Representation in Cognitive Science

Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.

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Author's Profile

Nicholas Shea
School of Advanced Study, University of London

Citations of this work

The number sense represents (rational) numbers.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:1-57.
Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), Mental Representations. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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