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Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
Edited by Armin W. Schulz (University of Kansas)
About this topic
| Summary |
The philosophy of cognitive science concerns philosophical issues that arise in cognitive science. Indeed, cognitive science is itself partly a philosophical project: it combines tools and insights from psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, biology, anthropology, and philosophy. Initially unified by a commitment to a computational and representational outlook on cognition, cognitive science has increasingly come to embrace a wide variety of theoretical and methodological outlooks. Major questions that are being considered in the philosophy of cognitive science include: (i) Which (if any) cognitive processes or states are innate (in which organisms)? (ii) Should cognitive processes be seen as computational processes—and, if so, over what do they compute? (iii) What are the relationships between cognitive processes and neural (and other physiological) processes? |
| Key works | Fodor 1983 is a classic—and still very influential—defense of the view that the mind consists of a handful of specialized and informationally encapsulated input and output systems, plus a central reasoning system. A more recent defense of a different, more empiricist view of cognition is in Prinz 2002 . |
| Introductions | Two good introductions are: Clark 2001 Thagard 2006 |
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Nativism in Cognitive Science (265 | 160)
Evolution of Cognition (834 | 126)
Extended Cognition* (710 | 91)
Animal Minds (1,735 | 355)
Animal Consciousness (392 | 42)
Animal Cognition (500 | 49)
Animal Communication (99)
Animal Culture (108)
Animal Metacognition (10)
Animal Moral Cognition (109)
Animal Reason (17)
Animal Test (7)
Animal Minds, Misc (159)
Interlevel Relations in Cognitive Science (598 | 139)
Psychophysical Reduction* (625 | 10)
Psychophysical Supervenience* (196)
Other Psychophysical Relations* (420 | 51)
Cognitive Ontologies* (88)
See also
- General Philosophy of Science (55,186)
Contents
10115 found
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| 1 — 50 / 10115 |
Material to categorize
- Philosophical Dimensions of the Morris Water Maze.Jordan Dopkins - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa CruzIn 2014, John O’Keefe was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on the hippocampus and its role in encoding map-like representations. His contributions were significantly influenced by Morris water maze studies. O’Keefe himself acknowledged the pivotal role of the Morris water maze, stating that it remains the preeminent behavioral assay for assessing hippocampal function. Indeed, thousands of researchers have turned to the Morris water maze for evidence about navigation abilities and the effects that stress, lesions, (...)
- The Minimal Cognitive Grid+, Universal Cognition and Perceptual Performance.Selmer Bringsjord, Paul Bello & James Oswald - 2024 - Proceedings of Aisc 2024, Xx Conference of the Italian Association for Cognitive Science, Rome, Italy, September 18-20, 2024.Lieto’s Minimal Cognitive Grid (MCG) for assessing artificial agents, augmented as the method MCG+, has two implications: (1) MCG+ can advance the mathematical science of universal intelligence/cognition. (2) (a) pre-Lieto, this science lacks of coverage of perception; (b) heralded artificial agents of today are devoid of human-level perceptual intelligence.
- Locating Values in the Space of Possibilities.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.Where do values live in thought? A straightforward answer is that we (or our brains) make decisions using explicit value representations which are our values. Recent work applying reinforcement learning to decision-making and planning suggests that more specifically, we may represent both the instrumental expected value of actions as well as the intrinsic reward of outcomes. In this paper, I argue that identifying value with either of these representations is incomplete. For agents such as humans and other animals, there is (...)
- Ranking the cognitive plausibility of computational models of metaphors with the Minimal Cognitive Grid: a preliminary study.Alessio Donvito & Antonio Lieto - 2024 - Proceedings of Aisc 2024, Xx Conference of the Italian Association of Cognitive Science.
