Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)

In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyakṣa, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It arises through the practice of meditation upon the Four Noble Truths. The method of the practice is to contemplate their aspects with attention (sādara), without interruption (nairantarya), and over a long period of time (dīrghakāla). A problem occurs in this position since Buddhists hold the theory of momentariness: how is possible that a yogin attains yogipratyakṣa even (...) when everything arises and perishes moment by moment. It is not possible for the momentary mind to fix on the object. Neither is the intensification of the practice possible in a stream composed of cognitions different at each moment. To provide a solution of this problem, a renown eleventh century Buddhist logician, Jñānaśrīmitra, assures us that momentariness is incompatible with duration (sthāyitā), but not with the occurrence of dissimilarity (visadṛśotpāda). Even if cognitions are momentary, the vividness of an object continues to intensify in the course of each preceding cognition-moment producing, in turn, its following moment. Jñānaśrīmitra discusses the attainment of yogipratyakṣa in terms of Buddhist ontological distinctions of moment (kṣaṇa) and continuum (santāna). At the level of the continuum, the process of enlightenment is considered gradual. By retaining a strict adherence to the final moment of the practice, on the other hand, the process is considered sudden. (shrink)

In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the word anityatva (“impermanence”) means a process of transformation ( pariṇāma ) of primordial matter ( pradhāna ). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance ( tirodhāna ) of the previous dharma of an entity ( dharmin/dravya ) and (2) the cessation ( nivṛtti ) of the previous state ( avasthā ) of an entity ( avasthātṛ ). In response to (...) these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction ( vināśa ). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu’s criticism allows room for a retort from the Sāṅkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu’s theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory. (shrink)

Maxime Vachon | : L’objectif de cet article est de montrer l’unité du chapitre 14 du Peri Hermeneias, chapitre dans lequel Aristote retourne au fondement de l’échange dialectique, à savoir la doxa. Je montre ainsi que ce chapitre expose progressivement les trois conditions sémantiques que des points de vue doivent respecter pour être contraires : le sujet doit être le même, l’objet doit aussi être le même, mais le mode de prédication doit être contradictoire. | : The aim of this (...) paper is to show the unity of chapter 14 of the Peri Hermeneias, in which chapter Aristotle goes back to the basis of dialectical exchange, that is doxa. Thus I show that this chapter presents in successive order the three semantical conditions that points of view must respect in order to be contrary : the subject has to be the same, the object has also to be the same, but the mode of predication must be contradictory. (shrink)

The article deals with some facets of the phenomenon of the underdetermination of meaning by (linguistic) data which are particularly relevant for textual exegesis in the historico-philological disciplines. The paper attempts to demonstrate that lack of relevant information is by no means the only important reason why certain issues of interpretation cannot be definitely settled by means of traditional philological methods but that the objective nonexistence of pertinent data is equally significant. It is claimed that the phenomenon of objective under-determination (...) possesses among others two major consequences: (1) A strict separation between the exploration of the history of (Indian) philosophy and philosophical criticism is theoretically incorrect. (2) Transference of indeterminacy and vagueness to the target langue in translations of textual sources is not only legitimate but sometimes most appropriate. Presumably the relevance of the discussed issues is not strictly confined to the area of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

Šiaurinių panevėžiškių patarmės daiktavardžio morfologinio proceso natūralumo išsamus tyrimas ir išvados pirmą kartą publikuotos autorės daktaro disertacijoje. Siekiant platesnės patarmės tyrimų sklaidos straipsnyje glaustai ir aiškiai pateikiamas koncentruotas disertacijoje aprašytas tyrimas. Straipsnyje atlikti tik nežymūs pakeitimai. Straipsnyje keliamas tikslas – remiantis natūraliosios morfologijos teorijos principais įvertinti ir glaustai aprašyti konstrukcinį linksnių formų ikoniškumą, daiktavardžio formų ir galūnių sinkretizmą. Fleksinių formų paradigmų lyginimas parodė, kad šiaurinių panevėžiškių patarmėje, palyginti su bendrine kalba, sinkretizuotų linksnių, neikoniškų, kontraikoniškų formų yra gerokai daugiau. Dėl to (...) atsiranda tendencija nuo trijų linksniavimo tipų pereiti į du linksniavimo tipus. (shrink)

This introduction argues for the value of projecting as a category of analysis, while exploring the contexts for its emergence and spread as a genre of intellectual and practical activity in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The emergence of the morally ambivalent figure of the “projector” in Elizabethan and Stuart England – initially in connection with confessional strife and attacks on corruption, and subsequently in relation to colonial expansion, experimental philosophy, and commercial and fiscal innovation – provoked defences of (...) projecting that articulated the relationship between private interest, individual effort, the public good, and collaborative ­scientific practice in new ways. German cameralists and French philosophes extended these arguments, while recuperating the figure of the projector, in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

