In this follow up to The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, Peter L. P. Simpson centers his attention on the basics of Aristotelian moral doctrine as found in the Great Ethics: the definition of happiness, the nature and kind of the virtues, pleasure, and friendship. This work's authenticity is disputed, but Simpson argues that all the evidence favors it. Unlike the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle wrote the Great Ethics for a popular audience. It gives us insight less into Aristotle the (...) theoretician than into Aristotle the pedagogue. For this reason, the Great Ethics has distinct advantages as an introduction to Aristotelian ethical thinking: it is simpler and clearer in its argumentation, matters such as the intellectual virtues are made suitably secondary to the practical focus, the moral virtues come through with a pleasing directness, and the work's syllogistic formalism gives it a transparency and accessibility that the other Ethics typically lack. Arius' Epitome, which relies heavily on this work, helps confirm its value and authenticity. Because the Great Ethics is generally neglected by scholars, less has been done to clear up its obscurities or to expose its structure. But to ignore it is to lose another and more instructive way of approaching and appreciating Aristotle's teaching. The translation is prefaced by an analytic outline of the whole, and the several sections of it are prefaced by brief summaries. The commentary supplies fuller descriptions and analyses, sorting out puzzles, removing misunderstandings, and resolving doubts of meaning and intention. This book is a fresh rendition of the work of the preeminent philosopher of all time. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001712129; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 207-225.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 222-225.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

I perform an economic and ethical analysis on wealth and income inequality. Economists have performed many statistical studies that reveal a number of, often contradictory, findings in connection with the distribution of wealth and income. Hence, the statistical findings leave us with no better knowledge of the effects that inequality has on economic progress. At the same time, the existing theoretical results have not provided us with a definitive answer concerning the effects of inequality on progress. By gaining knowledge of (...) the nature of inequality, and bringing basic economic principles to bear on the subject, we can come to an understanding of what the causal relationship is between inequality and economic progress. Furthermore, I apply a new theory of ethics – rational egoism – to assess economic inequality. I show that, in the right context, economic inequality is both economically and morally desirable. (shrink)

Among the works on ethics in the Aristotelian corpus, there is no serious dispute among scholars that the "Eudemian Ethics "is authentic. The "Eudemian Ethics "is" "increasingly read and used by scholars as a useful support and confirmation and sometimes contrast to the "Nicomachean Ethics." Yet, it remains a largely neglected work in the study of Aristotle's ethics, both among scholars and moral philosophers. Peter L. P. Simpson provides an analytical outline of the entire work together with summaries of each (...) individual section, making the overall structure and detailed argument clear. His translation and explanatory notes include the common books that the "Eudemian" "Ethics" shares with the "Nicomachean." This translation contains renderings of words and phrases, and proposals for emending the text that differ from what other translators and scholars have adopted. This translation is literal, without expansion or paraphrase, and yet also readable. A readable but literal translation is necessary because in the "Eudemian Ethics," more than usual in Aristotle's writings, the logic of the argumentation can turn on the peculiar wording or order. Simpson explains the argumentation where necessary in notes and separate explanatory comments. This book is a fresh, twenty-first-century rendition of the work of one of the most eminent philosophers of all time. (shrink)

Pope John Paul II's opposition to the Iraq War was not that it failed to meet the conditions of Just War Theory. Indeed, we cannot tell from what he publicly said whether he thought it met those conditions or not, for he would have opposed it in any case. His thinking was rather that even just and necessary wars always come, as it were, too late, and are never able to solve the problems that made wars just and necessary. He (...) was not trying therefore to enter into the details of Just War Theory. He wanted to subsume the principles of war into the principles of peace and to do so, not by denying justice, but by transcending it with charity. This article shows how this thinking is to be understood and the many means the Pope devised for putting this thinking into practice. (shrink)

Background: People with traumatic brain injury face a range of mental health challenges during the adjustment process post-injury, but access to treatment can be difficult, particularly for those who live in regional and remote regions. eHealth provides the potential to improve access to evidence-based psychological therapy for people with a severe TBI. The aim of the current study is to assess the efficacy of a psychological intervention delivered via video consulting to reduce psychological distress in people with TBI.Methods: This paper (...) outlines the protocol for a multi-center, three-arm, parallel, non-inferiority randomized controlled trial of an evidence-based manualized psychological intervention, ACT-Adjust. ACT-Adjust provides nine sessions for adults with a moderate to severe TBI experiencing clinical levels of psychological distress. Fifty-six participants referred from Brain Injury Rehabilitation Units across New South Wales and the NSW icare scheme will be randomly allocated to three conditions; video consulting, face-to-face and, a waitlist control.Discussion: This is the first RCT to evaluate the efficacy of a psychological therapy delivered via video consulting for individuals with a moderate to severe TBI.Trial Registration:www.anzctr.org.au, Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ANZCTRN2619001602112. (shrink)

