We prove that the degree structures of the d.c.e. and the 3-c.e. Turing degrees are not elementarily equivalent, thus refuting a conjecture of Downey. More specifically, we show that the following statement fails in the former but holds in the latter structure: There are degrees f > e > d > 0 such that any degree u ≤ f is either comparable with both e and d, or incomparable with both.

We study the relationship between a computably enumerable real and its presentations. A set A presents a computably enumerable real α if A is a computably enumerable prefix-free set of strings such that equation image. Note that equation image is precisely the measure of the set of reals that have a string in A as an initial segment. So we will simply abbreviate equation image by μ. It is known that whenever A so presents α then A ≤wttα, where ≤wtt (...) denotes weak truth table reducibility, and that the wtt-degrees of presentations form an ideal ℐ in the computably enumerable wtt-degrees. We prove that any such ideal is equation image, and conversely that if ℐ is any nonempty equation image ideal in the computably enumerable wtt-degrees then there is a computable enumerable real α such that ℐ = ℐ. We also prove a kind of Rice Theorem for these ideals, namely that if the index set of such a equation image ideal is not empty or equal to ω then it is equation image-complete. (shrink)

As a natural example of a 1-random real, Chaitin proposed the halting probability Ω of a universal prefix-free machine. We can relativize this example by considering a universal prefix-free oracle machine U. Let [Formula: see text] be the halting probability of UA; this gives a natural uniform way of producing an A-random real for every A ∈ 2ω. It is this operator which is our primary object of study. We can draw an analogy between the jump operator from computability theory (...) and this Omega operator. But unlike the jump, which is invariant under the choice of an effective enumeration of the partial computable functions, [Formula: see text] can be vastly different for different choices of U. Even for a fixed U, there are oracles A =* B such that [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are 1-random relative to each other. We prove this and many other interesting properties of Omega operators. We investigate these operators from the perspective of analysis, computability theory, and of course, algorithmic randomness. (shrink)

A real is called properly n-generic if it is n-generic but not n+1-generic. We show that every 1-generic real computes a properly 1-generic real. On the other hand, if m > n ≥ 2 then an m-generic real cannot compute a properly n-generic real.

We study completely decomposable torsion-free abelian groups of the form $\mathcal{G}_S := \oplus_{n \in S} \mathbb{Q}_{p_n}$ for sets $S \subseteq \omega$. We show that $\mathcal{G}_S$has a decidable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_2$and has a computable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_3$.

The Dushnik–Miller Theorem states that every infinite countable linear ordering has a nontrivial self-embedding. We examine computability-theoretical aspects of this classical theorem.

There is a perfect thin class whose upward closure in the Turing degrees has full measure . Thus, in the Muchnik lattice of classes, the degree of 2-random reals is comparable with the degree of some perfect thin class. This solves a question of Simpson [S. Simpson, Mass problems and randomness, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 1–27].

We investigate the initial segment complexity of random reals. Let K denote prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. A natural measure of the relative randomness of two reals α and β is to compare complexity K and K. It is well-known that a real α is 1-random iff there is a constant c such that for all n, Kn−c. We ask the question, what else can be said about the initial segment complexity of random reals. Thus, we study the fine behaviour of K (...) for random α. Following work of Downey, Hirschfeldt and LaForte, we say that αK β iff there is a constant such that for all n, . We call the equivalence classes under this measure of relative randomness K-degrees. We give proofs that there is a random real α so that lim supn K−K=∞ where Ω is Chaitin's random real. One is based upon work of Solovay, and the other exploits a new idea. Further, based on this new idea, we prove there are uncountably many K-degrees of random reals by proving that μ=0. As a corollary to the proof we can prove there is no largest K-degree. Finally we prove that if n ≠ m then the initial segment complexities of the natural n- and m-random sets and Ω︀) are different. The techniques introduced in this paper have already found a number of other applications. (shrink)

