De nos jours existe un extraordinaire engouement pour les sciences du cerveau qui captivent de plus en plus de penseurs. Des philosophes americains encouragent leurs pairs a s'initier aux neurosciences. Des hommes de science, conscients des enjeux metaphysiques inherents a leur domaine, invitent les philosophes a decouvrir les faits nouveaux apportes par les decouvertes sur le systeme nerveux. Il parait donc legitime que le philosophe soit concerne par les developpements recents des sciences du cerveau. Par la diversite des points de (...) vus et des perspectives, le present recueil souhaite contribuer a eclairer, dans la mesure du possible, quelques-unes des questions inherentes aux interactions entre la philosophie et les neurosciences. (shrink)

The importance of the problem lies not so much in the constitutional texts, but in the constitutional practice. In the practical powers Leopold I acquired on the eve of his reign in 1831, foreign examples are quite visible. They are less visible in the process which led to the loss of these powers.The Constitution itself gave to the King two effective powers, which he could exercisepersonally; he could dismiss his ministers, and dissolve Parliament. In both respects, for more than a (...) century, the King actually took personal decisions. Lately he has no langer been able to do so and his former powers are now practically in the hands of the Prime Minister. The influence of the British model is here quite evident. (shrink)

"Isabelle Stengers presents us with a new way of understanding a remarkably diverse range of sciences and their relation to a material and living world. Playing with a position both inside the practices that constitute and transform science and outside the sciences as their mode of conceptualization, Stengers explores the limits, constraints, and inventions that fuse modern science and contemporary society." Elizabeth Grosz --.

The first question I wanted to ask you has to do with the manner in which you do philosophy, in the sense that the concepts that you create, develop and experiment with, always resist the temptation to tell others what to do. In fact, at the very beginning of your “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”, you begin with a question that I think resonates with this. You write: “How can we present a proposal intended not to say what is, or what ought (...) to be, but to provoke thought?” So what I wanted to ask you is, how would you characterize the importance of this challenge of creating concepts that provoke thought, rather than instruct others on how to think?Well, probably you never know why you do what you do as you do it.... (shrink)

We all know, in fact we are sure, that our medical practices are very different from those in the times of Molière or of Louis XVI. In one way or another medicine has today become ‘modern’ in the same way as the whole set of knowledges and practices that call themselves rational. This is obvious, but I would like to interrogate this obviousness. Not to debunk it so as to show that beyond these appearances nothing has changed, but in order (...) to focus in a slightly clearer way on ‘what’ has changed. To be even more precise, I would like to focus on ‘what’ has changed for the doctor, the one who practises medicine. (shrink)

For years theists have claimed that the constants of physics had to be finely tuned by God to the values that have for life in the universe to be possible. In my column of June, 2009 I showed that many of these claims are based on an improper analysis of the data. Even some of the competent scientists who write on this subject commit the fallacy of holding all the parameters constant and varying just one. When you allow all to (...) vary, you find that changes to one parameter can be easily compensated for by changes to another, leaving the ingredients for life in place. This point is also made nicely in a recent Scientific American cover story by Alejandro Jenkins and Gilad Perez. In this column I will discuss perhaps the most cited example of claimed fine-tuning, the Hoyle resonance. In 1953 the famous astronomer Fred Hoyle calculated that the production of carbon would not occur with sufficient probability unless that probability was boosted by the presence of an excited nuclear state of C12 at a very specific energy. In what appeared to be a remarkable victory for anthropic reasoning, Hoyle proposed that this previously unknown state must exist at about 7.7 MeV. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this answer to “Evolutionism as a Modern Form of Mechanicism”: 287–306) I discuss the strange double use the authors make of their reference to Kant in order to deny the relevance of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, and more generally, of the physical irreversibility question in the problem of evolution.On the one hand, the authors quite legitimately use a materialist version of Kantian apriorism in the guise of “means of cognition” presupposed by any physical theory. But on the other hand, they (...) accept a theoretical interpretation of physical irreversibility whose precise historical function was to occult the intrinsic difference between the cognitive means of dynamics and those of thermodynamics in order to promote a mechanistic unification of physics.I thus argue that at stake is not the case of such or such a physicist transgressing the border between philosophy and natural science as defended by von Borzeszkowski and Wahsner, but rather the very interpretation of irreversibility accepted by most physicists since Boltzmann. In contrast, Prigogine's enterprise could be understood as an attempt to take the notion of cognitive means seriously, by approaching the problem of evolution via the problem of the relevance of these means.I conclude with comments on the strategic role Kant is still made to play today by physicists who wish to transform dissents in physical theory into philosophical ones and by philosophers who wish to judge scientists instead of trying to understand them. (shrink)