Aristotle's Ethica Eudemia Book 2 Chapter 2 contains, at lines 1220b10–11, a well-known crux in the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις. The context makes clear that Aristotle is using this phrase to refer to some writing or other, but scholars have been puzzled both about what the phrase means and what writing it refers to.

Aristotle's Ethica Eudemia and Ethica Nicomachea, as is well known and much discussed, contain three books in common. Less well known, at least until Dieter Harlfinger alerted scholars to the fact in 1971, is that some of the manuscripts of Eth. Eud. do, contrary to the then prevailing consensus, contain the text of these common books. Even less well known is that Harlfinger's discovery was anticipated some 50 years before by Walter Ashburner, who had uncovered this fact about Eth. Eud. (...) MSS in the Laurentian library of Florence. Ashburner's anticipation of Harlfinger, however, is not the real value of his article. Its value rather is that it contains collations of readings for the common books, and thereby gives us an excellent resource for examining the text of the common books as this text is contained in exclusively Eth. Eud. MSS. The Eth. Eud. tradition of the common books has hitherto received little attention. Modern editions of Eth. Eud. do not include these books, and editions of Eth. Nic. have other MSS for the purpose. Ashburner's collations are the more valuable because they are taken from the one MS that, in Harlfinger's learned stemma, appears as the archetype for all the rest. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian corpus of writings as it has come down to us, there are four works specifically on ethics: the Nicomachean ethics, the Eudemian ethics, the Magna moralia ( or Great ethics) and the short On virtues and vices. Scholars are now agreed that the first two are genuinely by Aristotle and most also believe that the Nicomachean is the later and better of the two. About the Magna moralia, there is still a division of opinion, though probably most (...) scholars hold that it is not genuine, Those who hold it is genuine suppose it to be an early work or a redaction of an early work made by a later Peripatetic. As for On virtues and vices almost everyone holds it to be a spurious work written some two centuries after Aristotle's death. However the arguments scholars give for these opinions are entirely unconvincing. In fact, they beg the question by assuming the conclusion in order to prove the conclusion. My own contention is that all the hard evidence we have compels us to conclude that all of these works are definitely by Aristotle but that they dffer not by time of writing, as scholars universally suppose, but by audience and purpose. In brief, the Nicormachean and Eudemian ethics are writings internal to Aristotle's School with the Nicomachen being directed to legislators and the Eudemian to philosophers. The Magna moralia ls an exoteric work meant for those outside the school. On virtues and vices is a collection of endoxa, or common and received opinions about virtues, perhaps meant as a handbook for young students but also for use in philosophical analysis. It is almost certainly referred to as such by a cryptic remark in the Eudemian ethics. (shrink)

The text of Aristotle'sEthica Eudemia is often in need of emendation, especially because of the particular fault in the manuscripts of misreading one letter for another or misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in correcting many of these errors, but more needs to be done. A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or grammar, but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, as scholars have noted, theEEis marked (...) by considerable compression of thought, and this compression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration, it can be shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed. (shrink)

Let $\mathcal{P}_w$ be the lattice of Muchnik degrees of nonempty $\Pi^0_1$ subsets of $2^\omega$. The lattice $\mathcal{P}$ has been studied extensively in previous publications. In this note we prove that the lattice $\mathcal{P}$ is not Brouwerian.

A mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if for all Y ∈ Q there exists X ∈ P such that X is Turing reducible to Y. A weak degree is an equivalence class of mass problems under mutual weak reducibility. Let [Formula: see text] be the lattice of weak degrees of mass problems associated with nonempty [Formula: see text] subsets of the Cantor (...) space. The lattice [Formula: see text] has been studied in previous publications. The purpose of this paper is to show that [Formula: see text] partakes of hyperarithmeticity. We exhibit a family of specific, natural degrees in [Formula: see text] which are indexed by the ordinal numbers less than [Formula: see text] and which correspond to the hyperarithmetical hierarchy. Namely, for each [Formula: see text], let hα be the weak degree of 0, the αth Turing jump of 0. If p is the weak degree of any mass problem P, let p* be the weak degree of the mass problem P* = {Y | ∃X ⊆ BLR )} where BLR is the set of functions which are boundedly limit recursive in X. Let 1 be the top degree in [Formula: see text]. We prove that all of the weak degrees [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text], are distinct and belong to [Formula: see text]. In addition, we prove that certain index sets associated with [Formula: see text] are [Formula: see text] complete. (shrink)

We initiate the reverse mathematics of general topology. We show that a certain metrization theorem is equivalent to Π2 1 comprehension. An MF space is defined to be a topological space of the form MF(P) with the topology generated by $\lbrace N_p \mid p \in P \rbrace$ . Here P is a poset, MF(P) is the set of maximal filters on P, and $N_p = \lbrace F \in MF(P) \mid p \in F \rbrace$ . If the poset P is countable, (...) the space MF(P) is said to be countably based. The class of countably based MF spaces can be defined and discussed within the subsystem ACA0 of second order arithmetic. One can prove within ACA0 that every complete separable metric space is homeomorphic to a countably based MF space which is regular. We show that the converse statement, "every countably based MF space which is regular is homeomorphic to a complete separable metric space," is equivalent to Π2 1-CA0. The equivalence is proved in the weaker system Π1 1-CA0. This is the first example of a theorem of core mathematics which is provable in second order arithmetic and implies Π2 1 comprehension. (shrink)

We initiate the reverse mathematics of general topology. We show that a certain metrization theorem is equivalent to Π12 comprehension. An MF space is defined to be a topological space of the form MF with the topology generated by {Np ∣ p ϵ P}. Here P is a poset, MF is the set of maximal filters on P, and Np = {F ϵ MF ∣ p ϵ F }. If the poset P is countable, the space MF is said to (...) be countably based. The class of countably based MF spaces can be defined and discussed within the subsystem ACA0 of second order arithmetic. One can prove within ACA0 that every complete separable metric space is homeomorphic to a countably based MF space which is regular. We show that the converse statement, “every countably based MF space which is regular is homeomorphic to a complete separable metric space,” is equivalent to. The equivalence is proved in the weaker system. This is the first example of a theorem of core mathematics which is provable in second order arithmetic and implies Π12 comprehension. (shrink)

A mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P. We say that P is strongly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P via a fixed Turing functional. The weak degrees and strong degrees are the equivalence classes of mass problems under weak and strong reducibility, respectively. We (...) focus on the countable distributive lattices P w and P s of weak and strong degrees of mass problems given by nonempty Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω . Using an abstract Gödel/Rosser incompleteness property, we characterize the Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω whose associated mass problems are of top degree in P w and P s , respectively. Let R be the set of Turing oracles which are random in the sense of Martin-Löf, and let r be the weak degree of R. We show that r is a natural intermediate degree within P w . Namely, we characterize r as the unique largest weak degree of a Π 1 0 subset of 2 ω of positive measure. Within P w we show that r is meet irreducible, does not join to 1, and is incomparable with all weak degrees of nonempty thin perfect Π 1 0 subsets of 2 ω . In addition, we present other natural examples of intermediate degrees in P w . We relate these examples to reverse mathematics, computational complexity, and Gentzen-style proof theory. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski argues, contra Howard Sankey, that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true. In this short reply, I’ll agree with Grzankowski that to believe that p isn’t to believe that p is true, and I’ll argue that Sankey’s recent response to Grzankowski is inadequate as it stands. However, it’ll be my contention that Grzankowski’s argument doesn’t demonstrate that believing that p doesn’t require taking it to be the case (...) that p. (shrink)

We examine the concept of almost everywhere domination from the viewpoint of mass problems. Let AED and MLR be the sets of reals which are almost everywhere dominating and Martin-Löf random, respectively. Let b1, b2, and b3 be the degrees of unsolvability of the mass problems associated with AED, MLR × AED, and MLR ∩ AED, respectively. Let [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w be the lattice of degrees of unsolvability of mass problems associated with nonempty Π01 subsets of 2ω. Let 1 (...) and 0 be the top and bottom elements of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w. We show that inf, inf, and inf belong to [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w and 0 < inf < inf < inf < 1. Under the natural embedding of the recursively enumerable Turing degrees into [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]w, we show that inf and inf but not inf are comparable with some recursively enumerable Turing degrees other than 0 and 0′. In order to make this paper more self-contained, we exposit the proofs of some recent theorems due to Hirschfeldt, Miller, Nies, and Stephan. (shrink)

Couched in Death: Klinai and Identity in Anatolia and Beyond. By Elizabeth P. Baughan. Wisconsin Studies in Classics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013. Pp. xvii + 487, illus. $65.

