Volume 25, Issue 4, June 2020, Page 486-488.

McLeod's Conscience in Reproductive Health Care offers a number of valuable contributions to the literature, both within and beyond reproductive care. In this commentary, I begin by discussing two potential applications of her argument that healthcare professionals—specifically, those "who are charged with gatekeeping access to healthcare services" —have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to prioritize the interests of their patients over their own. Then, I turn to a couple of concerns one might raise about extending this fiduciary duty (...) to pharmacists who function as gatekeepers of reproductive services. Finally, I pose some questions about the ways in which McLeod conceives of the harms and wrongs of... (shrink)

Background: Limited knowledge of the experiences of conflicts of conscience found in nursing literature. Objectives: To explore the individual experiences of a conflict of conscience for neonatal nurses in Alberta. Research design: Interpretive description was selected to help situate the findings in a meaningful clinical context. Participants and research context: Five interviews with neonatal nurses working in Neonatal Intensive Care Units throughout Alberta. Ethical consideration: Ethics approval from the Health Research Ethics Board at the University of Alberta. (...) Findings: Three common themes emerged from the interviews: the unforgettable conflict with pain and suffering, finding the nurse’s voice, and the unique proximity of nurses. Discussion and conclusion: The nurses described a conflict of conscience when the neonate in their care experienced undermanaged pain and unnecessary suffering. During these experiences, they felt guilty, sad, hopeless, and powerless when they were unable to follow their conscience. Informal ways to follow their conscience were employed before declaration of conscientious objection was considered. This study highlights the vital importance of respecting a conflict of conscience to maintain the moral integrity of neonatal nurses and exposes the complexities of conscientious objection. (shrink)

While abortion has been legal in most developed countries for many years, the topic remains controversial. A major area of controversy concerns women’s rights vis-a-vis the rights of health professionals to opt out of providing the service on conscience grounds. Although scholars from various disciplines have addressed this issue in the literature, there is a lack of empirical research on the topic. This paper provides a documentary analysis of three examples of conscientious objection on religious grounds to performing (...) abortion-related care by midwives in different Member States of the European Union, two of which have resulted in legal action. These examples show that as well as the laws of the respective countries and the European Union, professional and church law each played a part in the decisions made. However, support from both professional and religious sources was inconsistent both within and between the examples. The authors conclude that there is a need for clear guidelines at both local and pan-European level for health professionals and recommend a European-wide forum to develop and test them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Coward Conscience and Bad Conscience in Shakespeare and NietzscheSandra BonettoGeorge Bernard Shaw once observed that the whole of Nietzsche was expressed in three lines that Shakespeare puts into the mouth of one of his greatest villains, Richard III 1 : "Conscience is but a word that cowards use / Devised at first to keep the strong in awe / Our strong arms be our conscience; (...) swords, our law" (5.6). More specifically, perhaps, these lines invite a comparison between Shakespeare's repeated association of conscience with cowardice in Richard III, 2 and Nietzsche's negative evaluation of bad conscience, notably in On the Genealogy of Morals. 3 The aim of this article is to offer such a comparative analysis in order to demonstrate that Shakespeare's coward conscience anticipates Nietzsche's understanding of the bad conscience (das schlechte Gewissen) as "the consciousness of guilt" (GM, II, p. 67), including its involvement with the notions of debt, sin, punishment, and God.INietzsche devoted the Second Essay of his Genealogy to the discussion of bad conscience, its origins, and related matters, notably guilt (Schuld) and its relation to duty (Pflicht) and debt (Schuld). The German term Schuld denotes both guilt and debt, and both senses are inextricably linked in Nietzsche's analysis. The bad conscience as consciousness of guilt is also [End Page 512] the consciousness of a debt owed—to another individual, society, and above all to the Christian God. The debt owed to God is one that can never be repaid, so that Christian morality necessitates guilt as "eternal punishment" for man's original transgression (see GM, II, pp. 91–92). Thus, Nietzsche argues, the descriptive equivalent of bad conscience, in the language of Christianity, is sin—"this is the priestly name for the... bad conscience" (GM, III, p. 140). In other words, sin is essentially a debt contracted with God. This is evident, for instance, in the substitution of the word "sin" for "debt" (ophéilema) in the formula of the Our Father as found in St. Luke. Even in the more general description, e.g. in the passage of St. Matthew where Jesus is explaining the implications of the petition "Forgive us or debts as we forgive our debtors," where the expressions paràptoma (fault, error) and armatia (aberration, failing, defect in relation to a norm or whole) are the more common terms used to denote sin, the sense of debt is implicit—we only accept our failure in relation to the Christian norm or whole if we accept that we "owe it to God" to live up to that norm in the first place. Moreover, the notion of debt brings with it the debtor's fear of failing to repay the creditor, so that a fear of punishment results from the sense of not living up to the contractual relationship with God.According to Nietzsche, the basis for the bad conscience and guilt, which he further defines as "anger directed against the self" (GM, I, p. 45), is cruelty, a natural human disposition that is displayed unabashedly in punishment. Bad conscience, he argues, is cruelty turned inward and essentially amounts to self-punishment or "psychical cruelty"—a form of subliminal suffering we impose on ourselves. Speaking of the "psychology of conscience," Nietzsche emphasises therefore that conscience "is not 'the voice of God in man'—it is rather the instinct of cruelty that turns back after it can no longer discharge itself externally" (GM, "A Polemic," p. 312). Bad conscience, or sin, is cruelty directed backwards, at oneself. In short, Nietzsche holds that the bad conscience, experienced by us as the "bite" or "sting" of conscience (morsus conscientiae; Gewissensbiss), results from the internalisation of instincts, notably the instincts to cruelty. Rather than acting on natural impulses, man has come to stifle and repress them: "Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the "'bad conscience'" (GM, II, p.85).Anticipating Freud's theory of repression and pre-empting his psychological interpretation of conscience as superego (Über-Ich), Nietzsche argues, "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn [End Page 513... (shrink)

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word ‘conscience.’ This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one’s ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has (...) done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed. (shrink)

Kant's conception of conscience has been relatively neglected by Kant scholars and the secondary literature offers no explanation of whether (and if so, how) his treatments of conscience fit together. To achieve a fuller understanding of Kant's general position on conscience, I question the widespread assumption that conscience is a feeling and account for the nature of conscience and its multiple functions. On my reading, conscience is ‘the internal judge’ whose verdict triggers certain (...) emotional reactions. Through the moral self-evaluative activities of this inner judge, we come to know our character better. In the judgements of conscience, we take account of various psychological conditions while judging both whether these conditions stand in the way of our establishing moral maxims and whether we hold ourselves accountable for our actions. By arousing certain feelings, these judgments also move us to moral action. (shrink)

Why conscience matters is a landmark in the literature on conscientious objection in healthcare. In it, Xavier Symons, bioethicist and postdoctoral research fellow at Harvard University, makes the...