- The neglected conscious subject in consciousness science: Commentary on “Beyond task response—Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness” by G. Northoff, F. Zilio & J. Zhang.Matthew Owen - 2024 - Physics of Life Reviews 50:61-62.Given the ever-present subject of consciousness wherever consciousness is, it is peculiar that consciousness researchers often mention mental states as if they are conscious independently of being the conscious states of someone [1, p. 132]. We refer to visual perceptions that become conscious, when in reality no one has ever studied mere conscious visual perceptions. What are studied are visual perceptions belonging to conscious human or animal subjects; it is the subjects who are conscious of visual stimuli, not the visual (...)
- Is Complexity Important for Philosophy of Mind?Kristina Šekrst & Sandro Skansi - manuscriptComputational complexity has often been ignored in the philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e., treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to (...)
- Hawkes’ Ladder, Underdetermination, and the Mind’s Capacities.Adrian Currie & Andra Meneganzin - 2024 - In Thomas Wynn, Karenleigh A. Overmann & Frederick L. Coolidge (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Archaeology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1107–1128.At base, cognitive archaeology is in the business of using the archaeological record as an inroad to the abilities and expressions of past human minds. This does important work: explaining assemblages and patterns in the record, reconstructing past societies and people, as well as testing and probing hypotheses about minds and their evolution. However, there is often a long bow to be drawn from material traces to cognition; archaeological interpretation is often underdetermined. Using “Hawkes’ ladder” as a foil and drawing (...)
- Therapeutic Chatbots as Cognitive-Affective Artifacts.J. P. Grodniewicz & Mateusz Hohol - 2024 - Topoi 43 (3):795-807.Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...)
- Concepts, core knowledge, and the rationalism–empiricism debate.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2024 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 47:e137.While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that the curse of a compositional mind constitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.
- Elements of Episodic Memory: Insights from Artificial Agents.Alexandria Boyle & Andrea Blomkvist - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.Many recent AI systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these ‘episodic-inspired’ AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory whilst differing in important respects, and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory’s (...)
- Emotional AI as affective artifacts: A philosophical exploration.Manh-Tung Ho & Manh-Toan Ho - manuscriptIn recent years, with the advances in machine learning and neuroscience, the abundances of sensors and emotion data, computer engineers have started to endow machines with ability to detect, classify, and interact with human emotions. Emotional artificial intelligence (AI), also known as a more technical term in affective computing, is increasingly more prevalent in our daily life as it is embedded in many applications in our mobile devices as well as in physical spaces. Critically, emotional AI systems have not only (...)
- Acting on What You are Perceiving: The Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis Revisited.Bin Zhao - 2024 - Journal of Neurophilosophy 3 (1).The two-visual-systems hypothesis proposed by Goodale and Milner is a radical one. If it were to be true, then our common sense such as we are acting on what we are perceiving should be completely abandoned. In this paper, I argue that the hypothesis over-generalizes what happens in simple tasks to what happens in complex tasks. By contrast, I demonstrate that what happens in complex tasks is compatible with our common sense. In a word, though what we are acting on (...)
- Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction.Mason Westfall - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):831-860.What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The things that (...)
- Mental Time Travel in Animals: The “When” of Mental Time Travel.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Rasmus Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 (1913).While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an (...)
- Machina sapiens.Nello Cristianini - 2024 - Bologna: Il Mulino -.Machina sapiens - l;algoritmo che ci ha rubato il segreto della conoscenza. -/- Le macchine possono pensare? Questa domanda inquietante, posta da Alan Turing nel 1950, ha forse trovato una risposta: oggi si può conversare con un computer senza poterlo distinguere da un essere umano. I nuovi agenti intelligenti come ChatGPT si sono rivelati capaci di svolgere compiti che vanno molto oltre le intenzioni iniziali dei loro creatori, e ancora non sappiamo perché: se sono stati addestrati per alcune abilità, altre (...)
