Analyse & Kritik 29 (2):163-187 (2007)

Abstract
Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized inthispaperongeneraldomainsandwithout full transitivity of rationalizing relations
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DOI 10.1515/auk-2007-0204
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