Depuis Jules Ferry, l'histoire est la principale arme d'assaut de propagande d'Etat. Par les manuels et les leçons, l'école républicaine n'a cessé de truquer et de tronquer ce que l'honnête citoyen pouvait écrire. La mise en condition et le " formatage " du citoyen se poursuivent tout au long de sa vie par le commun des journaux, les romans et les images, les célébrations nationales, les émissions télévisées, les directives et les interdits. Ces tout derniers temps, l'Etat veut, en France, (...) soumettre la démarche historique à une étroite surveillance et laisse de moins en moins de liberté aux centres de recherche qui n'ont même plus le loisir de choisir en toute indépendance leurs sujets d'enquête et leurs programmes.L'Histoire s'est dévoyée. Elle se dit " science humaine " mais n'étudie souvent que des catégories, des classes et ordres, des conditions sociales où l'individu paraît effacé, inexistant, soumis à la géographie, à l'évolution des techniques, à l'économie ou même au " sens de l'Histoire ". Elle édicte des règles qui ne souffrent ni exceptions ni contradictions. Du Moyen Age à nos jours, Jacques Heers dresse ici un inventaire des manipulations de l'Histoire. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. (...) According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Entre les postes et le mouvement analytique, le principe de plaisir et l'histoire des télécommunications, la carte postale et la lettre volée, bref le transfert de Socrate à Freud, et au-delà. Cette satire de la littérature épistolaire devait être farcie - d'adresses, de codes postaux, de missives cryptées, de lettres anonymes, le tout confié à tant de modes, de genres et de tons.

Many think it is plausible that agents enjoy freedom and responsibility with respect to their actions in virtue of being reasons-responsive. Extant accounts spell out reasons-responsiveness (RR) as a general modal property. The agent is responsive to reasons for and against ϕ-ing, according to this idea, if they ϕ in accordance with the balance of reasons in a suitable proportion of possible situations. This paper argues that freedom and responsibility are not grounded in such modal properties on the basis of (...) a phenomenon I call ‘rational blind spots’. Agents have highly specific local blockages (or openings) that prevent them from seeing or reacting for a particular type of reason. When these blind spots are triggered, agents fail to be responsive to reasons in the sense relevant to freedom and responsibility. Thus, we judge that they are not free and responsible. But bind spots don’t remove the agent’s possession of general modal RR properties. Thus, extant accounts of reasons-responsiveness render the incorrect result that the agents in these cases remain responsible because they remain responsive to reasons in a general sense. (shrink)

A fun introduction in comics to deep thinking and the history of philosophy -- Back cover.

Plausibly, agents act freely iff their actions are responses to reasons. But what sort of relationship between reason and action is required for the action to count as a response? The overwhelmingly dominant answer to this question is modalist. It holds that responses are actions that share a modally robust or secure relationship with the relevant reasons. This thesis offers a new alternative answer. It argues that responses are actions that can be explained by reasons in the right way. This (...) explanationist answer comes apart from the modalist answer. For it holds that actions are responses to reasons if they are explained by those reasons even if they don’t share a modally robust relationship. Explanationism thus offers a novel way of vindicating the intuition that alternative possibilities don’t matter to responding to reasons and (consequently) free agency. The key dialectical position the thesis develops is that both modalism and explanationism constitute attempts to capture he core type of relationship encoded by the notion of a response. Responses to reasons, at core, involve a non-accidental relationship between reason and action. We can either understand non-accidentality as a modal phenomenon – as a modally robust tracking between two facts. Or we can understand non-accidentality as an explanatory phenomenon – as a special explanatory relationship between two facts. According to my rival explanationist proposal, two facts share a non-accidental relationship iff we can give a unified explanation of why both obtain. Unified explanations are explanations of why [p&q] that cannot be decomposed into two (or more) separate independent explanations of p and of q. Consequently, according to explanationism about responding to reasons, actions are responses to reasons iff those reasons offer a rational explanation of the action that cannot be decomposed into separate independent components. (shrink)

Current literature suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect consumers’ attitudes towards an organization and is regarded as a driver for reputation-building and fostering sustained consumer patronage. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of CSR on consumer responses, this research examined the mediating influence of consumer’s perceived organizational motives within an NGO setting. Given the heightened public attention surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, data were collected from consumers of the Games to assess their perceptions of the (...) International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) socially responsible initiatives. We hypothesized that consumers of the Games were likely to cognitively elaborate on CSR messages by way of three specific attribution effects derived from the literature. The results show that, contingent on CSR awareness, consumers responded positively to social efforts judged to be values-driven and stakeholder-driven; and a negative response was seen for efforts judged to be strategic. These attribution effects influenced various types of patronage and perceived organizational reputation. (shrink)

The President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development examines three major ethical problems in the transition from post‐Communist Europe to a market economy and spells out the only real option for Western Europe. He delivered this address, which is reprinted with permission, at a Conference on Business and Moral Standards in Post Communist Europe held in London in November last year under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Westminster and sponsored by the Sedgwick Group and KPMG Peat Marwick.

