This paper explores systematic parallels between the criticisms of Kantian cognitive dualism provided by Salomon Maimon within his 'Essay on Transcendental Philosophy' of 1790 and F.W.J. Schelling within his 'General Overview of the Most Recent Philosophical Literature' of 1797. It discusses how both Maimon and Schelling suggest that the difficulties with Kant's cognitive dualism are so severe that they can only be resolved by recourse to a Leibnizian position, in which sensibility and understanding, and matter and form, arise from one (...) and the same cognitive source. It thus shows how Maimon and Schelling – within 1790 and 1797, respectively – sketch systems of transcendental philosophy explicitly modelled on the Leibnizian philosophy, which both of them interpret as claiming that God is immanently contained within the human soul. (shrink)

Kant's transcendental idealism is often praised for resolving antinomies and attacked for representationalism. Such an attitude prevailed even among Kant's contemporaries. As early as 1787 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi noted that the "main advantage" of the doctrine that we cognize only appearances and not things in themselves is that it resolves the antinomical conflicts in which previous metaphysics was embroiled and thus "sets reason at rest." Yet, at the same time, Jacobi bemoaned that the transcendental idealist cannot consistently uphold the positive (...) consequences of his "transcendental ignorance" without likewise accepting the negative consequence that his doctrine is tantamount to "speculative egoism,"1 insofar .. (shrink)

This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique (...) of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians (such as F. I . Niethammer). I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act (in which I in some sense become my own intentional object), whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'. (shrink)

This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique (...) of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians. I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act, whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'. (shrink)

Richard Fincham - Refuting Fichte with "Common Sense": Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer's Reception of the Wissenschaftslehre 1794/5 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 301-324 Refuting Fichte with "Common Sense": Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer's Reception of the Wissenschaftslehre 1794/5 Richard Fincham Even a cursory comparison of Fichte's first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5 with Kant's critical works reveals a striking methodological difference. For, whereas Kant begins with the conditioned and ascends to the (...) subjective foundations of its conditioning, Fichte immediately begins—in Hegel's words, "like a shot from a pistol" —from an unconditioned subjective foundation. It may thus be said that Kant's method is "analytic," whereas Fichte's is "synthetic." For, in the Wolffian terminology of the time, the analytic method names a movement "from... consequences to their grounds," whereas the synthetic method names a movement "from grounds to their consequences." Kant himself employs these terms to describe the same distinction. However, he clearly believes that the analytic method is the correct procedure of all philosophy, whereas the synthetic method describes the correct procedure of mathematics. Therefore, it appears that Fichte's method is not only different from Kant's, but is also one that Kant would not sanction. It therefore seems fruitful to consider both why... (shrink)