The essentially comparative conception of value entails that the value of a state of affairs does not depend solely upon features intrinsic to the state of affairs, but also upon extrinsic features, such as the set of feasible alternatives. It has been argued that this conception of value gives us reason to abandon the transitivity of the better than relation. This paper shows that the support for intransitivity derived from this conception of value is very limited. On its most (...) plausible interpretations, it merely provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intransitivity. It is further argued that the essentially comparative conception of value appears to support a disjunctive conclusion: there is incommensurability of value or betterness is not transitive. Of these two alternatives, incommensurability is preferable, because it is far less threatening to our other axiological commitments. (shrink)

After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961-2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed.

I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.

Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution (...) to this problem. I will then investigate Kamm’s justification for rejecting the transitivity of the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation. Next, I will look at Dorsey’s solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate the problem. I will argue that neither of these solutions are fully satisfying before going on to provide my own solution to the problem and arguing that it avoids these problems. (shrink)

“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H ?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H ?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have (...) a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects. (shrink)

We introduce, in a general setting, an ‘‘analytic’’ version of standard equational calculi of combinatory logic. Analyticity lies on the one side in the fact that these calculi are characterized by the presence of combinatory introduction rules in place of combinatory axioms, and on the other side in that the transitivity rule proves to be eliminable. Apart from consistency, which follows immediately, we discuss other almost direct consequences of analyticity and the main transitivity elimination theorem; in particular the (...) Church−Rosser and the leftmostreduction theorems for the associated notions of reduction. The last two sections deal with analytic combinatory calculi with the extensionality rule added. Here, as far as the elimination of transitivity is concerned, we have only partial results, which unfortunately do not cover, at present, full CL + Ext. Yet, they are sufficient to prove the decidability of weaker combinatory calculi with extensionality, including e.g. BCK + Ext. (shrink)

In the recent paper “Naive modus ponens”, Zardini presents some brief considerations against an approach to semantic paradoxes that rejects the transitivity of entailment. The problem with the approach is, according to Zardini, that the failure of a meta-inference closely resembling modus ponens clashes both with the logical idea of modus ponens as a valid inference and the semantic idea of the conditional as requiring that a true conditional cannot have true antecedent and false consequent. I respond on behalf (...) of the non-transitive approach. I argue that the meta-inference in question is independent from the logical idea of modus ponens, and that the semantic idea of the conditional as formulated by Zardini is inadequate for his purposes because it is spelled out in a vocabulary not suitable for evaluating the adequacy of the conditional in semantics for non-transitive entailment. I proceed to generalize the semantic idea of the conditional and show that the most popular semantics for non-transitive entailment satisfies the new formulation. (shrink)

There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the (...) whole chain of reasoning must also acceptable. In this paper I focus on whether there are good philosophical reasons for thinking that the consensus that good reasoning must satisfy cut is true. My central claim is that we should not accept the consensus—good reasoning might not satisfy cut. In particular, I consider four arguments for the consensus and explain why they are unpersuasive. (§2-5). I then show that the issue of whether good reasoning is cut turns on a substantive yet until now unnoticed question in epistemology (§6). (shrink)

Mainstream economics, with its rational actor models, appears to be against common sense. For example, it does not take into account how tribal people are. They have a group identity and they are largely concerned with perpetuating that identity. I propose that mainstream economics is not more opposed to common sense than alternative frameworks. The appendix introduces a counterexample to transitivity of preferences, which I assume is where the chief value of the paper is.

In this section we shall publish brief communications commenting on published papers or bringing up special points of interest which can be discussed by correspondence.