Pursuing the proof-theoretic program of Friedman and Simpson, we begin the study of the metamathematics of countable linear orderings by proving two main results. Over the weak base system consisting of arithmetic comprehension, II 1 1 -CA0 is equivalent to Hausdorff's theorem concerning the canonical decomposition of countable linear orderings into a sum over a dense or singleton set of scattered linear orderings. Over the same base system, ATR0 is equivalent to a version of the Continuum Hypothesis for linear orderings, (...) which states that every countable linear ordering either has countably many or continuum many Dedekind cuts. (shrink)

This article identifies both prudence and antiprudence as options for rational people. Building upon Wiggins's "sensible subjectivism," the account offers an analysis of prudential emotions which are not rationally required but whose reasonableness need not be doubted. One result is that skepticism about prudence is avoidable. Another, as shown through examination of some of Parfit's worries about replication, is that prudence is autonomous from metaphysical theories of persons. It is also autonomous from morality, neither prudence nor morality being appropriately subordinated (...) to the other in a theory of rational choice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Participation and Immersion in Walton and CalvinoM. Carleton SimpsonThe novel begins in a railway station, a locomotive huffs, steam from a piston covers the opening of the chapter, a cloud of smoke hides part of the first paragraph... The pages of the book are clouded like the windows of an old train, the cloud of smoke rests on the sentences.1Part of Kendall Walton's theory of psychological participation, explicated in (...) Mimesis as Make-Believe, is that representations that display or draw attention to their fictionality discourage participation; part of our enjoyment of representational art is our psychological participation with the representation. The activity of participating comprises the game world, while the material representation comprises the work world. We play games of make-believe with representations, much as children play games with toys or other props. For Walton, the fullest psychological participation arises from the fullest immersion in the game world. Immersion means ignoring or being unaware of the materiality of the work world, attending only to the fictional reality of the work world. It is to "look past" the painted surface, or to become engrossed in the novel's narrative.To the extent that we consider the material of the work, we are distracted from participating in the game prescribed by the work: we do either the one or the other. So, Walton claims "One obvious way in which works sometimes discourage participation is by prominently declaring or displaying their fictionality, betraying their own pretense" (p. 275).2 For example, "The conspicuous brush strokes of Van Gogh's Starry Night call attention to themselves and to their record of the process by which paint was applied to the canvas, possibly intruding on the viewer's participation in his game... One can ignore the brush [End Page 321] strokes enough to lose oneself in the fictional world" (p. 277). In response to prodding by Patrick Maynard, Walton tempers this position: "Prominent brush strokes, as in many of Vincent van Gogh's paintings, can have an inhibiting effect, especially if the observer isn't used to such. Then they not only constitute a plain indication that what one is seeing is a mere painted canvas, but force this fact on the viewer's attention" (italics added).3Ernst Gombrich endorsed this position in Art and Illusion, attributing it to Kenneth Clark.4 Gombrich tells of Clark attempting to see both the brush strokes and the representation, and his failure to "observe what went on when the brush strokes and dabs of pigment on the canvas transformed themselves into a vision of transfigured reality as he stepped back" (p. 6). Walton intends his theory of psychological participation to be widely applicable to the representational arts; he argues that what holds for visual representations holds also for verbal representations. When reading a novel our ability to participate in the story is diminished to the extent the novel draws attention to its fictionality. We either immerse ourselves in the fictional world of the novel or attend to the historical production or materiality of the novel.Attending is contained in Walton's notion of appreciation. Appreciation without participation results when some representations "positively discourage participation, especially the psychological participation that would constitute the experience of being caught up in the story" (p. 274). Works like these employ a variety of strategies, "deliberately 'distancing' the appreciator from the fictional world... For if one does not imagine a proposition, it is unlikely to be fictional that one knows or believes it; and if one imagines it with minimal vivacity, one is unlikely to have the experience of fictionally being concerned or upset or relieved or frightened or overjoyed by the fact that it is true" (p. 274). Just as children imagine themselves to be participants in games of make-believe, more mature imaginings require us to imagine we are participants, not simply observers. Reflexive imagining is central to Walton's theory, and is a point he extensively develops.I argue against this disjunction of activities. My thesis is that participation need not arise from immersion at the expense of awareness. I am also critical of Walton's distinction between appreciation and participation—they are... (shrink)