Some bioethicists argue that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that explain why they should be exempt from offering the services that they find offensive. There are two versions of this view in the literature, each giving different standards of justification. We show these views are each either too permissive (i.e. would result in problematic exemptions based on conscience) or too restrictive (...) (i.e. would produce problematic denials of exemption). We then develop a middle ground position that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of healthcare professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients. Our claim, in short, is that insofar as objectors should have to justify themselves, they should have to do it according to the standard that we defend rather than according to the standards that others have developed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature in MindH. G. Wells and the Evolution of the Mad ScientistAnne StilesIn 1893, H. G. Wells's article "Man of the Year Million" dramatically predicted the distant evolutionary future of mankind:The descendents of man will nourish themselves by immersion in nutritive fluid. They will have enormous brains, liquid, soulful eyes, and large hands, on which they will hop. No craggy nose will they have, no vestigial ears; their (...) mouths will be a small, perfectly round aperture, unanimal, like the evening star. Their whole muscular system will be shriveled to nothing, a dangling pendant to their minds.2The editors at Punch evidently found this prediction hilarious, publishing a poem and accompanying sketch ridiculing Wells's lopsided future humans (Figure 1, p. 318). But not everyone was laughing.As ridiculous as Wells's bodiless, large-headed "human tadpoles" may seem, they were based on the most rigorous evolutionary science of their day. Wells, a lower-middle-class academic prodigy, received a prestigious [End Page 317] Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1."1,000,000 A.D.," Punch, or the London Charivari, 25 November 1893, 250.[End Page 318]government scholarship to attend the Normal School of Science in South Kensington (later absorbed into the University of London). Though Wells left South Kensington in 1887 without earning his degree, he was greatly inspired by his biology teacher, famed physiologist Thomas Huxley. Wells absorbed Huxley's pessimistic take on late-Victorian evolutionary theory, particularly his emphasis on the inherent brutality of natural selection.Huxley's pessimism surfaces in Wells's dystopian scientific romances, which imaginatively probe the consequences of evolutionary theory run amok.3 Beginning with the eponymous mad-scientist villain of The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) and continuing with alien invasion narratives like The War of the Worlds (1897–98) and The First Men in the Moon (1901), Wells depicts brains becoming steadily larger and more powerful as bodies grow smaller and more useless, emotions increasingly muted, and conscience all but silenced. Wells's nightmarish vision of the massively over-evolved brain unites these three works, as the ruthlessly intellectual biologist Moreau morphs into the amoral, top-heavy Martians and lunar inhabitants.Wells's malevolent mad scientists and extraterrestrials owe an intellectual debt not only to Huxley, but also to discussions of genius and insanity in late-Victorian issues of Mind (1876–present).4 The now-familiar trope of the mad scientist in fact traces its roots to the clinical association between genius and insanity that developed in the mid-nineteenth century. Authors like Scottish journalist and materialist philosopher John Ferguson Nisbet, English eugenicist Francis Galton, and Austrian Jewish physician Max Nordau—all of whose works were reviewed in Mind—argued that mankind had evolved larger brains at the expense of muscular strength, reproductive capacity, and moral sensibility.5 Wells drew upon these arguments in his fiction and even contributed his own article to Mind, a philosophical reflection on science entitled "Scepticism of the Instrument" (1904).In its unique role as "the first English journal devoted to Psychology and Philosophy." Mind was an ideal venue for an inherently interdisciplinary [End Page 319] subject like the clinical study of genius.6 The journal's first editor, George Croom Robertson, was particularly concerned that articles in Mind rise "above the narrowing influences of modern specialism."7 This disciplinary breadth attracted contributors from all fields, including fiction writers and literary critics like George Henry Lewes, Grant Allen, Andrew Lang, and, of course, H.G. Wells. During the same period, literary works probed ideas discussed in Mind, such as the nature of the soul, the possibility of free will, and the ramifications of biological determinism. In the four decades following its auspicious start, Mind provided a venue where scientists, philosophers and literary authors could find intellectual common ground.In this essay, the early fiction of H.G. Wells will serve as a case study of cross-fertilization between literature and scientific ideas discussed in Mind. The goals of this exploration are threefold: to gain a better understanding of the journal's history and influence; to investigate why Victorians associated genius with insanity; and to illuminate the shared... (shrink)

In “Disentangling Conscience Protections,” in this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Nadia Sawicki offers a taxonomy of conscience protection laws (conscience clauses) that highlights the expansive protections they can offer to health professionals who refuse to provide a medical service for reasons of conscience. Conscience clauses can protect health professionals from adverse actions by public actors (such as administrative agencies, prosecutors, and government funders) or private actors (such as employers, private professional associations, and injured (...) patients), and they can also protect health professionals from being subject to adverse actions for their beliefs, their conduct, or harm that results from their conduct. This taxonomy provides an accurate description of the broad range of protections conscience clauses can offer and thereby is a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on conscientious objection in health care. But it remains to consider whether the distinctions Sawicki identifies disentangle conscience protections beyond merely providing a taxonomy. In particular, does the taxonomy identify relevant distinctions in relation to determining whether a conscience clause is justified? (shrink)

Compared to other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, Kant’s theory of conscience remains relatively unexplored in the secondary literature on his work. This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that in the Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth: Groundwork) and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's two most widely read works on ethics, conscience plays very little role. However, Kant has extended discussions of conscience in three of his lesser read (...) works: On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy (henceforth: Miscarriage), the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason (henceforth: Religion), and the Metaphysics of Morals. There are also many unpublished notes in which Kant discusses conscience, and it may be conjectured, on the basis of extant copies of students’ notes, that conscience was a frequent topic in Kant’s lectures. As commentators have begun to play closer attention to these lesser read works, the literature on Kant’s theory of conscience has begun to develop. It is thanks to this development that this Element is possible: there is an emerging consensus that Kant’s theory of conscience is important both in its own right and insofar as it can help to correct various misunderstandings that have become part of the standard view of Kant’s ethical thought. This Element is divided into two parts. The first focuses on exegesis of Kant’s ethics. One of the overarching theses of this first part of the Element is that, although many of Kant’s claims about conscience are prima facie inconsistent, a close examination of context generally can dissolve apparent contradictions. The second part of the Element focuses on philosophical issues in Kantian ethics. One of the overarching theses of this part of the Element is that many positions traditionally associated with Kantian ethics, including the denial of moral luck, the nonaccidental rightness condition, and the guise of the objectively good, are at variance with Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