The primary aim of this thesis is to examine some of the arguments that have been leveled against the idea that all value bearing entities are comparable. A secondary aim is to investigate some putative properties of the relation ‘better than', especially transitivity and vagueness. Also, some of the consequences of accepting incomparability are investigated, both with regards to other value theoretical issues, such as the implications for monadic value predicates, and with regards to more applied issues, such as (...) the comparison of risks. PAPER I is a critical examination of the so-called small-improvement argument for incomparability. It is demonstrated that the value structure this argument is able to distinguish is compatible not only with incomparability but also with a kind of evaluative indeterminacy that is distinct from incomparability. PAPER II argues that if the possibility of non-conventional value relations is granted it follows that some things that have value are neither good, bad, nor neutral. This counterintuitive conclusion is reached by combining two individually plausible analyses of value. PAPER III addresses the phenomenon of incomplete preferences. It is shown how it is possible to model incomplete preference orderings by means of probabilistic preferences, and how to reveal an agent's incomplete preference ordering within a behaviorist framework. PAPER IV examines another version of the small-improvement argument designed to establish the rationality of incomplete preferences. It is argued that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in this version, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises. And without support for the conjunction of the premises the small-improvement argument for incomparability fails. PAPER V defends the common sense claim that ‘better than' is transitive against the compelling counterexamples provided by Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels. It is demonstrated that the contradiction that follows from accepting Temkin and Rachels' premises trades on the vagueness of ‘better than', and so does not warrant the rejection of transitivity, but rather the conclusion that ‘better than' is vague. PAPER VI applies the notions of incommensurability and incomparability to comparative risk analysis. It is argued that if risks are incommensurable, and thereby resistant to accurate comparisons in terms of severity, we cannot perform accurate and cost effective trade-offs between risks and their associated benefits. (shrink)

Derek Parfit presents his Mere Addition Paradox in order to demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. And in order to avoid it, Parfit has embraced perfectionism. However, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin, taking their lead from Parfit, have concluded, instead, that the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by denying the axiom of transitivity with respect to the all-things-considered-better-than relation. But this seems to present a major challenge to how we evaluate normatively. In this article (...) I show how the Mere Addition Paradox and the Repugnant Conclusion can both be avoided without subscribing to perfectionism, and without sacrificing the axiom of transitivity. (shrink)

In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that (...) is better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Reply to ramachandran on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis, Volume 52, Issue 2, 1 April 1992, Pages 77–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.2.

Recent studies on colonial discourse have demonstrated that the speeches of freedom activists in colonial Africa served as sites of resistance. One key text type that has, however, been neglected in the critical literature on the discourse of emancipation is the national anthem of colonised states. To fill this gap, the present study examines the discursive enactment of resistance in the anthems of former British colonies in Africa, focusing on the transitivity framework in systemic functional linguistics. Semantic and structural (...) parallelisms across the anthems are identified as evidence of a collective memory, a cultural trauma reconfigured and reconstituted to reclaim a positive identity and project a desirable postcolonial future. They also foreground the motif of freedom and legitimise the African as the owner of the reclaimed territory. These procedures articulate an anti-imperialist and anti-establishment stance that provides hope, strength and encouragement to an oppressed group. This paper extends the scholarship on the discursive enactment of resistance by focusing attention on a context underexplored in the literature. It also illustrates the (re)construction of relevant ideologies in national anthems to stimulate desirable, progressive attitudes among citizenry in African states. The paper is furthermore significant to decolonial research and highlights the role of language in political decolonisation processes. (shrink)

This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and that in (...) some circumstances, at least, these mighthave deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, hisTime-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-DependentPerson-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought todo, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’tapply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that thetwo Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Argumentsare contradictory. I question Horta’s position that there isno point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on thebasis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solvethe predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude mypaper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views aboutnontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatiblewith the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor. (shrink)

Silent gesture is not considered to be linguistic, on par with spoken and sign languages. It is claimed that silent gestures, unlike language, represent events holistically, without compositional structure. However, recent research has demonstrated that gesturers use consistent strategies when representing objects and events, and that there are behavioral and clinically relevant limits on what form a gesture may take to effect a particular meaning. This systematicity challenges a holistic interpretation of silent gesture, which predicts that there should be no (...) stable form‐meaning correspondence across event representations. Here, we demonstrate to the contrary that untrained gesturers systematically manipulate the form of their gestures when representing events with and without a theme (e.g., Someone popped the balloon vs. Someone walked), that is, transitive and intransitive events. We elicited silent gestures and annotated them for manual features active in coding transitivity distinctions in sign languages. We trained linear support vector machines to make item‐by‐item transitivity predictions based on these features. Prediction accuracy was good across the entire dataset, thus demonstrating that systematicity in silent gesture can be explained with recourse to subunits. We argue that handshape features are constructs co‐opted from cognitive systems subserving manual action production and comprehension for communicative purposes, which may integrate into the linguistic system of emerging sign languages. We further suggest that nonsigners tend to map event participants to each hand, a strategy found across genetically and geographically distinct sign languages, suggesting the strategy's cognitive foundation. (shrink)

