (Voluntary) Acts Abandoning the Act Requirement? An Action Presumption? References.

This work provides, for the first time, a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both British and American criminal law and its underlying morality. It defends the view that human actions are volitionally caused body movements. This theory illuminates three major problems in drafting and implementing criminal law--what the voluntary act requirement does and should require, what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require, and when the (...) two actions are the "same" for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy. It provides a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability for legislators, judges, and the lawyers who argue to them. (shrink)

This book is a collection consisting of an introduction and nine essays that explore foundational aspects of criminal law. As the introduction makes clear, the book is eclectic and the essays can be classified under three main headings. The first group of essays explores the political constitution of criminal law as part of the institutional structure of the state. The second group of essays investigates the question of the authority of criminal law and its potential to create (...) reasons for action. The third group deals with transnational and international criminal law. The essays are primarily normative but they also contain historical and sociological discussions. The book will therefore be of interest to criminal lawyers, political and legal philosophers, political scientists and policy-makers. I will review separately some of the essays.Nicola Lacey’s essay, “What Constitutes Criminal Law?,” touches upon the fundamental question of criminal law: the question of legitimation. Lacey ap .. (shrink)

: The paper discusses the contribution that the neuroscience of action can offer to the legal understanding of action control and responsibility in the case of adult individuals. In particular, we address the issues that follow. What are the cognitive capacities that agents must display in order to be held liable to punishment in criminal law? Is the legal model of liability to punishment compatible with a scientifically informed understanding of voluntary behaviour? To what extent should the law take (...) into account people’s subjective feelings about their own actions? As a result of our analyses, we indicate some areas where the contribution of the neuroscience of action to the law is potentially relevant. We focus on the subjectivity mechanisms of action control, specifically the requirement that the agent must violate the law voluntarily in order to be held responsible, and on the factors that modulate the wrongdoer’s experience of agency. Overall, we advocate more cross-disciplinary work, aimed to bridge the gap between conceptual boundaries, on the theme of responsibility for actions. Keywords : Responsibility; Neurolaw; Sense of Agency; Criminal Law; Criminal Liability La responsabilità tra neuroscienza e diritto penale. La componente di controllo dell’imputabilità penale Riassunto : L’articolo discute il contributo che la neuroscienza dell’azione può offrire ai temi del controllo dell’azione e della responsabilità in ambito legale, nel caso degli individui adulti. In particolare, ci occuperemo delle questioni che seguono. Quali sono le abilità cognitive che un agente deve possedere per esser considerato penalmente responsabile e quindi punibile? Il modello legalistico della responsabilità è compatibile con il modello scientifico-naturalistico del comportamento umano? Fino a che punto variazioni nel senso di controllo soggettivo sulle azioni dovrebbero essere considerate un parametro rilevante in sede penale? Sulla scorta della nostra analisi, indicheremo alcune aree nelle quali il contributo della neuroscienza dell’azione a questioni legate al tema della responsabilità legale potrebbe rivelarsi rilevante. L’articolo si concentra sui meccanismi che regolano il senso soggettivo di controllo dell’azione – in particolare il requisito secondo il quale l’agente deve violare la legge volontariamente per essere ritenuto responsabile –, e sui fattori che modulano il senso di agentività del colpevole. In conclusione, difenderemo l’appropriatezza di una più ampia riflessione multi-disciplinare volta a ridurre le incompatibilità fra differenti approcci al tema della responsabilità per le nostre azioni. Parole chiave : Responsabilità; Neurodiritto; Senso di agentività; Diritto penale; Imputabilità penale. (shrink)

In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused bodily movements and nothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in the drafting and the interpretation of criminal codes: 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and (...) should require; 2) what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require ; and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides both legislators and judges a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability. (shrink)

Criminal law exceptionalism, or so I suggest, has turned into an ideology in German and Continental criminal law theory. It rests on interrelated claims about the (ideal or real) extraordinary qualities and properties of the criminal law and has led to exceptional doctrines in constitutional criminal law and criminal law theory. It prima facie paradoxically perpetuates and conserves the criminal law, and all too often leads to ideological thoughtlessness, which may blind us to the (...) dark sides of criminal laws in action. (shrink)

Written by leading philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the criminal law. It sheds theoretical light on the diversity and unity of the general part and advances our understanding of such key issues as criminalisation, omissions, voluntary actions, knowledge, belief, reckelssness, duress, self-defence, entrapment and officially-induced mistake of law.

