Mixed Theories of Law

What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining morals with ethics- as (...) well as whether any discrepancies among ourselves are justifiable. An investigation into relevant moral and jurisprudential theories revealed much about the inner workings of a judge’s mindset- whether he or she recognizes it or not. Coupling this with corroborated research on a select few heuristics present specifically for judges sets the foundation for an array of possible solutions in order to ensure the most impartial judicial proceedings. Plausible remedies include conducting premortems, implicit association tests, and a revised ruling procedure. (shrink)

The law confers rights on non-human entities, namely nature, machines (AI), and animals. While doing so, the law is either viewed as progressive or sometimes as abstract and ambiguous. Despite the critique, it is undeniable that many of the rights of non-humans have come to solidify in statutory and constitutional rules of different systems. In the context of these developments, the article sheds light on the core justifications for advancing the rights of non-human entities. In addition, it discusses the conditions (...) for the emergence of these rights and the non-binding normative statements adopted by different stakeholders for advocacy. These include the Charter on the Law of the Living (2021), the Toulon Declaration (2019), and the Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism (2019), etc. The paper also discusses the relevant theoretical frames, namely post-humanism, digital humanism, and multi-species justice, followed by selective critical views on the subject. (shrink)

While some descriptive and normative theories of legislation account for an extensive role of legal interpretation in legislation, others see its legislative role as marginal. Yet in contemporary constitutional democracies, where legislation is limited and guided by constitutional norms, as well as international and supranational law, legal interpretation must play some role in legislation—even if all or most of legislative activity may not be adequately described and evaluated as legal interpretation. In this chapter, I aim to explore some implications of (...) recognizing the role of legal interpretation in legislation—notably, for the conceptualization and significance of legal expertise in the legislative process, as well as for determining the moral duties of legislative representatives. First, I argue that the role of legal interpretation in legislation calls for institutional reforms in legislatures in order to ensure that legal expertise is adequately channeled into the legislative process, including agenda-setting. Second, I argue that interpreting legal norms through legislation implies specific moral duties for legislative representatives, both in their relations to one another and in their relations vis-à-vis their constituents. I show that giving legal interpretation its due in a descriptive and normative account of legislative activity does not imply an elitist understanding of legislation, and it does not compromise our conception of legislatures as loci of political and moral disagreement and democratic representation. (shrink)

Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is dis- tinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns (...) the heteroge- neity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism. (shrink)

Peter Fitzpatrick’s intellectual relationship with Jean-Luc Nancy centred on the related problems of myth and community. In this article, I will explicate the ‘restlessness of the negative’ that Nancy describes in Hegel, in order to further develop Fitzpatrick’s notion of ‘law as resistance’. Set against the backdrop of myth and community, law can be understood as a community’s fragmentary attempt to explicate its essence. Modern law becomes an artefact of the negative twisting through a community’s attempts to construct itself through (...) a Nancian ontology of ‘being singular plural’. In this manner, one might understand Fitzpatrick’s claim that there is ‘always more to be done’ as affirming the necessity of some extra-formal legality—that is, the political—that must be opened through the resistance wrought by negativity. (shrink)

Forward-looking aims tend to play a much less significant role than retribution in justifying criminal punishment, especially in common law systems. In this paper I attempt to reinvigorate the idea that there are important forward-looking justifications for criminal law and punishment by looking to social theories of responsibility. I argue that the criminal law may be justified at the institutional level because it is a part of larger responsibility practices that have the effect of bolstering our reasons-responsiveness by making us (...) sensitive to the potential reactive attitudes of a larger societal audience. I further claim that forward-looking effects may justify criminal law institutions even if retribution is the primary aim of assigning punishments to specific offenders. (shrink)

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive (...) view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law. (shrink)