Cet article étudie les transformations que les sciences de Dieu, de l’âme et de l’esprit dans le Système figuré des connaissances humaines ainsi que dans son commentaire explicatif publiés par Diderot dans le Prospectus de l’ Encyclopédie ont subies dans la reprise dans le tome I. Emprunté à Bacon mais aussi à Chambers, l’arbre encyclopédique présente un schéma conventionnel que le classement épistémologique des trois sciences dans l’« Explication détaillée » des éditeurs subvertit en les assimilant à la pneumatologie, qui (...) traite des êtres abstraits considérés par Diderot comme « vides de sens ». (shrink)

Reading this collection of articles is a troubling experience because, each in their own manner, they produce something like a “portrait of a philosopher with her problem” – to recall Gilles Deleuze’s proposition about how to characterize the work of a philosopher. I am most grateful to Martin Savransky and those who accepted his invitation because, in order to obtain such a “portrait,” they needed not to stop at the obvious but respond, each in her or his own way, to (...) what has been a learning process rather than the obstinate development of one ever- recurring problem.Indeed, as many of the contributors emphasize, my work can hardly be associated with such a development. It may rather look like an opportunistic... (shrink)

Four different contributions about my Penser avec Whitehead are a bit like four different chemical tests, helping me to understand better how my proposition may activate interest and connections, but also, and more surprisingly, enlightening me about “how” I myself have inherited from Whitehead’s philosophical adventure. This answer weaves threads from Debaise, Goffey, Meyer, and Palin together with this very special gift I owe them all: the recognition that if I felt it needed to resist the notion of a Whiteheadian (...) “conception of a creative world,” it is because to me “thinking with Whitehead” is not thinking about the world, rather reclaiming the kind of trust that thinking requires. (shrink)

The claim that certain fundamental constants of nature are fine tuned for life and that this provides strong evidence for supernatural design is perhaps the best scientific argument for the existence of God since Paley’s watch. Even atheist physicists find these so called “anthropic coincidences” difficult to explain and need to invoke the Weak Anthropic Principle and multiple universes to do so. Certainly if there are many universes, fine tuning is simple. Our form of life was fined tuned to our (...) universe by evolution. While multiple universes are expected from modern cosmological theories, theists and some scientists object that invoking the unobservable is not science. Of course, God is unobservable too, so the best theists can claim is a standoff. This is the first in a series of columns based on a book in the works that attempts to show that the apparent fine tuning of fundamental constants can be understood from basic physics without invoking multiple universes. In some cases the explanation is provable. In other cases, it is not provable but plausible. Fine tuning by design is a God of the Gaps argument. The proponent has the burden if proving that no possible natural explanation can be found. Thus a plausible natural explanation is sufficient to defeat the argument. A list of thirty four parameters that seem to be fine tuned has been assembled by Rich Deem on the God and Science website. Several of Deem’s constants, such as the speed of light in a vacuum, c, Newton’s constant of gravity, G, and Planck’s constant, h, are just arbitrary numbers that are determined simply by the unit system you are using. They can be set equal to any number you want, except zero, with no impact on the physics. So no fine tuning can possibly be involved, just as the number p is not fine tuned. I will focus first on the five parameters that have the most significance because, if interpreted correctly, they seem to pretty much rule out almost any conceivable kind of life without fine tuning: · Ratio of electrons to protons · Ratio of electromagnetic force to gravity Expansion rate of the universe · Mass density of the universe · Cosmological constant I will admit that the features a universe would have for slightly different values of these parameters, all other parameters remaining the same, would render unlikely any form of life even remotely like ours, that is, one that is based on a lengthy process, chemical or otherwise, by which complex matter evolved from simpler matter. Let me discuss each in turn, with the last, the most difficult, reserved for a future column.. (shrink)

