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Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.details
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Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
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Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.details
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Is There a Geography of Thought for East‐West Differences? Why or why not?Ho Mun Chan & Hektor K. T. Yan - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):383–403.details
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Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect.Louis C. Charland - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):273-301.details
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Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism.Rosa Cao - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-31.details
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Collective Belief Defended.Michael G. Bruno & J. M. Fritzman - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):48-66.details
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Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.details
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Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.details
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Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance.William Bechtel - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.details
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The question of animal technical capacities.Ana Cuevas Badallo - 2019 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 14:139-170.details
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Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism.Marvin Backes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10311-10329.details
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The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation.Emily Adlam - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:21-32.details
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Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Internal Perspectivalism: The Solution to Generality Problems About Proper Function and Natural Norms.Jason Winning - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (33):1-22.details
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Filozofija psihologije i problem sučeljavanja. Implikacije za neke filozofske rasprave u medicini i pravu (Eng. Philosophy of Psychology and the Interface Problem Implications for Some Philosophical Debates in Medicine and Law).Ivana Jerolimov & Marko Jurjako - 2023 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 43 (3):567-586.details
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Redundant Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (5):364-384.details
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Jaspers on explaining and understanding in psychiatry.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - In Thomas Fuchs & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), One Hundred Years of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-120.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 81-91.details
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Interpreting ordinary uses of psychological and moral terms in the AI domain.Hyungrae Noh - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-33.details
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El pragmatismo biológico de las creencias.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2019 - Caracas: Amazon.details
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Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.details
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What levels of explanation in the behavioural sciences?Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi (eds.) - 2015 - Frontiers Media SA.details
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Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.details
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Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.details
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Levels and kinds of explanation: lessons from neuropsychiatry.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Emotional Actions Without Goals.Isaac Wiegman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):393-423.details
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Deceptive Appearances: the Turing Test, Response-Dependence, and Intelligence as an Emotional Concept.Michael Wheeler - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (4):513-532.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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Tarski's theory of truth and field's solution to the problem of intentionality.Peter Weatherall - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):291 – 304.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):33-51.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.details
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Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 31:91-126.details
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Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności.Maciej Tarnowski - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):323-353.details
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Real intentionality.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):287-313.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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Who is Afraid of Commitment? On the Relation of Scientific Evidence and Conceptual Theory.Steffen Steinert & Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):477-500.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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