Though there exists a vast literature dealing with Hannah Arendt's thoughts on evil in general and Adolf Eichmann in particular, few attempts have been made to assess Arendt's position on evil by tracing its connection with her reflections on conscience. This essay examines the nature and significance of such a connection. Beginning with her doctoral dissertation on St Augustine and ending with her posthumously published studies in The Life of the Mind, Arendt's oeuvre exhibits strong thematic continuity: the (...) triad thinking-conscience-evil forms its most enduring core. A puzzling core, to be sure, considering the controversies triggered, especially regarding her notion of the 'banality of evil'. By placing the role of conscience at the very center of Arendt's lifelong reflections, this essay explores the - in many ways related - influence exerted by St Augustine and Heidegger. Heidegger's conception of conscience in Sein und Zeit is identified as a crucial source for understanding - so the claim holds - why Arendt found Heidegger's philosophy particularly wanting as regards the question of evil. Key Words: Arendt • Augustine • conscience • evil • Heidegger • Socrates • thinking. (shrink)

In this paper I uncover and critically analyze a methodological assumption in the literature on conscientious refusals in health care. The assumption is what I call the “Priority of Conscience Principle,” which says the following: to determine the moral status of any act of conscientious refusal, it is first necessary to determine the nature and value of conscience. I argue that it is not always necessary to discuss conscience in the debate on conscientious refusals, and that (...) discussing conscience is even problematic, since it can lead authors to beg the question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Teaching Ethics in the Health Care Setting Part I:Survey of the LiteratureMary Carrington Coutts (bio)The last twenty years have brought important changes to health care and health care education. Educators and students alike face an enormous number of new fields of study and new medical technologies. Health care professionals and institutions are also facing new challenges in the form of shrinking economic resources, and the AIDS epidemic. They must (...) also respond to increased patient participation in health care decisions, and public concern about abortion and euthanasia. These challenges to the health care professional have compelled educators to accommodate ethics within their already overcrowded curriculum. Those same dilemmas have influenced health care institutions to become active in health care ethics education.Medical ethics education gained a foothold in the United States during the late 1960s, when the medical schools of Pennsylvania State University, the University of Florida, and the State University of New York at Stonybrook established programs in the humanities (Pellegrino 1982). In 1978 Robert Veatch noted that formal teaching in medical ethics was rare; most institutions that taught medical ethics used "informal instruction in the apprenticeship mode" (Veatch 1978). However, by 1982 a survey by the American Medical Association (AMA) revealed that all but one of the 127 medical schools had courses that included medical ethics. Thirty eight of these had medical ethics as a required course (Pellegrino 1985). And by 1989, 43 of the 127 medical schools had separate courses in medical ethics, while 100 covered medical ethics within required courses. Medical ethics is now an accepted part of medical curriculum, though it is not fully mature, and its future remains somewhat unclear (Miles 1989).The evolution of ethics in the nursing curriculum has essentially mirrored that of the medical curriculum. A 1977 survey of baccalaureate nursing programs revealed that only 7 percent of nursing programs required courses in ethics [End Page 171] (Aroskar 1977). A decade later a second survey of undergraduate programs identified 85 percent of responding nursing schools as teaching nursing ethics either in separate ethics courses or within other required courses (Cassells and Redman 1989).Though the precise future of health care ethics may be unpredictable, there is little thought that the role of ethics will diminish in importance as the 21st century approaches. Ethics is seen as part of a larger plan to develop and enhance the health professional's human values, social conscience, and interpersonal skills. "This broader effort derives from concerns about the personal attributes and humanistic sensitivity of physicians, the recent overly 'scientized' trend in premedical education, the selection of medical students, and the socialization and cynicism engendered by medical education" (Miles 1989, p. 705).While nearly every medical and nursing school in the United States now teaches ethics in one form or another, the degree to which ethics is integrated into the curriculum varies from school to school. Some ethics courses are required elements of the students' education; some institutions require attendance at seminars and ethics grand rounds. Other schools offer an array of elective courses in topics that relate to ethics in medicine and nursing (including medical humanities, medicine and the law, literature and medicine, history of medicine, patient advocacy, and human values in nursing.) "Brown bag" seminars and journal clubs are also common.There is much debate over how health care ethics should be taught. Some argue that medical professionals should be conversant with theories of ethics and principles of biomedical ethics. Others think that a theoretical approach will alienate already over-worked medical or nursing students, and that instruction in ethical theory should be kept to a minimum. Case studies are frequently cited as a way to involve students in medical decision making, forcing them to analyze problems that they can relate to their own experiences.Additional concerns center around who should teach health care ethics. Frequently, physicians and nurses interested in ethics teach courses. Some commentators see this as the most desirable arrangement, asserting that practicing health care professionals best understand the conflicts faced by physicians and nurses-in-training. However, there is a growing pool of professionals who are undergoing training as medical ethicists. These individuals study ethical theory and bioethical... (shrink)

The great critic Peter Viereck, in a volume that both reproduces an earlier effort and presents an entirely new work on the intersection of history and literature, offers a biting critique of the American desire for normalcy that leads to a culture of the surrender of personality. In contrast to this voluntary thought control process is the unadjusted person. Cast in the mold of great individualists from Thomas More to Friedrich Nietzsche, such a person responds to fundamental values of (...) conscience rather than conformity built exclusively on ego gratification and icon worship. Viereck's book is a stinging critique of the liberal presumption of a monopoly in critical thought. He argues to the contrary, that most varieties of liberal expression offer little else than the common platitude dressed up as critique. In such a cultural environment, conservatism is the skeleton in the liberal closet. The virtue of conservatism is that in its very stress on liberty as dependent on tradition and law, it permits the human being an opportunity to test all transient things by the touchstone of all lasting ideas. Unadjusted Man cuts deep and in many directions: against left totalitarian regimes of Europe and right wannabes like McCarthyism in America. For Viereck, the art of conserving is not an embrace of utopias to come or empires that were, but retaining the sense of individuality over against the senselessness of the "massman." Civil liberties in this approach are a right to non-conspiratorial dissent informed by fundamental values. The new material is presented unabashedly--without an attempt to rewrite personal history, and with an admission that not every prediction made in the original edition has come to fruition. That said, the underlying themes of the original are not so much repeated as expanded upon. For those seeking a work in the classic mold of conservatism, rather than the strident reactionary views that have come to dominate much of the conservative dialogue, this will be a special book, a special entrance to the mind of a great figure in American culture wars of present as well as past. (shrink)

