The paper points out the reasons for the substitution of the concept of reason’s striving for the concept of will in J.G. Fichte’s later writings, and particularly in his lectures on the Facts of Consciousness of 1813. In this way, it is possible to rethink R. Lauth’s interpretation, according to which Fichtian philosophizing would reconsider the primacy attributed by modernity to theoretical knowledge and would succeed in constructing a “nova method” philosophy, but would fail to overcome a ‘horizontal’ conception of (...) reason with a view to the formation of a “prima methodo” philosophy. The latter would start, not from the striving-affection correlation, but from the self-clarification of reason according to the task it sets for itself. After an overview of the doctrine of striving in the context of a philosophical exposition nova methodo, (§2) we define how Fichte rethinks it in terms of a will capable of coherently ordering constellations of events and how such ordering underlies an understanding of the world as the horizon of coherent human action (§3). (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo trata da relação entre individualidade e valor, na filosofia transcendental, a partir de uma análise da interpretação da filosofia de J. G. Fichte dada por Emil Lask, no livro publicado em 1903, Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte. O artigo visa a mostrar como a radicalização do transcendentalismo o orienta a um realismo não empírico, o qual impede ao transcendentalismo de realizar-se exclusivamente na forma da investigação autorreflexiva das estruturas da consciência e o traduz em uma valorização da (...) práxis. Depois de uma descrição geral das perspectivas abertas pela filosofia laskiana e das razões para valorizar o Fichte-Buch de Lask, serão esclarecidos os conteúdos e o contexto de amadurecimento da tese laskiana em relação a três interlocutores específicos: Windelband, Rickert e Liebmann. Por fim, serão avaliadas a solidez e a fecundidade de duas questões decisivas para o desenvolvimento do pensamento fichtiano: a relação entre filosofia e vida e aquela entre individualidade e sacrifício.: This paper deals with the relationship between individuality and value in transcendental philosophy based on the analysis of J. G. Fichte’s philosophy by Emil Lask in his 1903 book, Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte. The paper aims to demonstrate how the radicalization of transcendentalism guides it toward a non-empirical realism. It also aims to show how this non-empirical realism prevents transcendentalism from realizing itself exclusively in the form of self-reflexive investigation of the structures of consciousness, and translates it into an appreciation of praxis. After a discussion of Lask’s philosophy in general and of Lask’s Fichte-Buch, I explain the content and development of Lask’s thesis in relation to three specific authors: Windelband, Rickert, and Liebmann. Finally, I analyze two questions that are crucial to the development of Fichtean thought: the relationship between philosophy and life and between individuality and sacrifice. (shrink)

The paper offers an interpretation of the thesis developed by Fichte in the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre following “the philosophy one chooses depends on the man one is” as a deepening of symbolic practices and dispositions that philosophy shares with ordinary consciousness. To support this interpretation, the paper describes how Fichte defines individual character formation and how it relates to a historical determinate is presented through a quick excursion in the Nicolaischrift of 1801 (§2). Through a critical and synthetic (...) view of the process of initiation into philosophy, the paper shows how the choice of philosophy is a choice for philosophy (§ 3) and invests a certain “skill” that is produced in the pre-philosophical dimension (§ 4). Through discussion of the Fichtian concepts of “instinct of reason” and “new sensory,” how the choice for philosophy, interpretable as the production of a new habitus, the fichtean doctrine of Science realizes itself fully as ‘critique’ (§ 5). (shrink)

O texto consiste na primeira tradução em português da lição final do curso sobre a doutrina da ciência que J.G. Fichte ministra no semestre de inverno de 1810, na recém fundada Universidade de Berlim, e é o único texto dedicado à doutrina da ciência in specie que Fichte publica após a Fundação da doutrina da ciência, nas suas duas edições de 1794 e de 1802. O comentário anexo à tradução apresenta de modo sintético e argumentado os pontos mais significativos do (...) texto fichteano: a concepção do saber na perspectiva da doutrina da ciência ; o contexto histórico em que o pensamento do Fichte tardio se coloca ; a relação entre esquema, capacidade e lei, conceitos básicos para entender o percurso argumentativo das exposições da doutrina da ciência a partir de 1810 e as implicações teoréticas e praticas da perspectiva assumida nestas exposições. A dedução completa das determinações prático‑ teoréticas do saber no espaço aberto pela doutrina da ciência permite, por fim, uma reflexão sobre a transformação do saber em sabedoria, autentico objetivo da Wissenschaftslehre fichteana. (shrink)