"The four essays in this volume constitute Derrida's most explicit and sustained reflection on the art work as pictorial artifact, a reflection partly by way of philosophical aesthetics (Kant, Heidegger), partly by way of a commentary on art works and art scholarship (Van Gogh, Adami, Titus-Carmel). The illustrations are excellent, and the translators, who clearly see their work as both a rendering and a transformation, add yet another dimension to this richly layered composition. Indispensable to collections emphasizing art criticism and (...) aesthetics."--Alexander Gelley, Library Journal. (shrink)

This text proposes an evaluation of what remains of cinema in the age of the digital, and of an ever increased circulation between movie theatres and museums. Much has changed in the social and aesthetic status of cinema, at least since the appearance of video art; but cinema, in general, has not disappeared, quite to the contrary, and remains a very important social practice. Two important factors, however, have undergone deep changes: 1°, film no longer has the exclusivity of the (...) moving image, which it has to share with television and contemporary art; 2°, the recent hegemony of the digital image has driven film toward a massive return to the “Méliès path” of film art, that of a direct intervention on the film image. The contention here is that, though the art of film is obviously not what it was, it has kept a number of qualities which still make it the positive reference for any thinking of the moving image in general. The article puts forward three kinds of reasons to support this argument: 1°, cinema has invented a specific way to see moving images, resting on what is termed here the production of a gaze; 2°, time is essential to the film form itself; 3°, film is the only art which has developed an aesthetic of the encounter (with the real) – and the co-presence of these three ranges of value remain absolutely specific. (shrink)

"The cinema is, as a photographic medium, an art form of light. But the mastery of lightning and the 'dark' side of his rhizomatic, interactive net have led very early to the configuration of shade and shadow and refer, ergo, to something which is perpetually related to all forms of figurative art. To film, 'night' means, however, something different, as it brings the configuration of the skies in a state of darkness with it. This is in disagreement with his usual (...) depiction. It entails embarking on a singular figurative project, which approximates a contradiction in itself. This project demonstrates the autonomy of the configuration process precisely through this contradiction.". (shrink)

This text proposes an evaluation of what remains of cinema in the age of the digital, and of an ever increased circulation between movie theatres and museums. Much has changed in the social and aesthetic status of cinema, at least since the appearance of video art; but cinema, in general, has not disappeared, quite to the contrary, and remains a very important social practice. Two important factors, however, have undergone deep changes: 1°, film no longer has the exclusivity of the (...) moving image, which it has to share with television and contemporary art; 2°, the recent hegemony of the digital image has driven film toward a massive return to the “Méliès path” of film art, that of a direct intervention on the film image. The contention here is that, though the art of film is obviously not what it was, it has kept a number of qualities which still make it the positive reference for any thinking of the moving image in general. The article puts forward three kinds of reasons to support this argument: 1°, cinema has invented a specific way to see moving images, resting on what is termed here the production of a gaze; 2°, time is essential to the film form itself; 3°, film is the only art which has developed an aesthetic of the encounter (with the real) – and the co-presence of these three ranges of value remain absolutely specific. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the period that immediately followed the invention of the Leiden jar. Historians of science have developed narrations that emphasize the role of grounding during the process of charging the jar. In this respect, this episode shows significant aspects that can be used to characterize science, scientific knowledge production, and the nature of science. From our own experimentation, we learned that grounding was not necessary in order to produce the effect. These experiences inspired us to go (...) back to primary sources. In doing so, we came to a new understanding of the early period after Kleist’s and Musschenbroek’s initial creation of the effect. From our analysis, we conclude that it is not the grounding which was perceived as a major innovation during this early period of the discussion but the concept of an electrical circuit. This understanding was fundamental in characterizing the Leiden jar as a new device challenging the then current knowledge of experimental practices in the field of electricity. (shrink)

This volume brings together four of Jacques Derrida's essays on Maurice Blanchot's fictions: "Pace Not(s)," "Living on," "Title To Be Specified," and "The Law of Genre.".

In God existence is the same as essence; or—the same thing ·put differently·—it is essential for God to exist. So God is a necessary being, ·a being who exists necessarily·.

