We present a visual world eye-tracking study on Tseltal (a Mayan language) and investigate whether verbal information can be used to anticipate an upcoming referent. Basic word order in transitive sentences in Tseltal is Verb–Object–Subject (VOS). The verb is usually encountered first, making argument structure and syntactic information available at the outset, which should facilitate anticipation of the post-verbal arguments. Tseltal speakers listened to verb-initial sentences with either an object-predictive verb (e.g., “eat”) or a general verb (e.g., “look for”) (...) (e.g., “Ya slo’/sle ta stukel on te kereme,” Is eating/is looking (for) by himself the avocado the boy/ “The boy is eating/is looking (for) an avocado by himself”) while seeing a visual display showing one potential referent (e.g., avocado) and three distractors (e.g., bag, toy car, coffee grinder). We manipulated verb type (predictive vs. general) and recorded participants' eye movements while they listened and inspected the visual scene. Participants’ fixations to the target referent were analyzed using multilevel logistic regression models. Shortly after hearing the predictive verb, participants fixated the target object before it was mentioned. In contrast, when the verb was general, fixations to the target only started to increase once the object was heard. Our results suggest that Tseltal hearers pre-activate semantic features of the grammatical object prior to its linguistic expression. This provides evidence from a verb-initial language for online incremental semantic interpretation and anticipatory processing during language comprehension. These processes are comparable to the ones identified in subject-initial languages, which is consistent with the notion that different languages follow similar universal processing principles. (shrink)

We use the comparative method of language acquisition research to investigate children’s expression of directional expressions in two Eastern Mayan languages – K’iche’ and Mam. Both languages add clitics derived from verbs such as ‘go’ and ‘stay’ to their verb complex to express the direction an agent takes in the course of accomplishing an event. Historic changes to the prosodic structure of the verb complex in both languages explain why the directional clitics are predominately postverbal in (...) K’iche’, while they occur in preverbal and postverbal positions in Mam. Prosody explains why K’iche’ children initially produce clitics postverbally, while Mam children produce clitics both preverbally and postverbally. Prosody also explains why the children acquiring both languages produce morphemes in the verb complex that are relatively infrequent but prosodically prominent, while omitting obligatory morphemes that are prosodically weak. (shrink)

Anthropologists have provided rich field descriptions of the norms and conventions governing behavior and interactions in small-scale societies. Here, we add a further dimension to this work by presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, to a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population, with the specific goal of exploring the hypothesis that certain moral principles apply universally. We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed (...) nations, the Mayan participants judged harms caused as the means to a greater good as more forbidden than harms caused as a side-effect (i.e., side-effect bias). However, unlike these other populations living in large-scale societies, as well as a more educated and less rural Mayan comparison group, the target rural Mayan participants did not judge actions causing harm as worse than omissions (i.e., omission bias). A series of probes targeting the action-omission distinction suggest that the absence of an omission bias among the rural Mayan participants was not due to difficulties comprehending the dilemmas, using the judgment scale, or in attributing a greater causal role for actions over omissions. Thus, while the moral distinction between means and side-effect may be more universal, the moral distinction between actions and omission appears to be open to greater cross-cultural variation. We discuss these results in light of issues concerning the role of biological constraints and cultural variation in moral decision-making, as well as the limitations of such experimental, cross-cultural research. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to test the claim that languages universally employ morphosyntactic marking to differentiate events of more‐ versus less‐direct causation, preferring to mark them with less‐ and more‐ overt marking, respectively (e.g., Somebody broke the window vs. Somebody MADE the window break; *Somebody cried the boy vs. Somebody MADE the boy cry). To this end, we investigated whether a recent computational model which learns to predict speakers’ by‐verb relative preference for the two causatives in English, (...) Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese, and K'iche’ Mayan is able to generalize to a sixth language on which it has never been trained: Balinese. Judgments of the relative acceptability of the less‐ and more‐transparent causative forms of 60 verbs were collected from 48 native‐speaking Balinese adults. The composite crosslinguistic computational model was able to predict these judgments, not only for verbs that it had seen, but also––in a split‐half validation test––to verbs that it had never seen in any language. A “random‐semantics” model showed only a relatively small decrement in performance with seen verbs, whose behavior can be learned on a verb‐by‐verb basis, but achieved zero correlation with human judgments when generalizing to unseen verbs. Together, these findings suggest that Balinese conceptualizes directness of causation in a similar way to these unrelated languages, and therefore constitute support for the view that the distinction between more‐ versus less‐distinct causation constitutes a morphosyntactic universal. (shrink)

