A number of Artificial Intelligence (AI) ethics frameworks have been published in the last 6 years in response to the growing concerns posed by the adoption of AI in different sectors, including healthcare. While there is a strong culture of medical ethics in healthcare applications, AI-based Healthcare Applications (AIHA) are challenging the existing ethics and regulatory frameworks. This scoping review explores how ethics frameworks have been implemented in AIHA, how these implementations have been evaluated and whether they have been successful. (...) AI specific ethics frameworks in healthcare appear to have a limited adoption and they are mostly used in conjunction with other ethics frameworks. The operationalisation of ethics frameworks is a complex endeavour with challenges at different levels: ethics principles, design, technology, organisational, and regulatory. Strategies identified in this review are proactive, contextual, technological, checklist, organisational and/or evidence-based approaches. While interdisciplinary approaches show promises, how an ethics framework is implemented in an AI-based Healthcare Application is not widely reported, and there is a need for transparency for trustworthy AI. (shrink)

The great Falsification Debate about the logical status of religious beliefs seems fairly quiescent at present. Most philosophers of religion have opted for one or the other of two opposite responses to the falsificationists' challenge.

The literature on affective determinants of physical activity is growing rapidly. The present paper aims to provide greater clarity regarding the definition and distinctions among the various affect-related constructs that have been examined in relation to PA. Affective constructs are organized according to the Affect and Health Behavior Framework, including: affective response to PA; incidental affect; affect processing; and affectively charged motivational states. After defining each category of affective construct, we provide examples of relevant research showing how each construct may (...) relate to PA behavior. We conclude each section with a discussion of future directions for research. (shrink)

Summary Critics have said that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions represents them as subjective and irrational processes, in which mystical conversions and community pressures rather than good reasons determine choices between theories. Kuhn rejects the charge, insisting that there is partial communication among proponents of competing paradigm candidates and their arguments are rational though not coercive. The critics reply that in fact Kuhn's position entails total non-communication and irrationality. A Kuhnian account of partial communication is thus necessary. Kuhn's attempt to (...) give one, based on the notion that the good reasons advanced in paradigm debates function asvalues, fails. But a more satisfactory account can be given if it is recognized that paradigm-debaters will, in one or both of two ways, share paradigmsother than the ones at issue. Further, Kuhn's position both should and can accommodate a notion of theory reduction; his unqualified rejection of reduction is an unnecessary weakness, even apart from questions about the rationality of revolutions. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the contrast between Kuhn's and Feyerabend's strategies for the advancement of science. (shrink)

This article describes the education portion of an ongoing grant-sponsored education and research project designed to help graduate students in all engineering disciplines learn about the basic ethical principles, rules, and obligations associated with engineering practice in the United States. While the curriculum developed for this project is used for both domestic and international students, the educational materials were designed to be sensitive to the specific needs of international graduate students. In recent years, engineering programs in the United States have (...) sought to develop a larger role for professional ethics education in the curriculum. Accreditation requirements, as well as pressures from the private sector, have helped facilitate this shift in focus. Almost half of all engineering graduate students in the U.S. are international students. Further, research indicates that the majority of these students will remain in the U.S. to work post-graduation. It is therefore in the interest of the profession that these students, coming from diverse backgrounds, receive some formal exposure to the professional and ethical expectations and norms of the engineering profession in the United States to help ensure that they have the knowledge and skills—non-technical as well as technical—required in today’s engineering profession. In becoming acculturated to professional norms in a host country, international students face challenges that domestic students do not encounter; such as cultural competency, language proficiency, and acculturation stress. Mitigating these challenges must be a consideration in the development of any effective education materials. The present article discusses the project rationale and describes the development of on-line instructional materials aimed at helping international engineering graduate students acclimate to professional engineering ethics standards in the United States. Finally, a brief data summary of students’ perceptions of the usefulness of the content and instructional interface is provided to demonstrate the initial effectiveness of the materials and to present a case for project sustainability. (shrink)