Setting forth the building blocks of banking bailout law, this book reconstructs a regulatory framework that might better serve countries during future crisis situations. -/- It builds upon recent, carefully selected case studies from the US, the EU, the UK, Spain and Hungary to answer the questions of what went wrong with the bank bailouts in the EU, why the US performed better in terms of crisis management, and how bailouts could be regulated and conducted more successfully in the future. (...) Employing a comparative methodology, it examines the different bailout and bank resolution techniques and tools and identifies the pros and cons of the different legal and regulatory options and their underlying principles. In the post-2008 legal-regulatory architecture financial institution specific insolvency proceedings were further developed or implemented on both sides of the Atlantic. Ten years after the most recent financial crisis, there is sufficient empirical evidence to evaluate the outcomes of the bank bailouts in the US and the EU and to examine a number of cases under the EU’s new bank resolution regime. -/- This book will be of interest of anyone in the field of finance, banking, central banking, monetary policy and insolvency law. (shrink)

Legal animal rights may, in the short term, offer an efficient means to improve the living conditions of animals and how they are treated by human societies. This article argues that this shift to adopt an animal rights framing of the human-animal interaction might also risk producing certain counterproductive effects. It suggests that there is a need for a broader reassessment of the relationships between the human and animal worlds. This article posits that the adoption of legal animal rights as (...) a workable legal solution for the better protection of animals has been increasingly accepted because rights frameworks rely upon a core premise of Western jurisprudence, namely legal subjectivism and the epistemological and axiological assumptions it conveys. The article argues that such an individualistic and dualist approach to legal animal rights will ultimately reveal itself to be insufficient and unable to capture animals as members of concrete social and environmental entanglements. Rather, a true legal revolution is required, which would evoke an ecological understanding of law itself. (shrink)

This essay offers an exegesis and critique of the moment of community formation in Agamben’s Homo Sacer Project. In The Sacrament of Language, Agamben searches for the site of a non-sovereign community founded upon the oath [horkos, sacramentum]: an ancient institution of language that produces and guarantees the connection between speech and the order of things by calling the god as a witness to the speaker’s fidelity. I argue that Agamben’s account ultimately falls short of subverting sovereignty, however, because the (...) sacramentum derives its power, at a fundamental level, from the ‘monothetic’ structure of truth—what Agamben calls ‘the name of God’ [il nome di Dio]. I propose we may yet salvage the oath as a means of subverting sovereignty, however, if we reconsider it in the context of polytheism, where the names of the gods [i nomi degli dei] can be many, while remaining powerful. First, through a reading of Aeschylus’ Eumenides, I argue that the Greeks understood the oath to function even where truth and falsity were inherently undecidable. Second, I argue that if we separate the truth and power functions interwoven in the sacramentum, we find a second formula, the decisory oath, which can be taken in order to produce a community even in the absence of one sovereign truth. As a kind of magical speech, the decisory oath provides the limit conditions for the possibility of distinguishing true from false in the sacramentum, and thus founds it. (shrink)

Legal positivism maintains a distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be. In other words, for positivists, a law can be legally valid even if it is immoral. H. L. A. Hart hoped to defend legal positivism against natural law. This paper analyses Hart’s criticism of Gustav Radbruch, a natural lawyer, before suggesting that Hart’s account of legal positivism gives rise to a logical problem. It is concluded that this problem leaves logical space for a (...) theory of natural law based on moral authority rather than legal validity. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...) that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading. (shrink)

Kenneth Westphal, in his “Hegel, Natural Law & Moral Constructivism,” offers an argument to the effect that Hegel elaborated a theory of natural law. Westphal contrasts such a natural law with positivism. Such a contrast holds out an either-or prospect: either Hegel is a legal positivist or he is a natural law thinker. I ask whether it is possible that Hegel elaborated a third theory of law other than that of positivism or of natural law. In addressing this possibility, I (...) first raise a problem in Westphal’s adoption of Hegel’s regressive argument. The ultimate justification, according to Westphal, is an a priori concept: namely, the equal rational will. I then exemplify the importance of the problem when a constitutional lawyer identifies intermediate principles justifiable with reference to such a final referent of justification. The problem raises the prospect that Hegel’s theory of law has elements of both natural law and positivist law. Section 3 highlights the need to situate any natural law claim in the particular ethos of the movement of legal consciousness through the experience of time. (shrink)

