The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century (...) with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early and late. Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Hermann Cohen: An Attempt to SystematizeThe article adressess the problem of evolution of Hermann Cohen’s thinking. In the first part, the evolution is shown in the historical-problematic context and the main idea is to show the basic concepts organizing the author’s most important books. Part two is an attempt to capture the motives of his understanding of philosophy and the central concept is the logic of validity Geltungslogik. As a result it is shown that throughout his whole (...) life Cohen struggled with the problem of such an understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

Książka zawiera wybrane teksty najważniejszych myślicieli zaliczanych do dwóch najbardziej znaczących kierunków neokantowskich, a mianowicie do szkoły badeńskiej i szkoły marburskiej. Szkoły te wyłoniły się w konsekwencji podziałów, jakie dokonywały się w ramach neokantyzmu, niezwykle złożonego kierunku filozoficznego drugiej połowy XIX wieku i początków wieku XX. Mówienie o neokantyzmie jest złożone, gdyż nie można podać ani daty jego powstania, ani też daty zakończenia, co przysparza wielu kłopotów z jego historycznym określeniem. Pomijając wszelkie trudności klasyfikacyjne, antologia ogranicza się do zaprezentowania poglądów (...) dwóch najważniejszych szkół. Poglądy szkoły badeńskiej ukazują teksty Wilhelma Windelbanda i Heinricha Rickerta, Emila Laska i Brunona Baucha. Natomiast poglądy szkoły marburskiej prezentują teksty Hermanna Cohena i Paula Natorpa oraz ich najwybitniejszych uczniów, tzn. Ernsta Cassirera i Nicolaia Hartmanna. Autorzy żywią przekonanie, że zamieszczone teksty są najbardziej reprezentatywne dla neokantyzmu prezentowanych szkół. (shrink)

Das Buch ist eine systematische Bearbeitung der neukantischen Philosophie und enthält einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Vertreter aller sieben neukantianischen Richtungen und Schulen: physiologische, metaphysische, relativistische, psychologische, realistische, so wie auch Badische Schule und Marburger Schule.

The paper gives an analysis of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s, which for Hartmann and Heidegger was a shared philosophical platform. Both philosophers are to be conceived of mainly in the context of Neo-Kantianism, which ends, when the conception of epistemology as prima philosophia is replaced by ontology. While Hartmann conceived of metaphysics through the optics of what remains unknowable in grasping the problems logically, Heidegger saw the metaphysics of that time on the background of the forgetfulness (...) of being. (shrink)

The article is trying to present reception not as such, but as a problem which reception is for historian of philosophy. It is clearly visible in the process of formation on neo-Kantianism, which programme distance themselves from any orthodoxy. As a consequence there is a need of treating a neo-philosophy as original and one-off phenomenon and not a renewal of old philosophy. As an example can serve a dead dog motif present at Hegel and Jacobi related to Spinoza.

Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache. - Dt. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Fragen und Perspektiven des Transzendentalismus.

Problem with understanding the system is subject to analysis, with particular emphasis on position presented by Franz Kröner. The article is an attempt to show that Kröner's work is in line with started in the beggining of 20th century tradition of critical thinking towards philosophical system.

One of the crucial elements of philosophising at the beginning of the twentieth century is the problem of grounding of philosophy. Representatives of neo-Kantianism fit in with this trend. They try to describe the grounding of philosophy by referring to the philosophy of Kant. That, however, raises a number of difficulties of interpretation that result from the appearing possibilities of interpretation. The article is an attempt to show the efforts of Hermann Cohen, who emphasized the importance of transcendental deduction and (...) transcendental apperception in Kant’s system. In accordance with the thesis of Fichte, Cohen searches for a basis that would allow building a system of knowledge and finds it is the concept of hypothesis. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to systematize views on the subject of history of philosophy. Starting point of the analysis are the conceptions occurring in the post-Kantian philosophy, where significant differences in understanding the history of philosophy reveals themselves. History of philosophy may be understood as doxography, as a history of concepts, as history of idea, as a history of problems or, finally, as a philosophical history of philosophy. Author presents main assumptions of each of before mentioned approaches, pointing to (...) the special value of history of philosophy treated as a history of problems and philosophical history of philosophy. Additionally author appeals to Polish researchers of that problem being Kazimierz Twardowski, Zbigniew Kuderowicz or Mieczysław Gogacz. Separate position in presented analysis takes hermeneutics and her characteristic criticism of the position presented by Wilhelm Dilthey. (shrink)