Taking a Harder Line “The New Atheism” is the name that was attached, often pejoratively, to the series of six bestselling books by five authors that appeared in the period 2004-2008.[i] Since then many have joined the movement, with an upsurge in books, freethinker organizations, and an exponential expansion of the blogosphere spreading the word on atheism to thousands. The message of new atheism is that it is time to take a far less accommodating attitude toward religion, including moderate religion, (...) than had been exhibited in previous years by atheist authors and, in particular, non-believing scientists. Science, in the United States, is locked in a battle with conservative Christians over the teaching of evolution and creationism in the schools. While 87 percent of scientists accept evolution by unguided, purely natural processes, only 32 percent of the public does.[ii] Belief in unguided evolution among mainline Protestants and Catholics is about the same as among the general public, while only 10 percent of Evangelicals and 19 percent of Fundamentalist Protestants acknowledge this view. (shrink)

Translator's introduction : At the end of July 2014 there was a week-long workshop held at the Ecole des Mines in Paris, Bruno Latour's former work-place. This was a final workshop, convened by Latour's project, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, which was not only a book, but a website that was an experiment in interactive metaphysics that had been going on for four years. About 30 participants gathered to workshop and rewrite some key contested areas that had been challenged (...) on the site with discussions and counter-examples. One of the round tables working away during the week, occasionally with changes in personnel, was on Nature. Their job (like the other round tables on Politics, Diplomacy, Religion and Economics) was to ‘reboot’ or reinstitute a concept close to the heart of the Moderns. The assumption was that the traditional concept of nature, as developed through modern European history, would no longer be adequate to a future beset by environmental crises. The main people working on a draft were Didier Debaise, Pablo Jensen, Pierre Montebello, Nicolas Prignot, Isabelle Stengers and Aline Wiame. When they finished the draft, I translated it and it was presented, in French and English, in a final two-day public session at Science Po, to a group of seven international scholars designated as “chargés d'affaires,” or “diplomats from the future” whose job was to assess the results of our labours in terms of how they might be met by Gaia, the ur-representative of future planetary crises. The text, originally under the title of Our “Nature,” was as follows. [Stephen Muecke]. (shrink)

The scientific world is, as I have often repeated, a shadow world, shadowing a world familiar to our consciousness. Just how much do we expect it to shadow? We do not expect it to shadow all that is in our mind, emotions, memory, etc. In the main we expect it to shadow impressions which can be traced to external sense organs. But time makes a dual entry and thus forms an intermediate link between the internal and the external. This is (...) shadowed partially by the scientific world of primary physics (which excludes time's arrow), but fully when we enlarge the scheme to include entropy. Therefore by the momentous departure in the nineteenth century the scientific world is not confined to a static extension around which the mind may spin a romance of activity and evolution; it shadows that dynamic quality of the familiar world which cannot be parted from it without disaster to its significance.—Arthur Eddington,The Nature of the Physical World. (shrink)

This article deals with the impact of governmental assistance on insurance demand under ambiguity, i.e., in situations where probabilities are uncertain. First, using a model of insurance demand under ambiguity, we derive theoretical predictions about the impact of several governmental assistance programmes on optimal insurance demand. For example, governmental assistance through a fixed public support scheme implies that partial insurance is always optimal under fair insurance with ambiguity. Second, we present the results of an experiment designed to test these predictions. (...) We find support for several of our theoretical predictions. For example, the presence of governmental assistance through a fixed public support scheme decreases individuals’ willingness to pay to be fully insured. Finally, we compare these results with those obtained for a risk situation. We find that, regardless of the form of governmental assistance, participants in the ambiguity context are consistently willing to pay more to be fully insured than participants in the risk situation. (shrink)

Review of: Isabelle Stengers (2010), Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Posthumanities, 9) (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press).