This volume provides an overview of experimental methods, approaches, and techniques used by field linguists of the Russian school, and highlights the fieldwork experience of Russian scholars working in regions with a range of languages that differ genetically, typologically, and in the degree of their preservation. The collection presents language and sociolinguistic data relating to fieldwork in diverse languages: Uralic, Altaic, Paleo-Siberian, Yeniseian, Indo-European Iranian, Vietic, Kra-Day, and Mayan languages, as well as pidgin. The authors highlight (...) the fieldwork techniques they use, and the principles underlying them. The volume’s multidisciplinary approach covers linguistic, ethnolinguistic, sociolinguistic, educational, and ethnocultural issues. The authors explore problems associated with the study of minority languages and indicate diverse and creative techniques for data elicitation. Close collaboration with speakers lies at the core of their approach. The collection presents strategies for eliciting systems of knowledge from mother-tongue speakers, triggering linguistic self-awareness, and providing semantic and morphosyntactic context for their languages. This publication is intended for academics, and for specialists in the field of linguistics and minority and indigenous languages. It will also benefit students as a guide to field research, as well as language activists, interested in documenting and preserving their mother tongue. (shrink)

TEXT: D. and A. Bolles, 1996, A Grammar of the Yucatecan Mayan Language/The Expoloits of Juan Thul, The Trickster Rabbit. http://www.famsi.org/reports/96072/grammar/section42.html. GLOSSES & TRANSLATION: See the text pdf at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~mbittner/ym.html. ONLINE UPDATE: See Bittner 2004 ‘Online Update: Quantified de se and polysynthesis’. The following table lists some basic symbols of the semantic representation language to be used.

Zinacantec Family Homesign is a new sign language emerging spontaneously over the past three decades in a single family in a remote Mayan Indian village. Three deaf siblings, their Tzotzil-speaking age-mates, and now their children, who have had contact with no other deaf people, represent the first generation of Z signers. I postulate an augmented grammaticalization path, beginning with the adoption of a Tzotzil cospeech holophrastic gesture—meaning “come!”—into Z, and then its apparent stylization as an attention-getting sign, followed by (...) grammatical regimentation and pragmatic generalization as an utterance initial change of speaker or turn marker. (shrink)