- Vẻ đẹp của những phát hiện mới nhỏ bé trong nghiên cứu.Phạm Hiệp - 2024 - Khoa Học Và Phát Triển.Công chúng kỳ vọng mỗi nghiên cứu đều phải cho những kết quả ấn tượng, trong khi trên thực tế, hầu hết các nghiên cứu chỉ có thể đưa ra những kết luận nhỏ bé, dè dặt. Liệu có gì sai ở đây không? (KH&PT; ngày 23/2/2024).
- Mixed-grain Property Collaboration: Reconstructing Multiple Realization after the Elimination of Levels.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
- Ancient Greek Mathematical Proofs and Metareasoning.Mario Bacelar Valente - 2024 - In Maria Zack (ed.), Research in History and Philosophy of Mathematics. Annals of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics. pp. 15-33.We present an approach in which ancient Greek mathematical proofs by Hippocrates of Chios and Euclid are addressed as a form of (guided) intentional reasoning. Schematically, in a proof, we start with a sentence that works as a premise; this sentence is followed by another, the conclusion of what we might take to be an inferential step. That goes on until the last conclusion is reached. Guided by the text, we go through small inferential steps; in each one, we go (...)
- مجلة كراسات تربوية. العدد03. يناير 2018.الصديق الصادقي العماري وآخرون & Seddik Sadiki Amari - 2018 - maroc المغرب .Errachidia الرشيدية: Imprimerie Belaf9ih مطبعة بنلفقيه. Edited by الصديق الصادقي العماري وآخرون.تقديم من دون شك، أن الرؤية الإستراتيجية شكلت أهم حدث بارز في إصلاح منظومة التربية والتكوينفي الآونة الأخيرة، غير أن المتتبع للحقل التربوي منذ بداية الإصلاحات سيقارن بين المنطلقات التي بني عليها الإصلاح منذ بداياته الأولى، وبين المحطات البارزة التي مر منها، وبين النتائج التي وصل إليها على رأس كل إصلاح، إضافة إلى انعكاسات جميع الإصلاحات على شخصية المتعلمين والمربين، وكذا على واقع المجتمع الذي عشناه والذي نعيشه الآن، وربما لكل واحد رؤية افتراضية لهذا الواقع ولو بشكل مبسط. هل فعلا (...)
- When remediating one artifact results in another: control, confounders, and correction.David Colaço - 2024 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 46 (1):1-18.Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem. I argue that remediation amounts to a change to an experimental arrangement. These changes need not be surgical, and the arrangement need not (...)
- Realism and instrumentalism in Bayesian cognitive science.Danielle Williams & Zoe Drayson - 2024 - In Tony Cheng, Ryoji Sato & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Expected Experiences: The Predictive Mind in an Uncertain World. Routledge.There are two distinct approaches to Bayesian modelling in cognitive science. Black-box approaches use Bayesian theory to model the relationship between the inputs and outputs of a cognitive system without reference to the mediating causal processes; while mechanistic approaches make claims about the neural mechanisms which generate the outputs from the inputs. This paper concerns the relationship between these two approaches. We argue that the dominant trend in the philosophical literature, which characterizes the relationship between black-box and mechanistic approaches to (...)
- A planning theory of belief.Sara Aronowitz - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):5-17.What does it mean to hold a belief? Some of our ways of speaking in English suggest that to hold a belief is to have something in your mind: beliefs are things we acquire, defend, recover, and so on (Abelson, 1986). That is, believing is a matter of being in a state of having a thing. In this paper, I will argue for an alternative: believing is something we do. This is not a new suggestion. For instance, Matthew Boyle (2011) (...)
- Top-down and bottom-up constraints in mechanistic inquiry.Matheus Diesel Werberich - 2023 - Controvérsia 19 (3):87 - 106.Mechanisms play a crucial role in scientific research across various disciplines, and philosophers of science have devoted significant effort into understanding their ontology and epistemology. This paper examines the relationship between mechanisms and phenomena, highlighting the inherent dependence of mechanistic delineation on the characterization of phenomena. By acknowledging that characterizing phenomena is influenced by pragmatic considerations and research interests, the paper argues that mechanistic inquiry is inherently shaped by researchers’ perspectives. This dependence raises concerns about the possibility of a realist (...)