Postcolonial science studies entails ostensibly contradictory critical and empirical commitments. Science studies scholars influenced by Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers embrace forms of realist, radical empiricism, while postcolonial studies scholars influenced by Jacques Derrida trace the limits of the knowable. This essay takes their common use of the term cosmopolitics as an unexpected point of departure for reconciling Derrida’s program with Stengers’s and Latour’s. I read Derrida’s critique of hospitality and Stengers’s and Latour’s ontological politics as necessary (...) complements for conceiving a care-oriented subalternist cosmopolitics, a process of composing common worlds that remains attentive to the limits of representation. (shrink)

This essay brings the work of Isabelle Stengers into the fold of feminism to propose a feminist politics of the earth that disrupts the fantasy of human exceptionalism underpinning much Anthropocene discourse. I begin by situating Stengers’s political use of Gaia theory in current debates on the Anthropocene. Next, I show how Stengers’s reworking of Gaia helps in reconsidering the relations between two bodies of feminist theory—Deleuzian feminism and Marxist ecofeminism—that are rarely brought into conversation. On this (...) basis, I explore what a feminist politics of composition with the earth might look like. (shrink)

When I first held a copy of Isabelle Stengers’s passionate book, a big tome that tangles with a truly speculative philosopher, one we were both in love with, I misread the actual title, Penser avec Whitehead, as Pensez avec Whitehead! My French is better than that, but I fear my character is not. I saw an imperative rather than a situated practice of thinking-with. Horrified but laughing, in a characteristic act of friendship, with earth-rooted and precise abstractions, Stengers (...) lured me to think with her beyond the catastrophes of my always-ready-to-hand self-certainties and ideologies. She has taught me—taught us—to recognize the killing trap of believing that we have nothing but infernal choices, each of which... (shrink)

Generalized solutions with apparently limitless applications are anathema to Isabelle Stengers, who demands that we recognize the specificity of the remit of the abstractions that we are constructing. One hallmark of her work is the distrust of any response that appears to be able to mollify a wide range of positions, problems or questions. Stengers is also wary of denouncing the positions held by opponents by claiming to trap them in a logical vice or pinning them in an (...) absurdity. This is why, in this article, I do not set out to solve either the problem of cause or the problem of faith. Instead, I want to eavesdrop on the ongoing conversation between Stengers and Whitehead and to provide some comments on how... (shrink)

Victor Stenger (this issue) has responded to my recent criticism of the so-called New Athe- ism movement (2013). Here I endeavor to counter Stenger’s note and highlight several of the ways in which it goes astray. To begin with, however, let me summarize the main points of my earlier paper.

Alfred North Whitehead has never gone out of print, but for a time he was decidedly out of fashion in the English-speaking world. In a splendid work that serves as both introduction and erudite commentary, Isabelle Stengersâe"one of todayâe(tm)s leading philosophers of scienceâe"goes straight to the beating heart of Whiteheadâe(tm)s thought. The product of thirty yearsâe(tm) engagement with the mathematician-philosopherâe(tm)s entire canon, this volume establishes Whitehead as a daring thinker on par with Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Michel Foucault. Reading (...) the texts in broadly chronological order while highlighting major works, Stengers deftly unpacks Whiteheadâe(tm)s often complicated language, explaining the seismic shifts in his thinking and showing how he called into question all that philosophers had considered settled after Descartes and Kant. She demonstrates that the implications of Whiteheadâe(tm)s philosophical theories and specialized knowledge of the various sciences come yoked with his innovative, revisionist take on God. Whiteheadâe(tm)s God exists within a specific epistemological realm created by a radically complex and often highly mathematical language. âeoeTo think with Whitehead today,âe Stengers writes, âeoemeans to sign on in advance to an adventure that will leave none of the terms we normally use as they were.âe. (shrink)

Depuis qu'elles existent, les sciences dites exactes se prétendent différentes des autres savoirs. Comment comprendre cette prétention? Faut-il, à la manière des épistémologues anglo-saxons ou de Karl Popper, tenter d'identifier les critères qui la justifient? Peut-on, suivant le modèle nouveau des études sociales des sciences, y voir une simple croyance? Ce livre propose un dépassement fructueux de l'opposition, apparemment irréconciliable, entre ces deux approches des sciences. Et si la tension entre objectivité scientifique et croyance était justement constitutive des sciences, enjeu (...) des pratiques inventées et réinventées par les scientifiques? Réussir à parler des sciences avec humour, sans en faire un objet de vénération, ni de dénonciation, en restant au plus proche de la passion des scientifiques, tel est ici le pari d'Isabelle Stengers. Mais ce livre ne se limite pas à un discours sur les sciences. Il s'agit bien plutôt de prolonger l'histoire de leur invention. Comment comprendre les liens multiples entre la science et les pouvoirs qui la mobilisent aujourd'hui? Comment concevoir les rapports entre science, expertise et démocratie? La nouveauté de L'invention des sciences modernes est de faire de ces différents problèmes intellectuels, pratiques et politiques les enjeux du processus par où pourrait s'inventer et se renouveler l'identité même des sciences. (shrink)