This article examines emergency ambulance calls made by lay callers for patients found to be in cardiac arrest when the paramedics arrived. Using conversation analysis, we explored the trajectories of calls in which the caller, before being asked by the call-taker, said why they were calling, that is, calls in which callers pre-empted a reason-for-the-call. Caller pre-emption can be disruptive when call-takers first need to obtain an address and telephone number. Pre-emptions have further implications when call-takers reach the stage when (...) they are required to deliver the scripted turn ‘tell me exactly what happened’. When there has been a pre-emption earlier on, callers tend to treat the scripted turn as a request for more information and may not repeat their reason-for-the-call. This can occasion delays and important information can be lost. We identified an effective alternative strategy used by some call-takers, pre-emption repeat, which callers treat as a request for confirmation. (shrink)

First published in 1962, contains the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. It sets out Austin's conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life. Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well- known distinction of performative utterances from statements, Austin here finally abandons that distinction, replacing it by a more general theory of 'illocutionary forces' of utterances which has important bearings (...) on a wide variety of philosophical problems. (shrink)

Answering important public health questions often requires collection of sensitive information about individuals. For example, our understanding of how HIV is transmitted and how to prevent it only came about with people's willingness to share information about their sexual and drug-using behaviors. Given the scientific need for sensitive, personal information, researchers have a corresponding ethical and legal obligation to maintain the confidentiality of data they collect and typically promise in consent forms to restrict access to it and not to publish (...) identifying data.The interests of others, however, can threaten researchers' promises of confidentiality when legal demands are made to access research data. In some cases, the subject of the litigation is tightly connected to the research questions, and litigants' interest in the data is not surprising. Researchers conducting studies on tobacco or occupational or other chemical exposures, for example, are relatively frequent targets of subpoenas. (shrink)

This chapter considers certain key features of Austin's philosophy. It discusses the under recognised affinities that exist between the work of Derrida and Austin, particularly concerning their philosophical methods and their respective attempts to work against the traditional, representation list account of language. The chapter exemplifies the manner in which Derrida nevertheless presents himself as going beyond Austin's philosophy in certain crucial ways, by attending to the criticisms he levels at Austin in his paper ‘Signature Event (...) Context’. It describes Derrida's account by assessing whether his critique of Austin holds, a task that is aided by an exploration of Stanley Cavell's critique of Derrida's reading of Austin. Finally, through appraising Cavell and Derrida's readings of Austin, the chapter argues that Derrida's critique can in fact be defended and in a manner that serves understand Derrida's account of language and thought in certain significant ways. (shrink)

This chapter considers a thinker Jacques Derrida, who in some ways inherits the Heideggerian legacy and yet also problematises and puts it to work in new ways. Like Heidegger, the insights raised by Derrida's philosophy in respect to the nature of human thinking come by way of his exploration of the relation between thought and language. Derrida in many ways comes close to one of the key accounts of language afforded by Ordinary Language philosophy, namely that of John Austin. (...) The chapter shows how Derrida's own account of language enables such a surpassing and demonstrates that this is not by way of any bizarre, farfetched man oeuvres but is rather the result of a commitment to remaining faithful and attentive to the actual workings of language. It explores Derrida's account of signification as it develops from his critical confrontation with structuralism and De Saussure. (shrink)

When William May first wrote Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, his position was that to perform a craniotomy on a child to save the mother’s life constitutes a direct abortion and is not justifiable. In later editions, May rejected his earlier position in favor of one he originally argued against, most notably by Germain Grisez. The author maintains that the argu­ments surrounding craniotomies on the unborn are still of major relevance today, because they relate directly to (...) certain controversial techniques used to manage ectopic pregnancies. He also argues that May’s original conclusion ought to be upheld, and that May’s later conclusion places too much weight on the interior intention of the actor and not enough on the act itself. (shrink)

