Luck and Manipulation Cases: A Response to Professor Haji

Dialogue 54 (4):633-646 (2015)
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Abstract

Dans un article publié dans ce numéro, Ishtiyaque Haji soutient que la difficulté posée par la chance au compatibilisme n’est pas nouvelle, mais qu’elle est en fait identique au problème inhérent aux cas de manipulation, auquel les compatibilistes ont déjà répondu. Dans cet article, je distingue deux problèmes que la chance pose au compatibilisme. Si l’un des deux est bien celui que l’on trouve dans les cas de manipulation, celui identifié par Haji est cependant différent. La difficulté soulevée par la chance est donc bien originale, et les solutions au problème des cas de manipulation échouent à y répondre.

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Neil Levy
Macquarie University

Citations of this work

Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):302-324.

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References found in this work

A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.
Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):169-192.

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