While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from the (...) actual ontological commitments that scientists do through their scientific theories. Certainly, we know scientific theories through some specific scientific language, which is, in its turn, a subset of the natural language developed by a particular culture. This study is conducted to explore and evaluate some of the most important epistemological consequences of these ontological commitments, specially the so-called ‘truth-commitment’ and its relation with a linguistic-cultural framework. There is an interesting debate between advocates and opponents of scientific realistic view of the natural world. Some lines of scientific realism argumentation assure that: (i) Mature scientific theories are approximately true. (ii) There are entities and organisms in the world that correspond with the ontology presupposed by the best scientific theories within a specific domain of scientific research and (iii) The new acceptable scientific theories should explain why past theories were successful predecessors (Colyvan 2008, Cocchiarella 2007 & Laudan 1981). Contrary, anti- realist positions ensure against the realist’s true - claim that is a semantic commitment - that the purpose of scientific theories to found the truth it is simple an unattainable goal, especially if the kind of truth they are looking for is a corresponding relation between scientific theories and the ontology of the world. Anti-realist positions held that this relation could be circular and unknowable. I do believe that there is a deep confusion between the way in which we accede to the knowledge of the constitutive structures, entities and organisms of the world (which is an epistemological matter) and the way these structures, entities and organisms are (which is an ontological matter). It seems that there is a bridge between the epistemological and ontological aspect in need for conceptual clarification. I do propose that the type of link between the two extremes have to be linguistic in nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Crafting Marks Into MeaningsJoseph S. CatalanoIn his fascinating book about the Mayan Code, Michael D. Coe writes, “I challenge any native English speaker to avoid thinking of the word ‘twelve’ when looking at ‘12,’ or an Italian to avoid the utterance ‘dodici’ when going through the same performance.” 1 I accept the challenge, and claim that I have done just that. What shall the reply be—“I should not (...) have done so?” One suspects that linguists confuse theoretical problems about writing and reading with the experience itself.The nature of reading and writing is difficult to understand because on the one hand it seems to involve a complex of conventional marks, but on the other hand these marks seem capable of being understood independently of their relationship to speech or to things. One can claim, of course, that the competent reader works under an illusion: meaning comes to a script through spoken language, through a deep-structured language, through concepts, or through the way the neurons work in the brain. Without denying that the written word enters into many relations, I want to make a case that the history of writing shows that we have crafted marks into meanings and, therefore, that a text is meaningful on the level of the script itself.Before proceeding, I want both to clarify my use of the term “script,” and to give the basic outline of this essay. Studies on writing frequently distinguish among writing systems, scripts, and orthographies. Writing system is the most general of these terms. For example, the alphabet forms one writing system, and Chinese characters another. A script is a particular form of writing system; examples are the Roman alphabetic script and the Greek alphabetic script. An orthography is the way a particular language uses a script; for example, the way the English or [End Page 47] French languages use the Roman alphabetic script. In the concrete, however, there are only orthographies, and without wishing to challenge the traditional distinction, I will frequently interchange script and orthography.The first part of the essay is a discussion of my perspective on writing. My perspective is a substantive part of my case about writing, and I will clarify it at some length. Then I will examine some of the steps that led to our ability to read and write fluently. I will be recommending that in reading histories about writing, we view speech merely as a mediation through which written marks are crafted into meanings. My claim is that every artifact, indeed, every thing, needs to be correctly “read” in order to be used, and that the invention of an elegant system of writing lifts this readability from its specific materiality. For example, to use a fork properly one must be able to read this use in the fork. Language lifts this readability from the matter of the fork, the silver or stainless steel, and makes the readability itself an object.IRecall the last time you were engrossed while reading a novel. Most likely, you were not concerned with questions about the meaning of meaning or the difference between meaning and signification. But did your engaged reading and writing involve an inner speech and, if it did, how did you recognize homonyms, for example the difference between there and their? I suspect that only a small part of our vocabulary is acquired by vocalization. But more importantly, I want to question whether writing must be related to speech to be understood.Frank Smith has persistently questioned the belief that reading must involve vocalizations, and he has criticized the notion that the best way to proceed with reading instruction is by mapping speech onto print. In Understanding Reading, he writes: “Phonics is complicated.... We now know that if we really expect to give children a mastery of phonetics, that we are not talking about a dozen or so rules. We are talking about 166 rules, which will still not account for hundreds of the words they might expect to meet in their early reading.” 2In Reading, he notes: “How is it possible to recognize written words without sounding them out? The answer is that we recognize words in... (shrink)

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and (...) more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. (shrink)

The Argument from Disagreement (AD) (Mackie, 1977) depends upon empirical evidence for ‘fundamental’ moral disagreement (FMD) (Doris and Stich, 2005; Doris and Plakias, 2008). Research on the Southern ‘culture of honour’ (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) has been presented as evidence for FMD between Northerners and Southerners within the US. We raise some doubts about the usefulness of such data in settling AD. We offer an alternative based on recent work in moral psychology that targets the potential universality of morally significant (...) distinctions (e.g. means vs. side-effects, actions versus omissions). More specifically, we argue that a recent study showing that a rural Mayan population fails to perceive as morally significant the distinction between actions and omissions provides a plausible case of FMD between Mayans and Westerners. (shrink)

Resumen En esta discusión expongo algunas objeciones a las siguientes tesis de Velázquez 2020: 1) que tanto Descartes como Frege sostienen que las entidades aritméticas son irreductibles a procesos empíricos; 2) que, en el caso de Descartes, dichas entidades son “perennes, inherentes a la propia constitución y funcionamiento de la mente” y 3) que Frege impugnó la filosofía matemática de Mill por psicologista. Sostengo que la segunda tesis no es, per se, controversial, pero que sí lo es en el contexto (...) del artículo de Velázquez.In this discussion I present objections to the following theses in Velázquez 2020: 1) that both Descartes and Frege maintain that arithmetic entities are irreducible to empirical processes; 2) that, in the case of Descartes, these entities are “perennial, inherent to the very constitution and functioning of the mind”, and 3) that Frege contested Mill’s mathematical philosophy for being psychologistic. I argue that the second thesis is not, per se, controversial, but that it is controversial in the context of Velázquez’s article. (shrink)

