In a 1997 paper, Salvatore Lilla pinpointed multiple textual parallels between Damascius and the Pseudo-Dionysius, showing certain conceptual parallels. For instance, both Ps.-Dionysius and Damascius speak of the first cause, or God, as being all things, i.e. as “encompassing” (περιληπτική) or as “anticipating” (προληπτική) all things, at the same time that God transcends all things. In my chapter I expand on Lilla’s findings by showing how Ps.-Dionysius’ conception of God fits more closely with Damascius’ framework for the (...) One, especially Damascius' description of the triad of principles (i.e. the One-All, All-One, and Unified) at the One’s level which closely parallels Ps.-Dionysius’ description of the Christian Trinitarian persons (i.e. the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). The chapter also shows striking parallels between Damascius and Ps.-Dionysius elevating divine revelation as a primary means of communicating knowledge about the first cause’s mode of being (correcting certain claims of Lilla), while it also shows how the parallels drawn between Proclus’ henadology and Ps.-Dionysius make more sense when looking at Damascius’ own adaptation of Proclus’ henadology with his conception of the One’s triad of principles. (shrink)

Sur la toile de fond de la theologie negative, tissee par la discussion des apories que soulevent les notions de l'ineffable et de l'un, Damascius, le dernier diadoque de l'Ecole d'Athenes, elaboreson systeme metaphysique, sans se departir de la rigueur de sa methode aporetique, qui est une critique radicale du langage a l'interieur des coordonnees fixees par le Parmenide de Platon et par les Oracles Chaldaiques. Damascius, dans une enquete unique par son ampleur et son originalite questionne tour (...) a tour Porphyre, Jamblique, Syrianus et Proclus sur les principes; il examine les problemes que pose, en derivation de l'un, la formation de la trinite; de l'un-tout (la limite), du tout-un (l'infini) et de l'unifie (le mixte ou l'etre). Lien a priori entre l'un-tout et le tout-un, l'unifie est le principe de constitution de tout ordre et de toute realite. Damascius etudie sa nature de mixte originaire et autoconstituant, d'etre exemplaire et de premier intelligible. Cette notion lui permet de pas au crible, pour la mieux fonder, la problematique neoplatonicienne de la manence, de la procession et de la conversion. Les divers niveaux d'unification de la pluralite intelligible l'amenent a construire une theorie generale des elements, des parties et des formes Au passage, de nombreux textes, capitaux du point de vue de l'ontologie et de la doctrine de la connaissance, font regretter qu'ils aient ete inconnus du Moyen Age et qu'ils le demeurent pour beaucoup de nos contemporains. (shrink)

Damascius’ discussion of the Platonic notions of the sudden (to exaiphnēs) and the now (to nun) occurs in the context of his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. His view is that the Platonic sudden should be identified not with the timeless essence of the individual human soul, as Proclus suggested, but with the cohesive element that holds the individual human soul together through the cycles of reincarnation. For Damascius, the human soul is so thoroughly intertwined with time, when it (...) descends to the realm of Becoming, that its very essence gets altered. Damascius also maintains that the Platonic now is not a dimensionless boundary or temporal limit but an indivisible stretch of extended time. For Damascius, time progresses by ‘leaps’, and those leaps, determined once for all by the Demiurgic Intellect, are the atomic nows. Behind the flowing atomic nows there lies a numerically identical non-flowing now that is their eternal origin and form. The paper addresses the issue of the relationship of the sudden as the cohesive element of the soul to the now as the cohesive element of time, in the context of Damascius’ views about timeless Being and ever-flowing Becoming. (shrink)

Damascius was head of the Neoplatonist academy in Athens when the Emperor Justinian shut its doors forever in 529. His work, Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles, is the last surviving independent philosophical treatise from the Late Academy. It has never before been translated into English.