Resumen Este estudio tiene como objetivo perfilar el concepto de abuso de conciencia en vistas a su tipificación en el derecho canónico. Se comienza describiendo la reflexión postconciliar sobre la manipulación de conciencia desde una perspectiva teológico-moral, que anticipa el concepto actual de abuso de conciencia. El centro del artículo es el esclarecimiento del concepto de abuso de conciencia y de su gravedad. Este abuso se da en el contexto de relaciones de cuidado, donde se traspasan los límites de la (...) mediación eclesial que corresponde a dicha relación: el abuso de conciencia implica apropiarse indebidamente de la autoridad de Dios. El presente estudio continúa la línea de investigaciones precedentes para perfilar con mayor nitidez el abuso de conciencia propiamente tal en el contexto católico. Es un paso indis pensable para la necesaria justicia y reparación para las víctimas de este grave delito.This article offers a systematic characterization of abuse of conscience in order to its typification as a canonical crime. We begin exploring the study of conscience manipulation in moral theology after Vatican II as an important background for the understanding of abuse of conscience in more recent studies. The core statement of this study is the definition of abuse of conscience and its gravity. This kind of abuse is set within care relationships, where the abuser steps over the limits of his ecclesial mediation: he appropriates himself of God’s own authority. This study builds on this literature to understand abuse of conscience as a specific type of spiritual abuse in catholic settings. We understand this is absolutely necessary for justice and reparation towards victims. (shrink)

Background The nursing profession considers conscience as the foundation and cornerstone of clinical practice, which significantly influences professional decision-making and elevates the level of patient care. However, a precise definition of conscience in the nursing field is lacking, making it challenging to measure. To address this issue, this study employed the hybrid approach of Schwartz Barcott and Kim to analyze the concept of conscience-based nursing care. Methods This approach involves a three-phase process; theoretical, fieldwork, and analytical. A (...) systematic literature review was conducted using electronic databases during the first phase to find relevant papers. The content of 42 articles that met the inclusion criteria was extracted to determine the attributes, antecedents, and consequences of consciousness care using thematic analysis. Based on the working definition as a product of this phase, the plan of doing the fieldwork phase was designed. During this phase, data were collected through interviews with nurses all of whom were responsible for patient care in hospitals. In this phase, 5 participants were chosen for in-depth interviewing by purposeful sampling. Data were analyzed using directed content analysis. The findings of the theoretical and fieldwork phases were integrated and the final definition was derived. Results The integration of the theoretical and fieldwork phases resulted in identifying four key characteristics of conscience-based nursing care. Firstly, it involves providing professional care with a conscientious approach. Secondly, ethics is at the core of conscience-based care. Thirdly, external spirituality plays a significant role in shaping one's conscience in this context. Finally, conscience-based nursing care is both endogenous and exogenous, with professional commitment being the central focus of care. Conclusion Conscience-based nursing care is an essential component of ethical care, which elevates clinical practice to professional care. It requires the integration of individual and social values, influenced by personal beliefs and cultural backgrounds, and supported by professional competence, resources, and a conducive organizational atmosphere in the healthcare field. This approach leads to the provision of responsive care, moral integrity, and individual excellence, ultimately culminating in the development of professionalism in nursing. (shrink)

“It's almost like putting salt in a wound, for this person who's already made a very difficult decision,” suggested Meghan Patterson, a licensed obstetrician-gynecologist whom we interviewed in our qualitative study of the experiences of North Carolina abortion providers practicing under the state's Woman's Right to Know Act. The act requires that women receive counseling with state-mandated information at least twenty-four hours prior to obtaining an abortion. After the law was passed, Patterson worked with clinic administrators, in consultation with a (...) lawyer, to write a script to be used in the state-mandated counseling procedure. She and her colleagues took particular steps to mitigate the effects of what she described as HB 854's “forced language”—such as referring to the “father of the child.” While HB 854 stipulated that patients must be informed of the medical risks associated with the particular abortion procedure as well as those of carrying the child to term, Patterson's script made explicit the magnitude of comparative risks, emphasizing that the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term are substantially greater than the risks of an early-term abortion. She felt that these contextualization strategies helped to facilitate trust and rapport in a clinical care situation that proved relationally and morally challenging. In this article, we take up and expand on this point by elucidating an empirically grounded approach to ethically justified care when health care providers face legal or institutional policy mandates that raise possible moral conflicts. Our approach builds on recent bioethics discourse addressing conscience in the practice of medicine. While the concept of conscience has broad philosophical underpinnings relating to moral judgment, agency, and discernments of right and wrong, debates in bioethics have tended to engage the concept primarily vis-à-vis rights of conscientious objection or refusal. Here, we suggest a broader frame for thinking about claims of conscience in health care. Our approach draws on the feminist bioethics and the ethics of care literatures to highlight how providers may be motivated by matters of conscience, including relational concerns, in the active provision of certain forms of care. What emerges are two possibilities: not only conscientious refusal to comply with a policy mandate but also conscientious compliance—working conscientiously within a mandate's confines. (shrink)

The figure of the sovereign individual has stood for about two decades at the center of an exegetical debate concerning its identity and ideality. What is often lost sight of in these debates is the role of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt and bad conscience in the Genealogy’s second essay. I argue for the following claims. First, that the figure of the sovereign individual is not a singular occurrence in Nietzsche’s published writings but is present in (...) sections from Daybreak and The Gay Science that have not been pursued in this context in the Anglophone literature; sections that shed new light on the sovereign individual. Second, that examination of these texts reveals that the sovereign individual is for Nietzsche embodied by Socrates and the Socratic individual. Third, and most importantly, that with the sovereign individual there emerges individualized conscience – the capacity for self-laceration that concerns one’s misdeeds alone and involves the belief that one’s misdeeds are entirely one’s own individual fault, rather than the fault of the community or the gods. A fourth, rather negative consequence, is that at the end of the day Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, does not manage to provide us with a genealogy of moral guilt. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe figure of the sovereign individual has stood for about two decades at the center of an exegetical debate concerning its identity and ideality. What is often lost sight of in these debates is the role of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt and bad conscience in the Genealogy’s second essay. I argue for the following claims. First, that the figure of the sovereign individual is not a singular occurrence in Nietzsche’s published writings but is present in (...) sections from Daybreak and The Gay Science that have not been pursued in this context in the Anglophone literature; sections that shed new light on the sovereign individual. Second, that examination of these texts reveals that the sovereign individual is for Nietzsche embodied by Socrates and the Socratic individual. Third, and most importantly, that with the sovereign individual there emerges individualized conscience – the capacity for self-laceration that concerns one’s misdeeds alone and involves the belief that one’s misdeeds are entirely one’s own individual fault, rather than the fault of the community or the gods. A fourth, rather negative consequence, is that at the end of the day Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, does not manage to provide us with a genealogy of moral guilt. (shrink)