A dominant trend in the philosophical literature on abortion has been concerned with the question of whether the fetus has moral status and how such a status might or might not conflict with women's liberties. However, a new and powerful trend against abortion requires philosophical examination. We refer to this trend as the paternalistic argument. In a nutshell, this argument holds that, insofar as motherhood is a constitutive end of women's well-being, abortion harms women; thus, abortion is wrong and should (...) be prohibited, restricted, or avoided when possible regardless of the moral status of the fetus. In this article we undertake three tasks. First, we analyze four variations of this reasoning: what we call the Kantian PA, the Aristotelian PA, the Catholic Church PA, and the Psychological PA. Second, we show how some public policies that regulate or prohibit abortion around the world are now in fact following paternalistic justifications and imposing distinctive paternalistic restrictions ; we refer to these policies as “the new abortion laws.” Finally, we argue that both the four paternalistic arguments presented and the new abortion laws are at times ill-intentioned, comprehensive in nature and thus unsuited for guiding public policy, empirically flawed, or else unjustified. (shrink)

Varios autores afines al proyecto del liberalismo político han propuesto diferentes modelos de razón pública para enfrentar la situación de desacuerdo moral permanente en las sociedades liberales. En este trabajo presentamos un modelo que defiende dos argumentos. Primero, argumentamos a favor de una interpretación deflacionista de las razones que son aceptables para los ciudadanos razonables. Segundo, introducimos una nueva terminología que distingue entre lo que llamamos razones dependientes, accesibles y aceptables. Sostenemos que sólo las segundas y las terceras son medios (...) adecuados de discusión dentro de la razón pública, y las terceras son un estándar correcto de justificación de política pública. (shrink)

First published in 1982. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Theories of subjective probability are viewed as formal languages for analyzing evidence and expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probability langauges, the Bayesian language and the language of belief functions (Shafer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meaning of the scale) and the syntax (i.e., the formal calculus) of these languages. We also investigate some of the designs for probability judgment afforded by the two languages.

Originally published in 1973, this book shows that methods developed for the semantics of systems of formal logic can be successfully applied to problems about the semantics of natural languages; and, moreover, that such methods can take account of features of natural language which have often been thought incapable of formal treatment, such as vagueness, context dependence and metaphorical meaning. Parts 1 and 2 set out a class of formal languages and their semantics. Parts 3 and 4 show (...) that these formal languages are rich enought to be used in the precise description of natural languages. Appendices describe some of the concepts discussed in the text. (shrink)

In this paper we study the expressive power and definability for modal languages interpreted on topological spaces. We provide topological analogues of the van Benthem characterization theorem and the Goldblatt–Thomason definability theorem in terms of the well-established first-order topological language.

. . . Unlike Dewey, he has provided detailed incisive argumentation, and has shown just where the dogmas and dualisms break down." -- Richard Rorty, The Yale Review.

In this paper, I focus on AIs as very different, or at least potentially very different, kinds of language users from what humans are. Is the metasemantics for AI language use different, in the way Cappelen and Dever argue? Is it reasonable to think that AIs will come to use languages importantly different from human languages, what I call alien languages?

1. There is a tendency nowadays for linguists, philosophers and other theorists of language, to dismiss the notion of an object like the English language or the Polish language as simply mythological or mythopoeic—as of no interest to any serious science of language. Some theorists even appear to deny that there are such things as languages . ‘This notion [of a public language] is unknown to empirical inquiry and raises what seem to be irresolvable problems’, Chomsky said in a (...) lecture he gave recently in London. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to extend the Realist account of the foundations of linguistics offered by Postal, Katz and others. I first argue against the idea that naive Platonism can capture the necessary requirements on what I call a ‘mixed realist’ view of linguistics, which takes aspects of Platonism, Nominalism and Mentalism into consideration. I then advocate three desiderata for an appropriate ‘mixed realist’ account of linguistic ontology and foundations, namely (1) linguistic creativity and infinity, (2) linguistics as (...) a theory of types (and not tokens) and (3) independence but structural respect between language and the linguistic competence thereof. My own brand of mixed realism, what I call ante rem realism, is defended along the lines of an ante rem or non-eliminative structuralism, the likes of which has been offered for mathematics by Resnik (1997) and Shapiro (1997). In other words, grammars describe a mind-independent (but not necessarily unconnected) linguistic reality in terms of linguistic patterns or structures also known as natural languages. I further amend this picture to allow for the possibility of a naturalistic account of language acquisition and evolution by arguing against a particular view of the type-token distinction. (shrink)

