The newest innovation in assisted reproduction is oocyte cryopreservation, more commonly known as egg freezing, which has been developed as a method of fertility preservation. Studies emerging from around the world show that highly educated professional women are turning to egg freezing in their late thirties to early forties, because they are still searching for a male partner with whom to have children. For these women, egg freezing may be a new “hope technology” for future romance; but it may also (...) be a “technology of despair,” as women navigate the ends of a failing relationship. Based on the largest ethnographic study to date, undertaken with 150 women who froze their eggs for nonmedical reasons in the United States and Israel, we examine egg freezing at the end of romance. Relationship dissolution—involving divorce, separation, broken engagements, and relationship breakups from men who are unfaithful, controlling, rejecting, uncommitted, or unready for fatherhood—is one of the major pathways to egg freezing. When such relationship dissolution ruptures a woman’s reproductive life course, egg freezing may become a “technology of repair,” allowing women to find new strengths and opportunities as well as new visions for the future. (shrink)

In this article, we describe the social and economic changes that have contributed to contemporary problems of work—family conflict, gender inequality, and risks to children's healthy development. We draw on feminist welfare state scholarship to outline an institutional arrangement that would support an earner—carer society—a social arrangement in which women and men engage symmetrically in paid work and unpaid caregiving and where young children have ample time with their parents. We present a blueprint for work—family reconciliation policies in three areas—paid (...) family-leave provisions, working-time regulations, and early childhood education and care—and we identify key policy design principles. We describe and assess these work—family reconciliation policies as they operate in six European countries widely considered to be policy exemplars: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and France. We close with an analysis of potential objections to these policies. (shrink)

The processes of learning and memory have traditionally been studied in large experimental organisms (Aplysia, mice, rats and humans), where well‐characterized behaviors are easily tested. Although Drosophila is one of the most experimentally tractable organisms, it has only recently joined the others as a model organism for learning and memory. Drosophila behavior has been studied for over 20 years; however, most of the work in the learning and memory field has focused on initial learning, because establishing memory in Drosophila has (...) not been as straightforward as in other organisms. A major recent advance in this field has been the development of a training protocol that induces long‐term memory in flies. This made possible experiments that implicated the Drosophila CREB gene as a critical component in the consolidation of long‐term memory, and paves the way for future experiments utilizing the well developed tools in Drosophila. This review will briefly summarize what is known in the field of Drosophila learning and memory to date, and discuss why the unique aspects of this field make traditional approaches difficult and reward the use of alternative paths of experimentation. (shrink)

Face attractiveness can influence memory for previously seen faces. This effect has been shown to differ for young and older perceivers. Two parallel studies examined the moderation of both the age...

This paper aims to explore the association between over-indebtedness and two facets of well-being – life satisfaction and emotional well-being. Although prior research has associated over-indebtedness with lower life satisfaction, this study contributes to the extant literature by revealing its effects on emotional well-being, which is a crucial component of well-being that has received less attention. Besides subjective well-being, reported health, and sleep quality were also assessed. The findings suggest that over-indebted consumers have lower life satisfaction and emotional well-being, as (...) well as poorer health and sleep quality. Furthermore, over-indebtedness impacts life satisfaction and emotional well-being through different mechanisms. Consumers decreased perceived control accounts for the impact of over-indebtedness on both facets of well-being. Financial well-being, partly mediates the impact of indebtedness status on overall life satisfaction. The current study contributes to research focusing on the relationship between indebtedness, well-being, health, and sleep quality, and provides relevant theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25 MORALITY AS A BACK-UP SYSTEM: HUME'S VIEW? The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty..... Nowell-Smith A certain picture of morality — arguably a Humean one — has come to have a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. On this picture, morality, as Richard Brandt asserts, is "a back-up system, which operates (...) when spontaneous personal caring fails 2 to motivate us to do as we ought." Morality — at least in the form of moral principles, whose force is felt through one's sense of duty — is, on this view, ideally superfluous. As a guide for one's own conduct it is needed only insofar as the agent's affective network is deficient. If one only spontaneously desired a, cared about b, cared for c, felt aversion towards d as, ideally, one should, moral principles and a sense of duty would be of no use. There are good reasons for supposing that this is Hume's view. After all, his characterization of acting from duty is more than a little disparaging: When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,,as much as possible, his want of it. I will argue, however, that there is tension in Hume's ethics between two lines of thought. According to the first line of thought, and the one 26 usually associated with Hume, good conduct is conduct which is spontaneously prompted by virtuous desires. Unless our desires either are not what they should be or are motivationally weak, there is no need for mediation or tempering by a sense of duty or moral principles. According to the second line, the very good desires of a very good person may nonetheless need to be filtered, tempered, redirected or checked. This line is most evident in "Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices." Before arguing that these strains of thought are in tension in Hume's ethics, I need to clarify what is at issue and to develop the two competing pictures of moral motivation. First the issue. The issue is not 'Who is better: someone with a sense of duty but corrupt desires or someone with no sense of duty but ideal desires?' Nor is the issue one of the moral worth of actions ('Can an action have moral worth if it is not performed out of duty?') The issue, rather, is how to characterize morally good (or right) conduct. What role, if any, does a sense of duty or a Butlerian principle of reflection, i.e., an overarching, guiding conception of what is right or good which is 'juridically' supreme within the self, play in good conduct? Is morally good conduct ideally a matter of acting as one should from the proper desires? Or should the desires be governed and guided by moral principles? Consider two models of moral conduct. Model I: Morality as a Back-Up System On this picture, wrongness in conduct is traceable to an affective deficiency. The claim underlying this picture seems to be as follows: One 27 acts wrongly because one's passions are not quite what they should be. One person cheats in her business dealings because she cares too little about the welfare of others (and too much about her own); another is harsh and abrupt to a student because he cares too little about his students' concerns and is jealous and possessive when it comes to 'his time.' In each case the problem can be traced to an affective deficiency. Hume appears to be supporting this view when he asserts, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no act can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality' (T 479). A few pages later he writes, "[E]very immorality... (shrink)