The technical term “ tarka ” in the Nyāya tradition is the object of the present investigation. Diverse texts including Buddhist ones exhibit a negative estimation of activities using tarka . In contrast, more often than not, later treatises dealing with logico-epistemic problems, especially certain Naiyāyika works, identify the methodological peculiarity of Nyāya with tarka . Such an ambivalent attitude toward tarka can be understood in a coherent way if the essential features of tarka that gave rise to it can (...) be grasped. Starting from the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.40 and the explanation given in the Nyāyabhāṣya on it, the present researcher sorted out three characteristic features of tarka in the early Nyāya tradition. These three features focus on the main feature of tarka : namely, reflective analysis without requiring further factual information on the object of investigation. Based on this, the present researcher critically reviewed what promoted an understanding of tarka as a reductio ad absurdum argument or an a priori reasoning. Furthermore, certain passages from the Nyāyamañjarī , Nyāyakalikā , and Tarkasaṅgraha were examined to demonstrate that the present researcher’s interpretative understanding of tarka was adequate for explaining the usage of this term in a broad sense, with positive connotations. (shrink)

De concert avec ses fonctions politiques - et cela sur vingt ans -, Montaigne rédigea ses Essais que l'on considère trop souvent comme séparés de ses responsabilités publiques aujourd'hui reléguées à l'arrière plan de sa carrière d'écrivain. Nous voudrions arguer que ses Essais sont indissociables de sa vie publique. Certes, les préoccupations littéraires et politiques de Montaigne changent avec son temps, mais ce qui fonde la forme de l'essai - à savoir un discours profondément inscrit dans le présent - ne (...) permet pas d'établir une différence théorique entre le privé et le public puisque les deux sont pratiquement inséparables quand ils sont réduits à leur unité la plus stricte qui se rapporte essentiellement au quotidien, car dans l'immédiat du vécu, le privé et le public sont pratiquement indissociables. Si une philosophie se dégage indubitablement des Essais, elle a peut-être plus à voir avec la manipulation constante effectuée par Montaigne entre le particulier (vie privée) et l'universel (vie publique) que sur le contenu de tel précepte moral ou dogme des écoles antiques. La temporalité de l'écriture et celle des événements ne sont pas en synchronie dans les Essais et Montaigne joue constamment sur cette image d'un livre privé (hors de toute temporalité historique) alors que les Essais sont conçus comme un objet lui permettant précisément l'accès à la vie publique. Cette philosophie du quotidien et du temps présent qui ressort des Essais ne saurait mettre à l'écart les considérations publiques et historiques qui rythment toujours l'écriture d'une vie bien particulière. Paralelamente a suas funções políticas - e isso em 20 anos - Montaigne escreveu seus Ensaios frequentemente considerados como separados de suas responsabilidades públicas, atualmente relegadas a um segundo plano em relação à sua carreira de escritor. Gostaríamos de argumentar que seus ensaios são inseparáveis ​​de sua vida pública. Certamente, as preocupações literárias e políticas de Montaigne mudam com o seu tempo, mas o que funda a forma do ensaio - a saber, um discurso profundamente inscrito no presente - não permite estabelecer uma diferença teórica entre público e privado, uma vez que os dois são praticamente inseparáveis ​​quando reduzidos à sua unidade mais estrita, a qual se relaciona principalmente com a vida cotidiana, porque no imediato do vivido, o privado e o público são praticamente indissociáveis. Se uma filosofia emerge, sem dúvida, dos Ensaios, ela talvez tenha mais a ver com a manipulação constante realizada por Montaigne entre o particular (vida privada) e o universal (vida pública) do que com o conteúdo de algum preceito moral ou dogma das escolas antigas. A temporalidade da escrita e a dos eventos não estão em sincronia nos Ensaios e Montaigne opera constantemente sobre a imagem de um livro privado (fora de toda temporalidade histórica), enquanto os Ensaios são concebidos como um objeto, permitindo-lhe precisamente o acesso à vida pública. Essa filosofia do cotidiano e do tempo presente que promana dos Ensaios não afasta as considerações públicas e históricas que sempre dão ritmo à escrita de uma vida muito particular. (shrink)

This article contrasts Epicurus's and Diogenes the Cynic's respective views on acceptable desires. I emphasize their appeals to nature to legitimize or de-legitimize certain types of desires.