Alien Languages and Linguistic Structure.

Notice that this paper has not claimed that all natural languages are CFL's. What it has shown is that every published argument purporting to demonstrate the non-context-freeness of some natural language is invalid, either formally or empirically or both.18 Whether non-context-free characteristics can be found in the stringset of some natural language remains an open question, just as it was a quarter century ago.Whether the question is ultimately answered in the negative or the affirmative, there will be interesting further (...) questions to ask. If it turns out that natural languages are indeed always CFL's, it will be reasonable to ask whether this helps to explain why speakers apparently recognize so quickly whether a presented utterance corresponds to a grammatical sentence or not, and to associate structural and semantic details with it. It might also be reasonable to speculate about the explanation for the universally context-free character of the languages used by humans, and to wonder whether evolutionary biological factors are implicated in some way (Sampson (1979) could be read in this light). And naturally, it will be reasonable to pursue the program put forward by Gazdar (1981, in press) to see to what extent CFL-inducing grammatical devices can be exploited to yield insightful descriptions of natural languages that capture generalizations in revealing ways.If a human language that is not a CFL is proved to exist, on the other hand, a different question will be raised: give the non-context-free character of human languages in general, why has this property been so hard to demonstrate that it has taken over twenty-five years to bring it to light since the issue was first explicitly posed? If human languages do not have to be CFL's, why do so many (most?) of them come so close to having the property of context-freeness? And, since the CFL's certainly constitute a very broad class of mathematically natural and computationally tractable languages, what property of human beings or their communicative or cognitive needs is it that has caused some linguistic communities to reach beyond the boundaries of this class in the course of evolving a linguistic system?Either way, we shall be interested to see our initial question resolved, and further questions raised. One cautionary word should be said, however, about the implications (or lack of them) that the answer will have for grammatical studies. Chomsky has repeatedly stated that he does not see weak generative capacity as a theme of central importance in the theory of grammar, and we agree. It is very far from being the case that the recent resurgence of interest in exploring the potential of CF-PSG or equivalent systems will, or should, be halted dead in its tracks by the discovery (if it is ever forthcoming) that some natural language is not a CFL. In the area of parsing, for instance, it seems possible that natural languages are not only parsed on the basis of constituent structure such as a CF-PSG would assign, but are parsed as if they were finite state languages (see Langendoen (1975) and Church (1980) for discussion along these lines). That is, precisely those construction-types that figure in the various proofs that English is not an FSL appear to cause massive difficulty in the human processing system; the sentences crucial to the proofs are for the most part unprocessable unless they are extremely short (yet the arguments for English not being and FSL only go through if length is not an issue). This means that in practice properties of finite state grammars are still of great potential importance to linguistic theory despite the fact that they do not provide the framework for defining the total class of grammatical sentences. The same would almost certannly be true of CF-PSG's if they were shown to be inadequate in a similar sense. It is highly unlikely that the advances made so far in far in phrase structure description could be nullified by a discovery about weak generative capacity. Moreover, there are known to be numerous ways in which the power of CF-PSG's can be marginally enhanced to permit, for example, xx languages to be generated without allowing anything like the full class of recursively enumerable or even context-sensitive languages (see Hopcroft and Ullmann (1979), Chapter 14) for an introduction to this topic, noting especially Figure 14.7 on p. 393. The obvious thing to do if natural languages were ever shown not to be CFL's in the general case would be to start exploring such minimal enhancements of expressive power to determine exactly what natural languages call for in this regard and how it could be effectively but parsimoniously provided in a way that closely modelled human linguistic capacities.In the meantime, it seems reasonable to assume that the natural languages are a proper subset of the infinite-cardinality CFL's until such time as they are validly shown not to be. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out the equivalence between three notions respectively issued from recursion theory, computational complexity and finite model theory. One the one hand, the rudimentary languages are known to be characterized by the linear hierarchy. On the other hand, this complexity class can be proved to correspond to monadic second‐order logic with addition. Our viewpoint sheds some new light on the close connection between these domains: We bring together the two extremal notions by (...) providing a direct logical characterization of rudimentary languages and a representation result of second‐order logic into these languages. We use natural arithmetical tools, and our proofs contain no ingredient from computational complexity. (shrink)