State agents’ misconduct (SAM), such as the violations carried out by the police or prosecution, may harm an offender’s rights during the criminal process in various ways. What, if anything, can retributivism, as an offense-focused theory that looks to the past, offer in response to SAM? The goal of this essay is to advance a retribution-based framework for responding to SAM within the criminal process. Two retribution-based arguments are provided. First, a retribution-based response to SAM aims to protect (...) the legitimacy of the criminal process. Such an argument is based on how the crime and punishment connect to the moral standing of the state and that connection’s meaning for the legitimacy of the trial (legitimacy-based argument). Second, a retribution-based response to SAM aims to consider the offender’s side of the penal dialogue and promote a more accurate calibration of the penal suffering (compensation-based argument). Based on these arguments, the essay theorizes the legal response for SAM in US and non-US traditions through the retributive lens. The essay concludes with a call for expanding the multiple roles for retributive logic to include the actions of law-enforcement actors and addresses what that expansion means for the justice of the criminal process. (shrink)

In this paper I am specifically concerned with a normative assessment, from the perspective of a principled criminal law theory, of norms criminalizing illegal immigration. The overarching question I will dwell on is one specifically regarding the way of using criminal law which is implied in the enactment of such kinds of norms. My thesis will essentially be that it constitutes a veritable abuse of criminal law. In two senses at least: first, in the sense that by (...) criminalizing illegal immigration criminal law puts a ban on (certain categories of) persons, rather than on their actions/omissions, in a way in which a principled criminal law should not do; and—second—in the sense that the criminalization of illegal immigrants represents a perversion of the criminal law, being a case in which criminal norms are (unjustifiably) used as means to attain extrapenal aims. (shrink)

This is the third volume of the new series _Social, Political, & Legal Philosophy_ and it deals with the relationship between Law and The Philosophy of Action. In this volume a number of legal issues are illuminated by resource to the analysis of mental concepts. Issues in Criminal Law, Contract Law, Acceptance of Legal Systems, and the nature of Legal Norms are some of the main issues dealt in the papers that constitute the volume. Conceptual analysis is used and (...) new overtures are made into current findings in the Cognitive Sciences. All of this results in illuminating accounts that throw new light on traditional fundamental legal issues. This volume is a precursor in the powerful theorizing of the Cognitive Sciences that is being brought to bear in the Philosophy of Mind and in the theory of Law, and this theorizing will increase in the coming years. (shrink)

Prominent theories of the criminal law borrow heavily from the two leading theories of temptation—the evaluative conception of temptation, which conceives emotion and desire as essentially involving a kind of evaluation, and the mechanistic conception of temptation, which conceives emotion and desire as essentially involving felt motivation. As I explain, both conceptions of temptation are inconsistent with the possibility of akratic action, that is, action contrary to a person’s conscious better judgment. Both are inconsistent with the possibility of akratic (...) action because both are covertly inconsistent with a two-fold psychological assumption that undergirds common beliefs about human action and lies at the heart of the law of criminal responsibility: that resisting a powerful temptation is extremely difficult yet not ordinarily impossible. I reveal these inconsistencies and offer in place of the leading theories of temptation a theory of affective desire as primitive psychic attraction, an elemental psychological state typically accompanied by evaluation and motivation but not reducible to either one. I then show how this theory of desire is consistent with the possibility of akratic action, with the two-fold psychological assumption at the heart of the law of criminal responsibility, and, in particular, with the defense of provocation. (shrink)