There is a good deal linking Whitehead’s and Emerson’s deepest in-tuitions starting with their shared emphasis on intuition and flux—and despite the fact that in sharp contrast with Whitehead, Emerson carefully avoided anything resembling a metaphysical system. Following Stengers, I distinguish between Whitehead’s "scheme" and his "intentionality": he is "less the author of the scheme and of the concepts he articulates than he is obliged by them, compelled by them, in a process of empirical experimentation and verification which has (...) about it something of the experience of a trance because the thought in question is taken, captured, by a becoming—something about to be. "The bulk of the essay concerns the central role played by "interstitial wagers" of this sort in Whitehead’s contribution to what he termed "the romance of human thought.". (shrink)

En ce XXe siècle, où la physique s'est identifiée à la science révolutionnaire par excellence, l'œuvre passionnée d'Ilya Prigogine constitue une singulière anomalie. Anormale parce qu'elle prend le parti du monde des phénomènes physiques contre le pouvoir de la théorie, jugé abusif ; mais anormale aussi par sa longue obstination à une époque où la rapidité fait foi. Le combat avait commencé au début des années soixante, sur un mode mineur : Prigogine demandait à ses collègues de reconnaître qu' " (...) il y a certainement une signification physique profonde dans l'équation de Boltzman ". Thèse apparemment bien légitime : l'équation de Boltzmann permet de décrire avec succès le comportement de non-équilibre des gaz dilués. Mais thèse iconoclaste : car, depuis que la croissance de l'entropie a été renvoyée aux seules probabilités, le comportement de non-équilibre n'est plus sensé autoriser la moindre " signification profonde ". Raconter l'histoire de ce combat, comme le fait Isabelle Stengers dans ce livre, revient à interroger les lois fondamentales sous l'angle du lien entre théorie, valeur et obligation. En effet, sans ce lien, ni la position de Prigogine ni celle des physiciens contre qui il va chercher des arguments toujours plus puissants ne sont intelligibles. L'auteur montre que ce lien permet d' " inventer " des problèmes : Il y a Prigogine qui oppose ainsi des lois nouvelles, les " lois du chaos ", au déterminisme absolu des lois fondamentales de la physique. La physique est habitée par la passion de la loi, mais la manière dont cette passion est ici réinventée pourrait ouvrir de nouvelles voies, vitales pour une " écologie des pratiques ". Serait-il possible que le physicien ne se présente plus comme celui par qui s'opère la fascinante découverte des lois de la nature? Serait-il possible de célébrer avec lui l'extraordinaire aventure que constitue l'invention d'un objet capable de dicter la manière dont il doit être décrit? (shrink)

La vie a-t-elle émergé de la matière? Et dans ce cas, comprendre le vivant signifie-t-il le réduire à un ensemble particulier d'interactions physico-chimiques? Et comprendre l'expérience psychique, est-ce la réduire à l'activité de populations neuronales enchevêtrées? Le premier visage proposé par la question de l'émergence de la vie est celui de l'affrontement entre les conquérants de la réduction et les défenseurs de la différence qualitative entre le tout et ses parties. Visage polémique, affichant l'arrogance et les prétentions qui dominent l'écologie (...) des pratiques scientifiques. Avec le thème de l'auto-organisation, l'émergence propose aujourd'hui d'autres visages, plus avenants, car ils annoncent un intérêt nouveau, orienté vers l'exploitation des propriétés en vérité très singulières que l'apparition et l'évolution des vivants pourraient avoir requis de la matière. Une approche pacifique de la question de l'émergence est-elle désormais possible? Ou s'agit-il là d'une opération de pacification, menée à l'encontre de belligérants naïfs par des tiers qui en savent plus? Les différents visages de l'émergence expriment les différents types de liens qui existent ou pourraient s'inventer entre pratiques scientifiques, entre constructeurs de modèles et praticiens de terrain. Mais les protagonistes de la question de l'émergence, qu'ils entendent la réduire, à la manière des sociobiologistes, ou en célébrer la complexité innovante, ne peuvent s'empêcher de rêver, de spéculer sur la possibilité d'une approche enfin scientifique qui permettrait de nous comprendre nous-mêmes et de comprendre les enjeux de nos histoires. Isabelle Stengers prend ici le risque d'accepter que cette composante spéculative est irrépressible. Mais l'enjeu est alors de reconnaître les situations où la spéculation change de nature, parce que les pratiques scientifiques s'y adressent à ces questions posées par d'autres, et qu'elles obligent à une rencontre avec d'autres pratiques humaines, modernes et non-modernes. (shrink)