Can we deploy creative practices to critically address the fatal interlocking of global surveillance technologies, neo-colonial expansionism, environmental degradation and the lethal threat of drone warfare? Throughout the following conversation, Shona Illingworth and Anthony Downey examine these and other questions in relation to the recent publication of Topologies of Air (Sternberg Press and The Power Plant, 2022). Edited by Downey, the book includes discussion and documentation of two major bodies of work by Illingworth, including Topologies of Air (2021) and Lesions (...) in the Landscape (2015), alongside an extended series of essays that analyse the psychological and environmental impact of military, industrial and corporate transformations of airspace and outer space. Employing interdisciplinary research and collaborative processes, Illingworth’s practice, as detailed in the discussion below, uses creative methodologies to visualize and interrogate this proliferating exploitation of airspace. The conversation between Illingworth and Downey also outlines the work of the Airspace Tribunal, an ongoing series of public hearings that brings together diverse disciplines, methodologies, knowledge and lived experiences to propose a new human right that will counter the colonization of the sky and, in time, protect individuals, communities and ecologies from ever-increasing threats from above. (shrink)

Psychotherapy with the use of psychedelic substances, including psilocybin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), ketamine, and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), has demonstrated promise in treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, addiction, and treatment-resistant depression. Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy (PP) represents a unique psychopharmacological model that leverages the profound effects of the psychedelic experience. That experience is characterized by strong dependency on two key factors: participant mindset and the therapeutic environment. As such, therapeutic models that utilize psychedelics reflect the need for careful design that promotes (...) an open, flexible, trusting mindset and a supportive setting. To meet this need, the PP model is increasingly supplemented by auxiliary methods, including meditation, relaxation, visualization or spiritual practices. We suggest virtual reality (VR) as a full-spectrum tool able to capitalize on and catalyze the innately therapeutic aspects of the psychedelic experience, such as detachment from familiar reality, alteration of self-experience, augmentation of sensory perception and induction of mystical-type experiences. This is facilitated by VR’s evidenced capacity to: aid relaxation and reduce anxiety; buffer from external stimuli; promote a mindful presence; train the mind to achieve altered states of consciousness (ASC); evoke mystical states; enhance therapeutic alliance and encourage self-efficacy. While these unique VR features appear promising, VR’s potential role in PP remains speculative due to lack of empirical evidence on the combined use of VR and PP. Given the increased commercial interest in this synergy there is an urgent need to evaluate this approach. We suggest specific VR models and their role within PP protocols to inspire future direction in scientific research, and provide a list of potential disadvantages, side effects and limitations that need to be carefully considered. These include sensory overstimulation, cyber-sickness, triggering memories of past traumatic events as well as distracting from the inner experience or strongly influencing its contents. A balanced, evidence-based approach may provide continuity across all phases of treatment, support transition into and out of an ASC, deepen acute ASC experiences including mystical states and enrich the psychotherapeutic process of integration. We conclude that the potential application of VR in modulating psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy demands further exploration and an evidence-based approach to both design and implementation. (shrink)

The Anthropology of Sport and Human Movement represents a collection of work that reveals and explores the often times dramatic relationship of our biology and culture that is inextricably woven into a tapestry of movement patterns. It explores the underpinning of human movement, reflected in play, sport, games and human culture from an evolutionary perspective and contemporary expression of sport and human movement.

A subspace V of an infinite dimensional fully effective vector space V ∞ is called decidable if V is r.e. and there exists an r.e. W such that $V \oplus W = V_\infty$ . These subspaces of V ∞ are natural analogues of recursive subsets of ω. The set of r.e. subspaces forms a lattice L(V ∞ ) and the set of decidable subspaces forms a lower semilattice S(V ∞ ). We analyse S(V ∞ ) and its relationship with L(V (...) ∞ ). We show: Proposition. Let U, V, W ∈ L(V ∞ ) where U is infinite dimensional and $U \oplus V = W$ . Then there exists a decidable subspace D such that U |oplus D = W. Corollary. Any r.e. subspace can be expressed as the direct sum of two decidable subspaces. These results allow us to show: Proposition. The first order theory of the lower semilattice of decidable subspaces, Th(S(V ∞ )), is undecidable. This contrasts sharply with the result for recursive sets. Finally we examine various generalizations of our results. In particular we analyse S * (V ∞ ), that is, S(V ∞ ) modulo finite dimensional subspaces. We show S * (V ∞ ) is not a lattice. (shrink)