On relying on De principiis II 149.13-17, the paper highlights the difference between the object of sense-perception, which is the perceptible quality, and the content of perception. The same distinction applies to opinion and discursive thinking as well. Moreover, it is also indicated that Damascius denies all sorts of identity between knowledge and its object, non-discursive thinking included. Instead, he seems to allow for a union between noesis and its object, which rules out numerical identity. Even non-discursive thinking is (...) a form of knowledge, therefore a form of differentiation, and obtains being as related to something else. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage part d’une question simple dans son énoncé et pourtant complexe dans sa solution : c’est la question du principe unique et absolu du tout. Pourquoi et comment en parler? En quoi résident sa nécessité, son importance et son sens pour la pensée? Cette question trouve une réponse radicale à la fin de la tradition néoplatonicienne, notamment chez Damascius, dans son Traité des premiers principes. Bien que ce problème ait toujours été présent sous le calame des philosophes héritiers (...) de Platon (à commencer par Plotin), ce n’est qu’à la fin de cette tradition – et dans sa phase éminemment critique – que le principe premier a été abordé frontalement, par l’entremise du doute radical, afin d’en acquérir une certitude ultime et d’identifier sa présence subtile dans la réalité, ainsi que dans la pensée elle-même. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest (...) the previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything. (shrink)

Dans son Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon, § 167-168, Damascius rapporte une série d’objections à la thèse fameuse de Socrate dans le Philèbe selon laquelle il existe des « plaisirs faux ». Ces objections furent formulées par Théophraste, l’élève d’Aristote, peut-être dans son livre en un volume Sur les plaisirs faux (DL 5.56). Dans cet article, je montre d’abord comment les critiques de Théophraste recourent aux ouvrages d’Aristote, et notamment à son analyse des différents types de fausseté en (...) Métaphysique Δ 29. Je montre ensuite comment Damascius défend Platon contre ces critiques en retournant les arguments d’Aristote, l’autorité sur laquelle Théophraste se fonde, contre Théophraste lui-même. Ce faisant, Damascius atteste sa grande familiarité avec le corpus aristotélicien et montre que certains des textes que Théophraste convoque à l’appui de ses critiques peuvent être mobilisés pour défendre la position platonicienne. (shrink)

This article analyzes the concept of self-constitution in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. On the one hand, I try to see how self-constitution functions within the framework of reality. I identify the different levels of self-constituted reality, showing that each of these levels is also constituted by the absolute One, which is the cause of all things. Self-constitution is present throughout the process in which the One is slowly in labor towards plurality, starting from the highest level (...) of intelligible being down to the level of the particular soul. On the other hand, I also try to show how self-constitution appears at a discursive level. In this context I discuss its crucial role in Damascius’ interpretation of the second and third hypotheses in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. (shrink)

Cet article examine les opinions des néoplatoniciens tardifs sur le phénomène social de la philotimia (« amours des honneurs » ; « ambition »). Sur la base du Commentaire de l’Alcibiade de Proclus, on montre que la philotimia est une émotion qui résulte d’une compréhension imparfaite de la vraie nature de l’honneur et du pouvoir. La mauvaise philotimia pousse les ambitieux à poursuivre une carrière politique en quête de pouvoir mondain et de prestige au prix de l’étude de la philosophie. (...) La bonne philotimia, au contraire, peut les pousser à rechercher ce qui est véritablement bien et donc les mettre sur la voie de la philosophie. L’histoire fournit maints exemples de bonne et de mauvaise philotimia. Damascius, dans sa Vie d’Isidore, mobilise des théories de la bonne et de la mauvaise philotimia pour éloigner ses lecteurs de l’arène politique et les conduire vers la poursuite de la philosophie. (shrink)

For Damascius, any attempt to grasp the first principle of all things, the Ineffable, implies the rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The reasoning soul, using aporia, is forced to admit contradictory statements as true when it comes to cognising what lies beyond any intelligible being. Damascius shows that it is necessary to postulate a completely transcendent and unknowable Absolute which is the uncoordinated cause of all things beyond the One. This paper examines how Damascius relates (...) the rejection of the PNC and regressive arguments by distinguishing two types of reversal (peritropê) of arguments. This paper begins by analysing: i) Damascius’ first aporia, ii) his characterisation of the first principle as ineffable and iii) its unknowable nature. This leads to some comments about Damascius’ use of predicates and their negations. Finally, the paper distinguishes between regression and reversal to suggest that Damascius’ reversal of the predicates implies that the first principle lies beyond the PNC but does not involve an infinity of first principles. (shrink)