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

"I shall speak of ghost, of flame, and of ashes." These are the first words of Jacques Derrida's lecture on Heidegger. It is again a question of Nazism--of what remains to be thought through of Nazism in general and of Heidegger's Nazism in particular. It is also "politics of spirit" which at the time people thought--they still want to today--to oppose to the inhuman. "Derrida's ruminations should intrigue anyone interested in Post-Structuralism. . . . . This study of Heidegger (...) is a fine example of how Derrida can make readers of philosophical texts notice difficult problems in almost imperceptible details of those texts."--David Hoy, London Review of Books "Will a more important book on Heidegger appear in our time? No, not unless Derrida continues to think and write in his spirit. . . . Let there be no mistake: this is not merely a brilliant book on Heidegger, it is thinking in the grand style."--David Farrell Krell, Research in Phenomenology "The analysis of Heidegger is brilliant, provocative, elusive."--Peter C. Hodgson, Religious Studies Review. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of twenty-three interviews given over the last two decades. It illustrates the extraordinary breadth of Derrida's concerns, touching upon such subjects as the teaching of philosophy, sexual difference and feminine identity, the media, AIDS, language and translation, nationalism, politics, and Derrida's early life and the history of his writings. Often, as in the interviews on Heidegger, on drugs, or on the nature of poetry, these interviews offer something available nowhere else in his work. The informality (...) of the interview process frequently leads to the most succinct and lucid explications of many of the most important and influential aspects of Derrida's thought. Sixteen of the interviews appear in English for the first time, including an interview conducted especially for this volume, concerning the recent exchange of letters in the New York Review of Books. (shrink)

The animal that therefore I am (more to follow) -- But as for me, who am I (following)? -- And say the animal responded -- I don't know why we are doing this.

This brings together five pieces written by Jacques Derrida as extended lectures. The most important theme is Derrida's redefinition of speech acts and the 'event' as a particular kind of performative. The effects of globalization and mechanization, along with arising issues, provide a second constellation of themes. The first four essays involve a specific act of speech: the lie, the excuse, perjury and profession. The last two essays continue Derrida's powerful series of meditations on professional and institutional questions. The (...) final essay, 'Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul', confronts the task facing psychoanalysis today: coming to terms in new ways with worldwide cruelty and accommodating itself to the modern juridical concepts of crime against humanity. The phrase 'without alibi' (alibi, of course, being another speech act) is used throughout the essay as a leitmotif indicating that the responsibility psychoanalysis has to respond to globalization cannot be evaded. (shrink)

Recorded in Ithaca, NY by Cornell University., Sponsored by: Andrew D. White Professors-At-Large Program., Speaker: Professor of the History of Philosophy, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large., Lecture, October 3, 1988.

Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)

An edition of three essays by the leading French philosopher and theorist Jacques Derrida on the ethical, political and linguistic issues posed by the act of 'naming'. Passions: An Oblique Offering is a reflection on the question of the response, on the duty and obligation to respond, and on the possibility of not responding - which is to say, on the ethics and politics of responsibility. Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum) considers the problematics of naming and alterity, or transcendence, (...) raised inevitably by a rigorous negative theology. Much of the text is organised around close readings of the poetry of Angelus Silesius. The final essay, Khora, explores the problem of space or spacing, of the word 'khora' in Plato's Timaeus. Even as it places and makes possible nothing less than the whole world, 'khora' opens, dislocates and displaces all the categories that govern the production of that world, from naming to gender. (shrink)

The following interview took place between Jacques Bouveresse and Hilary Putnam on May 11, 2001 in Paris at the Collège de France. Sandra Laugier was present, preserved the transcription, and proposed that we publish the text here. It was translated into English by Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec and lightly edited by Jacques Bouveresse, Juliet Floyd, and Sandra Laugier. Themes covered in the interview include the question of Wittgenstein’s importance in contemporary philosophy, Putnam’s development with respect to realism, especially (...) in philosophy of mathematics, and the differences and motivations for realism in mathematics, physics, and ethics. The editors thank Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec for her translation, and Jacques Bouveresse, Mario De Caro, and Sandra Laugier for permission to publish this transcription. (shrink)

One of Jacques Derrida’s richest and most provocative works, Life Death challenges and deconstructs one of the most deeply rooted dichotomies of Western thought: life and death. Here Derrida rethinks the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between life and death, undertaking multidisciplinary analyses of a range of topics, including philosophy, linguistics, and the life sciences. In seeking to understand the relationship between life and death, he engages in close readings of Freudian psychoanalysis, the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, (...) French geneticist François Jacob, and epistemologist Georges Canguilhem. Derrida gave his “Life Death” seminar over fourteen sessions between 1975 and 1976 at the École normale supérieure in Paris as part of the preparation for students studying for the agrégation, a notoriously competitive qualifying exam. The theme for the exam that year was “Life and Death,” but Derrida made a critical modification to the title by dropping the coordinating conjunction. The resulting title of Life Death poses a philosophical question about the close relationship between life and death. Derrida argues that death must be considered neither as the opposite of life nor as the truth or fulfillment of it, but rather as that which both limits life and makes it possible. Through these captivating sessions, Derrida thus not only questions traditional understandings of the relationship between life and death, but also ultimately develops a new way of thinking about what he calls “life death.”. (shrink)

First published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.