- Emoção, afeto e racionalidade: em direção a uma ontologia do agente cognitivo.Leonardo Lana de Carvalho & Elayne de Moura Braga - 2019 - São Paulo: Cultura Acadêmica. Edited by M. A. Alves.Em diversas perspectivas teóricas existe uma oposição entre racionalidade e emoção. Esta dicotomia é desconstruída de uma perspectiva cognitiva das emoções. Neste capítulo, defenderemos que afetos, emoções e racionalidade são dimensões cognitivas, pois significam conhecimento que os organismos realizam no mundo. Em um primeiro momento, baseados principalmente na obra de Dennett (1997) e de Livet (2002), analisamos os conceitos de afeto, emoção e racionalidade. Em seguida, partimos para o objetivo central do texto que é, a partir das ontologias elaboradas por (...)
- Metaphysics of concepts: In defense of the abilitist approach.Ilya Bulov - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):625-639.Abilitism is an approach to the metaphysics of concepts according to which each concept consists of a managing cognitive ability coordinating other abilities (cognitive and non-cognitive) and a set of subordinate abilities associated with this managing ability. As I argue here, if we accept the abilitist approach, we can efficiently solve such puzzles in the metaphysics of concepts as the partial possession problem, the concept pluralism problem, etc. However, there are some possible objections to abilitism, concerning the abilitist explanation of (...)
- Extended Implicit Bias: When the Metaphysics and Ethics of Implicit Bias Collide.Uwe Peters - 2022 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3457-3478.It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social structures. This supports the view that we should counteract psychological and (...)
- Are machines radically contextualist?Ryan M. Nefdt - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):750-771.In this article, I describe a novel position on the semantics of artificial intelligence. I present a problem for the current artificial neural networks used in machine learning, specifically with relation to natural language tasks. I then propose that from a metasemantic level, meaning in machines can best be interpreted as radically contextualist. Finally, I consider what this might mean for human‐level semantic competence from a comparative perspective.
- Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications.Anna Shutaleva - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):94.This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge (...)
- Toward biologically plausible artificial vision.Mason Westfall - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e290.Quilty-Dunn et al. argue that deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) optimized for image classification exemplify structural disanalogies to human vision. A different kind of artificial vision – found in reinforcement-learning agents navigating artificial three-dimensional environments – can be expected to be more human-like. Recent work suggests that language-like representations substantially improves these agents’ performance, lending some indirect support to the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH).
- Emotional creativity: Emotional experience as creative product.Radek Trnka - 2023 - In: Cambridge Handbook of Creativity and Emotions (pp. 321-339). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Z. Ivcevic, J. D. Hoffmann & J. C. Kaufman.This chapter summarizes the conceptual foundations and research on emotional creativity. Emotional creativity is defined as a pattern of cognitive abilities and personality traits related to originality and appropriateness in emotional experience. This construct pervades human creative performance and represents an important link between emotional experience and cognitive processes. Empirical research in this field has revealed various links of emotional creativity to personality variables (e.g., openness to experience), positive affect, fantasy proneness, coping strategies, post-traumatic growth, better self-understanding, and one’s engagement (...)
- What are Coincidences? A Philosophical Guide Between Science and Common Sense.Alessandra Melas & Pietro Salis - 2023 - Wilmington: Vernon Press. Edited by Pietro Salis.It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences”. Firstly, this book explores this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. Such a view has been defended by authors like Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod. Second, a relevant alternative is provided by those accounts that, instead of acknowledging an intersection among causal (...)
- How do people use and appraise concepts?James A. Hampton (ed.) - forthcoming - Switzerland: Springer Nature.To approach the many challenges involved in the notion of engineering concepts, it is important to have a clear idea of the starting point – the concepts that people use in their everyday lives, in conversations and in expressing beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth. The first Section of this chapter introduces evidence that I have accumulated over the last many years concerning the flexibility, context-dependence, and vagueness of such common concepts. The concept engineer needs to understand the structure of (...)