What is the relation between legal certainty and correctness? This question poses one of the perpetual problems of the theory and practice of law—and for this reason: The answer turns on the main question in legal philosophy, the question of the concept and the nature of law. Thus, in an initial step, I will briefly look at the concept and the nature of law. In a second step, I will attempt to explain what the concept and the nature of law, (...) thus understood, imply for the relation between legal certainty and correctness. Here three issues will be considered: first, the Radbruch formula as an answer to the problem of extreme injustice; second, the special case thesis, which claims that legal argumentation is a special case of general practical argumentation; and, third, the problem of the judicial development of the law. (shrink)

Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint (...) commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct. (shrink)

Retribution enjoys an unwarranted appeal from the public and its politicians. This is because it is impractical and perhaps even incoherent. This does not mean that we should reject the importance of morality for criminal justice nor should we reject the link between desert and proportionality. Nevertheless, we can reject the way retribution has understood these ideas in defense of a more plausible and compelling alternative.

The article investigates the use of the term “Law” in Richard Rorty and suggests an alternative use of the word. Although Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and antirepresentationalism are well known specially in relation to the metaphysical grounds of the human sciences, I argue that he would employ the term “law” in important rhetorical contexts. The text proposes to identify some aspects of the Rortyan Approach to “law” and, at the same time, focuses on the environment and the professional activity of the jurists (...) in this context. At the end, I suggest a different use of the term, in the sense of a literary and conversational art (an artistic ability). This use of the term shall be understood as a provisional suggestion for narrative purposes and seems to partly escape a rigorous Rortyan view. If the practice of law was for the romans not only a “science”, but also an “art” (ars), so it can be for those that act in the juridical practice today a practice of prudence qua art. (shrink)

Se l’uomo è nato libero e non soggetto ad un suo pari, può obbligare un altro uomo senza cadere nella tirannia? È la domanda a cui Suárez cerca di dare risposta attraverso lo studio della legge, interpretata come una manifestazione dell’intelletto e della volontà, ovvero le due componenti che, in continuo ed armonico dialogo, sono la base di una nuova costruzione morale. Il gesuita riscrive il rapporto tra Creatore e creatura, da un lato, e il rapporto tra obbligo politico e (...) libertà, dall’altro, tenendo conto che l’uomo è naturalmente inserito nell’ambito dello Stato e sottomesso alla sua giurisdizione, senza tuttavia alcuna abdicazione da parte sua. Nella posizione filosofica di Suárez si scopre la nascita di una teoria sistematica della comunità politica, incentrata sulla dialettica tra rottura e continuità temporale con i temi della scolastica e del nascente. (shrink)

Through an analysis of Kafka's "Before the Law," Vardoulakis considers both various philosophical responses to Kafka's story and philosophical conceptions of the law. In particular, Vardoulakis suggests an affinity between Kafka and Spinoza's conceptions of the law.

Ronald Dworkin states in his preface to “Law's Empire” that he is doing a phenomenology of law. In regards to a phenomenology of law, I wish to investigate Dworkin's theory of law, and subsequently, what is left out in order for it to be considered a phenomenological account. In doing so, I will compare Dworkin's phenomenology of law to Schütz's phenomenology of the social world. The comparison between the two will illuminate what I believe is necessary for law, and that (...) is a Phenomenology of the Pre‐Legal. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that John Dewey developed a philosophy of law that follows directly from his conception of democracy. Indeed, under Dewey’s theory an understanding of law can only follow from an accurate understanding of the social and political context within which it functions. This has important implications for the form law takes within democ- ratic society. The paper will explore these implications through a comparison of Dewey’s claims with those of Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin; two other (...) theorists that inti- mately link law and democracy. After outlining their theories I will use the recent United States Supreme Court case, Citizens United, to discuss how practitioners of the three theo- ries would decide a case that implicates both the rule of law and democratic procedures. In order to do this judges following each theory, “Dews, Dworks and Poses,” are imagined. Ul- timately this paper will show that drastically different results to Citizens United would fol- low. The (tentative) conclusion of the paper is that Dewey’s conception of the relationship between democracy and law is a superior option to either that of Dworkin or Posner. (shrink)

