G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with the goal of, at some point, providing a complete translation. These drafts will be rough and I welcome feedback! -/- This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.

This is a translation of the short, third letter in G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, without its lengthy appendix. -/- Excerpts of the appendix which follows this letter have been translated into English by George di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, eds. G. di Giovanni and H.S. Harris, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2000).

This book provides the first edition of all the testimonia on the Sceptic philosopher Aenesidemus of Cnossus, who is deemed to be the source of Sextus Empiricus, the main surviving authority on ancient Scepticism. It provides an extensive philosophical and historical commentary, and throws light on a series of questions concerning the philosophy of the late Academy, Stoic Heracliteanism, and the interaction between medicine and philosophy in the late Hellenistic era. It will be an essential reference work for all (...) those scholars and students dealing with the history of ancient Scepticism. (shrink)

The importance of Gottlob Ernst Schulze's Aenesidemus 1 for the history of German Idealism has been widely recognized. Much as Hume had awoken Kant, Aenesidemus jolted the young Fichte out of his slumbering adherence to Reinhold's formulation of Kant's philosophy, leading him to re-evaluate the claims, methods, and foundations of the Critical philosophy. In his "Review of the Aenesidemus" 2 Fichte set out the results of this re-evaluation, which included his doctrine of intellectual intuition with remarkable and (...) uncharacteristic clarity. 3 According to a widely accepted story about the genesis of Fichte's Jena Wissenschaftslehre, the early Fichte was largely sympathetic to .. (shrink)

This is a draft translation of the fourth letter of G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus. Comments and corrections welcome.

This is a draft translation of the first letter of G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus. Comments and corrections welcome.

The book addresses the question of the alleged Heracliteanism of the Sceptic philosopher Aenesidemus of Cnossus.

In cod. 212 of his Bibliotheca, Photius provides some information of great importance for our scanty knowledge of Pyrrhonian scepticism between Timon and Sextus.

IN 1792 there appeared anonymously a book entitled, Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Propounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold, including a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason. This curious work, which takes the form of series of letter exchanged between an enthusiastic champion of the new transcendental philosophy and a skeptical critic of this same philosophy, created something of a sensation, appearing as it did at the height of the first (...) wave of general enthusiasm for the Critical Philosophy. Though by no means the first published attack on Kantianism, Aenesidemus was distinguished from most of the other early criticisms by the detailed character of its scrutiny as well as by its willingness to examine the Critical Philosophy not only in its original form, but also in the more "advanced" version represented by K. L. Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy. Aenesidemus claimed to be nothing less than a demonstration of the untenability of the new philosophy, specifically, of its failure to refute what the anonymous author called "Humean skepticism.". (shrink)