In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty:1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e.2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain.3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p epistemically certain. I’ll argue that premise 2 of Mizrahi’s argument is false, and (...) so Mizrahi’s argument is unsound. (shrink)

Fallibilism is typically taken to face a problem from the apparent infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions. CKAs are of the form: “S knows that p, but it’s possible that q,” where q obviously entails not-p. CKAs sound to the ears of many philosophers as contradictory or infelicitous. But CKAs look to be overt statements of fallibilism, since if S fallibly knows that p, then she can’t properly rule out some possibility in which not-p. Do fallibilists, then, have some way of (...) explaining the seeming infelicity of CKAs that doesn’t impugn the truth of fallibilism? Fallibilists think so. In this connection, there are two well-known responses to the problem: Patrick Rysiew’s pragmatic strategy and Jason Stanley’s semantic strategy. While both strategies have real virtues, there are aspects of each strategy that face certain complications. In this paper, I’ll outline those complications and I’ll develop some remedies to them. The aim of this paper will be to show that the challenge posed by CKAs isn’t a grave problem at all. In particular, I’ll argue that if the semantic strategy fails because CKAs really are overt statements of fallibilism, then there’s good reason to think that the pragmatic strategy succeeds, but if the pragmatic strategy fails because CKAs are obviously false or aren’t overt statements of fallibilism, then the semantic strategy succeeds. Thus, I’ll conclude that the problem for fallibilism posed by CKAs isn’t a grave problem at all. (shrink)

This paper investigates aspects of measure and randomness in the context of locale theory . We prove that every measure μ, on the σ-frame of opens of a fitted σ-locale X, extends to a measure on the lattice of all σ-sublocales of X . Furthermore, when μ is a finite measure with μ=M, the σ-locale X has a smallest σ-sublocale of measure M . In particular, when μ is a probability measure, X has a smallest σ-sublocale of measure 1. All (...) σ prefixes can be dropped from these statements whenever X is a strongly Lindelöf locale, as is the case in the following applications. When μ is the Lebesgue measure on the Euclidean space Rn, Theorem 1 produces an isometry-invariant measure that, via the inclusion of the powerset P in the lattice of sublocales, assigns a weight to every subset of Rn. When μ is the uniform probability measure on Cantor space {0,1}ω, the smallest measure-1 sublocale, given by Theorem 2, provides a canonical locale of random sequences, where randomness means that all probabilistic laws are satisfied. (shrink)

This proposes a new theory of Quantum measurement; a state reduction theory in which reduction is to the elements of the number operator basis of a system, triggered by the occurrence of annihilation or creation (or lowering or raising) operators in the time evolution of a system. It is from these operator types that the acronym ‘LARC’ is derived. Reduction does not occur immediately after the trigger event; it occurs at some later time with probability P t per unit time, (...) where P t is very small. Localisation of macroscopic objects occurs in the natural way: photons from an illumination field are reflected off a body and later absorbed by another body. Each possible absorption of a photon by a molecule in the second body generates annihilation and raising operators, which in turn trigger a probability per unit time P t of a state reduction into the number operator basis for the photon field and the number operator basis of the electron orbitals of the molecule. Since all photons in the illumination field have come from the location of the first body, wherever that is, a single reduction leads to a reduction of the position state of the first body relative to the second, with a total probability of mP t , where m is the number of photon absorption events. Unusually for a reduction theory, the larc theory is naturally relativistic. (shrink)

Fergus Kelly: Thinking in Threes: The Triad in Early Irish Literature Brian Pullan: Charity and Usury: Jewish and Christian Lending in Renaissance and Early Modern Italy Noel Malcolm: The Crescent and the City of the Sun: Islam and the Renaissance Utopia of Tommaso Campanella H. R. Woudhuysen: The Foundations of Shakespeare's Text J. G. A. Pocock: The Re-Description of Enlightenment Andrew Hadfield: Michael Drayton and the Burden of History Eric Foner: Abraham Lincoln: The Great Emancipator? Gillian Beer: Revenants and Migrants: (...) Hardy, Butler, Woolf and Sebald Stephen Banfield: Scholarship and the Musical: Reclaiming Jerome Kern Brian Simpson: The Rule of Law in International Affairs Christopher Bayly: 'The Nation Within': British India at War 1939-47 John Vickers: Economics for Consumer Policy Gillian Feeley-Harnik: The Geography of Descent Susan Gathercole: Working Memory and Learning During the School Years Lothar Ledderose: Carving Stone Sutras before the World Ends: The Inscription of 1118 CE at Cloud Dwelling Monastery near Beijing. (shrink)

