What we call the Hilbert‐Bernays (HB) Theorem establishes that for any satisfiable first‐order quantificational schema S, there are expressions of elementary arithmetic that yield a true sentence of arithmetic when they are substituted for the predicate letters in S. Our goals here are, first, to explain and defend W. V. Quine's claim that the HB theorem licenses us to define the first‐order logical validity of a schema in terms of predicate substitution; second, to clarify the theorem by sketching an accessible (...) and illuminating new proof of it; and, third, to explain how Quine's substitutional definition of logical notions can be modified and extended in ways that make it more attractive to contemporary logicians. (shrink)

As grandes epidemias de peste que atingiram ao longo de muitos séculos os ingleses, refletiram mudanças importantes para os conhecimentos de cada período histórico. Esse artigo busca unir duas extremidades de um decorrer de grandes catástrofes epidemiológicas na Inglaterra, com um olhar especial à populosa Londres, começando com a primeira entrada da peste bubônica na cidade, em 1348, e seu provável último grande surto, em 1665. Os dois episódios tocados aqui são apresentados sob a perspectiva das novidades, semelhanças e diferenças (...) entre essas duas pontas da história, passando pelas novas respostas da medicina no século XIV e os princípios de uma ‘aritmética política’ no século XVII. Para esse fim, são de extrema importância diferentes fontes, como as inúmeras cópias do tratado médico de John de Burdeaux, escritos a partir de 1390, e o Observations de John Graunt, publicado a partir de 1662. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was unquestionably one of the most important philosophers of all time. He trained as a mathematician, and his work in philosophy started as an attempt to provide an explanation of the truths of arithmetic, but in the course of this attempt he not only founded modern logic but also had to address fundamental questions in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Frege is generally seen (along with Russell and Wittgenstein) as one of the fathers of the (...) analytic method, which dominated philosophy in English-speaking countries for most of the twentieth century. His work is studied today not just for its historical importance but also because many of his ideas are still seen as relevant to current debates in the philosophies of logic, language, mathematics and the mind. The Cambridge Companion to Frege provides a route into this lively area of research. (shrink)

Estudos recentes vêm revisando a composição da literatura que, ao longo do século XVIII serviu como base às ciências em território britânico. Segundo esses estudos, os seiscentistas de fala inglesa dedicaram-se a duas linhagens de texto, originadas em concepções de ciência muito distintas. Uma dessas linhagens tinha como fonte principal a antiga “literatura do segredo” que incluía desde velhos e sigilosos manuais de ofício até os milenares e proibidos tratados de hermética, literatura antes reservada a poucos. Diferente dessa, a outra (...) ]inhagem de textos surgia como um direto da proposta baconiana para a nova ciência: um saber elaborado por muitos e ao alcance de todos. Exemplos conhecidos dessa linhagem são os livros de divulgação utilizados pelos comenianos ingleses ou mesmo os relatórios, atas e memórias das sociedades científicas, geradores dos primeiros embriões de periódicos dedicados às ciências. Todavia, sob essa aparente contraposição das duas linhagens, há indícios de um profícuo diálogo - expresso sobretudo na correspondência e diários pensadores da época. (shrink)

Bill New's (1999) thoughtful paper has performed the valuable service of clarifying the meaning and the policy implications of paternalism. His careful formulation delimits the domain of justified state paternalism. Having argued successfully, in our view, for a narrow ambit, New proceeds to identify situations that justify paternalism. This comment is written in the spirit of a friendly reformulation that refines and improves the specification of when paternalism is justified. Our argument is two-fold. First, we argue that New's formulation, properly (...) understood, will not readily permit the paternalistic interventions he argues are justified. Second, we identify a class of potentially justified interventions that have paternalistic aspects, but which are neither strictly paternalistic nor market-failure remedies. (shrink)

This text provides a straightforward, lively but rigorous, introduction to truth-functional and predicate logic, complete with lucid examples and incisive exercises, for which Warren Goldfarb is renowned.

Given the extraordinary influence of the DSM-III and its successors, the DSM-III-R and the DSM-IV, it behooves humanistically oriented practitioners to appraise these new manuals most carefully. Toward this end, we discuss the goals that have guided the manuals' development and provide an overview of their basic structure. This is followed by a phenomenologically based critique, evaluating the claim that these manuals are "descriptive" and "atheoretical." We conclude with a discussion of five guiding principles for phenomenological diagnosis and assessment.

The philosopher Rudolf Carnap, although not himself an originator of mathematical advances in logic, was much involved in the development of the subject. He was the most important and deepest philosopher of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, or, to use the label Carnap later preferred, logical empiricists. It was Carnap who gave the most fully developed and sophisticated form to the linguistic doctrine of logical and mathematical truth: the view that the truths of mathematics and logic do not describe (...) some Platonistic realm, but rather are artifacts of the way we establish a language in which to speak of the factual, empirical world, fallouts of the representational capacity of language. Carnap was also the thinker who, after Russell, most emphasized the importance of modern logic, and the distinctive advances it enables in the foundations of mathematics, to contemporary philosophy. It was through Carnap's urgings, abetted by Hans Hahn, once Carnap arrived in Vienna as Privatdozent in philosophy in 1926, that the Vienna Circle began to take logic seriously and that positivist philosophy began to grapple with the question of how an account of mathematics compatible with empiricism can be given.A particular facet of Carnap's influence is not widely appreciated: it was Carnap who introduced Kurt Gödel to logic, in the serious sense. Although Gödel seems to have attended a course of Schlick's on philosophy of mathematics in 1925–26, his second year at the University, he did not at that time pursue logic further, nor did the seminar leave much of a trace on him. In the early summer of 1928, however, Carnap gave two lectures to the Circle which Gödel attended, or so I surmise. At these occasions, Carnap presented material from his manuscript treatise, Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik, that is, “Investigations into general axiomatics”, which dealt with questions of consistency, completeness and categoricity. Carnap later circulated this material to various people including Gödel. (shrink)