Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 799-811, August 2022.

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom‐relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt‐style examples are not cogent. In this (...) paper, we explain why his argument fails. (shrink)

An agent who is the victim of covert and nonconstraining control is unaware of being controlled and controllers get their way by manipulating the victims so that they willingly do what the controllers desire. Our primary objective is to argue that if cases of CNC manipulation undermine compatibilist accounts of the sort of control required for moral responsibility, they also undermine various agent‐causal and non‐agent‐causal libertarian accounts as well.

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...) We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

This article critically examines Kadri Vihvelin's proposal that to have free will is to have the ability to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to have this ability is to have a bundle of dispositions that can be exercised in more than one way. It is argued that partisans of Frankfurt examples can still make a powerful case for the view that being able to do otherwise, even on Vihvelin's compatibilist explication of ‘could have done otherwise,’ is not (...) required for moral responsibility. (shrink)

In everyday life it is common to judge people morally responsible for their actions, but there is a time-honored philosophical challenge to this practice with which we are all familiar. The challenge can be put briefly as follows: moral responsibility requires that agents have a certain kind of control that is compatible with neither causal determinism nor its contradictory, causal indeterminism; hence moral responsibility is impossible. Haji notes that judgments about moral responsibility- which I will call hypological judgments—are not the (...) only category of moral, or morally relevant, judgments. There are also deontic judgments, which have to do with moral obligation, right, and wrong; aretaic judgments, which have to do with moral virtue and vice; and axiological judgments, which have to do with intrinsic and extrinsic value. In principle, a challenge to all such judgments can be made that parallels the challenge to hypological judgments: that they presuppose a certain kind of control that is compatible with neither determinism nor indeterminism and are therefore to be rejected. It is a surprising fact that, whereas the challenge to hypological judgments has been the subject of intense debate for centuries, the analogous challenges to the other kinds of judgments have received comparatively little, if any, attention. In this book, Haji seeks to rectify this omission. He concerns himself primarily with the challenge to deontic judgments. During the course of his discussion he deals in depth with the original challenge to hypological judgments, devotes a chapter to the challenge to aretaic judgments, and makes certain remarks in passing about the challenge to axiological judgments. (shrink)

In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the (...) choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna argue that my attack on Frankfurt-style cases fails. I had argued that we cannot be confident that agents in these cases retain their responsibility-underwriting capacities, because what capacities an agent has can depend on features of the world external to her, including merely counterfactual interveners. Haji and McKenna argue that only when an intervention is actual does the agent gain or lose a capacity. Here I demonstrate that this claim is (...) false: capacities are dispositions that can be constituted by features of the environment that are currently inactive. I also reply to two other objections: that my argument begs the question against historical accounts of moral responsibility and that it leaves the very locus of free action, our mental acts, untouched. (shrink)

Ishtiyaque Haji develops and supports the view that alternative possibilities are a requirement on many morally-relevant facets of our lives. I argue that the main argument he offers for his view fails due primarily to two things. First, Haji employs a Jackson-type case to support a claim that such cases fail to support. Second, Haji offers no reason to think that we must understand the 'can' in certain of his important principles as alethic. These troubles vex the insightful support (...) Haji offers for his many, wide-ranging conclusions. (shrink)

This article is part of a symposium on Alfred Mele’s Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. It is Mele’s response to John Fischer, Ishtiyaque Haji, and Michael McKenna. Topics discussed include the bearing of manipulation on moral responsibility, the zygote argument, the importance of scenarios in which manipulators radically reverse an agent’s values, positive versus negative historical requirements for moral responsibility, the scope of moral responsibility, the value of intuitions, bullet-biting, and how we develop from neonates who are (...) not morally responsible for anything into morally responsible agents. A variety of scenarios featuring various kinds of manipulation are discussed. (shrink)

Dans un article publié dans ce numéro, Ishtiyaque Haji soutient que la difficulté posée par la chance au compatibilisme n’est pas nouvelle, mais qu’elle est en fait identique au problème inhérent aux cas de manipulation, auquel les compatibilistes ont déjà répondu. Dans cet article, je distingue deux problèmes que la chance pose au compatibilisme. Si l’un des deux est bien celui que l’on trouve dans les cas de manipulation, celui identifié par Haji est cependant différent. La difficulté soulevée par (...) la chance est donc bien originale, et les solutions au problème des cas de manipulation échouent à y répondre. (shrink)

This paper is an illustration of the case study of trying to create an awareness of human values at the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) as part of its work culture. Some of the principles of this intervention and the key process used in developing a values-based culture are highlighted. A brief background of why MAS undertook a values journey is given along with the approach and the process used, based on the values clarification process (VCP). The development of other internal (...) processes customized to design in-house modules through the values awareness programme (VAP) and the values inculcation programme (VIP) are also outlined. The paper combines two perspectives in this case study: one of the authors was an internal consultant with MAS and the other an external consultant to parts of the process. The objective is to share insights from such an intervention to enable other organizations to benefit from this experience. (shrink)

The study aims through a deductively descriptive method to focuson the influence of Arabic on the Malaysian culture. The most importantmilestones of Arabic in the Malaysian context and the most stand out Malaysiapublic and private institutions which made the most contributions in spreadingArabic in the Malay culture. The study begins with the arrival of Islam andArabic in the Archipelago as a precursor to uncover the depth of the influenceof Arabic in the minds and culture of the Malays. The influence of (...) Arabic onthe following aspects will also be discussed: the writing script of the Malay,the educational system in schools and universities, the mass media in additionto the public. (shrink)

On mission of da'wah in accordance with Islamic ethics in Malaysia.