O artigo trata da relação entre pensamento transcendental, aplicação e natureza nas reflexões de G. Bardili, K. L. Reinhold e J. G. Fichte, entre 1799 e 1801. Após uma primeira discussão das críticas à filosofia transcendental formuladas por Reinhold e Bardili, são analisados os pressupostos da filosofia da natureza apresentada no Grundriss bardiliano e avaliada a expansão que aí opera a fenomenologia concebida por Reinhold no IV tomo dos Beyträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfänge des 19. (...) Jahrhunderts. Por fim, se discute a posição que Fichte assume com respeito a estas tentativas nos apontamentos preparatórios à revisão do Grundriss bardiliano e nas Teses explicativas da essência dos animais, comparando-as aos desenvolvimentos sucessivos da sua reflexão sobre a natureza. (shrink)

RESUMO Este trabalho desenvolve aspectos da controvérsia entre Fichte e Schelling em relação aos elementos estéticos, linguístico-filosóficos e da filosofia da religião de ambos, que é foco das "Investigações sobre a liberdade humana de Schelling", assim como das exposições da doutrina da ciência e da ética do Fichte tardio. As divergências entre Fichte e Schelling não envolvem apenas problemas especulativos, mas sim variadas implicações e consequências dos seus sistemas filosóficos, que podem ser destacadas por uma análise da função da analogia (...) nos dois autores. A analogia é uma figura que agrega a estética, a filosofia da linguagem e a filosofia da religião nos dois autores; ela é um significante que põe o problema do significado, ou seja, põe o problema da relação entre finito e infinito e da relação entre saber absoluto e saber particular. Essa relação vai ser investigada a partir de algumas passagens das "Investigações" de Schelling ; num segundo momento, será analisada a função do conceito de analogia e de símbolo nesse contexto ; e, no final, a diferente compreensão da Igreja como símbolo do absoluto na "Filosofia da arte" de Schelling e na "Doutrina moral" fichtiana de 1798 e 1812. ABSTRACT This paper develops elements of the controversy between Fichte and Schelling regarding aesthetics, philosophy of language and philosophy of religion starting from Schelling's "Inquiry on human freedom" and Fichte's late presentation of the "Wissenschaftslehre". The polemics between Fichte and Schelling is not just a speculative one, but it involves different implications and consequences of their philosophical systems, which can be deepened through an analysis of the role of analogy by the two authors. Analogy is a figure that combines aesthetics, philosophy of language and philosophy of religion; it is a significant that puts the problem of meaning, i.e., puts the problem of the relationship between finite and infinite and the relationship between absolute and factual knowledge. This relationship will be investigated starting from some passages of the "Inquiry on human freedom" ; then the function of the concept of analogy and symbol in this context will be analysed and, at last, a different understanding of the church as a symbol of the absolute in "Schelling's Philosophy of art" and Fichtes's "System of ethics" of 1798 and 1812. (shrink)

Objetivo deste artigo é discutir a recepção fichteana do mesmerismo e avaliar criticamente a interpretação fichteana do rapport como instrumento para desenvolver uma reflexão em torno das condições de possiblidade para a elevação ao ponto de vista transcendental. A minha tese é que Fichte opera uma assimilação seletiva do magnetismo animal, mas recusa os seus elementos fundamentais. Em especial Fichte explora a possibilidade de entender a Wisseschaftslehre como uma abordagem filosófica que pretende superar os limites que definem a concretude do (...) sujeito. Porém, em reestruturar e repensar a abordagem do magnetismo animal como forma de interação linguística, ele se aproxima as modernas concepções da magia como pontenciamento da liberdade e da performance humana.Para demonstrar esta tese irei fornecer uma problematização da estrutura da magia entre época moderna e contemporânea a partir do problema da comunicação ; situar neste contexto a reflexão fichteana sobre a estrutura da doutrina da ciência como saber incomunicável ; problematizar a recepção fichteana do mesmerismo no Diário sobre o magnetismo animal de 1813 ; aplicar os resultados desta problematização na leitura da reflexão fichteana acerca da relação entre percepção e atenção nas lições sobre os Tatsachen des Bewusstseins de 1811. (shrink)

The paper discusses Fichte’s reception of the kantian essay Was heißt: Sich im Denken zu orientiren? that Fichte employs in different phases of his thought in highlighting the specific nature of his Wissenschaftslehre respect to Kant’s critical philosophy and to identify the misunderstandings that led to psychological and realistic misrepresentation of criticism. The article discusses the definition of objectivity of representations that can be formed from the transcendental point of view, that Fichte elaborates in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo; the possibility (...) to derive a real object from the logic, which Fichte reflected in the Transzendentale Logik II and the different constitution of the object that can be configured within the transcendental context, that Fichte describes in the Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftlehre 1813. (shrink)

Europaea Memoria, Reihe I: Studien, Band77.