Based on the paradigm of Constructive Descriptions and Situations, we introduce NIC, an ontology of social collectives that includes social agents, plans, norms, and the conceptual relations between them. Norms are distinguished from plans, and their relations are formalized. A typology of social collectives is also proposed, including collection of agents, knowledge community, intentional collective, and normative intentional collective. NIC, represented as a first-order theory as well as a description logic for applications requiring automated reasoning, provides the expressivity to talk (...) about the contexts (social, informational, circumstantial, and conceptual), in which collectives make and produce sense within the interplay of plans and norms. (shrink)

In newly emerging democracies, succeeding governments have numerous policy tasks for the purpose of developing the free market and the democratic process. In such legal systems, policy-oriented views of law, which regard law as a policy tool for diminishing public problems, seem descriptively pertinent and prescriptively helpful. This is also the case in mature democratic legal systems, where the public problems faced by governments become more and more complex. Policy-directional views of law do not necessarily imply that law is a (...) value-neutral means that can serve any possible political ends. It is widely recognized among legal theorists and practitioners, with notable exceptions represented by exclusive legal positivists, that the law involves moral values, including justice and liberty. In the present essay, I focus on one version of policy-oriented views of law that is based on the fundamental ideals of justice and interest. By sketching out this version, I attempt to shed new light on some concepts and issues in jurisprudence. To begin, I articulate the concept of justice and identify the difficulties that interest-based conceptions of justice encounter, by referring to some classical works. I also make a distinction between different conceptions of interest. Next, the two basic concepts in law — rights and liberty — are explained in terms of justice and interest. Efficiency, which has been largely neglected in traditional jurisprudence notwithstanding its practical significance, is also briefly discussed. Then, I turn to exploring the implications that the law-as-policy theory grounded on justice and interest might have for the foundations of two legal domains: criminal law and laws governing political participation. Some allegations and objections against this theory are described, and responses to them are given. The essay concludes by noting the questions that remain open in this theory. (shrink)

This essay claims that the violence characterizing the 20th century has been coloured by the clash of two very different senses of legal authority. These two senses of legal authority correspond with two very different contexts of civil violence: state secession and the violence characterizing a challenge to a state-centric legal authority. Conklin argues that the modern legal authority represents a quest for a source or foundation. Such a sense of legal authority, according to Conklin, clashes such a view with (...) the unwritten laws of early Amerindian traditional societies. Conklin argues further that by arguing that the Amerindian sense of legal authority has been concealed in the dominant modern sense of legal authority. (shrink)

The law presents itself as a body of meaning, open to discovery, interpretation, application, criticism, development and change. But what sort of meaning does the law possess? Legal theory provides three sorts of answers. The first portrays the law as a mode of communication through which law-makers convey certain standards or norms to the larger community. The law's meaning is that imparted by its authors. On this view, law is a vehicle, conveying a message from a speaker to an intended (...) audience. The second theory portrays the law as a mode of interpretation, whereby judges, officials, and ordinary citizens make decisions about how the law applies in various practical contexts. The law's meaning is that furnished by its interpreters. According to this theory, law is a receptacle into which decision-makers pour meaning. The third viewpoint argues that these theories, while not altogether wrong, are incomplete because they downplay or ignore the autonomous meaning that the law itself possesses. This theory suggests that the law is basically a mode of participation, whereby legislators, judges, officials, and ordinary people attune themselves to an autonomous field of legal meaning. The law's meaning is grounded in a body of social practice which is independent of both the law's authors and its interpreters and which is infused with basic values and principles that transcend the practice. On this view, law is the emblem of meaning that lies beyond it. -/- Elements of all three theories are present in H.L.A. Hart's influential work, The Concept of Law, which attempts to fuse them into a single, all-encompassing theory. Nevertheless, as we will argue here, the attempt is not successful. Any true reconciliation of the communication and interpretation theories can only take place within the framework of a fully developed participation theory. In the early stages of his work, Hart lays the foundation for such a theory. However, his failure to elaborate it in a thoroughgoing way renders the work incomplete and ultimately unbalanced. As we will see, there is something to be learned from this failure. (shrink)