- Modelling Belief Dynamics.Manuel Bremer - manuscriptThe following considerations concern modelling Belief Dynamics (BD) not just in the sense of a formalization, but rather in the sense of building a computational model and implementing the corresponding data structures and algorithms of recomputing beliefs. The purpose of such a project is to illustrate some ideas about belief changes in a Web of Beliefs (WoB) to explore and deepen one's understanding of belief changes by trying to implement or improve corresponding algorithms.
- Expanded Social Reality: A New Framework to Study Social Systems.Lucia C. Neco - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Western AustraliaHumans are social beings. However, we are not alone in the realm of social reality; we share this space with diverse entities, including more than just animals. The term "social" has recently been applied to describe the collective behaviors of microorganisms and plants, as well as interactions among parts and groups of organisms. Therefore, there is a need to develop a framework that enables the study of social phenomena in a clearer and less restrictive manner. In this thesis, I lay (...)
- The Ecological Brain: Unifying the Sciences of Brain, Body, and Environment.Favela Luis H. - 2024 - Routledge.The Ecological Brain is the first book of its kind, using complexity science to integrate the seemingly disparate fields of ecological psychology and neuroscience. The book develops a unique framework for unifying investigations and explanations of mind that span brain, body, and environment: the NeuroEcological Nexus Theory (NExT). Beginning with an introduction to the history of the fields, the author provides an assessment of why ecological psychology and neuroscience are commonly viewed as irreconcilable methods for investigating and explaining cognition, intelligent (...)
- Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis.Uwe Peters & Olivier Lemeire - 2023 - Philosophy of Science.Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...)
- The imaginary inner inside the cognitive science of religion.Christopher Hoyt - 2023 - In Robert Vinten (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion: Interpreting Human Nature and the Mind. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 73-91.Scientists working on the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are eager to have us believe that they have recently uncovered the unconscious origins of religious beliefs and practices. Though their theories differ in detail, CSR researchers generally agree that religion is the product of faculties of mind that evolved to serve our adaptive needs, but which sometimes produce the false beliefs and incoherent practices of religious life. Pascal Boyer, a leading figure and a reasonable representative of the mode of thinking (...)
- Antirepresentationalism Before and After Rorty.Barbara Herrnstein Smith - 2022 - Common Knowledge 28 (3):424-442.Richard Rorty's rejection of prevailing interior-mirror understandings of the presumed relationship between “minds” and “nature,” along with his promotion of nonrepresentational accounts of knowledge, truth, and science, participates in a rich tradition of jointly pragmatist and constructivist views that spans the twentieth century. This contribution to the symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” considers Rorty's complex and ambivalent relation to that tradition, particularly to the work of his American pragmatist predecessors, William James and John Dewey, and to subsequent pragmatist-constructivist antirepresentationalism (...)
- Reasoning with Concepts: A Unifying Framework.Peter Gärdenfors & Matías Osta-Vélez - 2023 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):451-485.Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make essential use of conceptual knowledge. Despite significant theoretical and empirical progress, there is still no unified framework for understanding how concepts are used in reasoning. This paper argues that the theory of conceptual spaces is capable of filling this gap. Our strategy is to demonstrate how various inference mechanisms which clearly rely on conceptual information—including similarity, typicality, and diagnosticity-based reasoning—can be modeled using principles derived from (...)
- Sono solo parole ChatGPT: anatomia e raccomandazioni per l’uso.Tommaso Caselli, Antonio Lieto, Malvina Nissim & Viviana Patti - 2023 - Sistemi Intelligenti 4:1-10.