By an "inverse iteration" of Sacks forcing over a model of V = L, we produce a model in which the degrees of constructibility of nonconstructible reals have order type ω 1 *.

By an "inverse iteration" of Sacks forcing over a model of $V = L$, we produce a model in which the degrees of constructibility of nonconstructible reals have order type $\omega_1^\ast$.

Mein Beitrag untersucht die folgende Fragestellung: „Kann S gerechtfertigt sein, X zu tun, wobei es erlaubt ist, X zu tun, wenn die Bedingungen B vorliegen, wenn S fälschlich, aber vernünftigerweise glaubt, dass die Bedingungen B vorliegen?“ Ich plädiere für eine Bejahung dieser Frage, und zwar im Gegensatz zu der von Joachim Hruschka in seinem Aufsatz „Justifications and Excuses: A Sy-stematic Approach“ vertretenen Posi-tion. Ich bin der Auffassung, daß eine Rechtfertigung eine vernünftige Annahme voraussetzt; es ist nicht notwendig, daß diese Annahme (...) auch zutrifft. Dass S vernünftigerweise glaubt, daß p, während in Wirklichkeit p nicht vorliegt, scheint jedenfalls kein entschuldigender Umstand zu sein. Diese Situation ist vielmehr wesentlich unterschieden von krankheitsbedingter Zurechnungsunfähigkeit oder sonst verminderter geistiger Fähigkeit. Es ist daher wichtig, zwischen zwei Arten von Gründen zu unterscheiden, die dazu führen, daß eine Person nicht verantwortlich gemacht wird für X, obwohl sie X getan hat; und zwar sind dies einerseits Gründe, die im Hinblick auf Probleme der handelnden Person selbst entschuldigend wirken, und andererseits solche Gründe, die weder einen Mangel noch Verwirrung der handelnden Person selbst reflektieren, noch einen Fehler in dem Entscheidungsprozeß, der zu der Handlung geführt hat. My essay addresses the following question: "Can S be justified in doing X, where it is permissible to do X when conditions C obtain, if S mistakenly but reasonably believes that conditions C do obtain?" I defend an affirmative reply, contrary to the position taken by Prof. Hruschka in his "Justifications and Excuses: A Systematic Approach" . I understand justification as requiring reasonable belief; it is not necessary that the belief be true. That S believes on reasonable grounds that p when in fact p is false seems not to be an excusing condition. It is importantly different from insanity, or diminished capacity. I stress the importance of differentiating between two very different kinds of reasons for holding someone not to be culpable for X despite having done X, viz, reasons that exculpate due to problems with the agent himself and those that do not reflect any deficiency or disorder in the agent, or any flaw in the process by which she chose as she did. (shrink)

Cet article présente une discussion sur la pensée de la mutation chez Jean-Luc Nancy, elle-même une mutation des idées philosophiques traditionnelles sur la transformation. Il entend montrer que devant le sens intransformé de transformation dans la tradition philosophique de Platon à la philosophie contemporaine, Jean-Luc Nancy ouvre une autre voie lorsqu’il comprend transformation plutôt comme touche de l’âme. Loin de soumettre la mutation à une arche-téléologie des significations, la pensée de la mutation, une pensée de la touche de l’âme, trouve (...) le sens de la mutation dans l’« en train de se faire », plutôt que dans la quête de forme et de figuration. C’est dans la mutation du sens de l’entre-deux compris comme « en train d’être », que le sens d’une mutation de sens se donne à voir dans son non-figuration. Par-là, on découvre dans la pensée de Nancy non plus un autre sens d’âme, mais comment l’âme du sens touche le monde. (shrink)