This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death. The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the (...) purification of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death. (shrink)

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Dans cet article, nous discutons la première partie de l’aporie du principe premier énoncée par Damascius dans son Traité des premiers principes. La question qui se pose est de savoir quelle est la source de cette aporie qui met face à face le principe et le « tout » de la pensée et de la réalité. L’hypothèse que nous allons argumenter consiste à dire que c’est précisément le sens spécifique du « tout » chez Damascius qui est responsable (...) pour cette aporie. Nous allons discuter la dynamique interne de ce « tout » qui empêche que le principe soit situé « au-delà du tout ».In this article, we discuss the first part of the aporia of the first principle formulated by Damascius in his treatise De principiis. We are trying to identify the source of this aporia that opposes the principle and “all things”. The hypothesis that we are going to argue is that it is precisely the specific sense of the ‘all’ in Damascius’ thought that is responsible for this aporia. We will discuss the inherent dynamics of this ‘all’, which prevents that the principle be situated “above the all”. (shrink)

In this article, it is shown that, following the precedent set in particular by Marinus' "Life of Proclus", Damascius, in his "Life of Isidore", uses biography so as to illustrate philosophical progress through the Neoplatonic scale of virtues. Damascius applies this scale, however, to a wide range of figures belonging to pagan philosophical circles of the fifth century AD: they show different degrees and forms of progress in this scale and thus provide an edificatory panorama of patterns of (...) philosophical perfection. Each level of the scale of virtues is shown to be exemplified in Damascius' biographies. It is suggested that few, in Damascius' opinion, reached the highest levels of virtue and that philosophical decline is intimated in his descriptions of his contemporaries. (shrink)

Neoplatonism is a term used to designate the form of Platonic philosophy that developed in the Roman Empire from the third to the fifth century AD and that based itself on the corpus of Plato's dialogues. Sara Rappe's challenging study analyses Neoplatonic texts themselves using contemporary philosophy of language. It covers the whole tradition of Neoplatonic writing from Plotinus through Proclus to Damascius. Addressing the strain of mysticism in these works, the author shows how these texts reflect actual meditational (...) practices, methods of concentrating the mind, and other mental disciplines that informed the tradition as a whole. In providing such a broad survey of Neoplatonic writing, the book will appeal to classical philosophers classicists as well as students of religious studies. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 46 - 70 In this article, I analyze the idea of “stepping into the void”, which can be traced in the thinking of both Proclus and Damascius, but which sets their perspectives apart. Thus, I show how Proclus warns us that to speak about the absolute principle, taking it as an object of thought, is a negative “stepping into the void” that should be avoided. On the contrary, I show that Damascius (...) starts from this warning and tries to prove that the only adequate manner in which we can trace the absolute principle and approach it is precisely through “stepping into the void,” yet, this time, in a positive sense, as a constant attempt to understand that the principle is an absolute void which reverses our discourse. (shrink)

Dans son De Principiis, Damascius propose une définition originale de la «connaissance» . Les développements doctrinaux qui y sont exposés semblent rompre avec la conception plotinienne, principalement issue de l’exégèse du De Anima d’Aristote, lequel envisageait la connaissance, du moins dans sa modalité supérieure qu’est l’intellection , comme une «identité» du connaissant et du connu. Cette étude se propose de clarifier la gnoséologie de Damascius et de montrer que la connaissance y est envisagée comme une altérité surmontée sans (...) pour autant être abolie. (shrink)

This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius’ De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philoso­pher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite. Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows (...) the infinite to be superior and prior to the finite. Third, Damascius’ theory of being is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite. (shrink)