Building on previous speculations on the theological meaning Shakespeare intends with Falstaff, this essay argues that the character dramatizes the apprehension that tends to accompany a Protestant soteriology. Falstaff’s teasing Bardolph about his spiritual destiny bespeaks fright about himself, with the invoked memento mori calling attention to the unavailability of comforting ideas such as purgatory and self-determined repentance. Similarly, Falstaff’s forays into military impressment figure the incomprehensible nature of divine election, from a Protestant view. Through Falstaff, Shakespeare is not offering (...) a theological argument, so much as expressing sympathy for those afflicted with the anxieties to which Protestantism might leave them vulnerable. (shrink)

If we admit that Latin-American literature is a part of what is called Western culture, why, I ask myself, has it not been able to influence any of the great literatures of the West, outside of the Spanish? To be more precise, when I speak of influencing, I am not referring to the historico-cultural event that signifies Latin America, which has changed the West, but specifically to literature, that is, writing, the book, the language, the contents, the creative (...) structure and the symbols. From its origins until today, Latin-American literature, like Jugoslavian literature—in spite of the Nobel prize awarded to Ivo Andric—or Bulgarian or Icelandic, remains a marginal phenomenon. It is produced within a closed circuit, having no real resonance except in Spain. Furthermore, it struggles between two guilt feelings: one, that of being late with regard to renovating currents of fashions of the day and the other, that of not responding to its own reality. Because of those burdens of a guilty conscience, it often feigns innovation by following outside models or exalting a nationalist realism that has not produced the slightest new form but only a mediocre art of propaganda. It simulates and copies, or it lags behind. It either tries to be up to date or pretends to overcome this uneasiness by inventing an intransigent Americanism, behaving like a telluric barbarian or accepting traditional popular forms that may produce works such as Martin Fierro, whose value for the Latin-Americans cannot be denied but whose range is limited. (shrink)

BackgroundPublic Safety Personnel are routinely exposed to human suffering and need to make quick, morally challenging decisions. Such decisions can affect their psychological wellbeing. Participating in or observing an event or situation that conflicts with personal values can potentially lead to the development of moral injury. Common stressors associated with moral injury include betrayal, inability to prevent death or harm, and ethical dilemmas. Potentially psychologically traumatic event exposures and post-traumatic stress disorder can be comorbid with moral injury; however, moral injury (...) extends beyond fear to include spiritual, cognitive, emotional or existential struggles, which can produce feelings of severe shame, guilt, and anger.ObjectiveThis scoping review was designed to identify the extant empirical research regarding the construct of moral injury, its associated constructs, and how it relates to moral distress in firefighters, paramedics, and police officers.MethodsA systematic literature search of peer-reviewed research was conducted using databases MEDLINE, EMBASE, APA PsychInfo, CINHAL PLUS, Web of Science, SCOPUS, and Google Scholar. Included studies were selected based on the inclusion criteria before being manually extracted and independently screened by two reviewers.ResultsThe initial database search returned 777 articles, 506 of which remained after removal of duplicates. Following review of titles, abstracts, and full texts, 32 studies were included in the current review. Participants in the articles were primarily police officers, with fewer articles focusing on paramedics and firefighters. There were two studies that included mixed populations. Most studies were qualitative and focused on four topics: values, ethical decision-making, organizational betrayal, and spirituality.ConclusionPublic safety organizations appear to recognize the experience of moral distress or moral injury among public safety personnel that results from disconnects between personal core values, formal and informal organizational values, vocational duties, and expectations. Further research is needed to better understand moral distress or moral injury specific to public safety personnel and inform training and treatment in support of public safety personnel mental health. (shrink)

The concept of conscience continues to play a central role in our ethical reasoning as well as in public and philosophical debate over medical ethics, religious freedom, and conscientious objection in many fields, including war. Despite this continued relevance the nature of conscience itself has remained a relatively neglected topic in recent philosophical literature. In this paper I discuss some historical background to the concept and outline the essential features required for any satisfactory account of conscience (...) and its significance for a coherent moral psychology. It will become clear that conscience is a complex concept resisting reduction to any one of its component features. In doing so I critique recent accounts of conscience which have been insufficiently attentive to these complexities and as a consequence have drawn mistaken conclusions about the legitimate role of conscience in moral reasoning. I also discuss the significance of various distortions of conscience such what I call “the fanaticised conscience”. Clarifying our concept of conscience helps us avoid both conceptual confusion in moral psychology and misapplications of the concept in our understanding of conscientious objection both theoretically and in practice. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article n’est pas d’étudier les relations complexes que les pensées de Sartre et Merleau-Ponty entretiennent avec la psychanalyse – tâche qui exige à elle seule tout un livre –, mais uniquement de montrer que leur traitement respectif de la subjectivité entretient des rapports frontaliers, parfois conflictuels, avec la problématisation psychanalytique de l’inconscient. C’est donc seulement dans la perspective du problème très général de la « conscience fausse » que seront abordés ces emprunts et échanges sinueux. De (...) ce point de vue, il est nécessaire de préciser le sens attribué à la notion de « conscience » par Sartre et par Merleau-Ponty et, conjointement, le statut qu’ils accordent respectivement à l’inconscient. Le dissensus qui sépare les deux auteurs trouve d’abord sa source dans la fonction et les limites qu’ils assignent à la réflexion.The goal of this article is not to discuss the complex relationship between the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and psychoanalysis—such a subject would deserve an entire book—but rather to show that their respective treatments of subjectivity are closely related, sometimes conflicting, with the psychoanalytic problematization of the unconscious. It is therefore only in the perspective of the general problem of false consciousness that these references and sinuous exchanges will be presented. From this point of view, it is necessary to pinpoint the meaning attributed to the notion of ‘consciousness’ by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and conjointly, the status they accord respectively to the unconscious. The disparity between these two philosophers originates in the function and limits they assign to reflection.L’obiettivo di questo articolo non è quello di studiare le complesse relazioni che Sartre e Merleau-Ponty intrattengono con la psicoanalisi – cosa che esigerebbe un libro a sé – ma solo di mostrare che il loro modo di trattare il tema della soggettività intrattiene rapporti di frontiera, talvolta conflittuali, con la problematica psicoanalitica dell’inconscio. Affronteremo il movimento sinuoso di questi prestiti e di questi scambi nella sola prospettiva del problema molto generale della “falsa coscienza”. Da questo punto di vista, sarà necessario precisare il senso attribuito da Sartre e da Merleau-Ponty alla nozione di coscienza e, insieme, a quella di inconscio. Mostreremo quindi che il dissidio tra i due autori trova la sua origine anzitutto nella diversa funzione e nei diversi limiti che essi assegnano alla dimensione della riflessione. (shrink)