This paper examines the logic of conditional obligation, which originates from the works of Hansson, Lewis, and others. Some weakened forms of transitivity of the betterness relation are studied. These are quasi-transitivity, Suzumura consistency, acyclicity and the interval order condition. The first three do not change the logic. The axiomatic system is the same whether or not they are introduced. This holds true under a rule of interpretation in terms of maximality and strong maximality. The interval order condition (...) gives rise to a new axiom. Depending on the rule of interpretation, this one changes. With the rule of maximality, one obtains the principle known as disjunctive rationality. With the rule of strong maximality, one obtains the Spohn axiom (also known as the principle of rational monotony, or Lewis’ axiom CV). A completeness theorem further substantiates these observations. For interval order, this yields the finite model property and decidability of the calculus. (shrink)

The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical (...) and economic arguments against intransitive (cyclical) choice, before concluding that intransitive choices can be justified. (shrink)

This paper offers a politolinguistic analysis of four ‘state of the nation’ speeches delivered by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán between 1999 and 2002. The analysis focuses on the ways in which Orbán’s self-representation, his discourse strategies and the tone of the speeches changed in response to changes in the ideological background over the four years in question. The findings demonstrate that Orbán’s voice was most active in the pre-election speech of 2002, that he had become increasingly interpellative (in (...) the Althusserian sense) over this period and that he increasingly tried to conversationalize the dominant ideology. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity (...) claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option. (shrink)

We study political influence in institutions where each member chooses a level of support for a collective goal. These individual choices determine the degree to which the goal is reached. Influence is assessed by newly defined binary relations, each of which ranks members on the basis of their relative performance at a corresponding level of participation. For institutions with three options (e.g., voting games in which each voter may vote “yes”, “abstain”, or vote “no”), we obtain three influence relations, and (...) show that their strict components may be cyclic. This latter property describes a “paradox of power” which contrasts with the transitivity of the unique influence relation of binary voting games. Weak conditions of anonymity suffice for each of these relations to be transitive. We also obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for each of these relations to be complete. Further, we characterize institutions in which the rankings induced by these relations, and the Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik power indices coincide. We argue that extending the influence relations to firms would be useful in efficiently assigning workers to different units of production. Finally, we provide applications to various forms of political and economic organizations. (shrink)

Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximalelement rationalizability on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when (...) the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations. (shrink)

In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that (...) is better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Reply to wright on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis, Volume 45, Issue 4, 1 October 1985, Pages 200–202, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/45.4.2.

ABSTRACT This paper draws upon transitivity and Appraisal within Systemic Functional Linguistics to study the traumatic discourse of Nanjing Massacre in Chinese Mainland’s and Japan’s history textbooks. Through corpus analysis, this research finds that the Chinese discourse mainly uses effective process, relational process, verbal process to construe Japan’s victimizering experience and China’s victimhood, and employs negative Affect, opposite values of Judgment, negative Appreciation, Expand, Raise and Sharpen to construct a critical voice for the Japanese army and a sympathic tone (...) for the Chinese. By contrast, the Japanese discourse largely uses pseudo-effective and middle processes, mental and existential processes to cover up Japan’s victimizering experience, and employs negative Judgment, positive Appreciation, Contract and Raise to construct an almost uncritical voice for the Japanese army and the massacre. The difference in the representation and evaluation of Nanjing Massacre results from the politics of official memories in both countries. As China endeavors to strengthen its patriotic education by using Nanjing Massacre as an ideological weapon for national solidarity, Japan expedites its nationalist historiography move to recreate its normal national image by marginalizing the massacre. (shrink)