Le présent livre est audacieux et marque, à n’en pas douter, une avancée pour les recherches sur la pensée de Damascius. Tiré de la thèse de doctorat de l’auteur, le livre interroge le concept de causalité comme procession dans le Traité des premiers principes (De principiis) de Damascius. Pelin entend se distancier de ce qu’il estime être une tendance dominante des études damascéennes (p. 32-33) : plutôt que de lire le De principiis dans une perspective épistémologique et d’y (...) voir une enquêt... (shrink)

One of the main issues that dominates Neoplatonism in late antique philosophy of the 3rd–6th centuries A.D. is the nature of the first principle, called the ‘One’. From Plotinus onward, the principle is characterized as the cause of all things, since it produces the plurality of intelligible Forms, which in turn constitute the world’s rational and material structure. Given this, the tension that faces Neoplatonists is that the One, as the first cause, must transcend all things that are characterized by (...) plurality—yet because it causes plurality, the One must anticipate plurality within itself. This becomes the main mo- tivation for this study’s focus on two late Neoplatonists, Proclus (5th cent. A.D.) and Damascius (late 5th–early 6th cent. A.D.): both attempt to address this tension in two rather different ways. Proclus’ attempted solution is to posit intermediate principles (the ‘henads’) that mirror the One’s nature, as ‘one’, but directly cause plurality. This makes the One only a cause of unity, while its production of plurality is mediated by the henads that it produces. Damascius, while appropriating Proclus’ framework, thinks that this is not enough: if the One is posed as a cause of all things, it must be directly related to plurality, even if its causality is mediated through the henads. Damascius then splits Proclus’ One into two entities: (1) the Ineffable as the first ‘principle’, which is absolutely transcendent and has no causal relation; and (2) the One as the first ‘cause’ of all things, which is only relatively transcendent under the Ineffable. -/- Previous studies that compare Proclus and Damascius tend to focus either on the Ineffable or a skeptical shift in epistemology, but little work has been done on the causal framework which underlies both figures’ positions. Thus, this study proposes to focus on the causal frameworks behind each figure: why and how does Proclus propose to assert that the One is a cause, at the same time that it transcends its final effect? And what leads Damascius to propose a notion of the One’s causality that no longer makes it transcendent in the way that a higher principle, like the Ineffable, is? The present work will answer these questions in two parts. In the first, Proclus’ and Damascius’ notions of causality will be examined, insofar as they apply to all levels of being. In the second part, the One’s causality will be examined for both figures: for Proclus, the One’s causality in itself and the causality of its intermediate principles; for Damascius, the One’s causality, and how the Ineffable is needed to explain the One. The outcome of this study will show that Proclus’ framework results in an inner tension that Damascius is responding to with his notion of the One. While Damascius’ own solution implies its own tension, he at least solves a difficulty in Proclus—and in so doing, partially returns to a notion of the One much like Iamblichus’ and Plotinus’ One. (shrink)