Conflicts over rangeland exploitation have been a serious challenge in Iran, rooted in human behavior. Accordingly, this study aimed to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework in the field of analyzing conflict behavior among rangeland exploiters. This research is a descriptive-correlational and causal-relational study conducted using a cross-sectional survey. The statistical population of the study was rangeland exploiters in one of the northwest provinces of Iran (N= 66,867) of whom 384 people were selected as a sample and stratified random sampling method (...) with proportional assignment. The research instrument was a questionnaire, the validity of which was confirmed by a panel of academic experts and the reliability of its items was verified using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. The results showed that the variables of personal norms (PN) and the perceived behavioral control were able to predict 25.9% of the variance in terms of the conflicting behavior of rangeland exploiters; besides, ascription of responsibility, PN, perceived behavioral control, and awareness of consequences, which have been proposed as activators of PN, were able to explain a significant percentage (63.5%) of the variance in terms of PN. Furthermore, analysis of the effects of environmental and cultural values showed that conflict behaviors of exploiters were mostly affected by their underlying values. Generally, the results of this study would help in the development of more integrated and comprehensive models in the field of exploiters’ conflict behavior. Eventually, to change and improve the environmental behavior of exploiters to better management of conflict in rangelands, providing a list of considerations and competencies for agricultural extension and education, this article comes to the end. (shrink)

The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities—persons are morally responsible for having done something only if they could have avoided doing it—to secure this species of incompatibilism. In this paper, having outlined Peter van Inwagen's elegant version of the Direct Argument, I critically discuss Michael McKenna's recent responses to the argument. I then cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference that (...) it invokes. (shrink)

We standardly believe that people are morally responsible for at least some of their conduct. We think, for example, that we are praiseworthy for some of our deeds and blameworthy for others. Traditionally it has been thought that at least two conditions must be satisfied for a person to be responsible for her intentional actions: a control condition which says, loosely, that the person acts voluntarily; and an epistemic one which requires, roughly, that the person not be relevantly ignorant of (...) what she is doing.In this paper, I shall confine attention to a core element of the epistemic condition. After clarifying this element, I’ll motivate the suggestion that specifically moral goals, concerns, or ideals in the everyday lives of very many of us do not take pride of place. This simple fact, in association with the core epistemic element of responsibility, I believe, reveals that the ‘scope’ of moral responsibility is restricted. Next, I propose and attempt to defend the view that though people are not morally responsible for much of their behaviour in the day-to-day business of living, they are responsible — not just causally — but ‘normatively’ as I shall say, for a good deal of what they do. I shall end by producing a sketch of the concept of ‘normative responsibility’. (shrink)

Beyond their conventional concepts as some outcome of the system dynamics, Patterns and their Formation are regarded here as some substantial parts in description of the dynamics and flow of information in systems. Approach to a typical geometrical problem, for instance, comprises some sequential steps where the observed information of the system is rearranged, reorganized and reformulated to reach the final result. An algebra is introduced here to begin a systematic framework for sequential approaches to geometrical problems. The type of (...) the objects suitable for different kinds of the problems, the way the objects successively match to get a more detailed description of the problem, and the summation operator which combines simultaneous segments of the information of the system are discussed. Based on such abstract clarification for the sequential description of systems, we then switch to reformulate practical examples in various fields from network dynamics to molecular decomposition, relativity and embryogenesis, and demonstrate how different sequential implementation of symmetry could lead to proper description for the dynamics in each of these examples. (shrink)

Comparing the practice of nurse practitioners to medical practice began almost 50 years ago and continues to this day. This comparison is curious since the founders of this movement did not indicate that these advanced practice nurses were to be interchangeable with physicians. Nevertheless, substantial literature indicates that nurse practitioners perform equally or better when measured against physician practice standards. This paper compares the ontology and epistemology of both professions and concludes that the philosophical foundations are so different that comparisons (...) are illogical. (shrink)