피론주의를 부활시켰던 아이네시데모스는 고대 회의주의 역사에서 독특한 위치를 차지하고 있다. 처음에는 아카데미 학파의 일원이었으나, 독단주의로 경도된 아카데미학파를 떠나 회의주의자인 피론에게서 새로운 철학의 가능성을 찾았기 때문이다. 그가 부활시킨 피론주의는 크게 다음 3가지 특징을 가진다.BR 첫째, 아이네시데모스의 주저는 『피론의 담화』이나 현존하지는 않는다. 그 대신, 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『철학자 열전』, 섹스투스의 『피론주의 개요』, 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 등장하는 아리스토클레스의 언급 그리고 포티우스의 『도서관』등에 이 책의 단편적인 내용들이 존재한다. 섹스투스와 라에르티오스의 보고는 정당하나, 아리스토클레스와 포티우스의 보고는 많은 문제점을 안고 있다. 특히, 후자들은 그의 회의주의를 소개하면서 그의 철학적 (...) 목적을 인식론적 토대의 부재성에 찾고 있으나, 그의 철학을 인식론적인 것으로 한정하고, 그의 회의주의적 태도를 자기모순적인 것으로 이해하는 오류를 범하였다. 그러기에, 아이네시데모스의 회의주의에 대한 논의는 라에르티오스와 섹스투스의 기록에 힘입어 재구성되어야 한다.BR 둘째, 아이네시데모스의 회의주의에는 “이소스테네이아(isostheneia)”에 근거한 양립화의 기술이 있다. 이 기술을 통하여, 그는 모든 문제에 있어서 긍정적인 논증과 부정적인 논증이 동시적으로 성립될 수 있는 가능성을 보여준다. 하나의 이슈에 동일한 힘을 가지고 있는 대립항을 성립시키고 인식론적 판단유보를 이끌어냄으로써, 그는 사물의 한쪽 면만을 절대시하는 인식론적 독단주의로부터 자유로워지고, 마음의 평안(ataraxia)을 획득할 것을 강조하였다.BR 셋째, 아이네시데모스 회의주의의 중심에는 10개의 논증방식들(tropen)이 있다. 10개의 논증방식들은 ‘주체에 기인한 논증방식’, ‘판단되는 대상에 기인한 논증방식’ 그리고 ‘주체와 객체 양자에 기인한 논증방식’이 있으며, 3개의 상위 논증방식들은 다시 1개의 최상위 논증방식인 ‘상대성에 기인한 논증방식’으로 수렴된다. 그의 논증방식들은 딜레마적인 형태를 갖춘 10가지 파괴적인 논증방식으로, 판단의 가능성에 대한 그의 논증의 형태이자 체계적인 이해의 산물이다. 아이네시데모스는 이 파괴적인 논증방식들을 사용함으로써, 그는 인식론적 독단주의를 제거하고, 마음의 혼란을 잠재우고자 하였다.BR 결론적으로, 아이네시데모스는 새롭게 부활한 피론주의에 최고의 논증방식을 제공한 최초의 피론주의자였다. 물론, 그의 철학에 대한 많은 오해가 있음에도 불구하고, 그는 초기 피론주의를 확립하는데 부족함이 없었다. 이후, 섹스투스는 이러한 아이네시데모스의 성과에 힙 입어 성숙한 피론주의를 완성한다. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente ensaio aborda o período anterior às obras tidas como as diferentes reescrições da Doutrina da Ciência, de J. G. Fichte, e aí tenta não só perceber a origem da necessidade de um princípio da identidade, como ela surge aquando das primeiras ocorrências do mesmo, mas também discernir os primeiros passos de todo o problema da possibilidade de um princípio absoluto de toda a filosofia, que sempre animaria a empresa. O foco em questão é a «Aenesidemus-Rezension», onde (...) Fichte junta a sua voz ao aceso diálogo já anteriormente entabulado por K. L. Reinhold e G. E. Schulze, e, na necessidade de repensar o princípio da consciência do primeiro, e as críticas a este feitas pelo segundo, é trazido à convicção da necessidade de um novo princípio absoluto; mas onde, e é este o fulcro do presente ensaio, Fichte percebe a insuficiência filososófica do sistema reinholdiano como uma insuficiência de linguagem, e portanto todo o problema como um problema que depende intimamente de uma apoditicidade linguística, e daí parte para a proposta de uma nova terminologia nacional, uma linguagem filosófica sistematicamente certa e inequívoca, à altura de um sistema filosófico regido por um princípio absoluto – um problema que viria a ocupar as cogitações de toda a geração de jovens pensadores em torno do professor de Jena. ABSTRACT This essay approaches the period prior to the works considered as the different versions of the Doctrine of Science, by J. G. Fichte, and aims not only at discerning the origin of the need for a principle of identity, but also at retracing the first steps of the whole problem of the possibility of an absolute principle of all philosophy. The focus shall be the «Aenesidemus-Rezension», where Fichte joins his voice to the heated argument previously struck by K. L. Reinhold and G. E. Schulze, and, urged to rethink Reinhold's principle of consciousness and the criticism raised by Schulze, is brought to believe the necessity for a new absolute principle; but where, and this is the fundamental idea of this essay, Fichte realizes the philosophical insufficiency of Reinhold's system as a language-related insufficiency, and therefore the whole problem as one intimately dependent on a linguistic apodicticity, and moves on to propose a new national terminology, a systematically certain and unequivocal philosophical language, which might meet the demands of a philosophical system ruled by an absolute principle – a problem which would soon be in the agenda of a whole generation of young idealists around the Professor of Jena. (shrink)