Guided by a life-course perspective, this article uses data from 11 waves of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine the influence of human capital, family structure, and local labor-market demand variables on the reentry into the labor force of midlife homemakers in the United States in the 1970s. By looking at two contiguous time periods, the first and last halves of the 1970s, it investigates how the influence of these factors varied with social changes in the job-opportunity (...) structure for women in the United States during the 1970s, a time when the service sector expanded and public approval of married women's employment rose. We found that the likelihood of reentry varied with education, age, and marital status, as well as time period. These findings suggest the need for a model of the labor-force reentry of homemakers in midlife that takes account of historical period as well as the distinctive realities of women's lives in middle adulthood. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing. Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby (...) requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the ‘representation wars’; my account fits with extant empirical practice; my account provides guidance for future research; and, my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak’s IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation. (shrink)

Several papers (e.g. [7, 23, 42]) have recently sought to give general frameworks for online structures and algorithms ([4]), and seeking to connect, if only by analogy, online and computable structure theory. These initiatives build on earlier work on online colouring and other combinatorial algorithms by Bean [10], Kierstead, Trotter et al. [48, 54, 57] and others, as we discuss below. In this paper we will look at such frameworks and illustrate them with examples from the first author’s MSc Thesis (...) ([58]). In this thesis, Askes looks at online, adversarial online and strongly online algorithms and structures. Additionally, we prove some new theorems about online algorithms on graphs of bounded pathwidth as well as some new results on punctually 1-decidable structures. (shrink)

It is natural to wish to study miniaturisations of Cohen forcing suitable to sets of low arithmetic complexity. We consider extensions of the work of Schaeffer [9] and Jockusch and Posner [6] by looking at genericity notions within the Δ2 sets. Different equivalent characterisations of 1-genericity suggest different ways in which the definition might be generalised. There are two natural ways of casting the notion of 1-genericity: in terms of sets of strings and in terms of density functions, as we (...) will see here. While these definitions coincide at the first level of the difference hierarchy, they turn out to differ at other levels. Furthermore, these differences remain when the remainder of the Δ02 sets are considered. While the string characterization of 1-genericity collapses at the second level of the difference hierarchy to 2-genericity, the density function definition gives a very interesting hierarchy at level w and above. Both of these results point towards the deep similarities exhibited by the n-c.e. degrees for n ≥ 2. (shrink)

We show that Sacks' and Shoenfield's analogs of jump inversion fail for both tt- and wtt-reducibilities in a strong way. In particular we show that there is a ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{2}^{0}$ set B > tt ∅′ such that there is no c.e. set A with A′ ≡ wtt B. We also show that there is a ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{2}^{0}$ set C > tt ∅′ such that there is no ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{2}^{0}$ set D with D′ ≡ wtt C.

We study inversions of the jump operator on ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{1}^{0}$ classes, combined with certain basis theorems. These jump inversions have implications for the study of the jump operator on the random degrees—for various notions of randomness. For example, we characterize the jumps of the weakly 2-random sets which are not 2-random, and the jumps of the weakly 1-random relative to 0′ sets which are not 2-random. Both of the classes coincide with the degrees above 0′ which are not 0′-dominated. A (...) further application is the complete solution of [24, Problem 3.6.9]: one direction of van Lambalgen's theorem holds for weak 2-randomness, while the other fails. Finally we discuss various techniques for coding information into incomplete randoms. Using these techniques we give a negative answer to [24, Problem 8.2.14]: not all weakly 2-random sets are array computable. In fact, given any oracle X, there is a weakly 2-random which is not array computable relative to X. This contrasts with the fact that all 2-random sets are array computable. (shrink)