Let us begin by making a rather obvious remark: the meaning of the question of ‘what we do not know’ varies according to whether or not the word “yet” is explicitly or implicitly included. It comes as no surprise that it should be in physics, the science in which, ever since Galileo and Newton, the quest for knowledge has been so amply and unexpectedly rewarded, that we find the most dramatic examples of both possibilities: one in which theory points to (...) knowledge not yet acquired, knowledge which is still to be conquered, but which, once attained, should constitute its final triumph; and one in which “we do not know” may be taken as the conclusion of established knowledge. We do not (yet) know how to unify the four fundamental forces of interaction in a single theory, and yet that eventuality is already being called the theory of everything (TOE). Since interaction is the principle on which physics now bases all its explanations, and since physical explanations are in principle valid for everything that exists, the unification of the forces of interaction must therefore be the science of the principles of everything that exists. On the other hand, we do not know at what moment a particular radioactive nucleus will disintegrate. In this case, our knowledge of physics makes it impossible to use the word “yet”: radioactive disintegration is described in terms of a “lifetime,” which means that each nucleus within a given population has, at any one moment, the same probability of disintegrating, and that this probability is not a function of any variable which we can identify and manipulate. In this case, our knowledge asserts that we cannot know now and will not be able to know for as long as our present knowledge remains valid. (shrink)

From Einstein’s quest for a unified field theory to Stephen Hawking’s belief that we “would know the mind of God” through such a theory, contemporary science—and physics in particular—has claimed that it alone possesses absolute knowledge of the universe. In a sweeping work of philosophical inquiry, originally published in French in seven volumes, Isabelle Stengers builds on her previous intellectual accomplishments to explore the role and authority of science in modern societies and to challenge its pretensions to objectivity, rationality, (...) and truth. For Stengers, science is a constructive enterprise, a diverse, interdependent, and highly contingent system that does not simply discover preexisting truths but, through specific practices and processes, helps shape them. She addresses conceptual themes crucial for modern science, such as the formation of physical-mathematical intelligibility, from Galilean mechanics and the origin of dynamics to quantum theory, the question of biological reductionism, and the power relations at work in the social and behavioral sciences. Focusing on the polemical and creative aspects of such themes, she argues for an ecology of practices that takes into account how scientific knowledge evolves, the constraints and obligations such practices impose, and the impact they have on the sciences and beyond. This perspective, which demands that competing practices and interests be taken seriously rather than merely tolerated, poses a profound political and ethical challenge. In place of both absolutism and tolerance, she proposes a cosmopolitics—modeled on the ideal scientific method that considers all assumptions and facts as being open to question—that reintegrates the natural and the social, the modern and the archaic, the scientific and the irrational. _Cosmopolitics I_ includes the first three volumes of the original work. _Cosmopolitics II_ will be published by the University of Minnesota Press in Spring 2011. (shrink)

Presents a comprehensive history of multiverse theory, reviewing the discoveries that shaped astrophysicists' current consensus view while showing that the multiverse is able to be explained entirely in naturalistic terms.