At De Principiis II, p. 75.10-11 Westerink, Damascius states that ‘Being will be that which provides being itself to each thing, καὶ καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι’. The modern reference translation of the De Principiis, that of Joseph Combès for the Collection des Universités de France, renders the phrase left here in Greek as ‘et selon ce qu’elle est comme être’. Combès interprets it by stating that being is here conceived of as the constitutive unity of each form, at (...) once responsible for both its essence and existence. I argue that both a translation and an interpretation of καθ’ ὅ τι ὄν ἐστι of the type suggested by Combès are untenable and I defend an alternative construal. The two other main modern translations, those of Ahbel-Rappe and Galpérine, are also critically assessed. The translation of the relevant phrase I propose is: ‘and in virtue of which something is a being’. I argue that being – that is the property bestowed by the Kind or Form of Being, a notion that Damascius draws from Plato’s Sophist – is here conceived of as that which is metaphysically responsible only for the fact that something is (or is a being), not also for what something is. This construal does justice to the grammar of Damascius’ text and fits better with the argument of De Principiis II, pp. 56-99 Westerink. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scepticism in the Sixth Century? Damascius’ Doubts and Solutions Concerning First PrinciplesSara RappeThe Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles, an aporetic work of the sixth century Neoplatonist Damascius, is distinguished above all by its dialectical subtlety. Although the Doubts and Solutions belongs to the commentary tradition on Plato’s Parmenides, its structure and method make it in many ways unique among such exegetical works. The treatise positions itself, (...) at least in part, as a response to Proclus’ metaphysical system. Thus the first principles alluded to in its title refer to a metaphysical structure consisting of five central elements, the Ineffable, the One, and the Noetic Triad, which Damascius both adumbrates in opposition to Proclus1 as well as subjects to his own, internal critique. In this article, I will be asking whether or not Damascius’ critique of Neoplatonic metaphysics is informed or inspired by ancient Scepticism. No doubt this question catches the reader off guard: if the last exponent of ancient Scepticism is Sextus Empiricus, how could this sixth-century Neoplatonist Scholarch, the last officially appointed Platonic Successor, revert to a tradition that seemingly disappears for well over three centuries?2 In what [End Page 337] follows, I suggest that a plausible historical context for such a reversion can be found in contemporaneous Neoplatonic allusions to Sceptical readings of Plato. I then analyze the Sceptical techniques deployed by Damascius in his critique of Neoplatonist metaphysics, focusing especially on his attacks on Neoplatonic theories of intellect and causation. I conclude by speculating on some ideological factors that shaped Damascius’ Sceptical affiliations, suggesting that here it is possible to see an initial volley in what was to become a centuries-long skirmish between reason and revelation.1. the neoplatonists read the sceptics?R. T. Wallis has suggested that Plotinus borrows from the Sceptics’ arsenal in voicing his own objections against Stoic or Stoicizing epistemology and theology. The seemingly radical stance that Plotinus takes against Stoic notions of divine rationality, virtue, and providence is anticipated by the Sceptics’ refusal to grant that an omniscient mind could stand in need of rational deliberation or exercise virtues that imply the presence of corresponding vices, etc. Not only is it the case that Plotinus makes a detailed use of specific Sceptical arguments in his own polemics against the Stoics, he seems to have been the first philosopher to have grasped the implications of Sceptical challenges to Stoic theology, and to have circumvented Sceptical dilemmas by means of his highly original formulations of nondiscursive thinking and negative theology.That this Platonist might side with Sceptics against dogmatic philosophy would hardly be surprising to the modern student of Plato, but it is also true that historically, this has been an uneasy alliance. In fact, it is just this question, the alliance between Platonists and the Sceptics, that gets rehearsed in the sixth century. Olympiodorus devotes Chapter 10 of his Prolegomena to the Study of Platonic Philosophy to the refutation of an ephectic, or nondogmatic Plato3: “Plato also superseded the philosophy of the New Academy since that school gave precedence to akatalepsia (nonapprehension), while Plato demonstrated that there do exist cognitions grounded in genuine knowledge. Nevertheless, some assert, assimilating Plato to the ephectics and to the Academicians, that he too maintained the doctrine of akatalepsia.” These remarks are curious, for we have no indication that a Sceptical reading of Plato was current or even conceivable at this time. In fact, as the context makes clear, the Sceptics are represented in this passage as a prior philosophical school; chapters 7 through 10 present a concise history of philosophy that is remarkably free from any notions of philosophical currency attributable to any of the views that fall [End Page 338] under its purvue: “there has been no shortage of philosophical haireseis [schools] both before and after Plato, yet he surpassed all of them by his teaching, his thought, and in every possible way”4 (Prolegomena, 7.1).Olympiodorus performs the exegete’s role throughout his refutation of a non-dogmatic Plato, turning first to the grammatical item, Plato’s use of what Olympiodorus terms the “hestitating” adverbs, such as “probably,” “perhaps,” and “as I imagine.” Nevertheless Olympiodorus manages... (shrink)