Individual humans as well as human communities interact in a great variety of ways and, in essence, Unesco's Silk Roads Major Project endeavors to shed light on the cultural interactions along the trade routes linking various Eurasian civilizations. The term Silk Road or Roads conjures up visions of caravans laden with rare goods, carrying them from the distant, perhaps even the so-called “mysterious”, East towards the Western World. This general impression is partially created by the word “silk”, name of a (...) commodity generally and correctly linked with China where it was first produced. It is good to remember that a “Silk Road” is a historic fiction, invented in the nineteenth century by the German geographer von Richthofen to call attention to the existence of, first and foremost, commercial contacts between China and the Roman Empire. Silk was but one of the many goods circulating all along the many roads criss-crossing the great Eurasian space. This short essay will provide some information on the languages used along the land arteries of communication between East and West. (shrink)

An original and comprehensive study of the history, symbols and languages of the common law tradition.

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the Sofia school , the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the first technical, the second conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives rise to (...) well-behaved logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full first-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of defining the Until operator; we provide a minimal axiomatization, and show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over paths. (shrink)

i) We show for each context-free language L that by considering each word of L as a structure in a natural way, one turns L into a finite union of classes which satisfy a finitary analog of the characteristic properties of complete universal first order classes of structures equipped with elementary embeddings. We show this to hold for a much larger class of languages which we call free local languages. ii) We define local languages, a class of (...) languages between free local and context-sensitive languages. Each local language L has a natural extension L ∞ to infinite words, and we prove a series of "pumping lemmas", analogs for each local language L of the "uvxyz theorem" of context free languages: they relate the existence of large words in L or L ∞ to the existence of infinite "progressions" of words included in L, and they imply the decidability of various questions about L or L ∞ . iii) We show that the pumping lemmas of ii) are independent from strong axioms, ranging from Peano arithmetic to ZF + Mahlo cardinals. We hope that these results are useful for a model-theoretic approach to the theory of formal languages. (shrink)

Being professionally interested in African languages, there is no way in which we could try to hide our rather selfish motive in hoping for the survival of African languages, and as many as possible at that. The disappearance of any African language means to us scholars the final, irrecoverable loss of an important empirical resource, not only for linguistic studies, but also for studies on the history and culture of a people. Not many outside the academic circle, however, (...) will have heartaches over such matters. (shrink)

Kaviraj Sudipta’s Languages of Secularity outlines two main concerns: recent debates about secularity in Indian social science, and the colonial side of modernity. The former focuses on the reexamination of Indian thinking, and analyzing the historical changes in politics, religion, and Indian society. Sudipta argues that this change in thought was a significant moment in political theory, as it shows how India began to move away from Western social theory, and how the nature of social theory depends on the (...) extension and elaboration of ideas combined with academic thinking from the historical world. Sudipta’s second part of the paper concerns the differences between early modernization theory and more recent theories. Casanova, Jose. (shrink)

As the last century of the present millennium is drawing to a close and the first century of the next one is looming on the horizon, linguistics and the fate of many of the 6000 languages on our planet is poised on a watershed, looking at a changing future.

A fascinating study of moral languages and their discontents, Ethics after Babel explains the links that connect contemporary moral philosophy, religious ethics, and political thought in clear, cogent, even conversational prose. Princeton's paperback edition of this award-winning book includes a new postscript by the author that responds to the book's noted critics, Stanley Hauerwas and the late Alan Donagan. In answering his critics, Jeffrey Stout clarifies the book's arguments and offers fresh reasons for resisting despair over the prospects of (...) democratic discourse. (shrink)