The thrust of this paper addresses how the notion of an author relates to the authority of a law. Drawing from the legal thought of Hobbes, Bentham, and John Austin, the Paper offers a sense of the author as a distinct institutional source of the state. The Paper then addresses the more difficult legal theories in this context: those of HLA Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Hans Kelsen. The clue to the latter as well as the earlier theorists is a presupposed (...) inaccessible author or ghost. The presupposed ghost of the law is crucial to the binding character of a law. (shrink)

Fac simile of documents [mostly letters & dedications] from & to FELIX SOMLÓ (1873–1918) (including by Leonidas Pitamic and Adolf Merkl, among others) & JULIUS MOÓR (1888–1950) (including by M. Stockhammer, Wilhelm Sauer, Karl Petraschek, among others), followed by HANS KELSEN’s Selbstbiographie [February 1927] (15–22 w/ letter, 23) & ILMAR TAMMELO’s only surviving copy of his PhD thesis in his own translation on Kritik zu Prof. Kliimann’s normativistischer Unterscheidung des Privat- und des öffentlichen Rechts [Dorpat, 1942] (63–145), both prepared to (...) the latter; w/ Bibl. & Preface [1995/e] x–xv, as well as documentation in Hungarian on how the Editor could save their rich personal professional library of several thounds volumes and making acquired them by the Library of Parliament in Budapest as its special collection in Anhang (147–156); Personenverzeichnis. (shrink)

{texts from Western & Eastern Marxism} Introduction xiii–xxvii; ORIGINS L. S. MAMUT ‘Questions of Law in Marx’s Capital’ [1968] 3–10, PETER SCHÖTTLER ‘Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky as Critics of »Legal Socialism«’ [1986] 11–42, WILLIAM LEON MCBRIDE ‘The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels, and Others’ [1975] 43–57; BOUNDARIES WILLIAM LEON MCBRIDE ‘Marxism and Natural Law’ [1970] 61–87, ZDRAVKO GREBO ‘»Kelsenism« and Marxism’ [1985] 89–107, KÁLMÁN KULCSÁR ‘The Historical Concept in the Science of Law of the XXth Century’ [1963] 109–148; (...) TRENDS EUGENE KAMENKA ‘A Marxist Theory of Law?’ [1983] 151–177, R. WARRINGTON ‘Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory’ [1981] 179–200, EUGENE KAMENKA ‘Lukács and Law’ [1987] [= books1981/review] 201–208, MICHAEL JAWORSKYJ ‘Soviet Critique of the »Bourgeois« Philosophy of Law’ [1960] 209–232, RICHARD KINSEY ‘Marxism and the Law: Preliminary Analyses’ [1978] 233–258; CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IMRE SZABÓ ‘The Notion of Law’ [1976] 261–270, WIESLAW LANG ‘Law and Morality from a Marxist Point of View’ [1976] 271–286, JERZY KOWALSKI ‘Idea of Equality and the Law’ [1985] 287–291, JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI ‘Problems of Legality in Marxist Theory’ [1976] 293–311, CSABA VARGA ‘Rationality and the Objectification of Laws’ [1975/d] 313–338, LI CHANGDAO ‘The Old Law Cannot Be Critically Inherited, It Can Only Be Used as a Mirror’ [1980] 339–343; PERSPECTIVES FOR SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS IMRE SZABÓ ‘The Social Limits of Law’ [1972] 347–359, CSABA VARGA ‘Towards a Sociological Concept of Law: An Analysis of Lukács’ Ontology’ [1981/a] 361–378, STEVEN SPITZER ‘Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology of Law’ [1983] 379–400, PETER FITZPATRICK ‘Marxism and Legal Pluralism’ [1983] 401–415; LAW AND IDEOLOGY KÁLMÁN KULCSÁR ‘Ideological Changes and the Legal Structure: A Discussion of Socialist Experience’ [1980] 419–439, ALAN HUNT ‘The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law’ [1985] 441–467, ALAN STONE ‘The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure–Superstructure Archetype’ [1985] 469–497; FINAL ACCOUNT CSABA VARGA ‘Liberty, Equality and the Conceptual Minimum of Legal Mediation’ [1989/a] 501–523; w/ Name Index. (shrink)