Catulo (século I a.C.), o primeiro grande autor lírico romano, traz a elegia grega com temática variada, inclusive amorosa. Assim a poesia elegíaca latina desenvolve-se e ganha contorno de um gênero autônomo em Roma, com temática própria, a elegia erótica romana. O tema do amor passa a ser fundamental, nos autores do século de Augusto (século I a.C.), Tibulo, Propércio e Ovídio, que escrevem livros inteiros para uma amada. Contudo, unida à temática do amor encontramos também o tema morte, constante (...) em Propércio e encontrado também em Ovídio na esfera mítica. Através de fragmentos de poemas dos autores elegíacos, veremos como os temas amor e morte encontram-se unidos na elegia latina. (shrink)

Ovídio, poeta latino do século I a.C, compôs as Heroides, obra em que heróis e heroínas das lendas escrevem a seus amados(as) ausentes. Todas as cartas apresentam profundo teor trágico, tanto na temática quanto nos aspectos trágicos marcantes. Analisamos a tragicidade na carta de Dejanira a Hércules, na qual a mulher do herói narra seu desespero ao receber a notícia da morte de Hércules, após vestir a túnica que ela havia enviado. Como base para a análise, serão usados os conceitos (...) aristotélicos de hamartia e hybris, bem como os sentimentos de terror e compaixão e também a concepção filosófica de trágico estabelecida pelos idealistas alemães do século XVIII. (shrink)

A elegia é uma forma poética muito antiga. Os gregos compuseram elegias desde a lírica arcaica (século VII – V a.C.). Contudo, foram as elegias compostas no período da lírica alexandrina (século III – II a.C.) que influenciaram os elegíacos romanos. Tanto na Grécia quanto em Roma a elegia é considerada como gênero lírico, mas percebemos que nas composições romanas é notória a presença do trágico, especialmente, nas obras de Ovídio, por isso discutimos a problemática do gênero elegíaco, que se (...) apresenta na Antiguidade como um gênero híbrido. (shrink)

A personagem Medeia, desde os autores gregos, como Eurípides, é apresentada como o exemplo mais clássico do prejuízo causado pela paixão desmedida. Ela justifica todos os seus atos buscando como medida seu amor por Jasão. É o amor que a faz salvar a vida do amado e tirar várias outras vidas, inclusive de seus próprios filhos. Ovídio, poeta latino do século I a.C., retoma a personagem em sua obra Heroides, para também apresentar o mal que a paixão desenfreada pode causar (...) em um ser humano. A cultura romana que ensinava os riscos do amor e da paixão, como tão bem nos legou Lucrécio, em seu De rerum natura, buscava não cometer o erro de amar em demasia. Contudo, Ovídio mostra nessa obra, as dores e os sofrimentos causados por um amor que se torna para a personagem, ao mesmo tempo, sua salvação e sua destruição. (shrink)

With the arrival of the fourth volume of this work, Peter Lombard's Sentences is now fully available in English for the first time. Giulio Silano's text, based on the third critical edition by Ignatius C. Brady in two volumes (Grottaferrata, 1971-81) is distinguished by its accuracy and readability, meeting the exacting criteria of a Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies translation. Each volume has a detailed table of contents, an index of biblical and patristic references, and a full bibliography of English (...) translations of sources cited in the text along with on-line versions where they exist. Volume 1 contains a bibliography of Anglophone scholarship pertinent to the Lombard, not updated in volume 4. .. (shrink)

In the heady days of 2011–2012, when Barack Obama was in his first term and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act heralded a golden future, medical anthropologists and activists had reason to be excited. Their country was about to take—so they believed—the greatest single step in the right direction since LBJ’s “Great Society” welfare spending program. It was in this climate that Inhorn and Wentzell’s collection of essays was published, and the optimism of the times shines through many of (...) the essays.The harsh reality is that at the end of 2012 Obama was re-elected, and after a painful deadlock the health insurance legislation known as “Obamacare” was pushed through. What followed has not turned out quite the way anyone expected and has driven an initial and unprecedented tidal wave of disapproval of the Obama presidency. Reading Medical Anthropology at the Intersections is therefore a sobering lesson in how a week can be a very long time in politics and a year a positive etern. (shrink)

In the mid fourth century b.c. some Roman gentes drew on a Pythagorean tradition. In this tradition, Numa's role of Pythagoras’ disciple connected Rome with Greek elites and culture. The Marcii, between 304 and 300 b.c., used Numa's figure, recently reshaped by the Aemilii and the Pinarii for their propaganda, to promote the need for a plebeian pontificate. After the approval of the Ogulnium plebiscite, the needs for this kind of propaganda fell away. When Marcius Censorinus became censor, Numa's pontificate (...) was no longer relevant for promoting the gens. For this reason, the Marcii used another genealogy for similar propagandistic effect: the figure of Marsyas, a symbol of plebeian ideals. (shrink)