This text is an introduction to the philosophy of Heinrich Rickert. The introduction has three levels: biographical, bibliographical, and doxographic. The doxography involves examining Rickert’s views in the context of the achievements of Neo-Kantianism, the Baden school and contemporary philosophy. Noras discusses the main issues Rickert treated in his philosophy, which was occupied with the theory of cognition, the methodology of the humanities and natural sciences and the philosophy of the history of philosophy.

The aim of the paper is to briefly present the person, philosophical views and achievements of my recently deceased teacher Andrzej J. Noras - a great historian of philosophy, specializing in German philosophy, especially in Neo-Kantianism.

In Setting Limits, Daniel Callahan advances the provocative thesis that age be a limiting factor in decisions to allocate certain kinds of health services to the elderly. However, when one looks at available data, one discovers that there are many more elderly women than there are elderly men, and these older women are poorer, more apt to live alone, and less likely to have informal social and personal supports than their male counterparts. Older women, therefore, will make the heaviest demand (...) on health care resources. If age were to become a limiting factor, as Dr. Callahan suggests it should, the limits that will be set are limits that will affect women more drastically than they affect men. This review essay examines the implications of Callahan's thesis for elderly women. (shrink)

Recent developments in AI programming allow for new applications: individualized chatbots which mimic the speaking and writing behaviour of one specific living or dead person. ‘Deathbots’, chatbots of the dead, have already been implemented and are currently under development by the first start-up companies. Thus, it is an urgent issue to consider the ethical implications of deathbots. While previous ethical theories of deathbots have always been based on considerations of the dignity of the deceased, I propose to shift the focus (...) on the dignity and autonomy of the bereaved users of deathbots. Drawing on theories of internet-scaffolded affectivity and on theories of grief, I argue that deathbots may have a negative impact on the grief process of bereaved users and therefore have the potential to limit the emotional and psychological wellbeing of their users. Deathbot users are likely to become dependent on their bots which may make them susceptible to surreptitious advertising by deathbot providing companies and may limit their autonomy. At the same time, deathbots may prove to be helpful for people who suffer from prolonged, severe grief processes. I caution against the unrestricted usage of deathbots and suggest that they should be classified as medical devices. This classification would not the least mean that their non-harm, as well as their helpfulness for people suffering from prolonged grief needs to be proven and that their potential for autonomy infringements is reduced. (shrink)

Structural gaslighting arises when conceptual work functions to obscure the non-accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm they produce and license. This paper examines the role that structural gaslighting plays in white feminist methodology and epistemology using Fricker’s (2007) discussion of hermeneutical injustice as an illustration. Fricker’s work produces structural gaslighting through several methods: i) the outright denial of the role that structural oppression plays in producing interpretive harm, ii) the use of single-axis conceptual resources to (...) understand intersectional oppression, and iii) the failure to recognize the legacy of women of color’s epistemic resistance work surrounding the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. I argue that Fricker’s whitewashed discussion of epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the United States is a form of structural gaslighting that fails to treat women of color as knowers and exemplifies the strategic forgetting that is a central methodological tactic of white feminism. (shrink)