Scepticism in the Sixth Century? Damascius' Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles SARA RAPPE THE Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles, an aporetic work of the sixth century Neoplatonist Damascius, is distinguished above all by its dialectical subtlety. Although the Doubts and Solutions belongs to the commentary tradi- tion on Plato's Parmenides, its structure and method make it in many ways unique among such exegetical works. The treatise positions itself, at least in part, as a response to Proclus' (...) metaphysical system. Thus the first principles alluded to in its title refer to a metaphysical structure consisting of five central elements, the Ineffable, the One, and the Noetic Triad, which Damascius both adumbrates in opposition to Proclus' as well as subjects to his own, internal critique. In this article, I will be asking whether or not Damascius' critique of Neoplatonic metaphysics is informed or inspired by ancient Scepticism. No doubt this question catches the reader off guard: if the last exponent of an- cient Scepticism is Sextus Empiricus, how could this sixth-century Neo- platonist Scholarch, the last officially appointed Platonic Successor, revert to a tradition that seemingly disappears for well over three centuries? ~ In what ~As is well known, Damascius modifies Proclus' own exposition of the Parmenidean hypothe- ses, positing a first principle to which he gives the title ~the Ineffable." For those interested in a.. (shrink)

Damascius of Damascus, last ‘Platonic successor’ in Athens, is rarely compared to one of his masters, namely Ammonius, the philosopher of Alexandria. When scholars do compare the two Neoplatonist philosophers, they usually focus on the negative picture of Ammonius, which is drawn by Damascius in his Philosophical History. In this paper, I argue that Damascius admired Ammonius’ intellectual endeavours and espoused a basic feature of the philosophical exegesis of his master, namely his concordism regarding the philosophies of (...) Plato and Aristotle, as is evident in Damascius’ surviving work on Plato and his (fragmentarily preserved) treatise On Time. Damascius’ downgrading of Ammonius came about rather as a disappointment, which is however by no means fully justified. (shrink)

Taking its cue from a passage in which the late pagan Neoplatonist Damascius criticizes his predecessor Proclus, this paper explores the way that ancient philosophers understood the soul’s access to its own tacit contents through the power of memory. Late ancient discussions of this issue respond to a range of passages in Plato and to Aristotle’s On Memory. After a survey of this material it is shown that for Damascius, but not Proclus, memory requires a distinction between the (...) subject and object of remembering. This means that there can be no memory involved in self-thought, such as occurs in intellect, but only in soul. In conclusion, the paper draws attention to a parallel discussion in Augustine, who, like Proclus, thinks that self-thinking can be understood as a function of memory. (shrink)

In the fragments of Damascius’ Vita Isidori one can observe a significant presence of the “marvellous.” In many cases, the marvellous seems to manifest a sacral and anagogical value in line with the philosophical and religious conceptions of late Neo-Platonism. A similar value of the marvellous can also be found in a passage of De Principiis, where Damascius hails the totally ineffable Principle as supremely marvellous, upon which he presents it as absolutely unknowable and expressible only in an (...) aporetic way. (shrink)

In The First Principle, Jonathan Greig examines the philosophical theology of the two Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius (5th–6th centuries A.D.), on the One as the first cause. Both philosophers address a tension in the Neoplatonic tradition: namely that the One was seen as absolutely transcendent, yet it was also seen as intimately related to other things as the source of their unity and being. Proclus’ solution is to posit intermediate causes after the One, while Damascius posits a distinct (...) principle, the ‘Ineffable’, above the One. This book provides a new, thorough study of the theories of causation that lead each to their respective position and reveals crucial insights involved in a rigorous negative theology employed in metaphysics. (shrink)

In his tale entitled The Nameless City, Howard Phillips Lovecraft includes unspecified «paragraphs from the apocryphal nightmares of Damascius» among the «fragments» of the «cherished treasury of daemoniac lore» of the protagonist In the present essay, I suggest that there is a connection between this unusual reference and a note in the writer’s Commonplace Book, which refers to the notice by Photius on a lost work by Damascius that nowdays is generally referred to as Paradoxa and assumed to (...) consist of a variegated collection of extraordinary stories and facts. I, therefore, delineate a general presentation of the testimony by the Byzantine Patriarch, upon which I attempt to bring into focus the motivations that led the Providence to make the writer insert the name of Damascius in the fantastic plot of his story. (shrink)