Pourquoi les sciences modernes n'avancent-elles que sur le mode guerrier - guerre du scientifique contre ses concurrents, guerre du savant contre le " charlatan ", guerre du " nouveau " contre l' " ancien "? Pourquoi ces sciences sont-elles présentes parmi nous sous le jour le plus faux : triomphe d'un savoir enfin objectif, neutre et désintéressé, produit par une démarche méthodique, humble et sereine? Et pourquoi, lorsque les scientifiques osent dire leurs rêves et leurs ambitions, est-ce si souvent la (...) spéculation arrogante, le mépris et la polémique qui trouvent à s'exprimer? Les savoirs modernes sont aujourd'hui habités par une obsession de la différenciation. Et cette obsession de la différence à rappeler, de l'opposition à maintenir, entre objectivité scientifique et savoirs subjectifs, les voue à exister sur le mode de la guerre généralisée, guerre défensive ou offensive de chacun contre les autres, guerre de tous contre ce qu'ils s'accordent à disqualifier en tant que simple opinion. Est-il possible de civiliser les savoirs modernes, d'inventer entre eux et avec nous un régime de coexistence pacifique? Est-ce possible, sans leur demander de renoncer aux rêves et aux passions qui les font exister, sans exiger qu'ils se soumettent, au nom de cette paix à établir, à un quelconque tribunal distribuant les droits et les devoirs de chacun? C'est pour construire une réponse à cette question qu'Isabelle Stengers tente ici une démarche tout à la fois de diagnostic et de pronostic. Car il s'agit tout aussi bien de comprendre les valeurs que font exister les sciences, que de risquer un pari sur un avenir possible où ces valeurs seraient activement dissociées du pouvoir de disqualifier. Le projet d'une mise en culture des sciences n'a rien à voir, alors, avec un quelconque supplément d'âme, ou une meilleure diffusion des connaissances scientifiques. Pour Isabelle Stengers, il passe par la construction de ce qu'exigerait une véritable écologie des pratiques, modernes et non modernes. (shrink)

Au début de ce siècle, les atomes ont enfin conquis droit de cité à l'intérieur de la physique. Leur foule désordonnée, les évènements multiples dont ils sont les acteurs, renvoient aux apparences les lois classiques de la physique. Le monde s'est peuplé et le peuple des atomes semble rebelle à la loi. Et pourtant, quelques années plus tard, ce peuple rebelle est devenu silencieux. La loi règne à nouveau, et elle descend en ligne directe de la plus étonnante des créations (...) de la physique mathématique, la mécanique quantique. Moment de triomphe ou moment de désarroi? Car tout se passe comme si, soudain, les physiciens avaient perdu l'accès à ce qu'ils appelaient réalité, comme si tout savoir portant sur cette réalité devait être reconnu comme irrémédiablement factice. La loi règne, certes, mais dans le silence, une coupure infranchissable venant, semble-t-il séparer le langage que nous devons utiliser pour décrire la réalité et la vérité indicible de cette réalité. Le réel est voilé. La tragédie de la mécanique quantique a fait l'objet de mille et une controverses qui semblent témoigner que la physique, ici, est confrontée à des questions proprement philosophiques : la réalité est-elle connaissable? Voire, " existe-t-elle-en soi "? Mais une autre hypothèse peut être proposée, qui permettrait de transformer en comédie non dénuée d'humour l'ironie tragique d'un rêve dont l'accomplissement final entraîne la destruction. Car les questions d'apparence philosophique et le renoncement ascétique auxquels la mécanique quantique semble appeler les physiciens traduisent peut être d'abord et avant tout les moyens que ceux-ci ont utilisés pour faire faire le monde événementiel et tumultueux dont ils avaient gagné l'accès, pour transmuter en harmonie mathématique le bruit des atomes. (shrink)

Le prix Nobel de chimie montre comment ses résultats les plus récents en physique théorique lui permettent de résoudre les problèmes qui rendent invraisemblables, malgré leur succès retentissant, tant la physique classique que la mécanique quantique : le paradoxe du temps et le paradoxe quantique. ©Electre 2021.

La science classique s'est trouvée associée à un désenchantement du monde. C'est la leçon que Jacques Monod entendait tirer des progrès de la biologie : "L'ancienne alliance est rompue. L'homme sait enfin qu'il est seul dans l'immensité indifférente de l'Univers d'où il a émergé par hasard." Notre science n'est plus ce savoir classique, nous pouvons déchiffrer le récit d'une "nouvelle alliance". Loin de l'exclure du monde qu'elle décrit, la science retrouve comme un problème l'appartenance de l'homme à ce monde. Les (...) théories scientifiques ne peuvent plus supposer la possibilité d'un savoir omniscient : nous lisons, jusque dans leurs principes, les traces d'une activité d'exploration au sein d'une nature en évolution. (shrink)