Today, there are several problems in the field of criminal law caused both by the emergence of new types of legal relations and by the imperfection of legislation. Due to the emergence of new challenges in the field of criminal law, many of them require theoretical understanding. Some of these challenges, generated in the light of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, revealed several reasons for discussion in the Ukrainian and international legal community. The purpose (...) of the study involves consideration of certain aspects of modern challenges in the field of criminal-legal relations, which arose against the background of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The first part of the study is devoted to the question of the qualification of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as acts of genocide. The second part of the work is devoted to the issue of using existing international legal mechanisms to hold the Russian Federation accountable for war crimes. There are convincing reasons to say that the actions of the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine have signs of the crime of genocide. Even though Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Ukrainian government can use another tool to bring the subjects of war crimes to justice, by creating a certain mixed investigative mechanism or a criminal tribunal that could deal directly with the crime of aggression. (shrink)

Even when a person appears to have consented to another’s interference with her interests, we sometimes treat this apparent consent as ineffective. This may either be because the law does not permit consent to validate the actions concerned, or because the consent is undermined by the presence of additional factors which render it insufficiently autonomous to be effective. In this paper I propose that the project of categorising and systematically analysing the latter set of cases, would be furthered by (...) recognising (1) that prima facie consent is undermined when the prima facie consenter’s autonomy to choose whether or not to consent has been unfairly constrained, and (2) that theoretical and doctrinal clarity can be promoted by analysing the factors that unfairly constrain autonomy in the criminal law using a framework developed in contract law to determine analogous questions arising in relation to assent to a contract. (shrink)

In this essay we explain some of the problems of the Venezuelan criminal justice sub-system and, in general, the criminal law enforcement. That is to say, that which is expressed in the persecutory actions of the investigating authorities and the criminal courts, after having established in Venezuela a Carl Schmitt concept of Dual State with the purpose of eliminating “bourgeois” democracy and implanting the model of so-called Socialism of the XXI Century. In this sense, it is (...) a question of identifying the flagrant persecution and violation of human rights of those who do not have the capacity to resist the attacks emanating from the State in the abusive use of coercion and legal violence. With the Dual State want to impose an utopia by force, which leads to dystopia, due to the division and polarization of society with the dichotomous politics of friend-enemy, In a process of etiquette and "demonization" of the enemy. (shrink)

The question of excusing in law has been the subject of different philosophical theories of responsibility. These theories attempt to shed light on the nature and function of legal excuses and to justify their role in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the issue of excusing in law from two theoretical standpoints: the character theory and the choice theory of responsibility. The two theories differ on the kinds of causes of action they each find to provide the basis (...) for holding people responsible. The character theory focuses on character, the choice theory on choice and the capacity to choose. Following a brief introduction in which the fundamental distinction between justification and excuse is outlined, the character theory of responsibility is explained with special attention being paid to the work of George Fletcher, which has made a significant impact on the field of criminal law philosophy in recent years. Then follows a critical discussion of the choice theory as elaborated by H.L.A. Hart, one of the most influential legal theorists of our times. The paper concludes that the character theory of responsibility, by drawing attention to what lies behind and motivates actual choices, offers a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of human actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements regarding those actions. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the nascent literature on Moral Uncertainty Theory and explore its application to the criminal law. Moral Uncertainty Theory seeks to address the question of what we ought to do when we are uncertain about what to do because we are torn between rival moral theories. For instance, we may have some credence in one theory that tells us to do A but also in another that tells us to do B. We examine how we (...) might decide whether or not to criminalize some conduct when we are unsure as to whether or not the conduct is morally permitted, and whether or not it is permissible to criminalize the conduct. We also look at how we might make sentencing decisions under moral uncertainty. We argue that Moral Uncertainty Theory can be an illuminating way to address these questions, but find that doing so is a lot more complicated than applying Moral Uncertainty Theory to individual conduct. (shrink)