Margaret Reynolds: The Child in Poetry Ken Binmore: The Origins of Fair Play James Simpson: Bonjour Paresse: Waste and Recycling in Book 4 of Gower's Confessio Amantis Ian Hacking: Kinds of People: Moving Targets Adam Smith: Nation and Covenant: The Contribution of Ancient Israel to Modern Nationalism Louise Daston: The Marquis de Condorcet and the Meaning of Enlightenment R J Evans: Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany Robert Douglas-Fairhurst: A E Housman's Rejected Addresses Bernard Bailyn: The Search for Perfection: Atlantic (...) Dimensions John Stachel: Einstein; Ian Donaldson, Shakespeare, Jonson and the Invention of the Author Neil MacCormick: Judicial Independence: Who Cares? Norman Hammond: Recovering Maya Civilisation Roy Foster: 'Now Shall I Make My Soul': Approaching Death in Yeats's Life and Work Robert Darnton: The Devil in the Holy Water: Political Libel in Eighteenth-Century France. (shrink)

The Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI; Simpson & Gangestad 1991) is a self-report measure of individual differences in human mating strategies. Low SOI scores signify that a person is sociosexually restricted, or follows a more monogamous mating strategy. High SOI scores indicate that an individual is unrestricted, or has a more promiscuous mating strategy. As part of the International Sexuality Description Project (ISDP), the SOI was translated from English into 25 additional languages and administered to a total sample of 14,059 people (...) across 48 nations. Responses to the SOI were used to address four main issues. First, the psychometric properties of the SOI were examined in cross-cultural perspective. The SOI possessed adequate reliability and validity both within and across a diverse range of modern cultures. Second, theories concerning the systematic distribution of sociosexuality across cultures were evaluated. Both operational sex ratios and reproductively demanding environments related in evolutionary-predicted ways to national levels of sociosexuality. Third, sex differences in sociosexuality were generally large and demonstrated cross-cultural universality across the 48 nations of the ISDP, confirming several evolutionary theories of human mating. Fourth, sex differences in sociosexuality were significantly larger when reproductive environments were demanding but were reduced to more moderate levels in cultures with more political and economic gender equality. Implications for evolutionary and social role theories of human sexuality are discussed. Key Words: culture; gender; mating; reproduction; sex differences; sex roles; sexual strategies; sociosexuality. (shrink)

Celebrates a half century of television history, from "The Howdy Doody Show" and "I Love Lucy" to "The Simpsons" and "The Sopranos," and the personalities, shows, and landmark events that changed entertainment history.

We propose an alternative resolution of Simpson's paradox in multiple classification experiments, using a different maximum likelihood estimator. In the center of our analysis is a formal representation of free choice and randomization that is based on the notion of incompatible measurements.We first introduce a representation of incompatible measurements as a collection of sets of outcomes. This leads to a natural generalization of Kolmogoroff's axioms of probability. We then discuss the existence and uniqueness of the maximum likelihood estimator for a (...) probability weight on such a generalized sample space, given absolute frequency data.As a first example, we discuss an estimation problem with censured data that classically admits only biased ad hoc estimators.Next, we derive an explicit solution of the maximum likelihood estimation problem for a large class of experiments that arise from various kids of compositions of sample spaces. We identify the (categorical) direct sum of sample spaces as a representation of “free choice,” and the (categorical) direct product as a representation of “randomization.”Finally, we apply the foregoing discussion to the case of multiple classification experiments in order to show that there is no Simpson's paradox if the difference between free choice and randomization is recognized in the structure of the experiment.A comparison between our new estimator and the “usual” calculation can be summarized as follows: Pooling the data over one classification factor in the “usual” way in fact destroys or ignores the information contained in it, whereas our proposed maximum likelihood estimator is a proper marginal over this factor that “averages out” the information contained in it. The estimators agree with each other in the case of proportional sample sizes. (shrink)