Despite the increasing amount of literature on the legal and political questions triggered by a commitment to liberty of conscience, an explanation of the normative significance of conscience remains elusive. We argue that the few attempts to address this fail to capture the reasons people have to respect the consciences of others. We offer an alternative account that utilizes the resources of the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy to explain why conscience matters.

By way of a case story, two common presuppositions in the academic debate on conscientious objection in healthcare are challenged. First, the debate typically presupposes a sharp division between conscience-based refusals based on personal core moral beliefs and refusals based on professional reasons. Only the former might involve the moral gravity to warrant accommodation. The case story challenges this division, and it is argued that just as much might sometimes be at stake morally in refusals based on professional reasons. (...) The objector's moral integrity might be equally threatened in objections based on professional reasons as in objections based on personal beliefs. Second, the literature on conscientious objection typically presupposes that conflicts of conscience pertain to well-circumscribed and typical situations which can be identified as controversial without attention to individualising features of the concrete situation. However, the case shows that conflicts of conscience can sometimes be more particular, born from concrete features of the actual situation, and difficult, if not impossible, to predict before they arise. Guidelines should be updated to address such ‘situation-based’ conscientious refusals explicitly. (shrink)

The title of this book is too modest. In his Disputationes on the text of the Summa of St. Thomas, Gabriel Vazquez draws upon a very wide reading of the theological literature of his own and previous ages. His conclusions present a synthesis, not without originality, of the speculation of the 15th and 16th centuries. The problem here considered, that of the obligation of civil law, raises the great issues of civil obedience and the limits of human authority. The (...) book, then, is more than a monograph on a single author; it is an important study in the history of moral philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Douglas Langston’s book is an important contribution to the literature on ethics since it re-establishes the importance of “conscience” as a useful tool in ethical theorizing. Contemporary ethicists criticize conscience and outwardly reject any use of the concept to develop an adequate ethical theory. Even virtue theorists refrain from talking much about conscience as an important analytic tool. Langston believes that this is an important omission that must be rethought for the purposes of developing an effective (...) ethical theory that is applicable to human beings in their search for living fulfilled lives. Throughout the book, Langston examines some of the main reasons why conscience has been abandoned as a useful analytic tool in ethical theorizing by contemporary theorists. One reason that Langston cites is that, after the seventeenth century, philosophers regarded conscience as a faculty that was distinct from the intellect, will, and memory. It may have been better if some of these theorists postulated some type of interaction between these faculties instead of arguing that each of them should be kept separate and distinct. Another reason may be the long identification of conscience with some set of rules for behaviour. This reduces conscience to a set of observable rules that are followed by an individual. It extricates the person from the action and reduces the responsibility that an individual should feel when acting in a particular situation. In addition, when one removes moral reasoning from conscience, its only function is to make one feel uncomfortable when one refrains from doing the right thing. This is insufficient in building an ethical theory or in living a moral life. What is needed is a more positive view of the notion of conscience, which is possible when one regards it as more than a faculty whose judgements are infallible. One of Langston’s themes in the book is that it is possible to develop a positive view of conscience that can also be used as an analytic tool in developing an effective ethical theory. (shrink)

The proclamation of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion is one of the important achievements of mankind in the context of civilization development. The analysis of the historical temporal aspect of the development of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion testifies to the constant attention to these problems in the diversity of their manifestation. They without exaggeration are some of the most important and relevant topics of philosophical, legal, religious, and theological discourse. Essential conceptual peculiarity of (...) freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, their paradigmatic fundamentals, is devoted to a large array of scientific and theological literature, special studies. (shrink)

Paul Bernier | : Cet article discute de diverses versions du représentationnalisme de la conscience. L’objectif principal est de défendre une interprétation de la théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience (TARC) selon laquelle le contenu d’un état mental conscient serait une proposition de re qui est constituée, en partie, par l’état mental conscient lui-même. Je souligne d’abord certains problèmes importants auxquels est confrontée une des théories de la conscience les plus influentes, soit la théorie représentationnelle de la (...) class='Hi'>conscience (TRC) et soutiens que la principale théorie rivale, soit la théorie de la conscience d’ordre supérieur (TCOS) doit lui être préférée. Je montre que les versions standards de la TCOS sont confrontées à un problème de régression à l’infini intolérable, et je propose la TARC comme une version non standard de la TCOS. | : This article discusses various versions of Consciousness Representationalism. Its main purpose is to defend an interpretation of the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) according to which the content of a conscious state is a de re proposition which is constituted, in part, by the very conscious state itself. I first undescore some important problems for the Representational Theory of Consciousness (RTC), which is one of the most influential approach in the literature. I argue that the main rival theory, the Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (HOTC) should be preferred. I argue that the standard versions of the HOTC are faced with an intolerable infinite regress and I propose the SRTC as a non-standard version of the HOTC. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and philosophical assumptions of the Nursing Manifesto , written by three activist scholars whose objective was to promote emancipatory nursing research, practice, and education within the dialogue and praxis of social justice. Inspired by discussions with a number of nurse philosophers at the 2008 Knowledge Conference in Boston, two of the original Manifesto authors and two colleagues discussed the need to explicate emancipatory knowing as it emerged from the Manifesto . (...) Our analysis yielded an epistemological framework based on liberation principles to advance praxis in the discipline of nursing. This paper adds to what is already known on this topic, as there is not an explicit contribution to the literature of this specific Manifesto , its significance, and utility for the discipline. While each of us have written on emancipatory knowing and social justice in a variety of works, it is in this article that we identify, as a unit of knowledge production and as a direction towards praxis, a set of critical values that arose from the emancipatory conscience-ness and intention seen in the framework of the Nursing Manifesto. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and philosophical assumptions of the Nursing Manifesto, written by three activist scholars whose objective was to promote emancipatory nursing research, practice, and education within the dialogue and praxis of social justice. Inspired by discussions with a number of nurse philosophers at the 2008 Knowledge Conference in Boston, two of the original Manifesto authors and two colleagues discussed the need to explicate emancipatory knowing as it emerged from the Manifesto. Our analysis (...) yielded an epistemological framework based on liberation principles to advance praxis in the discipline of nursing. This paper adds to what is already known on this topic, as there is not an explicit contribution to the literature of this specific Manifesto, its significance, and utility for the discipline. While each of us have written on emancipatory knowing and social justice in a variety of works, it is in this article that we identify, as a unit of knowledge production and as a direction towards praxis, a set of critical values that arose from the emancipatory conscience-ness and intention seen in the framework of the Nursing Manifesto. (shrink)