Criminal law exceptionalism, or so I suggest, has turned into an ideology in German and Continental criminal law theory. It rests on interrelated claims about the (ideal or real) extraordinary qualities and properties of the criminal law and has led to exceptional doctrines in constitutional criminal law and criminal law theory. It prima facie paradoxically perpetuates and conserves the criminal law, and all too often leads to ideological thoughtlessness, which may blind us to the (...) dark sides of criminal laws in action. (shrink)

In this chapter we introduce the nascent literature on Moral Uncertainty Theory and explore its application to the criminal law. Moral Uncertainty Theory seeks to address the question of what we ought to do when we are uncertain about what to do because we are torn between rival moral theories. For instance, we may have some credence in one theory that tells us to do A but also in another that tells us to do B. We examine how we (...) might decide whether or not to criminalize some conduct when we are unsure as to whether or not the conduct is morally permitted and whether or not it is permissible to criminalize the conduct. We also look at how we might make sentencing decisions under moral uncertainty. We argue that Moral Uncertainty Theory can be an illuminating way to address these questions but find that doing so is a lot more complicated than applying Moral Uncertainty Theory to individual conduct. (shrink)

Five pre-eminent legal theorists tackle a range of fundamental questions on the nature of the philosophy of criminal law. Their essays explore the extent to which and the ways in which our systems of criminal law can be seen as rational and principled. The essays discuss some of the principles by which, it is often thought, a system of law should be structured, and they ask whether our own systems are genuinely principled or riven by basic contradictions, reflecting (...) deeper political and social conflicts. The volume as a whole shows how lively and exciting contemporary legal theory can be. (shrink)

The author examines two proposals to expand legal recognition of individual control over physical integrity. Protections for individual autonomy are discussed in relation to the right to die, euthanasia, medical treatment, and consensual and assaultive sexual behaviours. The author argues that at present, the legal doctrine of consent protects only those individual preferences which are seen to be congruent with dominant societal values; social preferences and convenience override all other individual choices. Under these conditions, more freedom to waive rights of (...) physical integrity can only place socially vulnerable persons at great risk of abuse. (shrink)

Five pre-eminent legal theorists tackle a range of fundamental questions on the nature of the philosophy of criminal law. Their essays explore the extent to which and the ways in which our systems of criminal law can be seen as rational and principled. The essays discuss some of the principles by which, it is often thought, a system of law should be structured, and they ask whether our own systems are genuinely principled or riven by basic contradictions, reflecting (...) deeper political and social conflicts. The volume as a whole shows how lively and exciting contemporary legal theory can be. (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in a certain area of the ‘law and emotion’ field, namely the literature on the role of affect in the criminal law. Following the dominance of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotions, authors moved away from seeing emotions as contaminations on reason and examined how affective reactions could be accommodated within penal proceedings. The review is structured into two main components. I look first at contributions about the multi-dimensional presence of emotions (...) within ordinary criminal proceedings. Second, I examine work done on the use of criminal trials under the emotionally stressful circumstances of post-conflict societies. In the conclusion I sketch a theoretical proposal for moving the discussion forward. (shrink)

Recent years have seen mounting challenge to the model of the criminal trial on the grounds it is not cost-effective, not preventive, not necessary, not appropriate, or not effective. These challenges have led to changes in the scope of the criminal law, in criminal procedure, and in the nature and use of criminal trials. These changes include greater use of diversion, of fixed penalties, of summary trials, of hybrid civil–criminal processes, of strict liability, of incentives (...) to plead guilty, and of preventive orders. The paper will assess the implications of these changes for the function of the criminal law, assessing the reasons behind them, and examining whether or not they are to be welcomed. Identifying the larger import of these changes draws attention to the changing relationship between state and citizen as well as changes in the nature of the state itself. These can in turn be attributed to a jostling among the different manifestations of the authoritarian state, the preventive state, and the regulatory state. These changes have profound normative implications for a liberal theory of the criminal law that require its re-articulation and its defence. A modest start may be to insist that where the conduct is criminal and the consequences are punitive the protections of criminal procedure and trial must be upheld. (shrink)