O artigo visa mostrar como o gesto filosófico reinholdiano de construção de uma filosofia elementar e o fichteano de fundamentar toda filosofia como ciência rigorosa em uma intuição intelectual alcançada através de um postulado, mais do que uma traição da impostação fundamental da crítica da razão kantiana, refletem uma tentativa de aprofundar elementos implícitos nela, sobretudo no que diz respeito à sua dimensão metodológica. Isto permite estabelecer uma continuidade entre o criticismo de Kant e o chamado de idealismo alemão que (...) ultrapassa toda concepção baseada sobre uma apropriação indevida ou uma assimilação seletiva do criticismo por parte deste último, e pode ser entendida como presentificação. (shrink)

L’articolo analizza la funzione dell’immagine nei Saggi di Montaigne individuato da un duplice movimento, che è di presa di distanze dall’esistente e di ridefi nizione dell’esistente nei termini di nuove forme, criticamente consapevoli, di abitare il mondo. A tal fine, l´articolo prende in considerazione alcuni temi-chiave che possono essere riscontrati nei Saggi (l´autodescrizione, la critica al sapere sensibile, la deformità e la critica all´abitudine) con l´obiett ivo di riflett ere sul potenziale ontologico della immagine come Bildung e sul modo in (...) cui tale potenziale si riverbera nella concezione montaigneana dell´arte di vivere e in particolare di come, non la teoria, ma la pratica dell’immagine apra lo spazio per una definizione creativa, ma non arbitraria, dell’esistente. Parole-Chiave: Montaigne. Immagine. Arte di vivere. (shrink)

We propose a new interpretation of the equation E=mc² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...) the nature of mass. (shrink)

A restrictive view of self-control identifies exercises of self-control with synchronic intrapsychic processes, and pictures diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies not as proper instances of self-control, but as clever ways of avoiding the need to exercise that ability. In turn, defenders of an inclusive view of self-control typically argue that we should construe self-control as more than effortful inhibition, and that, on grounds of functional equivalence, all these diverse strategies might be properly described as instances of self-control. In this paper, I (...) take a fresh look at this debate by focusing on cases of addiction. I argue that addicted agents face a paradigmatic sort of self-control challenge, which makes addiction an important test case for theories of self-control. And I discuss evidence that highlights both the unreliability of synchronic intrapsychic strategies and the crucial role that is played by diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies in successful attempts at achieving abstinence by addicted individuals. Abstaining addicts are a paradigmatic case of agents who successfully exercise self-control, and they mostly do so by relying on diachronic and externally-scaffolded strategies. This, I argue, lends further support to an inclusive view of self-control. (shrink)

Can addiction be credibly invoked as an excuse for moral harms secondary to particular decisions to use drugs? This question raises two distinct sets of issues. First, there is the question of whether addiction is the sort of consideration that could, given suitable assumptions about the details of the case, excuse or mitigate moral blameworthiness. Most discussions of addiction and moral responsibility have focused on this question, and many have argued that addiction excuses. Here I articulate what I take to (...) be the best argument for this view, based on the substantial difficulty that people with severe addiction experience in controlling drug-related behavior. This, I argue, may in some cases be sufficient to ground a mitigating excuse, given the way in which addiction undermines agents’ responsiveness to relevant moral reasons to do otherwise. Much less attention has been devoted to a second set of issues that critically affect the possibility of applying this mitigating excuse in particular cases, derived from the ambivalent nature of agential control in addiction. In order to find a fitting response to moral harm, the person with the right standing to blame must make a judgment about the extent to which the agent possessed certain morally relevant capacities at the time of the act. In practice, this will often prove tremendously difficult to assess. The ethical challenge for the person with the right standing to blame is fundamentally one of making a judgment about matters that seem underdetermined by the available evidence. (shrink)

Following the proposal of a new kind of selective structural realism that uses as a basis the distinction between framework and interaction theories, this work discusses relevant applications in fundamental physics. An ontology for the different entities and properties of well-known theories is thus consistently built. The case of classical field theories—including general relativity as a classical theory of gravitation—is examined in detail, as well as the implications of the classification scheme for issues of realism in quantum mechanics. These applications (...) also shed light on the different range of applicability of the ontic and epistemic versions of structural realism. (shrink)

In previous works, an ontology of properties for quantum mechanics has been proposed, according to which quantum systems are bundles of properties with no principle of individuality. The aim of the present article is to show that, since quasi-set theory is particularly suited for dealing with aggregates of items that do not belong to the traditional category of individual, it supplies an adequate meta-language to speak of the proposed ontology of properties and its structure.