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from (...) the public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

This article is a speculative review of psychology’s approach to the cultural and civilizational determinants of the development of human identity. It discusses the relation between human freedom and necessity as it is determined by culture and its alternative suggestions concerning normative human existence. As his point of departure the author adopted Feliks Koneczny’s quincunx philosophy of history together with its five basic categories of existence. One can try to transpose these categories into the factors which constitute human intra-psychic space (...) and also into measures of description of the mechanics of human behavior. Attention is drawn to the fact that, in this context, the axiological shortcomings of psychology are exposed, especially the deliberate refusal to evaluate behavior in terms of good and evil or the exclusion of ethics, moral obligations, conscience and responsibility from psychological discourse. (shrink)

: As the fifth national bioethics commission has concluded its work and a sixth is currently underway, it is time to step back and consider appropriate measures of success. This paper argues that standard measures of commissions' influence fail to fully assess their role as public forums. From the perspective of democratic theory, a critical dimension of this role is public engagement: the ability of a commission to address the concerns of the general public, to learn how average citizens resolve (...) moral issues in healthcare, and to monitor public opinion on the topics addressed in the commission. Such a public forum role is supported by the critical literature within bioethics, which has deemed some commissions successful, supported more generally by the history of bioethics as a reform discourse that has brought socially important values into the medical domain, and supported more generally still by the example of the great social issues commissions of the 1960s. (shrink)

Health care often involves ethically difficult situations that may disquiet the conscience. The purpose of this study was to develop a questionnaire for identifying various perceptions of conscience within a framework based on the literature and on explorative interviews about perceptions of conscience (Perceptions of Conscience Questionnaire). The questionnaire was tested on a sample of 444 registered nurses, enrolled nurses, nurses’ assistants and physicians. The data were analysed using principal component analysis to explore possible dimensions (...) of perceptions of conscience. The results showed six dimensions, found also in theory and empirical health care studies. Conscience was perceived as authority, a warning signal, demanding sensitivity, an asset, a burden and depending on culture. We conclude that the Perceptions of Conscience Questionnaire is valid for assessing some perceptions of conscience relevant to health care providers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:François H. Lapointe PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY ThL· survey is limited to articles written in English that have appeared in journals published between 1 January 1974 and 31 December 1976. Abbott, Don. "Marxist Influences on the Rhetorical Theory of Kenneth Burke." Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (1974): 217-33. Abel, Lionel. "Jacques Derrida: His 'Difference' With Metaphysics." Salmagundi no. 25 (1974): 3-21. Adamowski, T. H. "Character and Consciousness: (...) D. H. Lawrence, Wilhelm Reich, and Jean-Paul Sartre." University of Toronto Quarterly 43 (1974): 31 1-34. Adams, D. J. "Style and Social Ideas in Jacques le fataliste." Studies in Voltaire & the Eighteenth Century 124 (1974): 231-48. Adams, Hazard. "Contemporary Ideas of Literature: Terrible Beauty or Rough Beast?" Contemporary Literature 17 (1976): 349-77. Adorno, Theodor W. "Lyric Poetry and Society." Telos no. 20 (1974): 56-71. Ages, Arnold. "Bonald and the Jews." Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 44 (1974): 32-43. Allen, Diogenes. "The Experience of Existence: Jean-Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch." International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1974): 181-87. Allen, Marcus. "Character Development in the Oreste of Voltaire and Les Mouches of Jean-Paul Sartre." CLA Journal 18 (1974): 1-21. Alter, Jean. "A (Terrorist) System of the Novel." Diacritics 6 (1976): 10-15. Altieri, Charles. "Wittgenstein on Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to Derridean Literary Theory." MLN 91 (1976): 1397-1423. Altieri,Charles. "Wordsworth's 'Preface' as Literary Theory." Criticism 18 (1976): 122-146. [On Wordworth and Wittgenstein.] Ames, Van Meter. "Art for Art's Sake Again?" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1975): 303-307. Appleman, Philip. "The Dread Factor: Eliot, Tennyson, and the Shaping of Science." Columbia Forum, N. S. 3 (1974): 32-38. Armstrong, Paul B. " E. M. Forster's Howard's End: The Existential Crisis of the Liberal Imagination." Mosaic 8 (1974): 183-99. Arnold, A. James. "La Condition humaine as Nietzschean Tragedy." Mélanges Malraux Miscellany 6 (1974): 15-24. 366 François H. Lapointe367 Aronson, Ronald. "L'Idiot de la famille: The Ultimate Sartre?" Telos no. 20 (1974): 90-107. Arthos, John. "Du Bartas, Petrarch and the Poetry of Deism." Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 1-17. Artz, Johannes. "Newman as Philosopher." International Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1976): 263-88. Ausmus, Harry J. "Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Language." The Midwest Quarterly 18 (1977): 169-86. Ayala, Francisco. "Ortega y Gasset, Literary Critic." Critical Inquiry 1 (1974): 395-414. Bakalar, H. Nicholas. "The Cartesian Legacy to the Eighteenth-century Grammarians." MLN 91 (1976): 698-721. Barnes, Hazel. "Apotheosis and Deification in Plato, Nietzsche and Huxley." Philosophy and Literature 1 (1976): 3-24. Baron, Dennis E. "Role Structure and the Language of Literature." Journal of Literary Semantics 4 (1975): 43-52. Barooskian, Vahan D. "The Aesthetics of the Russian Revolutionary Theatre 1917-1921." British Journal of Aesthetics 15 (1975): 99-117. Bart, B. F. "Hypercreativity in Stendhal and Balzac." Nineteenth Century French Studies 3 (1974-75): 18-39. Barthes, Roland. "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative." New Literary History 6 (1975): 237-72. Bashford, Bruce. "The Rhetorical Method in Literary Criticism." Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976): 133-46. Bass, Alan. "Time and the Witch: Femininity, Metapsychology and the Temporality of the Unconscious." MLN 91 (1976): 871-912. Bassett, Sharon. "Towards a Critique of Romanticism: Wordsworth, Pater and the 'Anima Mundi'." Criticism 17 (1975): 262-75. Batchelor, R. "Literature, Society and the Concept of Revolt." European Studies Review 5 (1975): 395-427. Battin, M. Pabst. "Aristotle's Definition of Tragedy in the Poetics, Part 1." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1974): 155-70, and Part II in Ibid. 33 (1975): 293-302. Bauer, George. "Sartre and the 'Sugars' of History." L'Esprit Créateur 15 (1975): 377-86. Baumgarten, Murray. "The Historical Novel: Some Postulates." Clio 4 (1975): 173-82. Beauchamp, Gorman. "Gulliver's Return to the Cave: Plato's Republic and Book IV of Gulliver's Travels." The Michigan Academician 7 (1974): 201-10. Bennett, Jonathan. "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn." Philosophy 48 (1974): 123-34. Benzon, William. "Cognitive Networks and Literary Semantics." MLN 91 (1976): 952-82. Bergonzi, Bernard. "A Grid of Codes: Views of Structuralism." Encounter 45 (1975): 52-58. Berry, Wanda Warren. "The... (shrink)