This Article defines four distinct conceptions of cruelty found in underdeveloped form in domestic and international criminal law sources. The definition is analytical, focusing on the types of agency, victimization, causality, and values in each conception of cruelty. But no definition of cruelty will do justice to its object until complemented by the kind of understanding practical reason provides of the implications of the phenomenon of cruelty. -/- No one should be neutral in relation to cruelty. Eminently, cruelty in (...) criminal law, a human-created phenomenon, vigorously calls for responses in the form of preventive and corrective action on the part of private and public actors. It is in this sense that cruelty is a problem of practical reason, one of action preoccupied with its legal or moral obligations, rational grounds, value commitments, and actual consequences. -/- However, the connection between conceptions of cruelty and the implications practical reason can draw from the correct application of a conception of cruelty to phenomena in the world remains too detached to be able to capture and explain people's actual experiences both of seeing cruelty in the world and of confronting the question of what to do about cruelty and how to address its cultural and institutional aspects. Something is missing. -/- What is missing is the integration of conceptions of cruelty and the practical reason implications of detecting cruelty in the world into normative models which operate as meaning matrixes for cognition, meaning, and action. This Article undertakes this explanatory task through an exercise of reconstructing seminal philosophical ideas about cruelty. The result is that the four conceptions of cruelty are placed within three distinct normative models, which ultimately render intelligible legal conceptions of cruelty and legal reactions to it. (shrink)

Who should define what constitutes ethical and lawful medical practice? Judges? Doctors? Scientists? Or someone else entirely? This volume analyses how effectively criminal law operates as a forum for resolving ethical conflict in the delivery of health care. It addresses key questions such as: how does criminal law regulate controversial bioethical areas? What effect, positive or negative, does the use of criminal law have when regulating bioethical conflict? And can the law accommodate moral controversy? By exploring (...) class='Hi'>criminal law in theory and in practice and examining the broad field of bioethics as opposed to the narrower terrain of medical ethics, it offers balanced arguments that will help readers form reasoned views on the ethical legitimacy of the invocation and use of criminal law to regulate medical and scientific practice and bioethical issues. (shrink)

Who should define what constitutes ethical and lawful medical practice? Judges? Doctors? Scientists? Or someone else entirely? This volume analyses how effectively criminal law operates as a forum for resolving ethical conflict in the delivery of health care. It addresses key questions such as: how does criminal law regulate controversial bioethical areas? What effect, positive or negative, does the use of criminal law have when regulating bioethical conflict? And can the law accommodate moral controversy? By exploring (...) class='Hi'>criminal law in theory and in practice and examining the broad field of bioethics as opposed to the narrower terrain of medical ethics, it offers balanced arguments that will help readers form reasoned views on the ethical legitimacy of the invocation and use of criminal law to regulate medical and scientific practice and bioethical issues. (shrink)

This volume is the first of a new group of collections in the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law series. Each volume of the series will involve collaboration between editor and authors aimed at giving these volumes a sort of thematic unity often lacking in attempts to collect state of the art thinking on a particular topic. If the quality of this offering is representative of what is to come, we have much to look forward to in subsequent volumes.

Tenth annual conference at the University of Manchester, 8th-10th April 1983.

The purpose of the paper is to discover a rationale for the practice of attaching excuses to criminal responsibility. I do this by criticizing the theory of h l a hart that we adopt this practice largely because it gives persons more power to predict and determine their liability to punishment than would a system of "strict" liability. I extract from my criticisms of hart the alternative theory that we adopt the institution of excuses because it insures that persons (...) do not assume burdens beyond what it is necessary to assume for the benefits of the legal system to accrue to all. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that any acceptable-- and perhaps even imaginable-- legal system must assign to citizens certain rights not to be aggressed against. I argue that this is not so. Typical legal systems certain assign duties of non-aggression; but the criminal branches of those systems do not assign corresponding rights. The civil branches may, but not to an extent that supports Thomson's thesis.