- Color and Competence: A New View of Color Perception.Tiina Rosenqvist - 2023 - In José Manuel Viejo & Mariano Sanjuán (eds.), Life and Mind - New Directions in the Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences. Springer. pp. 73-103.I have two main goals in this paper. My first goal is to sketch a new view of color perception. The core of the view can be expressed in the following two theses: (i) the overarching function of color vision is to enable and enhance the manifestation of relevant (species-specific) competences and (ii) color experiences are correct when they result from processing that directly and non-accidentally subserves the manifestation of such competences. My second goal is to show that the view (...)
- Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 105-114.Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) (...)(collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation
Bookmark - Désaturer l'esprit. Usages du pragmatisme.Pierre [vnv] Steiner - 2018 - Paris: Questions théoriques.
- Limitations of Embodied Theory and the Representational Pluralism.Huitong Zhou - manuscriptSince the mid to late 1970s, the traditional paradigm of cognitive theory has been increasingly questioned in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. With the rise of embodied cognition, psychologists have begun to understand conceptual representation in terms of embodiment, emphasizing the role of the subject's sensorimotor system and bodily experience in conceptual representation. Although there is a large body of empirical research to support the theory of embodied cognition, it still fails to provide a reasonable (...)
- Ecological-enactive account of autism spectrum disorder.Janko Nešić - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-22.Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a psychopathological condition characterized by persistent deficits in social interaction and communication, and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior and interests. To build an ecological-enactive account of autism, I propose we should endorse the affordance-based approach of the skilled intentionality framework (SIF). In SIF, embodied cognition is understood as skilled engagement with affordances in the sociomaterial environment of the ecological niche by which an individual tends toward the optimal grip. The human econiche offers a whole landscape (...)
- The Puzzle of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (2):e13245.The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters (...)
- (1 other version)From Life-Like to Mind-Like Explanation: Natural Agency and the Cognitive Sciences.Alex Djedovic - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto, St. George CampusThis dissertation argues that cognition is a kind of natural agency. Natural agency is the capacity that certain systems have to act in accordance with their own norms. Natural agents are systems that bias their repertoires in response to affordances in the pursuit of their goals. -/- Cognition is a special mode of this general phenomenon. Cognitive systems are agents that have the additional capacity to actively take their worlds to be certain ways, regardless of whether the world is really (...)
- On the Foundations of Computing. Computing as the Fourth Great Domain of Science. [REVIEW]Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-12.This review essay analyzes the book by Giuseppe Primiero, On the foundations of computing. Oxford: Oxford University Press (ISBN 978-0-19-883564-6/hbk; 978-0-19-883565-3/pbk). xix, 296 p. (2020). It gives a critical view from the perspective of physical computing as a foundation of computing and argues that the neglected pillar of material computation (Stepney) should be brought centerstage and computing recognized as the fourth great domain of science (Denning).
- Dual aspect theory (Spinoza-Velmans) versus the EDWs perspective by Gabriel Vacariu (January 2023).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscriptOn January 2023, I received an email from somebody regarding Velmans’s article 2008. After I took a look at the paper, I started to read his book 2000. Therefore, in this section, I will investigate Velmans’ works from 2000 and 2008. I emphasize that the main difference between Spinoza’s (Velmans) dual aspect theory and my EDWs approach is the framework of thinking: Spinoza, Velmans and everybody until me had been working within the unicorn world (the Universe/world), while my EDWs assumes (...)
- Desde el pluralismo integrativo hacia un modelo enactivo en psiquiatría.Cristián Orus Norte - 2022 - Culturas Cientificas 3 (2):4-34.La búsqueda de un pluralismo integrativo en filosofía de la ciencia presenta ecos fructíferos en discusiones contemporáneas de la filosofía de la psiquiatría, sobre todo en torno a la necesidad de un pluralismo que supere un reduccionismo neurobiológico y un eclecticismo biopsicosocial. Los trabajos de la filósofa Sandra Mitchell constituirán un punto de partida para visualizar la necesidad de un paradigma pluralista, al mismo tiempo que permitirán exponer la tesis de que es necesario un modelo que permita una integración real (...)
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