Epistemologies have power. They have the power not only to transform worlds, but to create them. And the worlds that they create can be better or worse. For many people, the worlds they create are predictably and reliably deadly. Epistemologies can turn sacred land into ‘resources’ to be bought, sold, exploited, and exhausted. They can turn people into ‘labor’ in much the same way. They can not only disappear acts of violence but render them unnamable and unrecognizable within their conceptual (...) architectures. Settler systems of epistemic and conceptual resources and the relations among them are constructed to preclude certain forms of knowledge. This is not an accident; it is a central goal of colonial violence. Colonization and land dispossession would not be possible without the violent disruption of Indigenous knowledge systems and ongoing organized attempts to disrupt their survival. Violently disrupting the relationships of people to land is as much an epistemic project as it is a material one, and these two projects are inherently linked. The task of theorizing epistemic oppression is not only about epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression is a story that gives language to a phenomenon in order to get past it, to carry on with the maintaining and reviving the forms of Indigenous and diasporic knowledge that colonialism has worked tirelessly to corrupt and silence. (shrink)

This Element introduces major issues in the epistemology of experimental physics through discussion of canonical physics experiments and some that have not yet received much philosophical attention. The primary challenge is to make sense of how physicists justify crucial decisions made in the course of empirical research. Judging a result as epistemically significant or as calling for further technical scrutiny of the equipment is one important context of such decisions. Judging whether the instrument has been calibrated, and which data should (...) be included in the analysis are others. To what extent is it possible to offer philosophical analysis, systematization, and prescriptions regarding such decisions? To what extent can there be explicit epistemic justification for them? The primary aim of this Element is to show how a nuanced understanding of science in practice informs an epistemology of experimental physics that avoids strong social constructivism. (shrink)

Traditionally, empiricism has relied on the specialness of human observation, yet science is rife with sophisticated instrumentation and techniques. The present article advances a conception of empirical evidence applicable to actual scientific practice. I argue that this conception elucidates how the results of scientific research can be repurposed across diverse epistemic contexts: it helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how different evidence can be amalgamated and used jointly, and how the same evidence can be used (...) to constrain competing theories in the service of breaking local underdetermination. (shrink)

There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism (...) is compatible with Humeanism about the laws of nature, and we conclude that it is not. We specifically identify three major problems for the best-systems account of lawhood: its central concept of strength cannot be formulated non-circularly, it cannot offer a satisfactory account of the laws of the special sciences, and it can offer no explanation of the success of inductive inference. In addition, Humeanism fails to be naturalistically motivated. For these reasons, we conclude that the scientific realist must embrace natural necessity. (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism commits us to the indispensability argument. The viewpresented here is that the indispensability of mathematics commits us not only to the existence of mathematical structures and entities but to a metaphysical determination relation between those entities and the modal structure of (...) the physical world. The no-miracles argument is the primary motivation for scientific realism. It is a presupposition of this argument that unobservable entities are explanatory only when they determine the empirical phenomena they explain. I argue that mathematical entities should also be seen as explanatory only when they determine the empirical facts they explain, namely, the modal structure of the physical world. Thus, scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between mathematics and physical modality that has not been previously recognized. The requirement to account for the metaphysical dependence of modal physical structure on mathematics limits the class of acceptable solutions to the applicability problem that are available to the scientific realist. (shrink)

The business case constitutes an important instrumental motive for corporate social responsibility (CSR), but its relationship with other moral and relational motives remains controversial. In this article, we examine the articulation of motives for CSR among different stakeholders in Germany historically. On the basis of reports of German business associations, state agencies, unions, and nongovernmental organizations from 1970 to 2014, we show how the business case came to be a dominant motive for CSR by acting as a coalition magnet: the (...) vocabulary was used strategically by key policy entrepreneurs, while being ambiguous for flexible interpretations by different stakeholders, and thereby growing in attractiveness. As a resulting discourse coalition emerged among business, state, and civil society actors, the moral and relational motives for CSR became increasingly marginalized. The article offers a new approach to studying motives and contributes to understanding the complementary or competing nature of different motives for CSR. (shrink)