The idea of legal rights today enjoys virtually universal appeal, yet all too often the meaning and significance of rights are poorly understood. The purpose of this volume is to clarify the subject of legal rights by drawing on both historical and philosophical legal scholarship to bridge the gap between these two genres--a gap that has divorced abstract and normative treatments of rights from an understanding of their particular social and cultural contexts. Legal Rights: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives shows that (...) the meaning and extent of rights has been dramatically expanded in this century, though along with the widespread and flourishing popularity of rights, voices of criticism have increasingly been raised. The authors take up the question of the foundation of rights and explore the postmodern challenges to efforts to ground rights outside of history and language. Drawing rich historical analysis and careful philosophical inquiry into productive dialogue, this book explores the many facets of rights at the end of the twentieth century. In these essays, potentially abstract debates come alive as they are related to the struggles of real people attempting to cope with, and improve, their living conditions. The significance of legal rights is measured not just in terms of philosophical categories or as a collection of histories, but as they are experienced in the lives of men and women seeking to come to terms with rights in contemporary life. Contributors are Hadley Arkes, William E. Cain, Thomas Haskell, Morton J. Horwitz, Annabel Patterson, Michael J. Perry, Pierre Schlag, and Jeremy Waldron. Austin Sarat is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College. Thomas R. Kearns is William H. Hastie Professor of Philosophy, Amherst College. (shrink)

The Oxford or Tractarian Movement and later Ritualists and Anglo-Catholics schooled numerous converts in elements of the Catholic faith. Foremost among them was John Henry Cardinal Newman, one of the original founders of the Oxford Movement. Converts numbered in the hundreds and included another cardinal, Henry Edward Manning, the second Archbishop of Westminster, the religious foundress Cornelia Connelly, the priest novelist Robert Hugh Benson and later literary figures such as G.K. Chesterton, Evelyn Waugh and Mgr Ronald Knox. American historian, Patrick (...) Allitt, has argued that on both sides of the Atlantic converts dominated Catholic intellectual life between 1840 and 1960. While such 'Tractarian' converts have indeed greatly influenced Catholic life, many 'Tractarians' who never converted have also had a considerable impact on English-speaking Catholicism. C.S. Lewis is an obvious example. But there have been others, including author Charles Williams, poet T.S. Eliot and theologians John Macquarrie and Michael Ramsey. The author Dorothy L. Sayers also deserves to be counted among their number. (shrink)

Introduction: The argument of this book John Austin believed that the first ' moral' (now it would be called social) science to be established was political ...

O SET THE STAGE for the discussion[1], I will rehearse and clarify a well-known dispute between A. J. Ayer and J. L. Austin concerning whether perceptual judgments are inferences. Both in his Sense and Sensibilia[2] and in his "Other Minds,"[3] Austin carefully distinguishes recognizing that p from inferring that p. For the purpose of comparing his position to Ayer's, we might put his basic claim in this way: given the way words such as "recognize" and "infer" are used (...) outside philosophical discussions, one clearly distinguishes instances of recognizing from instances of inferring. Yet Ayer does not dispute that, but replies that while non-philosophers do make a sharp distinction between the two, it is arbitrary for philosophical purposes.[4] Claims based upon one's having recognized something are sufficiently like claims based upon one's having inferred, Ayer supposes, that it is useful to treat them as instances of a common category. So the issue is not whether the distinction is recognized outside philosophical circles, but whether it is a defensible and useful one to make. Clearly, Austin insists upon the distinction because he supposes that failing to make it will promote philosophical confusion; indeed, he argues that one traditional problem of skepticism is largely due to this confusion.[5] In his "Other Minds," Austin tries to suggest how recognizing differs from inferring by showing how the sorts of questions or challenges brought to bear differ between the two sorts of claim:[6] for inferences, one wants a rehearsal of the pieces of evidence and an account of their connections to the judgment; for perceptual claims of recognition, one explores whether the observer had the opportunity to see what he claimed to have seen, whether he had acquired the expertise to recognize the sort of thing he claimed to have seen, and whether the circumstances were free of evident distraction and defect. But his readers' appreciation of these things depends. (shrink)

My name is William Dembski. I’m an associate research professor in the conceptual foundations of science at Baylor University. I hold a Ph.D. in mathematics is from the University of Chicago. One of the things I do for a living is study the probabilistic underpinnings of neo-Darwinian evolution.