Fyodor Dostoevsky is renowned as one of the greatest psychologists in world literature, but what we know about the origins and the workings of the human mind has changed drasti­cally since the late nineteenth century. If Dostoevsky was such a sensitive reader of the human condition, do his insights hold up to modern research? To judge just by the issue of the psychology of confession, the answer appears to be: yes. The work of Michael Tomasel­lo indicates that the human (...) conscience evolved in order to make people obey group norms. From this I draw the proposition that confession should be best directed to the group as a whole, and not to an individual. Judging by Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment and an assortment of characters in The Brothers Karamazov, this appears to be exactly how confes­sion works in Dostoevsky’s novels: sin is against all, so forgiveness must be from all. (shrink)

This is the first study of guilt from a wide variety of perspectives: psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, six major religions, four key moral philosophers, and the law. Katchadourian explores the ways in which guilt functions within individual lives and intimate relationships, looking at behaviors that typically induce guilt in both historical and modern contexts. He examines how the capacity for moral judgments develops within individuals and through evolutionary processes. He then turns to the socio-cultural aspects of guilt and (...) addresses society's attempts to come to terms with guilt as culpability through the legal process. This personal work draws from, and integrates, material from extensive primary and secondary literature. Through the extensive use of literary and personal accounts, it provides an intimate picture of what it is like to experience this universal emotion. Written in clear and engaging prose, with a touch of humor, _Guilt_ should appeal to a wide audience. (shrink)

Bioethicists, through their writings, have been known to represent the conscience of the times. Speaking up against injustices, they have acted as moral compasses in the past. The events of October 7, 2023 and the resulting armed onslaught of Israeli forces on Gaza has created a huge humanitarian crisis. However, response of the global bioethics community appears muffled. In order to gain an objective insight, we conducted a scoping review of articles published on the current conflict in the top (...) ten bioethics journals, as classified by Google metrics. Broadening this search, we included relevant grey literature and selected medical and global health journals in our review. All types of articles published from the initiation of the conflict to the end of March 2024 were included. Findings from our exercise highlight the paucity of articles published on this crisis. This apparent indifference towards the Gaza crisis can be explained either by reluctance by bioethicists to write on this issue or perhaps due to editorial restraints. We argue that bioethicists, instead of focusing on esoteric issues, have a greater moral responsibility to speak out against injustices in Gaza. Their silence amounts to complicity and erodes the very foundations of the discipline of bioethics. (shrink)

This paper deals with the sudden change in the mood, themes and style of Korean literature in the 1990s, which was brought on by the inauguration of the first civilian government in three decades and the lifting of the oppressive shadow of military dictatorship. Under military dictatorship, serious Korean writers all felt obligated to be the conscience of the nation, so the emphasis of their works tended to be on social and political injustice and the lives of the (...) exploited workers or helpless and powerless citizens. Their tone, therefore, was that of harsh protest. However, with the demise of military dictatorship, Korean writers felt free to focus on personal relationships and the inner psyche. Shin Kyoung-suuk and Choi Yoon are just two among the many new talents who emerged in the Korean literary scene since the end of the 1980s. They awakened the deep-seated repression of the Korean psyche and fueled the exuberance of psychic liberation. (shrink)

Do humans have a reliable conscience? Do we have generally reliable (though fallible) moral intuitions? Many believe so. However, this idea is hard to reconcile with two broad scientific findings. First, consider the extensive moral diversity documented in the scientific literature. The moral differences we find across cultures and history should make us wonder whether we humans really do have a reliable conscience. Second, consider the influential role of culture. The scientific literature tells us that cultural (...) processes largely determine the specific content of our moral norms and intuitions. But this raises a problem. Cultural processes seem highly contingent: they can easily lead humans to all sorts of moral intuitions, including nasty ones. So why should we trust our culturally shaped conscience? Elsewhere I have argued that secular “moral objectivists” or “moral realists” have no good explanation (Braddock 2016; 2021). Now my question is this: can we explain the reliability of our conscience theologically, in a way that accommodates the scientific findings of moral diversity and the role of culture? Can theology’s doctrine of conscience succeed where secular moral philosophy has failed? That is my puzzle, which I explore in this paper. (shrink)

In this book, Diana Senechal confronts a culture that has come to depend on instant updates and communication at the expense of solitude. Schools today emphasize rapid group work and fragmented activity, not the thoughtful study of complex subjects. The Internet offers contact with others throughout the day and night; we lose the ability to be apart, even in our minds. Yet solitude plays an essential role in literature, education, democracy, relationships, and matters of conscience. Throughout its analyses (...) and argument, the book calls not for drastic changes but for a subtle shift: an attitude that honors solitude without descending into dogma. (shrink)