It is often assumed that, except perhaps in a few rare cases, people with addiction can be aptly held responsible for having acquired the condition. In this chapter, I consider the argument that supports this view and draw attention to a number of challenges that can be raised against it. Assuming that early decisions to use drugs were made in possession of normal-range psychological capacities, I consider the key question of whether drug users who later became addicted should have known (...) that addiction was a likely outcome of their decisions to use drugs in a way that makes them blameworthy for their lack of foresight. I focus on three different points of contention surrounding this claim: how likely the outcome to be predicted was, how tolerable risk should be weighed against the expected value of decisions to use, and how reliable the relevant predictive abilities of the average person are. Once we consider in some detail what would have to be true in order for someone to be aptly held responsible for becoming addicted, the prospects for making a convincing case to that effect look, I argue, somewhat more uncertain than they might at first appear. (shrink)

While some form of loss of control is often assumed to be a common feature of the diverse manifestations of addiction, it is far from clear how loss of control should be understood. In this paper, I put forward a concept of decrease in control in addiction that aims to fill this gap and thus provide a general framework for thinking about addictive behavior. The development of this account involves two main steps. First, I present a view of degrees of (...) control as the degree to which an agent would be responsive to potential or counterfactual sufficient reasons to do otherwise. Second, I sketch an account of the relevant control-undermining factors in addiction that is consonant with my proposed view of degrees of control. Being a high-level functional property, reasons-responsiveness is particularly well suited to frame an account of control-undermining factors that is doubly pluralistic: it encompasses the contribution of factors both internal and external to the agent, and it is consistent with various proposals as to the precise nature of the anomaly taking place in the psychology of addiction. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming part of the everyday. During this transition, people’s intention to use AI technologies is still unclear and emotions such as fear are influencing it. In this paper, we focus on autonomous cars to first verify empirically the extent to which people fear AI and then examine the impact that fear has on their intention to use AI-driven vehicles. Our research is based on a systematic survey and it reveals that while individuals are largely afraid of (...) cars that are driven by AI, they are nonetheless willing to adopt this technology as soon as possible. To explain this tension, we extend our analysis beyond just fear and show that people also believe that AI-driven cars will generate many individual, urban and global benefits. Subsequently, we employ our empirical findings as the foundations of a theoretical framework meant to illustrate the main factors that people ponder when they consider the use of AI tech. In addition to offering a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of AI technology acceptance, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the tension that exists between the fear and adoption of AI, capturing what exactly people fear and intend to do. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente artículo se busca describir el rol fundamental que juega la experiencia estética en los procesos de significación de lo que se suele denominar “religión popular”. Para esta labor, tomamos como objeto de estudio la fiesta religiosa que, junto con hacer referencia a una determinada realidad empírica, nos provee de dos mediaciones conceptuales para el desarrollo de nuestro análisis: la fiesta y la imagen. De este modo, después de contextualizar nuestra reflexión en el marco de los estudios (...) culturales y la estética, procedemos a definir la lógica estético-sacramental de la fiesta religiosa a partir de los conceptos de “fiesta” e “imagen”, abordados desde el enfoque de la New Material Culture.: The aim of this article is to describe the fundamental role of the aesthetic experience in the processes of signification of what is usually called “popular religion”. In order to achieve this, we define as the object of our study the religious feast, which, apart from referring to a concrete empirical reality, provides us with two conceptual mediations for our analysis: feast and image. Thus, following a contextualization of our reflection on the field of cultural studies and aesthetics, we proceed to define the aesthetic-sacramental logic of the religious feast on the basis of the concepts “feast” and “image”, from the perspective of the New Material Culture approach. (shrink)

Degrowth is the literal translation of 'decroissance', a French word meaning reduction. Launched by activists in 2001 as a challenge to growth, it became a missile word that sparks a contentious debate on the diagnosis and prognosis of our society. 'Degrowth' became an interpretative frame for a new (and old) social movement where numerous streams of critical ideas and political actions converge. It is an attempt to re-politicise debates about desired socio-environmental futures and an example of an activist-led science now (...) consolidating into a concept in academic literature. This article discusses the definition, origins, evolution, practices and construction of degrowth. The main objective is to explain degrowth's multiple sources and strategies in order to improve its basic definition and avoid reductionist criticisms and misconceptions. To this end, the article presents degrowth's main intellectual sources as well as its diverse strategies (oppositional activism, building of alternatives and political proposals) and actors (practitioners, activists and scientists). Finally, the article argues that the movement's diversity does not detract from the existence of a common path. (shrink)