The perspective on Isa al-Masih or Jesus has been one point of separation and a source of endless tension between Islam and Christianity. While Western tradition believes that Isa al-Masih is the son of God, Islam ensures that Isa is the son of a human being, a servant of God or a prophet and a messenger of God. This paper is not intended to resolve this debate, but through a thematic study by examining verses that reveal about Isa al-Masih in (...) any verses in the Qur’an, wants to show that despite theological differences in the views of Isa al-Masih between Islam and Christianity cannot be avoided. However the meeting points between Islam and Christianity is very strong and that is in the Qur’an called Kalimatun sawa’ which makes both emphasize peace rather than conflict. Isa al-Masih is seen by Christians and Muslims as a respected figure and has a prophetic mision of freeing the weak and oppressed people. Therefore, in Islamic tradition, Isa al-Masih is considered as the apostle of ulul azmi or the liberator Prophet. (shrink)

This article examines the theological polemics between Islam and Christianity focusing on the prophetic attribution of Isa al-Masih in Islamic tradition. It takes a close look at the Qur’anic construction upon the Prophet Isa al-Masih as a human being who served as a messenger of God, while briefly comparing the Islamic construction to the Christian tradition projecting Isa-al-Masih as the son of God. Rather than emphasising differences between the two traditions, this article, through the Quranic concept kalimatun sawa’, sheds a (...) new light on a shared belief between Islam and Christian traditions. Both Islam and Christianity believe that Isa al-Masih is the saviour for humanity, the liberator for the weak and the oppressed. The Qur’an maintains Isa al-Masih as one of the ulul azmi meaning that the prophets who successfully liberated his people. (shrink)

Essays on linguistics in Malaysia; festschrift in honor of Asmah Haji Omar, a doctor in linguistics at Universiti Malaya.

Distributed Cognition and the Will , edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stephens, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 2007. 369 pages. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 491-500.

Technological advances in the field of medicine and health sciences not only manipulate the normal human body and sex but also provide for surgical and hormonal management of hermaphroditism. Consequently, sex assignment surgery has not only become a standard care for babies born with genital abnormalities in the West but even in some Muslim states. On the positive side, it goes a long way in saving children born with abnormal genitalia from numerous legal interdictions of the pre-sex corrective surgery. Nevertheless, (...) the larger ethical and legal questions that medical management of genital abnormality raises to some extent have not been adequately appreciated by contemporary Muslim responses. This article, therefore, in principle argues against surgical management of intersexuality during early infancy from the Islamic legal perspective. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, (...) Michael McKenna, and David Widerker. We divide these objections into those based on dialectical considerations (section 1), and objections in the form of counterexamples to a central principle which the Direct Argument employs (sec 2). The conclusion we reach is that the proponent of DA can deal plausibly with these objections, thus establishing DA as a powerful argument in favor of incompatibilism. (shrink)

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas.

Ishtiyaque Haji’s provocative book Moral Appraisability advances an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for moral praise and blame. Haji develops three conditions: a control, an epistemic, and an autonomy condition. The book naturally divides into four parts with the first three devoted to the aforementioned conditions. A fourth concerns an application of Haji’s account to a range of issues including the appraisability of addicts, problems with cross-cultural appraisals, as well as nonmoral varieties of appraisability, such as legal, (...) prudential, and aesthetic. I shall focus my attention exclusively on the control condition as regards blame. (shrink)

In Luck’s Mischief, Ishtiyaque Haji offers a dual skeptical argument about obligation and moral responsibility, one that avoids direct appeal to determinism and indeterminism and instead argues tha...

The problem of free will has fascinated philosophers since ancient times: Do we have free will, or at least the kind of free will that seems necessary for moral responsibility? Does determinism - the idea that everything that happens is necessitated to happen, given the past and the laws of nature - threaten the commonly held assumption that we are indeed free and morally responsible? Although these questions have been widely discussed in the past, the present volume offers a variety (...) of new perspectives from philosophers who have made significant contributions to this debate over recent years, including Derk Pereboom, Robert Kane, Ishtiyaque Haji, Michael McKenna, John Martin Fischer, David Widerker and Saul Smilansky. The emphasis in these essays is not merely on free will, but on allied notions such as moral responsibility, moral obligation, fairness and meaningfulness, and on whether any room can be made for these notions in a deterministic or an indeterministic universe. (shrink)

A popular justification of education for autonomy is that autonomy possession has intrinsic prudential value. Communitarians have argued, however, that although autonomy may be a core element of a well-lived life in liberal societies, it cannot claim such a prudential pedigree in traditional societies in which the conception of a good life is intimately tied to the acceptance of a pre-established worldview. In this paper I examine a recent attempt made by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan Cuypers to respond to (...) this challenge by reestablishing the intrinsic prudential value of autonomy, and I argue that although their work has merit in some respects, it suffers from a notable theoretical deficiency as well as a practical deficiency. Like Haji and Cuypers, I wish to argue that autonomy has intrinsic prudential value; but my argument is not grounded on the claim that autonomy is a necessary part of well-being. I argue, rather, that it stands to reason—and that liberals and traditionalists alike have reason to accept—that autonomous assent to a conception of the good life is an intrinsically prudentially better state of affairs than nonautonomous assent to the same. My goal in this essay, then, is to clarify the prudential significance of (and to provide a justification for) education for autonomy in a manner that will be appealing to liberals and traditionalists alike. (shrink)