In Aenesidemus, G.E. Schulze adopts the skeptical voice of Aenesidemus and engages in critical dialogue with Hermias, a Kantian, in the hopes of laying bare what he views as the fundamental issues of K.L. Reinhold’s version of critical philosophy. While some attacks reveal a deep misunderstanding of Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie on Schulze’s part, others hit their mark. In the Aenesidemus Review (1794), J.G. Fichte at times agrees with criticisms raised by Aenesidemus and at times defends Reinhold against (...) them. On Fichte’s view, Schulze succeeds in proving that the first principle of Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie, the principle of consciousness (Satz des Bewußtseins), is neither self-evident nor self-determining. Therefore, it cannot be the first principle of philosophy. However, Schulze fails to dissuade Fichte from viewing Reinhold’s principle of consciousness as the pithiest expression of human consciousness of the time. For these reasons, Fichte holds that Reinhold’s principle of consciousness must be deduced from an even higher principle. The goal of this paper is to assess whether Fichte puts forth his own candidate for the first principle of philosophy in his Aenesidemus Review. (shrink)

L’importance d’une édition des témoignages d’Énésidème s’impose de toute évidence pour tous ceux qui s’occupent du scepticisme grec. Le problème est bien connu : le pyrrhonisme constitue un des mouvements philosophiques les plus intéressants de l’Antiquité et son influence a traversé les siècles jusqu’aujourd’hui. Mais qu’est-ce que le pyrrhonisme, quels sont ses origines et son développement? Nous sommes informés sur les deux extrêmes de cette histoire, Pyrrhon et Sextus Empiricus. Mais Pyr...

In my essay I try to show, how in his reaction to Schulze’s sceptical critique of Reinhold’s philosophy Fichte attempted to achieve the basic premisses of his own program of Wissenschaftslehre.In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, auf welche Weise Fichte in der Auseinandersetzung mit der skeptischen Herausforderung, die Schulzes Kritik der Reinholdschen Elementarphilosophie darstellte, versuchte, sein eigenes Programm der Wissenschaftslehre in seinen grundsätzlichen Prämissen zu profilieren.

Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three‐part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Pyrrho and Timon From Timon to Aenesidemus Agrippa Sextus Empiricus Bibliography.

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First, we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of (...) Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 124-146.

A re-examination of the anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, henceforth abbreviated K, is overdue. It may yet prove to be the most important document we possess for plotting the course of pre-Plotinian Platonism, and is by far the largest surviving portion of a pre-Plotinian commentary on a complete work of Plato. It offers us insights into the issues of the first century B.C. which are unparalleled in other extant Middle Platonist works, either because of the subject of the work and (...) its consequent tendency to bring to mind the epistemological debates between Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon, and Aenesidemus, or because the author, whom we may call A, is writing at a time comparatively close to those debates. (shrink)

The present paper makes the following points. The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. Not unlike (...) Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim, but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues.. Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus. (shrink)

Le scepticisme est une véritable constante de l’histoire de la philosophie depuis l’Antiquité. En se nourrissant des désaccords philosophiques, il ne cesse de se transformer pour mieux remettre en cause les certitudes du dogmatisme. Ce volume présente des contributions en langue française de spécialistes de la pensée sceptique dans l’antiquité, domaine qui s’est considérablement développé ces dernières années. Les études ici présentées portent aussi bien sur le pyrrhonisme que sur la nouvelle Académie ou l’empirisme médical ; elles utilisent une variété (...) d’approches (analytique, systématique et historiographique), toutes dans le même but : mieux comprendre l’énigme de la pensée sceptique. (shrink)