According to a shared functionalist view in philosophy of mind, a cognitive system, and cognitive function thereof, is based on the components of the organism it is realized by which, indeed, play a causal role in regulating our cognitive processes. This led philosophers to suggest also that, thus, cognition could be seen as an extended process, whose vehicle can extend not only outside the brain but also beyond bodily boundaries, on different kinds of devices. This is what we call the (...) ‘Externally Extended Cognition Thesis.’ This notion has generated a lively debate. Here, we offer a novel notion of extended cognition, according to which cognition can be seen as being realized outside the brain, but still inside the body. This is what we call the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis’. Not only our thesis but also our approach while defending it is innovative. The argument we offer is supported by recent empirical findings in the life sciences and biomedicine, which suggest that the gut microbiota’s activity has a functional role in regulating our cognitive processes and behaviors. In doing so, we embrace the holobiont-perspective, according to which it is possible to claim that what we call biological individuals are not autonomous entities with clear boundaries, but should rather be seen as networks of multiple interactions among species. Thus, by analyzing different sets of evidence in light of the holobiont-perspective, we argue that the gut microbiota could be seen as a component of our organism. On the basis of the philosophical interpretation of this evidence, however, we also suggest that there are no impediments standing the way of considering the gut microbiota also as a functional extension of our cognitive system. If so, this amounts to extending cognition out of ‘our skull’, though still confining it within ‘our body’: to ‘our gut’. This is an instance of the ‘Internally Extended Cognition Thesis,’ whose benefits for an original theory of extended cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at (...) a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. (shrink)

En este trabajo reconstruyo la estructura argumentativa del asociacionismo coercionista defendido por Michael Blake, que consta de dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica. Sostengo que ambas premisas pueden ser rechazadas, de manera indirecta (en el caso de la premisa empírica) o directa (en el caso de la premisa normativa). La conclusión es que el asociacionismo coercionista no prueba la existencia de una discontinuidad normativa entre el plano doméstico y el plano global.

In this paper I will evaluate the normative assumptions of Nozick's experience machine. I try to show that the intrinsic value that experiment gives to objectivity should be rejected from utilitarianism and that subjectivity counts as a necessary and sufficient condition for moral evaluation. I also conclude that satisfaction preferences utilitarianism to stay within the boundaries of utilitarianism should be considered as broad mental states consequentialism.

RESUMEN Las redes sociales han tenido un papel importante en el desarrollo de reclamos cívicos recientes. Internet presenta rasgos favorables para un libre intercambio de razones entre ciudadanos y ofrece un espacio nuevo para la circulación de información. En el presente trabajo me propongo indagar sobre el alcance de los recursos electrónicos y su vinculación con las concepciones deliberativas de la democracia.PALABRAS CLAVE DEMOCRACIA DELIBERATIVA – REDES SOCIALES - RECURSOS ELECTRÓNICOS - LEGITIMIDADABSTRACT Social networks have played an important role in (...) the development of recent civic complaints. Internet has favorable features for a free exchange of reasons between citizens and provides a new space for the circulation of information. This paper investigates the scope of electronic resources and its relationship to deliberative conceptions of democracy.KEYWORDS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY - SOCIAL NETWORKS – ELECTRONIC RESOURCES - LEGITIMACY. (shrink)

In a very short article, James Sterba argues that there is a moral duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others. Sterba justifies this duty by drawing an analogy with a series of cases in which some degree of sacrifice would be commonly accepted for the benefit of third parties. In this paper, I argue that Sterba’s argument reaches the correct conclusion, but is invalid. In addition, I point out two different arguments to support the existence of (...) a duty to sacrifice one’s life to save the lives of others. (shrink)

We discuss the mathematical structures that underlie quantum probabilities. More specifically, we explore possible connections between logic, geometry and probability theory. We propose an interpretation that generalizes the method developed by R. T. Cox to the quantum logical approach to physical theories. We stress the relevance of developing a geometrical interpretation of quantum mechanics.

According to Marshall et al. (2024), some of the patients who refuse to stay in observation after being resuscitated following an opioid overdose are likely not making an autonomous choice. While I do not intend to dispute this claim, it merits discussion what is the concept of autonomy at play in making this assessment. I contend that the concept at work is more substantive than Marshall et al. acknowledge—and more substantive, too, than the form of autonomy usually thought to underpin (...) the moral justification of the requirement of informed consent . (shrink)

The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, (...) their status as beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)