We report on some recent work centered on attempts to understand when one set is more random than another. We look at various methods of calibration by initial segment complexity, such as those introduced by Solovay [125], Downey, Hirschfeldt, and Nies [39], Downey, Hirschfeldt, and LaForte [36], and Downey [31]; as well as other methods such as lowness notions of Kučera and Terwijn [71], Terwijn and Zambella [133], Nies [101, 100], and Downey, Griffiths, and Reid [34]; higher level randomness notions (...) going back to the work of Kurtz [73], Kautz [61], and Solovay [125]; and other calibrations of randomness based on definitions along the lines of Schnorr [117].These notions have complex interrelationships, and connections to classical notions from computability theory such as relative computability and enumerability. Computability figures in obvious ways in definitions of effective randomness, but there are also applications of notions related to randomness in computability theory. For instance, an exciting by-product of the program we describe is a more-or-less naturalrequirement-freesolution to Post's Problem, much along the lines of the Dekker deficiency set. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley’s argument that split-brain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual field by using external factors to (...) stand-in for the missing corpus callosum. I next provide an argument that split-brain subjects do unify their perceptual fields via external factors. Finally, I explain why my account provides one with an experimental aberration model which avoids the problems typically levelled at such views, and highlight some empirical predictions made by the account. The nature of split-brain syndrome has long been considered mysterious by proponents of internalist accounts of consciousness. However, in this paper I argue that externalist theories can provide a straightforward explanation of the condition. I therefore conclude that the ability of externalist accounts to explain split-brain syndrome gives us strong reason to prefer them over internalist rivals. (shrink)

It is still commonly supposed that Descartes based his argument for the mind-body distinction on the law of the indiscernibility of identicals. I argue that this interpretation is very unlikely to be correct. I explain three contemporary versions of this interpreta- tion and say why I reject it. Basically, use of this law for Descartes’s conclusion would require reference to human bodies or else the supposition, for the purpose of the argument, of reference to human bodies. But at the time (...) Descartes formulated his argument, he would not have allowed either. Instead, I amend a different interpretation which others have found, and briefly defend it against one famous objection. (shrink)

We construct the set of the title, answering a question of Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [1], and discuss its connections with the study of the proof-theoretic strength and effective content of versions of Ramsey's Theorem. In particular, our result implies that every ω-model of RCA 0 + SRT 2 2 must contain a nonlow set.

We examine the multiplicity of complementation amongst subspaces of V ∞ . A subspace V is a complement of a subspace W if V ∩ W = {0} and (V ∪ W) * = V ∞ . A subspace is called fully co-r.e. if it is generated by a co-r.e. subset of a recursive basis of V ∞ . We observe that every r.e. subspace has a fully co-r.e. complement. Theorem. If S is any fully co-r.e. subspace then S has (...) a decidable complement. We give an analysis of other types of complements S may have. For example, if S is fully co-r.e. and nonrecursive, then S has a (nonrecursive) r.e. nowhere simple complement. We impose the condition of immunity upon our subspaces. Theorem. Suppose V is fully co-r.e. Then V is immune iff there exist M 1 , M 2 ∈ L(V ∞ ), with M 1 supermaximal and M 2 k-thin, such that $M_1 \oplus V = M_2 \oplus V = V_\infty$ . Corollary. Suppose V is any r.e. subspace with a fully co-r.e. immune complement W (e.g., V is maximal or V is h-immune). Then there exist an r.e. supermaximal subspace M and a decidable subspace D such that $V \oplus W = M \oplus W = D \oplus W = V_\infty$ . We indicate how one may obtain many further results of this type. Finally we examine a generalization of the concepts of immunity and soundness. A subspace V of V ∞ is nowhere sound if (i) for all Q ∈ L(V ∞ ) if $Q \supset V$ then Q = V ∞ , (ii) V is immune and (iii) every complement of V is immune. We analyse the existence (and ramifications of the existence) of nowhere sound spaces. (shrink)