In the first half of the first century BC the Academy of Athens broke up in disarray. From the wreckage of the semi-sceptical school there arose the new dogmatic philosophy of Antiochus, synthesized from Stoicism and Platonism, and the hardline Pyrrhonist scepticism of Aenesidemus. With his extensive knowledge of the ways in which Plato was read and invoked as an authority in late antiquity Dr Tarrant builds a most impressive reconstruction of Philo of Larissa's brand of Platonism and of (...) its arrival in Middle Platonism, particularly that of Plutarch, long after the Academy's institutional demise. Particularly valuable is his exploitation for this purpose of a text barely discussed since its publication 80 years ago - a commentary on Plato's Theaetetus whose unidentified author Dr Tarrant has cogently argued to be a follower of Philo. Among many other achievements, Dr Tarrant throws much light on the relation of Aenesideman scepticism to the Academy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:J. G. Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794–95 by J. G. FichteIsabelle Thomas-FogielJ. G. Fichte. J. G. Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794–95. Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 608. Hardback, $145.00.This edition of texts written or taught by Fichte between February 1794 and the winter of 1794–95 is a major editorial event and (...) is destined to become the indispensable working tool for all English-speaking students and researchers interested in Fichte. Daniel Breazeale, one of the greatest Fichte specialists, offers here four essential texts. First, the heart of this edition and of Fichte's philosophy, is Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (literally "Doctrine of Science") of 1794–95. This central text has already been translated into English by Peter Heath and John Lachs under the title Science of Knowledge (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1970), but as Breazeale explains in his preface, he corrected the errors in translation and above all wished to propose a version that was "as broadly accessible as possible" (xi). This is a great challenge, given that this version of the Wissenschaftslehre (henceforth WL) is considered one of the most abstract and difficult texts in philosophy. Let us recall that the term 'WL' qualifies Fichte's entire undertaking and not just one of his works; Fichte thus professed more than fifteen versions of the WL.With this fundamental text, we are also offered a revised translation of two essays (which Breazeale had already edited in 1988): Concerning the Concept of the WL, or of So-Called 'Philosophy' (April–May 1794) and Outline of What is Distinctive of the WL with Regard to the Theoretical Power (winter 1794–95). Finally, Breazeale translates for the first time into English The Zurich WL, the lectures Fichte gave before a small committee from February 24 to April 26 of 1794. With this book, English-speaking readers thus have at their disposal, [End Page 334] in a single volume, some of the most fundamental writings of Fichte's first philosophy. The precision and clarity of this translation will, if not "force the reader to understand," to use a well-known title of Fichte, at least help the reader to appreciate one of the culminating points of idealism.But there is much more to this edition than a precise, fluent, and illuminating translation. It includes, first, an introduction of about one hundred pages that details Fichte's bibliographical, historical, and philosophical journey; then, endnotes that clarify certain moments of the text by placing them in their context, identifying the opponents targeted by Fichte, and restoring the debates of the time; lastly, a German-English and English-German glossary and an index. It is a considerable work, the fruit of a lifetime of research, which will introduce many beginners to Fichte's philosophy and at the same time renew many specialist debates. And it is undoubtedly a strength of this edition that it can be read at several levels, by the beginner as well as by the most experienced researcher.As this review cannot deal with all the rich analyses in Breazeale's introduction, I will give just a few examples. Breazeale first endeavors to reconstruct the genesis of Fichte's questioning. Indeed, the work of the historian of philosophy—as R. G. Collingwood conceived of it—consists first of all in restoring as closely as possible the question to which the text is intended to provide an answer. So, what question or problem was the source of his philosophy that he felt the need to rename WL? Fichte's initial problem was that of the foundation of transcendental idealism. The criticisms of skeptics like Gottlob E. Schulze (also known as "Aenesidemus") or Salomon Maimon had revealed the inadequacy of the foundations laid down by both Kant and Reinhold. As Fichte says and Breazeale reminds us, "The system has to be rebuilt" (4). This rebuilding is the common object of these four translated texts. In this respect, the Zurich lectures (of which only a small part remains) are the witness of this foundation work. Reading these... (shrink)