This book is the culmination of almost forty years of writing and thinking about speech acts and the use theory of meaning. Chapter 1 sets out and defends a version of the Austin-Searle trichotomy of a sentential act, i.e., uttering a sentence or surrogate, an illocutionary act, i.e., uttering a sentence with a certain "content" as reported by indirect speech, and a perlocutionary act, i.e., producing an effect on an audience by an utterance. Chapter 2 poses the question: what (...) condition C will turn an SA into an IA: F? Perhaps adding a perlocutionary intention to the effect that "U asserts that p only if U utters p with the intention of getting H to believe that p" will meet condition C. Alston argues, contra Schiffer, that it will not. Chapter 3 objects to Searle's analysis of sincere and non-defective promising, on the one hand, because there are too many ways a promise can be defective and, on the other hand, because some of Searle's conditions are not necessary for promising simpliciter. Alston proposes. (shrink)

In the sketch of his (discontinuous) envelope argument in his Some Main Problems of Philosophy (Macmillan: 1953), Moore treats the various phrases, "appears to be," "appears like a thing would appear if it were presented in a certain way," as though they were synonymous. Austin, in the fourth chapter of his Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: 1962), tries to call to our attention the fact that these philosophically favorite phrases are not interchangeable; as a result, if an argument is begun (...) by using one phrase and then a different one is substituted without argument, the person equivocates and the argument fails. (shrink)

New Approaches to Monetary Economics brings together presentations of innovative research in the field of monetary economics. Much of this research develops and applies approaches to modelling financial intermediation, aggregate fluctuations, monetary aggregation and transactions-motivated monetary equilibrium. The contents of this volume comprise the proceedings of the second in a conference series entitled International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics. This conference was held in 1985 at the IC2 Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. The symposia in (...) this series are sponsored by the IC2 Institute and the RGK Foundation. New Approaches to Monetary Economics, edited by Professors William A. Barnett and Kenneth J. Singleton, consists of five parts. Part I examines transactions-motivated monetary holding in general equilibrium; Part II, financial intermediation; Part III, monetary aggregation theory, Part IV, issues in aggregate fluctuation; and Part V, theoretical issues in the foundations of monetary economics and macroeconomics. (shrink)

H´ector-Neri Casta˜neda-Calder´on (December 13, 1924–September 7, 1991) was born in San Vicente Zacapa, Guatemala. He attended the Normal School for Boys in Guatemala City, later called the Military Normal School for Boys, from which he was expelled for refusing to fight a bully; the dramatic story, worthy of being filmed, is told in the “De Re” section of his autobiography, “Self-Profile” (1986). He then attended a normal school in Costa Rica, followed by studies in philosophy at the University of San (...) Carlos, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to the University of Minnesota, where he received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1954), all in philosophy. His dissertation, “The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning”, was written under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. He returned to teach in Guatemala, and then received a scholarship to study at Oxford University (1955–1956), after which he took a sabbatical-replacement position in philosophy at Duke University (1956). His first full-time academic appointment was at Wayne State University (1957– 1969), where he founded the philosophy journal Noˆus (1967, a counter-offer made to him by Wayne State to encourage him to stay there rather than to take the chairmanship of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania). In 1969, he moved (along with several of his Wayne colleagues) to Indiana University, where he eventually became the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs (1978–1981). He remained at Indiana until his death. He was also a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin (1962–1963) and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1981–1982). He received grants and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1967–1968), the T. Andrew Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation. He was elected President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1979– 1980), named to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1990), and received the Presidential Medal of Honor from the Government of Guatemala (1991). Casta˜neda’s philosophical interests spanned virtually the entire spectrum of philosophy, and his theories form a highly interconnected whole.. (shrink)

The thrust of this paper addresses how the notion of an author relates to the authority of a law. Drawing from the legal thought of Hobbes, Bentham, and John Austin, the Paper offers a sense of the author as a distinct institutional source of the state. The Paper then addresses the more difficult legal theories in this context: those of HLA Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Hans Kelsen. The clue to the latter as well as the earlier theorists is a (...) presupposed inaccessible author or ghost. The presupposed ghost of the law is crucial to the binding character of a law. (shrink)