The ‘scaling up’ objection says non-representational ecological-enactive accounts will be unable to explain ‘representation hungry’ cognition. Obsessive-compulsive disorder presents a paradigmatic instance of this objection, marked as it is by ‘representation hungry’ obsessive thoughts and compulsive behavior organized around them. In this paper I provide an ecological-enactive account of OCD, thereby demonstrating non-representational frameworks can ‘scale up’ to explain ‘representation hungry’ cognition. First, I outline a non-representational account of mind— a predictive processing operationalization of Sean Kelly’s theory of perception. This (...) account explains the ‘tensions’ and ‘pulls’ which guide and constrain our action-oriented and affect-laden perceptual ‘grip’ upon the world to be underwritten by an imperative to minimize prediction error. I then argue that OCD is best understood as ‘grip gone awry’— malformed predictive models signal inappropriately high error, and this results in extremely strong ‘tensions’ and ‘pulls’ which prescribe actions. Thus, I arrive at the idea that OCD is primarily constituted by ‘not just right’ feelings caused by high error signaling. Finally, I explain that this account provides a causal explanation of the non-representational existential feeling fundamental to OCD. Compulsions are considered manifestations of non-representational grip responsive to this feeling, whilst obsessions are explained to play a meta-role in the condition, being formulated by subjects in a bid to make their ‘not just right’ feeling intelligible. I explain that the meta-role obsessions play makes their representational status largely irrelevant to OCD, and so leave this an open question. Consequently, I provide a non-representational account of OCD, thereby demonstrating that ecological-enactive approaches can respond to the ‘scaling up’ objection. (shrink)

Slavoj Zizek is operating from a position of certainty, a position discovered by Jacques Lacan in Seminar XI. In this essay, I examine this position of certainty ("Gewissheit") and the ways this position is distinct from both existential phenomenology and post-structuralism, ultimately arguing that for structuralist psychoanalysis to function requires an intentional forgetting of being.

Patrick Downey finds comedy at the heart of the Western philosophical and theological tradition. In Serious Comedy Downey tracks tragedy and comedy from the beginning of Western thought to the twentieth century, beginning with an in-depth examination of Aristotle and three Platonic dialogues: the Republic, the Phaedrus, and the Symposium. In the book's second section Downey argues that the Bible is at heart a comedic narrative and analyzes the philosophical and theological implications of this comedy. In the third section Downey (...) traces comedy and tragedy in classic and modern philosophers such as Machiavelli, Dante, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. Readers with an interest in classical philosophy and theology, political philosophy, and narrative theory will be particularly interested in this insightful and thoughtful perspective on the Western tradition. (shrink)

Clement Dore has offered a demonstration that God is possible. This is important because the Ontological Argument shows that if God is possible, it is necessarily true that God exists. Dore’s demonstration parallels Descartes’s Meditation V argument: (roughly) God by definition has all perfections; but (Dore proposes) possible existence is a perfection; therefore, God is possible. However, Leibniz recognized that Descartes’s argument is incomplete, omitting proof that the concept of God is consistent. Dore’s demonstration fails for just this reason. Dore’s (...) defense misses this objection. If the concept of God is consistent, that directly establishes that God is possible, making assumptions about perfections irrelevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Fallacy in the Intentional FallacyJames DowneyAccording to a famous argument by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard by which to judge the success of a work of literary art. I wish to focus on the former allegation. The author's intention is not available as a standard by which to judge a work's success, it is (...) argued, because "If the poet succeeded in doing it [the intention], then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem."1The intent of this reasoning is not entirely clear. It is intended to pose a dilemma for intentionalism, but what is the dilemma supposed to be? What difficulty is there for intentionalism if the poem itself shows what the author's intention was? Perhaps it is supposed to follow that somehow intentionalism would be purposeless. Perhaps the point is Socratic: if the intention is successful, then the reader automatically knows it was intended, so that the intention cannot be sought. Or, perhaps it is the success which cannot be sought. The idea may be that one automatically knows the extent of success precisely to the extent that one recognizes the intention. Perhaps both points are intended.On the other side of the dilemma, suppose the intention is not successful and the critic "must go outside the poem." Is this supposed to imply that whatever meaning is thereby discovered will not be the poem's meaning? Or, is the idea that being forced to go outside the poem for evidence of its meaning violates some essential goal of intentionalism? [End Page 149]It is not my main concern, however, to question the implications of the argument's premises. I wish to challenge the basic premise, itself, that if an intention is successful then the work would show that it was the author's intention. I will assume that this means, at least, that the reader would understand a certain intention and know that it was the author's intention, and that the work would provide this knowledge.Sometimes an author deliberately composes without thematic intentions. I take my example from cinematic art because it is a particularly striking example, and the point clearly holds for other forms of art. Furthermore, the intentional fallacy is usually thought to apply to other forms of art in addition to literary art. So, let us consider the method which Salvador Dalí claims that he and Luis Buñuel used when creating Un Chien Andalou, to put together whatever images came to their mind without any particular intentions directing them. Indeed, Dalí claimed, if there was even a pause between the artists, a mere moment when it seemed as though some directed thought might be beginning to take hold of them, he and Buñuel immediately discarded that idea. They retained only those ideas which arose with no thematic intentions, or intentions as to larger meaning. (We may set aside the fact that there were still formal intentions, such as what images to present, in what order, etc.—although even this can be eliminated to some degree, as when an artist cuts up bits of sound tapes and splices them together willy-nilly, and so forth.) In such a work of art, it is not possible that any such intentions be shown, since there are none.But there is still a definite intention behind such art, namely, the intention to compose with no thematic intentions. This intention could be successfully shown to an audience through a work, certainly. However, Dalís often intend otherwise (so they say). They may intend not to reveal whether or not there are certain, or even any, thematic intentions (perhaps that is an intentional anti-religious theme in that scene in Un Chien Andalou, after all; we do not know.) Perhaps, even, Dalí does not want us to know whether he wants us not to know. An intention not to reveal might apply to the intention not to reveal. What a grand game... (shrink)

