In this paper I wish to set forth as plainly and simply as possible a theory of the good which finds little modern vogue, but which nevertheless seems to me more plausible than any of those now current. The perfection theory of the good can claim weighty historical roots, especially in Plato and Aristotle; but I shall proceed systematically rather than historically. The exposition of the theory will be presented in three parts: first, a statement of a generic definition of (...) perfection; second, an attempt to give more specific content to the definition; and third, an indication of my reasons for upholding the truth of the theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Hermeneutical Turn in American Critical Theory, 1830–1860M. D. WalhoutLong considered an obscure province of biblical studies, hermeneutics is now familiar territory to American literary critics, along with phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, and the other European theories that have redrawn the map of American criticism in the past twenty-five years. The gradual transformation of hermeneutics into a theory of criticism, and ultimately into a comprehensive theory of the human sciences, (...) was the work of a series of great German thinkers, including Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. These figures were introduced (or reintroduced) to American critics by E. D. Hirsch, whose Validity in Interpretation (1967) “shattered,” in the words of Richard E. Palmer, “the splendid isolation of American literary criticism from hermeneutics.” Hailing Schleiermacher and Dilthey as the forefathers of “objective interpretation,” Hirsch dismissed Heidegger and Gadamer as prophets of subjectivism. For his part, Palmer strove to vindicate Heidegger and Gadamer as the true heirs of the hermeneutical tradition. Noting the difference between Hirsch’s understanding of hermeneutics and theirs, Palmer concluded,So the hermeneutical debate goes on. On the one side are the defenders of objectivity and validation, who look to hermeneutics as the theoretical source for norms of validation; on the other side are the phenomenologists of the event of understanding, who stress the historical character of this “event,” and consequently the limitations of all claims to “objective knowledge” and “validity.” 1Twenty-five years later this hermeneutical debate is still going on. [End Page 683]What Hirsch and Palmer did not realize is that they were reviving a debate over the nature of interpretation that dated from the late nineteenth century, when American literary criticism was undergoing professionalization. 2 As early as 1885, in the programmatic introduction to his book on Shakespeare as a dramatic artist, Richard G. Moulton had declared, “In the treatment of literature the proposition which seems to stand most in need of assertion at the present moment is, that there is an inductive science of literary criticism.” Moulton proceeded to lay down “a foundation axiom of inductive literary criticism: Interpretation in literature is of the nature of a scientific hypothesis, the truth of which is tested by the degree of completeness with which it explains the details of the literary work as they actually stand.” 3 Thirty years later Moulton repeated this axiom, insisting that “such inductive treatment constitutes the very alphabet of science.” 4 But Moulton’s determination to apply the logic of the natural sciences to the interpretation of literature was not without its critics. In 1900 the German-born philologist Julius Goebel began a valiant, if futile, effort to introduce the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey to his American colleagues. 5 Years later, in an article published in The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, Goebel drew on Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutik und Kritik (1838) to show “the possibility of attaining exact knowledge in the mental sciences without the aid of the scientific or laboratory methods.” 6 Later still, in an article on Dilthey published in the same journal, Goebel recalled how he had argued in an address to the Modern Language Association that criticism “had lost touch with the contemporary movements emphasizing the independence and importance of the mental sciences. What seemed to me needed above all was a reform of the method of interpretation for which Dilthey had set the example both in principle and practice.” 7 It was not until the late 1960s that Goebel’s project was finally revived.While Goebel may have been the first American literary scholar to use the word “hermeneutics,” the concept of interpretation had long been a part of American critical theory. In fact, what might be called the “hermeneutical turn” in American critical theory occurred well before the era of professionalization. [End Page 684] In order to trace this turn, we must recover the work of the amateur critical theorists of the antebellum era, including such forgotten figures as George Allen and Edwin Percy Whipple. Disciples of the Schlegels and Coleridge, these amateur theorists established the basic premises of the hermeneutical turn: that criticism is a science; that the critic must “reproduce” the author’s creative process; that... (shrink)

No satisfactory answers were received for the following questions.

The largest part of the book consists of analyses of the fundamental types of moral judgment. This section is preceded by a chapter on methodology in ethics, and the last two chapters discuss the nature and resolution of moral controversies. It will be convenient to divide the subsequent exposition according to this threefold division.

I offer an argument for the claim that there is a transcendent dimension in music. The argument begins with one offered by Augustine in the De Musica, and adds additional support from contemporary discussions in musicology.

2. Normative judgments express a standard that we are obliged to follow if we wish to think or act correctly.

: This article introduces a little-known woman philosopher, Julia Gulliver, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following a biographical sketch, the article discusses four illustrations of Gulliver's philosophical work. These illustrations deal with freedom and determinism, philosophy of religion, democracy, and philosophy of education. A concluding estimate of Gulliver's legacy suggests that her significance lies mainly in her applied philosophy and in her leadership as a philosophically-minded educator.

This article introduces a little-known woman philosopher, Julia Gulliver, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fottowing a biographical sketch, the article discusses four illustrations of Gulliver's philosophical work. These illustrations deal with freedom and determinism, philosophy of religion, democracy, and philosophy of education. A concluding estimate of Gulliver's legacy suggests that her significance lies mainly in her applied philosophy and in her leadership as a philosophically-minded educator.

Not only are there many particular relationships among religions to be explored, but there are many types of relationships or categories of relationships to be considered. As examples of these types we might mention historical, metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, sociological, or theological relationships without in any way being exhaustive. The prominence of some of these concerns has limited the attention given to other actual or possible relationships. For example, there has been an understandable, even justifiable, prominence given to historical relationships for (...) the sake of accurate fact, to theological relationships for the purpose of clarifying how to think of other religions from a received confessional norm, and to ethical relationships for the sake of judging practical accomplishments and superiorities. (shrink)

2. How do moral judgments "describe"? This question is raised by Messrs. Blanshard and Terrell. The judgment "You ought to do this" would be translated by the emotivist as "I approve...," by the sociological relativist as "Society approves...," and by the "non-naturalist" as "There is an unanalyzable quality of ought..." All three of these statements are descriptive in emphasis. I do not agree with any of these views, but I use them to illustrate how common it is to think of (...) moral judgments as also descriptive. In general we may say that moral judgments enjoin a demand, which is a relation between the person obligated and whatever obligates him. The moral judgment asserts that this relation exists and is therefore descriptive in that sense. (shrink)

Before we can approach an answer we need to distinguish various meanings of the question and determine what the ultimate question is. In doing this it will be necessary first to analyze some of the principal terms in the question, particularly the terms "I," "why," and "moral.".