In using the term “heart” to describe that which is constitutive of human personhood, Jean Vanier gives evidence that he views the person largely as affective, open to attraction, to be acted upon by another and drawn to communion. This is not to suggest that the heart is irrational or anti-intellectual, or to suggest that Vanier’s vision of the human person is so. Rather it is to suggest that, for Vanier, all that is known and decided is to be shaped (...) by the affective basis within the human person which needs to be touched by the Spirit. Maintaining the importance of intellect and reason, especially as these bear upon the social order, Vanier’s concern is with the core or ground of the human person which is antecedent to intellectual activity or rational discourse, and which, when touched by the presence of the Spirit, motivates one to the activity of the beatitudes. Those who respond to this action of the Spirit, and act from the heart when moved by God to compassion, become signs of God’s love, healing, tenderness and compassion. (shrink)

This book presents new results in computability theory, a branch of mathematical logic and computer science that has become increasingly relevant in recent years. The field's connections with disparate areas of mathematical logic and mathematics more generally have grown deeper, and now have a variety of applications in topology, group theory, and other subfields. This monograph establishes new directions in the field, blending classic results with modern research areas such as algorithmic randomness. The significance of the book lies not only (...) in the depth of the results contained therein, but also in the fact that the notions the authors introduce allow them to unify results from several subfields of computability theory. (shrink)

Donald R. Gregory has recently argued that the monk Gaunilo's response to St Anselm's ontological argument succeeds in showing what is fundamentally wrong with any ontological argument, including modern modal versions. He holds that the Gaunilo strategy in fact demonstrates what it alleges, that reasoning which parallels the form and intent ofAnselm's reductio argument can ‘prove’ a priori the existence of quite unacceptable entities.

STORY L, MAYFIELD‐JOHNSON S, DOWNEY LH, ANDERSON‐LEWIS C, YOUNG R and DAY P. Nursing Inquiry 2010; 17: 373–384 Getting on Target with Community Health Advisors (GOTCHA): an innovative stroke prevention projectHealth disparities along with insufficient numbers of healthcare providers and resources have created a need for effective and efficient grassroots approaches to improve community health. Community‐based participatory research (CBPR), more specifically the utilization of community health advisors (CHAs), is one such strategy. The Getting on Target with Community Health Advisors (GOTCHA) (...) project convened an interdisciplinary team to answer the call from 10 counties in the rural Mississippi Delta area of ‘The Stroke Belt’ to meet the region’s identified health needs, and to impact the health of a disparaged state. This article explores this CBPR project including the community involvement strategies, innovative CHA training curriculum, evaluation plan, and implications to healthcare professionals, particularly nurses. (shrink)